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Abstract 
 
Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) is a significant feature of the contemporary world and it 
is a particular challenge to the armed forces of many states which are involved is such 
conflict, or are likely to become so.  This thesis is not concerned with how such 
difficult conflict situations arise.  Rather it is concerned with how, from the point of 
view of the state, they may be contained and ultimately brought to a satisfactory 
resolution.  The work is thus concerned with the practicalities of ending LIC.  More 
specifically, the purpose of this research is to establish a framework of doctrinal and 
military principles applicable to the prevention and resolution of LIC. 
 The principles of this thesis are based in numerous historical examples of LIC 
and six in depth case studies.  These distilled principles are analysed in two central 
chapters, and are then applied in two latter defence force chapters so as to ensure there 
practicality and resilience.  Numerous defence academics and military practitioners 
have been consulted in the production of this thesis; their contribution has further 
reinforced the functionality of the principles examined in this research. 
 The research illustrates the criticality of a holistic approach to LIC.  The 
function of this approach is to guarantee the stability of the sovereign state, by 
unifying civil, police, intelligence and military services.  The effectiveness of the 
military elements must also be ensured, as military force is central to the suppression 
of LIC.  Consequently, the research makes strategic and operational prescriptions, so 
as to improve the capability of defence forces that are concerned with preventing or 
resolving LIC. 
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
 
The geopolitical vacuum left by the disintegration of the Soviet Union has been 
replaced by an abundance of intrastate instability and interstate, as well as 
intrastate, violence.  Such violence is perpetrated as a means to a political end 
(generally by sub-state groups who oppose the political foundation of the state); 
and is described henceforth as insurgency.  The suppression of such violence has 
become an operational reality for Western defence forces.  To overcome the 
complex challenges of insurgency, Western defence forces must possess tailored, 
conflict specific, doctrines, strategies and operational guidelines.  However, as 
indicated by Francart and Patry, “no such strategy [or guidance] has ever been 
officially formulated or expressed; the employment of forces has to be adapted on 
a case-by-case basis”.1  Consequently, this research was designed to provide the 
practical foundation for Western defence force operations opposing insurgency. 
The central purpose of the research is to present doctrinal and operational 
procedures applicable to the prevention and resolution of Low Intensity Conflict 
(LIC).  Briefly and as an aside, LIC is an actor neutral term used to define intra-
state conflict between an insurgent and counterinsurgent (insurgent and 
counterinsurgent describe the belligerents in LIC).  The thesis consists of three 
main sections: first, six case studies provide a practical foundation for the thesis; 
second, the core principles for a successful counterinsurgency (guidelines for 
governments fighting insurgency) are presented and analysed, within two central 
chapters; third, the key assumptions outlined in the research are applied to the 
Australian and New Zealand Defence Forces, and policy and procedural proposals 
are suggested. 
The principal rationale for including the analysis of the New Zealand and 
Australian Defence Forces was to test the doctrinal and military principles 
examined in the earlier sections of the thesis.  More specifically, the New Zealand 
and Australian Defence Forces were included for following three reasons.  First, 
New Zealand and Australia have been heavily tasked with operating as 
counterinsurgency forces in LIC since the end of the Cold War, which is the 
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primary scope of the research.  Second, the New Zealand and Australian Defence 
Force chapters illustrate how the principles of this research can be applied to 
small and medium sized defence forces.  Therefore many of the world’s defence 
forces (of small and medium states) will be able to directly exploit the 
recommendations made within the New Zealand and Australian chapters.  Many 
of the recommendations made are universally applicable; however, other 
recommendations require the resources that are available to medium sized (and 
larger) states.  Basically, this research has been designed to be of maximum 
beneficial value to a broad number of states.  Third, New Zealand and Australia 
are isolated maritime states without land borders.  This means that power 
projection is complex and demanding, in that forces must at times be projected 
over tremendous distances, disembarked through difficult points of entry and then 
sustained over these extended lines of communication.  The means with which 
these challenges have been overcome and the recommendations made so as to 
enhance those means will be of assistance to states faced with similar mission 
objectives. 
The thesis shows a counterinsurgent must take a holistic approach to 
ensuring the stability of the sovereign state, by unifying civil, police, intelligence 
and military services.  This holistic approach is shown to require a unified 
command and the formation of, what might be called, an Expeditionary Civil 
Service.  An Expeditionary Civil Service would emulate a territorial force of 
civilians.  On operation, the Expeditionary Civil Service would provide those 
functions of the civil state that had been destroyed by conflict.  A unified 
command would ensure unity of effort, while the Expeditionary Civil Service 
would guarantee that the civil units, which are essential in opposing an 
insurgency, were as capable as, and fully integrated with, their military 
counterparts.  These assertions are supported by senior New Zealand and 
Australian Defence Force personnel. 
Consequently the rationale for this thesis is to further the understanding of 
modern LIC, so as to bring about the cessation of such conflicts as effectively and 
economically as possible by the counterinsurgent.  For, as van Creveld has 
commented, ‘much has been written about Low Intensity Conflict – what it is and 
what it is not – but there is very little on how to fight one’.2  This analysis will 
begin to fill this void. 
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Definition 
LIC appeared as a widely used term in the 1980s.  LIC was initially used to 
loosely describe an emergent combination of complex security threats.  
Paramount in the political consciousness of the West was: (1) the defeat in 
Vietnam; (2) the Iranian hostage crisis; (3) the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan; 
and (4) the regionally destabilising effect of communist movement into countries 
such as Grenada.   
In the United States (U.S.), the inability to effectively and efficiently 
surmount such threats resulted in the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization 
Act of 1986.  This piece of legislation and the Cohen-Nunn Amendment to the 
Department of Defense Authorization Act of 1987, “established USSOCOM [the 
United States Special Operations Command] and the Office of the Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict 
(SO/LIC)”.3  These organisations were established to create a unified and 
effective approach to countering insurgency. 
Significantly for this analysis, the current SO/LIC definition of LIC is 
widely accepted and is as follows.  LIC is a “[p]olitical-military confrontation 
between contending states or groups below conventional war and above the 
routine, peaceful competition among states; frequently involves protracted 
struggles of competing principles and ideologies.  Low-intensity conflict ranges 
from subversion to the use of armed force.  It is waged by a combination of 
means, employing political, economic, informational, and military instruments.  
Low-intensity conflicts are often localized but contain regional and global security 
implications”.4
  The definition above effectively encapsulates the enigma which is LIC.  
Primarily, insurgent operations within the context of LIC are a complex phased 
array of violence and coercion, with the objective of challenging the sovereignty 
of the state.  As is indicated above, LIC encompasses a broad collection of 
operational types or phases.  The phases of LIC include organisation 
(cadre/support), terrorism, guerrilla warfare and mobile warfare.  This 
amalgamation of operations is the reason why LIC is so complex, and why 
insurgent operations are so difficult to defeat.  Hence a strategy designed to bring 
about the cessation of violence in LIC by the counterinsurgent must in itself be 
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sophisticated and comprehensive.  The counterinsurgent’s practical means within 
LIC must consist of military, police, intelligence and civil elements, operating 
cohesively under a central command.  The unification of these means will enable 
the counterinsurgent to dominate the political, economic, informational and 
military dimensions of the conflict.  As is indicated above, an insurgency will 
project instability regionally and globally.  However, LIC will also generally be 
contested by numerous regional and global actors, in addition to the principal 
actors involved.  This can create further complexity for the counterinsurgent to 
surmount. 
 There is also a secondary meaning of the term LIC; this refers to the 
intensity of the conflict.  The Australian Army’s doctrine, Fundamentals of Land 
Warfare, defines intensity as follows.  “Intensity refers to the overall tempo, 
degree of violence and technological sophistication of the violence employed…  
[The intensity] will also often vary at the level of individual participants, 
depending on their particular situation and perspective at any one time”.5  At the 
strategic level, the intensity of LIC is generally low.  This is because the number 
of contacts, technological sophistication and hence level of violence is low, when 
compared to other forms of warfare.  For example, the number of contacts and 
violence caused by the Soviet and German Army Groups fighting on the Eastern 
Front in World War Two was high.  However, the intensity of LIC does not refer 
to the tactical level contact.  All force element contacts are intense for those 
directly involved. 
 
Issues of Morality 
It is traditionally accepted that innocent civilians (non-combatants) should not 
deliberately be subjected to violence in war.6  Essentially, this issue of morality 
protects the insurgent.  The insurgent’s combatant status is camouflaged by the 
insurgent assuming a civilian guise.  However, this analysis leaves aside the 
morality and combatant status of the insurgent. 
Traditional just war theory also distinguishes between the cause of war 
and the way in which the war is fought.7  This research accepts the distinction.  
However, the research does not consider the cause espoused by the insurgent or 
the morality of the tactics used by the insurgent.  The research is only concerned 
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in practical terms with how the counterinsurgency is conducted.  In the latter 
context, morally justifiable courses of action must be foremost in a 
counterinsurgent’s strategy.  The rationale for this approach is prudential rather 
than moral.  Moral courses of action generate support for the counterinsurgent, 
whereas immoral courses of action undermine the counterinsurgent.  Prudentially, 
providing security and support for the civilian population will win their hearts and 
minds.  Winning the population’s hearts and minds will generate support for the 
counterinsurgent and undermine support for the insurgent.  Essentially, if the 
counterinsurgent can gain the support of the population, the insurgent cannot use 
the population to camouflage his combatant status. 
 Conversely, the insurgent will use means that are indiscriminate, conflate 
combatant and non-combatant status and exploit the constraints imposed by the 
counterinsurgent’s rules of engagement.  Such actions on the part of the insurgent 
will encourage the counterinsurgent to act in a similar way.  Basically, the weak 
version of the Golden Rule emerges: do as you are done by.  However, adopting 
the weak version of the Golden Rule would be both hypocritical and 
counterproductive.  First, the counterinsurgent’s main function is to protect the 
civil population from violence, not commit violence against the civil population.  
Second, it is counterproductive to act violently toward the population, as this will 
undermine the support of the counterinsurgent.  The counterinsurgent must always 
operate with restraint and respect for the rules of war.  In essence, the 
counterinsurgent must operate within the boundaries of the strong version of the 
Golden Rule; do as you would be done by.  This is a prudential strategy, as the 
counterinsurgent will then acquire the support of the population. 
 The aforementioned moral approach is not descriptive of all the actions 
taken by the counterinsurgents in the operations studied.  Rather, the moral 
approach outlined above is prescriptive: the counterinsurgent must act with 
restraint and respect for the conventions of conflict.  Given the subject of this 
analysis, there are many instances where moral argument could be entered into.  
However, this analysis is an objective examination of the most effective and 
efficient means of quelling the violence that occurs in LIC. 
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Theoretical Approach 
A theory, as defined by Kenneth Waltz, is “a mental picture of a domain – a 
picture showing how the domain is organized and how its parts are connected”.8  
Waltz goes on to say that so as to “display important causes and effects, the 
picture has to omit most everything that goes on in [the designated domain]”.9  
Much like a map of the Underground in London or the Metropolitain in Paris, 
theory ignores a great deal of what is reality, but nevertheless is of great 
assistance in navigating through an environment.  Conversely if too much is 
added to the map, it becomes inoperative because essential elements are masked 
by less-consequential information.  Herein lays the difference between theory and 
an account; an account incorporates less-consequential information.  With an 
understanding of what constitutes a theory, it is possible to specify what theory or 
theories constitute the foundation of this research.   
This research deals with how to end conflict.  Barry Buzan and Eric 
Herring, in The Arms Dynamic in World Politics, argue that an answer to this 
question of ending conflict from a purely strategic studies perspective would 
focus on creating conditions that ensure successful outcomes from contacts with 
the enemy.10  This is one potential theoretical map for this research, but it is not 
the right one.  War is not a self contained entity.  As is indicated by Carl von 
Clausewitz, in On War, “[w]ar is not merely a political act, but also a political 
instrument, a continuation of political relations, a carrying out of the same by 
other means”.11  Conflict cannot be solved by exclusively focusing on contacts 
with the enemy.  Wars are fought over the political domination of territory.  Wars 
occur so as to: (1) change the politics of an existing state; (2) enlarge an existing 
state; or (3) create a new state.  If it is accepted that war is about changing a state, 
then politics must be an instrument of war as much as war is an instrument of 
politics.  The idea that politics is an instrument of war is reflected in General Tao 
Hanzhang’s translation of Sun Tzu’s book, The Art of War.  Tao states that “Sun 
Tzu believed […] a military struggle was not only a competition between military 
forces, but also a comprehensive conflict embracing politics, economics, military 
force, and diplomacy”.12  It is therefore an imperative that conflict, broadly 
speaking, be approached through a cohesive and inclusive politically based 
doctrine.  More simply, this politically based doctrine should encapsulate politics, 
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economics, military force and diplomacy as strategic tools in ending conflict.  
This inclusive and cohesive politically based doctrine is, therefore, one of the 
major themes that link this research together. 
There are a variety of reasons why state forces find themselves at war with 
non-state forces.  First, conflict may arise over a request for autonomy that cannot 
be reconciled.  This scenario has been an operational reality for the Russian 
Government and Armed Forces, which have been at war with Chechen insurgents 
who have demanded autonomy that cannot be granted due to certain political and 
strategic considerations.  Second, conflict may occur in a post-invasion situation 
where interested actors within or outside the occupied state continue fighting in an 
irregular fashion.  Such a situation occurred in Iraq, where American-led coalition 
forces were engaged by domestic and foreign insurgents.  Third, conflict may 
occur in a state that has failed and when international forces set out to re-establish 
order in that state.  In the early 1990s Somalia became a failed state when internal 
cohesion was lost; the United Nations forces that subsequently attempted to re-
establish order in Somalia were engaged by various non-state forces.  
Notwithstanding the reasons that caused these situations to arise, there are 
characteristics in all of these cases that can be used as a basis for specifically 
tailored strategies, tactics and procedures that can be applied generically by 
counterinsurgency forces in LIC.  It is these conflict resolving practicalities that 
this research is primarily concerned with. 
It should be observed that this research is not concerned with how LIC 
arises.  This research is concerned with the problems that insurgency creates for 
counterinsurgents and how counterinsurgents can best create peace where there is 
conflict.  More specifically, this research analyses operational, tactical and 
strategic level actions by insurgents, the ramifications of these insurgent actions, 
and the most appropriate reactions and counter-actions to be taken by 
counterinsurgents in response to these insurgent actions.  Just as humanitarian law 
is only concerned with means, this research is not concerned with the causes of 
LIC, but rather with the prudential issues involved in ending such conflict.  The 
objective of this research was not to defend the actions taken by the 
counterinsurgents analysed, but rather to recommend effective courses of action 
that should be implemented by counterinsurgents operating in LIC.  The analysis 
and coordination of these operational, tactical and strategic guidelines, that are 
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intended to be used by counterinsurgents in LIC, are the major thematic threads 
that bind this research coherently.  The other thematic threads that bind this 
research are four doctrinal and ten military principles that are essential in 
counterinsurgency operations; these doctrinal and military principles are 
delineated below in the subsection entitled Thesis Outline. 
It is also important to note at this point the reason why this research is 
defined as political science.  Conflict or strategic studies is a sub-field of politics.  
In researching conflict, it is a misperception to extract the subject from the 
political realm within which it occurs.  Basically, this research agrees with Sun 
Tzu’s explanation of conflict being political, economic, diplomatic and military.  
Therefore this research was undertaken as political science and not purely as 
strategic studies.  The reverse would remove the research from reality, making it 
abstract and of less value. 
 
Methodological Approach 
This thesis utilised the following qualitative research methodologies.  First, 
thirteen domestic and international defence force personnel and academics were 
interviewed individually.  Second, two group interviews were conducted with 
foreign defence force personnel.  The individual and group in-depth interviews 
were tape-recorded, other than when consent to tape-record was withheld on the 
basis of military security.  The recorded materials were transcribed verbatim. 
These transcripts were then analysed to extract information and ideas relating to 
policy, strategy, doctrinal concepts, defence equipment, systems and organisation.  
This analysis contributed to the latter five chapters.  Third, a range of academic 
and military literature was collected and analysed.  This included: (1) primary 
literature, such as government policy and defence force doctrine; and (2) 
secondary literature, such as published journal articles and books, to unpublished 
private documents.  This combined approach adds validity to the research, 
through the sequential and continuous testing of LIC theories and assumptions. 
This thesis also utilised a cross verification technique to substantiate the 
validity of the information used.  This technique was required for two reasons.  
First, the information obtained in interviews can be subjective; interviewees may 
be conditioned by their environment, constrained by security issues, or give 
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overly sympathetic personal or organisational accounts when questioned.  Hence, 
information collected in interviews was critically analysed, with reference to other 
interviews and information sources.  For example, interviews were held with all 
three services of the Australian Defence Force, as well as the Australian 
Department of Defence.  By interviewing personnel from all sections of the 
Australian Defence Organisation, cultural dissonance or bias was minimised. 
Second, documentary information obtained from governments, organisations or 
the internet can be subjective, inaccurate or wrong.  Consequently, multiple 
sources of information were correlated, so as to ensure analytical accuracy.  For 
example, when analysing the impact of Australia’s future amphibious vessels, 
information was gathered from the internet, the vessels’ manufacturer, newspaper 
articles and the Australian Defence Force.  In so doing, the accuracy of individual 
articles of information was verified by other separate pieces of information. 
 
Thesis Outline 
As is indicated earlier, the thesis is divided into three sections.  The initial section 
of this thesis contains three chapters: (1) the Russian Experience in LIC: 
Afghanistan and Chechnya; (2) the American Experience in LIC: Somalia and 
Afghanistan; and (3) the Iraq War of 2003: the Coalition’s Experience in LIC.  
These conflicts have been analysed because: (1) within each there are aspects of 
LIC; and (2) they are contemporary.  Phases of each of these conflicts correlate 
with LIC.  Moreover, the analysis of LIC examines aspects of military capability 
that are in common with generic modern war.  Furthermore, contemporary 
conflicts enable analysis of modern weapons, military structures, principles and 
strategies.  Each of these chapters mentioned above has a dual function.  First, 
each individual conflict is analysed separately.  Second, lessons are drawn from 
each conflict.  The lessons from each of these conflicts are then analysed 
collectively in the subsequent two chapters.  
The central chapters of the thesis are a collection of normative realities and 
prescriptive requirements.  The doctrine and military force chapters analyse and 
collate policies, procedures and tactics that have been proven in practice.  The 
doctrinal chapter draws on empirical examples of LIC, including those analysed in 
the first three chapters of the thesis.  The doctrinal chapter consists of two 
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sections: (1) the phases of LIC are analysed to enable a clear understanding of the 
subject; and (2) the principles for a successful counterinsurgency are examined.  
LIC is a complex and challenging form of war.  Hence, the doctrinal chapter 
presents a comprehensive and task specific set of principles relevant to the 
containment of insurgency.  The initial section of the chapter, structures the 
incomprehensible nature of LIC into a phased array of violence.  The components 
of this phased array are as follows: (1) organisation (cadre/support); (2) terrorism; 
(3) guerrilla warfare; and (4) mobile operations.  The significance of the phased 
array is that individual phase threats can be countered by precisely targeted 
strategies.  In doing so, all aspects of the insurgency will be defeated.  The latter 
section of the chapter outlines four principles that the counterinsurgent must apply 
in LIC.  These principles include the control of international interference, the 
provision of internal security, the application of civil operations, and the 
installation of a unitary command.  These four principles form a holistic approach 
to defeating an insurgency.  This holistic approach is applied by four force 
elements: civil, military, police and intelligence.  The purpose of uniting these 
four force elements is to gain the support of the civil population, who in turn will 
provide the intelligence required to defeat the insurgent.  A prerequisite for this 
holistic approach is an Expeditionary Civil Service, or functional equivalent.  The 
function of such an organisation is to ensure the civil elements are operationally 
effective and integrated with their military counterparts. 
Military force is the core counterinsurgent element in providing security in 
LIC.  Moreover, counterinsurgent military force has a dual purpose in LIC.  The 
counterinsurgent’s military force elements must concurrently overcome the 
insurgent and win the hearts and minds of the population.  In accordance with this 
dual function, the military force chapter analyses and makes recommendations on 
the organisation of counterinsurgent forces.  The military force chapter is based 
on the case studies of the thesis, and other empirical examples of LIC.  The 
chapter analyses the following topics: doctrine; infantry; armour (armoured 
vehicles); artillery; helicopters; aircraft; command, control, initiative, 
communications and intelligence (C2ICI).  The chapter also examines military 
principles that are critical for the counterinsurgent to apply in LIC and bind the 
aforementioned topics together.  These military principles include: doctrinal 
precision, professionalism, independence, initiative, force precision, restraint, 
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combined arms, joint force, integrated communications, and accurate human 
intelligence.  These principles and topics form the foundation of effective 
counterinsurgent military force in LIC. 
The latter two chapters analyse the implications of LIC for the New 
Zealand and Australian Defence Forces.  The chapters concomitantly make 
recommendations concerning the New Zealand and Australian Defence Forces’ 
approach to counterinsurgency.  The sections of these two chapters correlate with 
the core elements of counterinsurgent military force in LIC, as analysed in the 
doctrine and military force chapters.  Some of these core elements of military 
force are as essential to conventional warfare, as they are in LIC.  However, there 
are a number of sections in these two chapters that are distinct to LIC.  These 
chapters conclude that the New Zealand and Australian Defence Forces are 
relatively effective in LIC.  Due to the irregularity of LIC, however, there are a 
number of areas where both Defence Forces could improve their respective 
counterinsurgency capabilities.  Principally, both Defence Forces need to: 
improve joint LIC doctrine; enhance command and control, communications and 
intelligence elements and processes; and direct more resources towards civil-
military affairs.  These requirements for capability development may be derived 
from the principles identified and analysed in the research.  
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Chapter Two
The Russian Experience in LIC:
Afghanistan and Chechnya
Imperial Russia, the Soviet Union and the modern Russian Federation have all
faced the realities of Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) internally, on the periphery and
at a distance. Thus, it would be inappropriate to ignore the Russian approach to
counterinsurgency operations in LIC.
The Russian approach to counterinsurgency is dissimilar, but is
converging with the Western approach. The Russian Armed Forces emphasise
mass armoured mobility, overwhelming firepower and the widespread use of
reservist troops. However, the capability of the Russian Armed Forces is degraded
by on-going corruption and a lack of training and logistical capabilities.
Russia’s two Chechen campaigns will be the focus of this analysis.
However, these campaigns will also be compared to the Soviet intervention into
Afghanistan. Central to this analysis is the question as to why the Soviets, and
later the Russians, did not absorb the contemporary Western lessons of LIC
learned after World War II.
The previous chapter introduced the major themes of this research. The
principal research theme is to analyse, collate and present operational, tactical and
strategic guidelines that can be used by counterinsurgent forces in LIC. This
chapter is the first in a series of three case study chapters that form the basis for an
effective theoretical approach to counterinsurgency operations in LIC. The
principal research theme elucidated above is in itself a holistic combination of
four elements of conflict. This derivation is in recognition of the four basic tools
of warfare, that is to say politics, economics, diplomacy and military force. These
four elements are therefore sub-themes of this research. These four tools (or sub-
themes) are the means to achieving the four principles of counterinsurgency: the
control of international interference, the provision of internal security, the
application of civil operations and the installation of a unified command. These
four principles are further themes that run through this research. It is important,
however, to observe at this point that the major focus of this research is on the
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actions of the armed forces of states (counterinsurgents) involved in LIC. This is
not a prescriptive theory, as a whole-of-government approach to
counterinsurgency is the most effective option. It is rather a normative reality;
this is because armed forces are the principal actors involved in
counterinsurgency. Given this primacy of armed forces in counterinsurgency
operations, there are ten critically important military force principles that run
through this research as a further thematic thread. These ten military force
principles include doctrinal precision, professionalism, independence, initiative,
force precision, restraint, combined arms, joint force, integrated communications
and accurate human intelligence.
The structure of the following analysis is initially a historical chronology.
This is designed to provide an understanding of the conflict’s participants,
processes and outcome. The chronology is divided into sections, which analyse a
specific phase or operation within the conflict. At the end of each of these
sections, initial implications are presented and examined. After each conflict is
presented, general implications are highlighted and analysed. This general
analysis is part of the foundation for the broad theoretical analysis of LIC,
contained in part two of this thesis.
The Soviet’s Afghan Intervention 1979 - 1989
The geopolitical imperatives that led to the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan
are multifaceted and ambiguous at best. This chapter will briefly analyse the
significant factors leading to the invasion.
The Soviet-Afghan entente of the 1970s was a product of the
Krushchevian era. Beginning in 1954, Soviet policy toward Afghanistan was akin
to that directed towards Turkey and Iran and was based overtly on benevolent
civil projects. The policy’s purposes were to undermine American containment,
parry Chinese interaction, showcase the benefits of Soviet relations in the third
world and reinforce Soviet spheres of influence. However, in July 1973
Mohammad Daoud overthrew King Zahir. Daoud attempted to assert greater
national independence and limit Soviet influence. This rejection of Soviet
suzerainty angered Afghan communists. Subsequently, Daoud was deposed in a
bloody coup on April 27, 1978. This coup brought the People’s Democratic Party
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of Afghanistan (PDPA) to power. The PDPA was led by Nur Mohammad Taraki.
However, internal division within the party caused Taraki, the leader of the
majority group Khalq, to purge the party of the pro-Moscow minority group
Parcham. Babrak Karmal, the leader of Parcham, took refuge in Eastern Europe.
Subsequently, the domestic policies of Taraki caused the Mujahedeen insurgency.
This led to the initial dispatch of Soviet military advisors to Afghanistan.
The PDPA remained divided, and in September 1979, Taraki was killed
and replaced by the then Prime Minister, Hafizullah Amin. Amin’s internal
policy was characterised by rigorous application of force. This policy intensified
Mujahedeen resistance and triggered a Soviet reaction. On December 27, 1979,
Amin was killed and replaced by Babrak Karmal. This change came at the behest
of the Kremlin, and effectively gave control of Afghanistan to the Soviet Union.1
The subsequent decision to invade Afghanistan was caused by four
primary factors. First, the Soviets were emboldened towards military intervention
by two successful actions in the late 1970s: Angola’s civil war and Ethiopia’s
annexation of the Ogaden. Both interventions incorporated direct and indirect
Communist bloc support for the African regimes. Moreover, these Soviet actions
were virtually unopposed, even rhetorically, by the West. Second, due to Western
geopolitical weakness, the Soviet Union had established a degree of power parity
with the West. Chairman Leonid Brezhnev used this power parity as a foundation
for a more assertive Soviet foreign policy. This assertive policy was supported by
the aggressive and mutually contentious Soviet intelligence agencies: the General
Staff’s Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) and the Committee of State Security
(KGB). Third, the ‘Brezhnev Doctrine’ obligated intervention in states where
socialism was threatened. This doctrine had been formalised in a 1978 alliance
between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan. Hence, the invasion was justified on
the grounds of repelling “outside armed intervention”.2 Fourth, Afghanistan’s
geopolitical situation was destabilised by the replacement of the Shah of Iran with
Ayatollah Khomeini. Consequently, it is suggested that the Soviet Union
expected American intervention in Iran.3 This was an erroneous assumption,
given the Carter administration’s inactivity and rhetorical appeasement of the
Tehran regime following the seizure of hostages at the American Embassy in Iran
on 4 November 1979.
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The final decision to invade Afghanistan was made by five or six men,
including President Brezhnev, Dmitri Ustinov (Minister of Defence), Andrei
Gromyko (Minister of Foreign Affairs), Mikhail Suslov (Head of the International
Department of the Central Committee),4 and potentially Yuri Andropov (Head of
the KGB).5 The decision to invade Afghanistan was made without the support of
the Soviet General Staff. This was to the detriment of the Ministry of Internal
Affairs (MVD), which was the organisation that provided most of the troops for
deployment to Afghanistan. Moreover, the KGB only supported the invasion, due
to coercion from the GRU.6 This internecine rivalry, between intelligence and
military agencies, was to become a central feature of the Soviet-Afghan war. This
rivalry greatly restricted intelligence collection and distribution, which
contravenes the basis laws of counterinsurgency.
The initial Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was a conventional operation.
The initial operation achieved complete surprise and occupied all strategic
objectives within 48 hours. This preliminary success was followed by a decade of
LIC. This eventually undermined the Soviet will to remain in Afghanistan.7
The Red Army in Afghanistan
The initial difficulty the Soviet military faced in Afghanistan was a complete lack
of credible counterinsurgency doctrine. This was primarily due to a Soviet
inability to see the conflict as anything but the defence of the revolution against
Chinese or Western intervention. The reality was the people of Afghanistan
despised socialist government.
Soviet doctrine employed in Afghanistan was a universal theatre concept
of war. This doctrine made no distinction between the technology, tactics or scale
of enemy operations. Furthermore, the doctrine did not emphasise the impact of
topography, terrain, endogenous infrastructure and support, culture, class
structure, temperature or weather in the theatre of operations. The doctrine viewed
the Six Day, Yom Kippur, Ogaden, Lebanon, Falklands, Gulf, and Afghan wars as
fundamentally comparable.8 This Soviet universal concept of war, and the ardent
rejection of LIC as a concept, condemned the Afghan war to failure before it had
begun.
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Soviet planners were unwilling to accept that guerrilla operations could
successfully defeat regular forces. This can partly be explained by the Soviet
contempt towards the Afghans, both enemy and allied. The Soviets saw Afghans
as “corrupt, backward, violent and uncivilised”,9 “whose main motive was greed
and whose main modus operandi was treachery”.10 This was not a useful attitude,
as it clouded Soviet judgement of the enemy. The Soviets contravened Sun Tzu’s
principle of knowing the enemy. In terms of doctrinal principles, the Soviets were
unable to create internal security because they lacked a unified command and they
contravened the military force principle of doctrinal precision.
The Initial Invasion
The initial invasion used the conventional theatre war concept. Thus, airmobile,
paratroopers and Spetsnaz (Special Forces) were used to seize logistic links,
border areas and command, control, communication and intelligence
infrastructure. Armoured and mechanised reinforcements then occupied the
positions seized by the shock troops. This tactical success quickly degenerated
into a frontless quagmire. There was no unity of command between Afghan and
Soviet forces, nor unity of command between Soviet military, political and
intelligence assets in theatre. Soviet doctrine prevented initiative, mobility and
small scale offensive operations. Most Soviet forces in theatre were under
equipped, poorly trained and predominantly Muslim. Afghanistan, as an area of
operations (AO), was not sealed against foreign intervention. Significantly the
enemy gained initiative and could choose the point of contact.11
The Soviet troops deployed in Afghanistan came mainly from the Soviet
Central Asian republics. Since the Central Asians were predominantly Muslim,
Moscow assumed the Afghans would receive these soldiers positively. The
Soviet troops were advised to expect a foreign enemy, American or Chinese. This
was not the case. Instead the enemy was indistinct and in many ways culturally
identical to the Soviet Central Asians. Consequently, the Soviet Central Asian
Muslims, serving in the Red Army, began to associate with the Mujahedeen.
Moreover, due to general financial hardship, poor living standards in-theatre and
low morale, Central Asians in the Red Army began supplying weapons to the
Mujahedeen.12
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Due to the lack of Soviet counterinsurgency doctrine, concepts of small
unit mountain and desert warfare had been neglected. Soviet equipment was
ineffective in Afghanistan’s harsh weather conditions, even though these
conditions are in common with the former Soviet republics of Uzbekistan and
Tajikistan. Afghanistan lacked roads, maintenance and health facilities.
Significantly, the Soviet logistics train could not sustain basic support, like food
and water, for the troops in Afghanistan. Soviet tactical mobility was hampered
by the lack of roads and tactical airlift in theatre. Thus, surprise and deception,
core components of Soviet strategy were surrendered to the enemy.13
The conflict was promoted as a popular defence of communism, against a
capitalist or Chinese threat. Due to this ideological spin, inadequate training and
lack of counterinsurgency doctrine, Soviet soldiers were in a perpetual state of
surprise, relying on and repeating basic and outmoded techniques. The Soviet’s
so-called Afghan ‘allies’ also provided the Mujahedeen with Soviet manuals, and
information on Soviet tactics. Hence, the enemy was able to learn and then
anticipate Soviet tactics. Moreover, Soviet doctrine espoused armoured
reconnaissance, surveillance and actions, and initially discouraged air mobility
and strike. These tactical concepts, in mountainous Afghan terrain against a
determined enemy, caused heavy casualties. In one such incident an entire
motorised battalion was destroyed in an ambush.14 In counterinsurgency, small
unit operations are critical. These small units must be highly independent, highly
trained, invested with authority and trusted to use it, and prepared to take the
initiative. Thus, sergeants and corporals are the leaders of counterinsurgency war.
A lack of training at this level will cause discipline, self-confidence and faith in
superiors to degenerate. Consequently, operational stagnation rather than
enterprise will develop.
The majority of regular Soviet troops in Afghanistan were reservists or
conscripts, with a low standard of training. Troops were also sent to Afghanistan
as punishment, or volunteered due to a sense of bravado. These motivations are
highly destructive to the effectiveness and cohesion of military units, especially in
a small unit counterinsurgency role. In addition, Soviet non-commissioned
officers (NCOs) were rotated often and received limited training. The lack of
capable NCOs reduced unit cohesion. Soviet officers were often attracted to
Afghanistan by financial inducements and unwarranted career advancements.
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Hence, there was a lack of professionalism and determination among Soviet
forces in Afghanistan. Alcohol and drug abuse, ethnic rivalry, poor living
conditions, insufficient medical care, isolation, smuggling and widespread
corruption were also synonymous with Soviet operations in Afghanistan. These
factors reduced morale, discipline, and military effectiveness, and resulted in
excesses being perpetrated against the populous.15
Elite Soviet troops (including airborne, reconnaissance and Spetsnaz) in
the Afghan theatre were not afflicted by the same deficiencies that applied to the
regular troops. All elite troops were highly trained or received augmented
training. Although regular troops operated in a conventional role, elite troops
performed the Soviet equivalent of counterinsurgency operations. Elite troops
conducted raids, infiltration, mining and disruption operations, which proved
highly effective against the Mujahedeen.16
Critical to a successful counterinsurgency are politico-military operations,
otherwise known as ‘hearts and minds’ or Civil-Military Affairs (CMA)
operations. These operations target the critical vulnerability or centre of gravity
within LIC, that is to say the population. Conceptually, the legitimacy of the
government is being fought for, and the insurgent is attempting to undermine this
legitimacy. The objectives of CMA operations are: (1) to gain the support of the
population; and (2) reduce population-based support of the insurgent. The Soviet
invasion initially weakened the Afghan people’s respect for the Afghan
Government, as the government was unable to independently provide security for
the people. The Soviets weakened central government control further by bombing
and menacing rural areas and attempting to starve the dissident population. These
actions forfeited any remaining support the government had in rural areas.
Basically, the Soviets provided the Mujahedeen with support, through violence.17
In terms of doctrinal principles, the Soviets did not establish a unified
command, seal the theatre of operations from international interference or
undertake civil operations. The infringement of these doctrinal principles was
further compounded the Soviet contravention of certain military force principles,
which are critical to counterinsurgency operations. Specifically, the force
deployed was largely incompatible with the task of counterinsurgency. Many of
the personnel deployed were not professional soldiers, and therefore lacked the
capabilities needed to operate effectively in counterinsurgency operations. The
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problem of force imprecision was exacerbated by doctrinal guidelines that
prevented these non-professional personnel from acting with initiative and
independence. Hence Soviet military commanders were left with only a small
cadre of professional personnel (airborne, reconnaissance and Spetsnaz), able to
operate with initiative and independence, who could undertake true
counterinsurgency operations.
Reclaiming the early Initiative with Airpower
To overcome the aforementioned problems, especially the lack of operational and
tactical mobility, the Soviets began to rely upon operational and tactical airlift and
air-strike. The application of airborne warfare enabled the Soviets to bring greater
force, in terms of troops and ordnance, to bear at the point of contact. Soviet
strategy had again secured the initiative, and at the time, the Mujahedeen had no
effective response. However, in theatre, air assets require guarded airbases and
approaches, and require significant logistic support. Thus, combat troops had to
be assigned to the static defence of infrastructure. These critical infrastructures
became fortified and reliant on air re-supply. Thus, strategic, operational and
tactical airlift and land transport became essential to Soviet strategy.18
Initially, Soviet air operations were highly successful, almost defeating the
Mujahedeen between 1984 and 1986. However, this effectiveness generated
apathy towards the development of innovative operational concepts. This
conceptually insular approach undermined the resilience of the Soviet strategy in
Afghanistan. Conversely, the success of Soviet air operations forced the
Mujahedeen to seek effective countermeasures.
The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Pakistani Inter-Services
Intelligence (ISI) Agency attempted to provide the Mujahedeen with an anti-
aircraft capability. Initially, the Mujahedeen was supplied with the commercially
available British Blowpipe surface to air missile (SAM). This however was a
marginally effective weapon, and attempts to train the Mujahedeen with this
weapon ultimately failed. Consequently, the American Stinger SAM was
supplied to the Mujahedeen in 1986. This action officially signalled American
involvement in Afghanistan. Blowpipe and Stinger are both man-portable
systems, weighing 12.7 and 15.8 kilograms respectively. Stinger is an all-aspect,
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fire-and-forget passive infrared guided missile, while Blowpipe is an optically
guided missile. The inherent technological superiority of the Stinger accounts for
its effectiveness in Afghanistan.19 The consequence of Mujahedeen employment
of effective SAMs was that the Soviets lost the freedom of airborne manoeuvre.
Fundamentally, the interdiction of Soviet air operations basically defeated the
Soviet forces in Afghanistan.
The lessons learned from Soviet air operations in Afghanistan are as
follows. Air operations are essential for a counterinsurgency, where instantaneous
force must be brought to bear upon elusive targets. Most significant are air assets
that can loiter upon the battlefield. To remain on station, fixed and rotary wing
aircraft must be equipped with an electronic warfare (EW) suite, onboard infrared
(IR) and radar jamming capabilities. In addition, all-aspect signature-suppression
(noise, radar and heat) is essential for aircraft endangered by SAMs. Fixed wing
aircraft provide immediate force, with little warning and can survive battle
damage. Troop-lift helicopters enable infantry to be deployed and extracted. This
capability is indispensable in a counterinsurgency. However, arming such
helicopters is a mixed blessing. The armament provides force multiplication, at
little cost upon a known airframe. However, such aircraft are generally slow, less
manoeuvrable, less armoured and less technologically advanced than specifically
designed helicopter gunships. Gunships can escort transport helicopters,
providing force protection in flight and field suppression when the transports are
embarking and disembarking troops. A gunship’s armour, manoeuvrability and
technological edge all increase survivability in hostile environments. This
enhanced survivability improves accuracy, discrimination and reduces collateral
damage.
Combined Arms
Afghanistan forced the Soviet Union to develop combined arms strategies and
tactics more suited to counterinsurgency operations in LIC. This is a critical
lesson to learn from the Soviet experience in Afghanistan. Soviet strategy
emphasised firepower and force protection over mobility. Thus, heavy armour
was deployed in mountainous terrain with disastrous results. The ineffectiveness
of armour was primarily due to a lack of combined arms operations and tactics.
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Soviet troops did not disembark when engaged, even when enemy positions were
exposed. Ground reconnaissance was ignored, high ground was forfeited. Hence,
armour and soldiers were lost.
Consequently, the use of armour declined. Armour was replaced as a
primary combat unit by airborne assault and combat element, motorised rifle
units, and Spetsnaz troops. In addition, anti-sniper mountain units were also
formed. Smaller scale infantry sweeps were supplemented with the use of
Airborne Infantry Fighting Vehicles (BMDs). The BMD provided greater ground
mobility to field elements, as these vehicles were more manoeuvrable than other
armour. In addition, anti-aircraft (AA) guns were fitted to armoured units, so as
to provide enhanced field suppression. Howitzers and Multiple Rocket Launcher
Systems (MRLS) were also concentrated in fire bases. This augmented the
indirect fire available to mobile forces. Small mountain artillery, heavy mortars
and Automatic Grenade Launchers (AGS-17) were decentralised among field
elements. This decentralisation improved the organic firepower available to
combat troops.
In valleys, inhabited areas and where Command, Control,
Communications and Intelligence (C3I) assets were stationed, the Soviets
maintained a static defence. However, static defence reduced the number of
personnel available to patrol. Hence, large areas of Afghanistan were conceded to
the Mujahedeen. So as to reassert influence in Mujahedeen controlled areas, the
Soviets bombarded rebellious cities, scattered mines and booby traps. These
actions crystallised the population’s support for the Mujahedeen.
Nevertheless, between 1982 and 1984 the Soviet military gained the
initiative. Soviet operations included sophisticated search and destroy missions,
smaller scale ground operations and extended ground and airborne sweeps of
cities. This strategy was heavily reliant on the unhindered use of airborne
mobility and combat assets. However, reconnaissance was neglected, especially
that based around infantry. The Soviets were effective in Afghanistan until their
airborne operations were interdicted. This interruption began in 1984. Initially,
the Mujahedeen began to deter airborne operations with the SA-7 SAM. However
from 1986 onwards, the use of Western air defence systems including Blowpipe,
Stinger and the 20mm Oerlikon-Buhrle AA cannon, significantly undermined
Soviet action.
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Heavy armour, such as the T-55/62/72 and the Infantry Fighting Vehicle
(BMP) proved to be ineffective in Afghanistan’s mountainous terrain. Light
armour, notably the highly manoeuvrable BMD, was more effective. Wheeled
vehicles, such as the Armoured Personnel Carrier (BTR) were not suitably
manoeuvrable or armoured for many operations. The most significant
impediments and risks to armour were; (1) lack of visibility; (2) engine
overheating problems; (3) poor maintenance; (4) the propensity of tracked
vehicles to lose their tracks in harsh terrain; and (5) the inability of armour to
operate without air cover. Significantly in mountainous terrain, most tank and
BMP main guns could not be aimed at enemy positions. This was due to a
constrained firing envelope. Simply, the elevation and depression ranges of the
weapons were limited. Later, chain guns, AA guns, AGS-17 grenade systems and
Anti-Tank Guided Missile (ATGM) systems were fitted to armoured vehicles.
These weapons were more versatile, as their firing envelope was less constrained.
The first three aforementioned weapon types were effective at saturation fire,
which caused more casualties than aimed fire. Alternatively, ATGMs were useful
against fortified targets.
The two most important Soviet combat air assets were the Su-25 fighter
bomber and the Mi-24 armed helicopter. These aircraft were: (1) highly armoured
and armed; (2) able to loiter over the target; and (3) had airspeeds low enough to
engage small scale targets. Older helicopters such as the Mi-4 and Mi-8 were
used as C2 battle managers, increasing the battle effectiveness of the air strike
assets. Early Soviet helicopter tactics were rigid and put aircraft and their crew at
risk. Subsequently, pop-up and terrain hugging tactics were improvised by Soviet
pilots. This improved survivability and accuracy. However, Soviet helicopters
were less able to perform these tactics compared to Western helicopters, due to
poor manoeuvrability. Decentralised control also improved Soviet airborne
operations. For example when Mi-24s were employed as convoy defenders,
decentralised control enabled their pilots to take the initiative. Embarked assault
troops could be deployed to control the high ground over the convoy routes.
These Soviet tactics markedly decreased the ability of the Mujahedeen to ambush
convoys.
This section illustrates that combined arms and joint operations are critical
in counterinsurgency. In addition, tactics and equipment must be matched to the
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operational environment. Wheeled BTRs were unsuited to mountainous combat.
This was due to poor manoeuvrability and deficient armour. BMPs and tanks
were also operationally impaired by the mountainous terrain, but to a lesser
degree. BMDs were most suited to Afghan conditions. Although, they required
the combined arms protection offered by dismounted infantry and indirect fire
support. Heavy artillery and MRLSs centralised in firebases were significant, due
to their ability to provide support for mobile operations. When the Soviets
exploited these tactics, operations were more effective. This was especially so
when airborne manoeuvre was utilised. High ground, reconnaissance, training,
tenacity and resourcefulness were key concepts in effective Soviet operations.
Suppression was also an important aspect of Soviet operations. As indicated
earlier, medium-calibre rapid-fire weapons were highly effective in providing
suppressing fire. These systems were predominantly deployed on armoured units,
in a supportive field saturation role. As was demonstrated by the Soviets in
Afghanistan, joint operations improve operational effectiveness. Soviet land force
elements were most effective when provided with airborne mobility and cover.
However to be effective, air and land integration was critical. In addition to land
force elements, tactical fighter bombers and helicopters were relied upon to
perform surveillance and reconnaissance missions. In addition, command and
control (C2) aircraft and helicopters were essential to relay this information to
combatant units. Airborne C2 was especially important in Afghanistan, as the
natural environment restricted ground-based forms of communication.
Planning from Intelligence
The lack of strategic and timely tactical intelligence undermined the Red Army in
Afghanistan. This situation was created by: (1) mutually obstructive intelligence
agencies; and (2) corruption. This situation was exacerbated further by a scarcity
of troops able to instantaneously react to intelligence and a lack of delegated
authority.
The initial invasion of Afghanistan was impeccable planned and executed.
However, planning had not included counterinsurgency and pacification missions.
Thus, the Mujahedeen gained the initiative. The lack of contingency planning has
been a deficiency in Russian operations since the days of the Czar. The Soviets
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should have learned the importance of contingency planning from the 1973 Yom
Kippur war. In this conflict, the Egyptians crossed the Suez Canal, taking Israeli
field elements unaware and without an immediate means of defence. The
Egyptians then stopped, as per instructed by their Soviet war plans. This
relinquished the initiative to the Israelis, who proceeded to defeat the Egyptian
Army. Similarly, Czarist war plans did not extend past the initial cavalry charge
or infantry assault. Helmuth Graf von Moltke, a nineteenth century Prussian
general, stated that ‘no war plan survives initial contact with the enemy’. This
statement however does not imply that contingency planning should not occur.
This example indicates contingencies must be planned for in advance. This is
important because commanders must have the resources to react effectively in
unexpected situations.
At a tactical level, indigenous and Soviet field operatives were often
successful in gathering intelligence in Afghanistan. However, the interpretation
and dissemination of raw intelligence was deficient. Bureaucratic filtration and
politicisation of information further debilitated the organisationally isolated flows
of intelligence in Afghanistan. Basically, the GRU, KGB, Ministry of Defence
(MoD) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) operated in isolation. The
Afghan Intelligence Service (KHAD then WAD) was also ineffective.
KHAD/WAD staff loyalties were questionable; often intelligence was supplied to
the enemy. Moreover, clan rivalry further diminished the Soviet’s faith in Afghan
information.20
The initial effectiveness of Soviet Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) was very
limited. This was because the Mujahedeen had few electronic communications
assets. The collection of Photo Intelligence (PHOTINT) was partially successful.
This was primarily due to low-level tactical reconnaissance by airborne units.
However, the introduction of the Stinger hindered this method of intelligence
collection. Electronic Intelligence (ELINT) was irrelevant in Afghanistan, due to
the absence of electronic emissions. Conversely, Human Intelligence (HUMINT)
was critical in Afghanistan. The Soviets had significant informant nets, and so
did the Mujahedeen. However, the Soviets lacked real time correlation analysis
that could turn intelligence into targets. Correlation analysis is equivalent to
mosaic theory; where disparate and, potentially false information is evaluated
simultaneously to create complete and reliable intelligence, in real time. This
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process requires advanced communications assets. These communications assets:
(1) collect information from dispersed sources; (2) provide the information to a
C2 facility, which performs the correlation analysis; and (3) disseminate usable
and reliable intelligence to appropriate units.
This section indicates the significance of HUMINT in counterinsurgency.
PHOTINT is secondary, but still significant. Strategic intelligence must be
gathered prior to the deployment of combat troops, so that appropriate forces can
be assembled for the correct type of war. Mutually antagonistic, self promoting
intelligence agencies will undermine their own existence. Integrated, personnel
focused, mutually supportive, decentralised structures are ideal in LIC. Moreover,
raw intelligence is ineffectual without: (1) real time correlation analysis; and (2)
combat forces that can react to the information promptly.
Command, Control, Communications and Surveillance
Soviet Command, Control, Communications and Surveillance were undermined
by Afghanistan’s terrain. Soviet C2 was gradually decentralised following the
initial invasion. This better enabled greater initiative in small scale, combined
arms and joint operations. For example between 1984 and 1986: (1) elite force
operations were highly successful; (2) indirect fire support was more mobile and
immediate; and (3) combat air support was highly effective. However, large
scale, regular troop operations and passive base defence continued. The tempo of
these operations was constrained and so was any combat initiative. After 1986,
Mujahedeen proficiency with air defence systems caused three significant changes
in Soviet strategy. First, C2 was centralised. This caused low tempo, large and
basically ineffective operations. Second, helicopter support for ground operations
was restricted. Third, strike aircraft were forced to fly high, reducing their
effectiveness.
The centralisation of planning and C2, effectively inhibited Soviet troops
from reacting to tactical intelligence. In addition, the Soviet neglect of proxy
militias also inhibited the use of intelligence. Militias were not inclined to act on
the basis of intelligence, due to the fear of inciting an enemy reaction and then
being abandoned by the Soviets.21 This section illustrates that decentralised C2 is
critical in counterinsurgency. However, decentralised C2 must be supported by
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mobile combat units. Furthermore, these mobile combat units require timely and
accurate intelligence to guide their operations.
In terms of doctrinal principles, the Soviets attempted to employ military
force as a counterinsurgency panacea. The Soviets gradually improved their
military capabilities, including joint force, combined arms and communications.
Despite these improvements in military capabilities, the Soviets were unable to
provide adequate internal security, control international interference, create a
unified command, or apply civil operations. In terms of the final point, Soviet
military operations were so injurious of the civil population that the population
became the enemy of the counterinsurgent. At a strategic level, the Soviets failed
to unify the intelligence and military capabilities that were deployed in theatre.
Furthermore, the Soviets did not effectively apply the political, diplomatic and
economic tools that are essential in warfare.
The Russian Intervention in Chechnya 1994 – 1996
Russian operations in Chechnya have consisted of both urban and mountain
campaigns. Most significantly, however, Military Operations in Urban Terrain
(MOUT) have predominated. As noted earlier, the initial Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan was a superbly orchestrated surprise. Significantly, Afghanistan’s
urban terrain was occupied within the first days of war, against negligible
resistance. However, the Soviets lost control of rural and mountainous terrain to
the Mujahedeen. Initial Russian expectations, tactics and strategy employed in
Chechnya, were a product of the initial occupation of Afghanistan’s urban areas.
The Russian Government and Armed Forces believed Chechen urban areas would
be seized with ease, as occurred in Afghanistan. Moreover, it was assumed that a
show of force would subdue unruly enemy irregulars. Realistically, however, the
Chechen insurgents had over three years to prepare for the Russian intervention.
Defensive Chechen preparation occurred between the Chechen leader, General
Dzhokhar Dudayev’s, declaration of independence in November 1991 and the
inevitable and much heralded Russian intervention in December 1994. This
preparation made the weaknesses of the Chechens irrelevant, and disabled
Russian strengths by selecting fortified, urban terrain as their battlefield.
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Strategically, Chechnya is as vital to the Russian Federation as to the
Chechens themselves. There are four major reasons for this. First, national
cohesion was at stake for the Russians. The independence of Chechnya could
have encouraged other segments of the Russian Federation to secede. Potential
threats to Russia’s internal cohesion existed: (1) within Russia’s North Caucasian
autonomous areas of North Ossetia, Ingushetia and Dagastan; and (2) within
Russia’s central autonomous areas of Tatarstan and Bashkortostan. Second,
Russian security could have been threatened by the destabilisation of Russia’s
near abroad. If Chechnya became an enclave for Islamic extremists, the trans-
Caucasian states of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan may have fallen to Islamic
extremists. Third, a major financial and strategic asset was in jeopardy. The
Baku (Azerbaijan) to Novorossiysk (Russian Federation) oil pipeline was
threatened. Fourth, the security of the ethnic Russians in Chechnya was
threatened. These four reasons mandated the Russian response.
The Russian forces deployed were unsuited to MOUT. Furthermore,
Russian forces exhibited manifestly similar limitations in tactics, operational
thought, training and weapons, as was apparent in Afghanistan. However, in rural
and mountainous terrain the Russian army effectively implemented the lessons
learned in Afghanistan. Subsequently in the second Chechen war, Russian forces
improved their approach to MOUT by incorporating tactics acquired in the first
Chechen war.
Doctrine, Strategy and Tactics
The lack of counterinsurgency doctrine applicable to LIC once again undermined
the Russian military and claimed the lives of many Russian soldiers. Russian
military thought concerning conflict in urban terrain was based in the context of a
European war. In this context, it was expected cities would not be subjected to
conflict. This idea was based on the assumption that the North Atlantic Treaty
Organisation (NATO) states would rather concede their cities freely, rather than
having them destroyed in combat. The disregard for urban combat was
widespread among Soviet military planners by the early 1980s. The lessons of
World War Two and intense study of urban warfare in the subsequent two
decades had been lost. By 1994 there were no troops within the Russian armed
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forces specifically trained for urban warfare. Accordingly, the Russian urban
strategy was essentially a display of force, as conflict was not expected.
Essentially, the Russians were planning for the previous war. The Russians
should have considered their own tenacious and bloody defence of Leningrad,
Stalingrad and Moscow, and obstinate German resistance demonstrated in
Cherbourg, Konigsberg and Berlin.
Due to these erroneous expectations and the consequent false sense of
security, Russian forces had failed to blockade or reconnoitre Groznyy. Hence,
Russian forces lacked reliable intelligence. This problem was aggravated by land
force commanders, who preferred aerial reconnaissance over Groznyy, rather than
risking their own troops in Groznyy. Furthermore, poor weather limited these
airborne reconnaissance operations, which are inherently not well suited to
surveillance over complex terrain. Consequently, Russian forces lacked
intelligence and dispensed with contingency planning almost entirely.22
Columns of Russian tanks and BMPs entered Groznyy on 26 December
1994. Many of the BMPs were operating without embarked troops. Moreover,
this ingress was 20 days behind schedule. This armoured thrust into Groznyy
occurred after: (1) three abortive coups de main by pro-Moscow forces in
Groznyy; and (2) a combative ingress into Chechnya by the Russian forces.
Hence surprise had been lost. Groznyy was the known target of Russian actions,
and had been turned into a fortress. Moreover, this fortress was defended by the
Soviet trained, highly motivated Chechen insurgents. These fortifications and
tenacious urban tactics should have been expected by the Russians. This is
because they were utilised in the previous conflicts, between loyalist Chechen
militias and the Chechen insurgents. The Russian forces entering Groznyy had
been hurriedly cobbled together, from minimally trained disparate forces. This
was a consequence of many Russian battalions being at approximately half
strength. In addition to this lack of defence force cohesion, troops from the MVD
and Federal Security Service (FSB) were combined with MoD troops. Moreover,
tanks were not supplied with machine gun ammunition, BMPs were operated
without full complements of crew and embarked soldiers. Those embarked
soldiers sent into Groznyy, were themselves occasionally without even weapons.
Thus, the initial assault on Groznyy was repulsed, with the loss of 105 of the 120
armoured vehicles which entered the city.23
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This initial action against Groznyy indicated six critical lessons for the
Russians. First, cities must be isolated. Second, effective infantry reconnaissance
is essential. Third, the occupation of key positions on the outskirts of cities
requires pre-emptive artillery bombardment. Fourth, sectors of cities must be
taken sequentially. Fifth, all insurgent positions must be cleared of troops and
residual weapons. Sixth, collateral damage is a significant consideration in
modern conflict. Some of these factors were effectively internalised by the
Russians. However, the high turnover of conscripts in the Russian forces meant
skills continually had to be relearned.
In terms of military principles, the Russians again lacked a coherent
doctrine applicable to counterinsurgency operations. The Russians also initially
failed to conduct effective combined arms and intelligence gathering operations.
As in Afghanistan the Russians deployed a principally non-professional force that
was imprecisely structured for the conflict in Chechnya.
Chechen Strategy and Tactics
Chechen insurgent operations were based upon highly independent squads,
applying close-quarter anti-armour tactics. The Chechen utilisation of urban
terrain was a product of the availability of weapons. The small arms and man-
portable support weapons available, suited urban terrain. Furthermore, these
tactics in urban terrain undermined Russian mobility and firepower. The lack of
dismounted infantry support for the initial Russian armoured columns suited
Chechens tactics perfectly. Chechen insurgent squads were made up of an
antitank gunner with a RPG-7 or 18, two riflemen with AK-47 or derivatives and
a sniper. These squads could move with relative impunity within Groznyy’s
infrastructure.
The combination of three such squads equated to the main force elements
of a 25 man cell. Each cell was supplemented by medics, logistics personnel,
litter bearers and, predominantly Dragunov 7.62mm (SVD) armed, snipers. Three
25 man cells combined to form a 75 man unit, with attached mortar team. The
mortar teams, and certain other units (SAM and some RPG), were mechanised (in
modified cars). This mechanisation reduced the chance of Russian counter-fire.
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The basic Chechen tactic involved numerous squads concentrating around
Russian columns, so as to achieve situational superiority. The antitank gunners
would aim to disable or destroy the lead and final armoured vehicle in the column.
Hence, the remaining armoured vehicles became trapped. The sniper and riflemen
could either eliminate supporting infantry, or pin down large Russian forces
making them vulnerable to antitank fire. Chechen tactics also relied upon
decentralised control. Chechen cells were either alerted by the sound of
advancing armour, or basic communications via Nokia and Motorola hand-held
radios.
The Chechens had also acquired a few T-62 and T-72 tanks, BTR-70, BM-
21 multiple rocket launcher systems and antitank cannon. These direct fire
weapons were either deployed behind defensive berms or within buildings. Such
tactics enabled surprise and had high propaganda value when news crews showed
Russian forces firing on ‘civilian buildings’. The porous blockade of the city
further hindered Russian operations. Chechen reinforcements, supplies and
wounded were able to move within, and to and from, the city.
Chechen operations indicate that the combined use of basic weapons, such
as the AK-47, RPG and sniper rifle, can be highly effective in urban combat.
Furthermore, urban fortification can drastically multiply the combat power of
defensive units. Future insurgents, if confronted with poorly defended armour,
will surely endeavour to exploit the aforementioned tactics and weapon systems.
Moreover, counter-communication is important in LIC. The counterinsurgent
must jam cellular and radio communications.
Russian Infantry, Armour and Direct Support Weapons
The embarked infantry in the initial assaults on Groznyy were poorly trained
conscripts, who were instructed to fight from within their BMPs. However,
embarked infantry could not engage the Chechens because: (1) they could not
identify the insurgents hiding within buildings; and (2) they could not fire upon
the enemy as the arc of fire from within the BMPs was limited. Similarly, the
tank crews could not bring their main guns to bear upon the insurgents. This was
due to the restricted depression and elevation envelopes of the main guns.A This
A Main Gun Elevation (o ) T-72: -6 to +14 T-80: -7 to +20 BMP-2: -5 to +74
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situation was exacerbated by the Chechen propensity to fight from basements and
elevated floors. Moreover, the Russian tank crews could not adequately defend
themselves with machine gun fire, as the Chechens presented simultaneous,
scattered targets. Furthermore, tests at the Kubinka test range showed that if the
tanks had been fitted with their reactive armour, fewer would have been lost to
RPG rounds.
As was the case in Afghanistan, Russian units lacked adequate junior
officers or NCOs. Furthermore, training had reduced since the fall of the Soviet
Union. Supplies and operational funding had also dissipated. The MoD, MVD
and FSB had severe problems working together. Cohesion between the various
arms of the said agencies was also poor. Commanders and procedures of the
aforementioned agencies were numerous. There were also many conflicts
between these organisational protocols and personnel. This caused intelligence
blocks, divergent planning, operational confusion, and caused friendly fire
incidents.
In response to the initial losses, Russian tactics evolved. Dismounted
infantry was given the primary role of retaking Groznyy, supported by armour.
The armour was fitted with reactive armour. Furthermore, ZSU23-4 and ZSU-
2S6 tracked and armoured antiaircraft guns augmented mobile field units. These
weapon systems were capable of high rates of suppressing fire, and possessed less
restrictive firing envelopes.B In addition, armoured vehicles were supplemented
with protective wire cages. These cages were fitted 25-30 centimetres proud of
armour hulls, so as to ameliorate the threat posed by shaped charges. Hence, the
risk presented by RPG-7 rounds, Molotov cocktails and bundles of antitank
grenades and explosives was reduced. When stationary, Russian armour would be
protected by previously destroyed armoured vehicles, sandbags and other
battlefield debris.24
As the conflict continued, naval infantry and Spetsnaz units were deployed
to Groznyy. These units were trained in urban warfare, and were highly effective
in Groznyy. These forces were also better equipped than the conscripts they
replaced. Significantly, night vision equipment and specialist training enabled
night reconnaissance, rescue and assault. The Russians also reduced the size of
B Main Gun Elevation (o ) ZSU-23-4: -4 to +85 ZSU-2S6: -10 to +87
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deployed combat units. This promoted greater operational freedom in battle. In
addition, the firepower of infantry units was substantially increased with
supplementary flame throwers, RPGs, AGS-17s and RPO-A thermobaric rocket
launcher systems. Specifically trained MVD and FSB snipers were deployed in
Groznyy to supplement the under-trained MoD snipers. Secure communication
techniques were also improved.25 Russian artillery became more effective with
greater planning and communications. This allowed for the increased use of
white phosphorous rounds to incapacitate insurgents and cover friendly
movement. However, attempts to create combined assault groups were
ineffective. This was due to low unit cohesion and the lack of prior combined
arms training. A further problem for the Russian soldiers was the ability of
Chechen combatants to blend into the non-combatant population.26
This section clearly illustrates that infantry are central to effective urban
combat. Armour is only effective in a support role, and if possible should be
fitted with reactive armour. In addition, an improvised cage can provide some
supplementary protection. Firing envelopes are a critical consideration in urban
terrain. Main guns must be able to depress and elevate sufficiently to fire on
targets in basements and upper floors of buildings. Thus, the broad firing
envelope and high rates of suppressing fire provided by armoured, self-propelled
AA guns is highly effective in urban terrain. A shortage of funding, supplies or
training, especially for NCOs and junior officers will severely reduce unit
cohesion and combat effectiveness. Professional soldiers, with a high degree of
urban training are crucial to operations in urban terrain. Moreover, night
reconnaissance and assault are significant capabilities these soldiers should
possess. The firepower of urban troops must also be supplemented with weapons
systems analogous to flame throwers, RPGs, AGS-17s and RPO-As. The latter is
particularly capable of neutralising sniper threats.
Russian Aviation
As in Afghanistan, the Mi-24 attack helicopter provided effective close air support
(CAS). However, helicopters were vulnerable over Groznyy until appropriate
tactics were developed. These tactics involved the helicopters using the urban
terrain. Simply, helicopters could advance below the cityscape to safe areas
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behind friendly buildings, then ‘pop up’ to fire on the target before hiding again.
Precision Guided Munitions (PGMs) were also highly effective in Groznyy.
Unmanned Air Vehicles (UAVs) presented an effective technical answer to the
Russian problem of gaining real time intelligence. UAVs, while expensive,
enabled situational awareness without risk.
Initially, Russian aviation assets were utilised to gain air control over
Chechnya. On 1 December 1994, Russian combat aircraft destroyed 266 aircraft
based in Chechnya. Although half of these aircraft were in a state of disrepair, the
remainder were being readied for combat in November 1994. The threat these
mostly antiquated trainer aircraft posed, was primarily unconventional. The
aircraft were being readied to act as piloted cruise missiles, utilised against
civilian infrastructure in Russia. The Russians were also successful in isolating
Chechnya from air re-supply. A-50 Airborne Warning and Control Systems
(AWACS) and MiG-31 interdiction fighters denied the potential for external air
links.27 Chechen C2, communications and other key infrastructure were not
destroyed in the Russian preparation of the battlefield. This potential failure was
attributed to deficient planning and intelligence.28 However, Russian forces may
have planned to occupy these facilities for their own use. This occurred in
Afghanistan, and would seem consistent with Russia’s initial Chechnya strategy.
The Chechen antiaircraft threat was not insignificant in the first Chechen
war. The Chechens possessed ZU-23 anti-aircraft cannon, DShK machine guns,
and utilised RPGs in an improvised antiaircraft role. In addition, ZSU-23-4 self-
propelled antiaircraft guns, SA-14, SA-18 and Stinger SAMs were potentially in
the possession of the Chechens. These systems, and small arms fire, partially
suppressed Russian helicopter operations. Chechnya’s partially mountainous
terrain and poor flying conditions further degraded helicopter operations. The
Russian’s attempted to reduce the risk posed by Chechen air defences with
complicated target approach manoeuvres, high speed, low level approaches,
complex attack formations and mutual covering fire. These tactics were partially
effective. However, they could not make up for the antiquated Russian
equipment, weapons and limited pilot training. Consequently, each sortie resulted
in 10% loss and 25% damage of participating aircraft.29 A significant issue for
the Russians in Chechnya was obsolete equipment; the Mi-24, Mi-8 and Mi-6
helicopters were so designated by their crews. More modern or upgraded
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helicopters, such as the Mi-8MTV2/3 and Mi-26, performed well in Chechnya.
However, there was a need for gunships like the Ka-50 or the Mi-28, which can
locate and engage targets from a safe distance, at night and in any weather. 30
There were six significant operational lessons learned from helicopter CAS
operations in Chechnya. First, enhanced target acquisition and PGMs are required
to reduce collateral damage. Second, pilot proficiency is central in alleviating risk
and improving capability. Third, the provision of ground based intelligence is
critical for helicopter operations, especially around fortified villages. Basically,
helicopter gunships are becoming too vulnerable to operate in some environments
independently. Rather, helicopter gunships should support land force elements.
Fourth, the intelligence provided by UAVs can be effectively utilised by
helicopters. Fifth, night operations functionally dislocated the Chechens
insurgents. Hence, night vision equipment is a force enhancer. Sixth, CAS must
be prompt, otherwise targets can escape.
Ground based reconnaissance, in support of Russian airborne operations,
was a critical deficiency in Chechnya. Air inserted or regular reconnaissance
troops were often unable to communicate with other infantry or air units. These
land force elements often lacked radios, night vision devices, silencers and
binoculars. Due to the lack of ground based intelligence, gunships often failed to
eliminate targets or understand Chechen air defence strategies. Due to this lack of
synergy between land and air units, Russian strategy often called for general
counter-fire. This strategy was ineffective, as the Chechens would fire and
withdraw. Furthermore, counter-fire lacks accuracy and increases the chance of
collateral damage.31
Russian CAS was predominantly performed by the Su-25. The Su-25 is
the Russian equivalent of the American A-10. The Su-25 is a subsonic,
manoeuvrable aircraft with heavy armament and armour. These characteristics
enable the aircraft to survive in unfriendly environments. The manoeuvrability of
these aircraft enabled reasonably precise strikes against small targets, in any non-
urban environment. The aircraft could also loiter on the battlefield for extended
periods. Due to the significance of this aircraft in combat, the Su-25 has been
upgraded and re-designated the Su-39. The upgrade enabled night operations with
precision weapons, and reduced the vulnerability of the aircraft with improved
electronic countermeasures. The other significant Russian fighter-bomber in
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Chechnya was the Su-24M. The Su-24M performed two essential functions.
First, the Su-24M provided all weather and night aerial reconnaissance
information. Second, the Su-24M was capable of delivering of PGMs.32 The Su-
24M was employed frequently over Groznyy, dropping KAB-500/1500 TV and
laser guided bombs and Kh-25 ML laser guided missiles.33
This section illustrates that the effectiveness of air assets in
counterinsurgency is dependent on timely intelligence. Hence, combat aircraft,
helicopters and land force elements must be well integrated. This integration is a
product of realistic training. Personnel training and a synergistic approach to joint
air-ground operations are vital. Another source of effective intelligence was
UAVs. UAVs were used with good results in Groznyy. However, the primary
intelligence source in urban terrain is the infantry unit. This section also
illustrates the effectiveness of CAS in counterinsurgency. The use of combat
aircraft was essential to Russian operations in open terrain. However, combat air
assets were of little value in urban terrain, without the use of PGMs. CAS was
essential in Chechnya. However, aircraft providing CAS must be: (1) well armed
and armoured; (2) constantly on station; (3) able to apply precise firepower; and
(4) possess countermeasures against AA threats. Air control is also important in
LIC. The airborne isolation of a conflict is critical, so as to deter airborne re-
supply missions.
Command, Control and Non-Urban Terrain
Command, Control and Communications were key weaknesses of Russian
operations in non-urban terrain. Centralised C2 was a central impediment to
Russian operations in Chechnya. This prevented initiative and independence on
the battlefield. Inter-unit communication was also restricted. This reduced
situational awareness and the capacity for units to reinforce one another. Russian
personnel also lacked communications encryption training. Hence, Russian
communication provided the Chechen insurgents with intelligence on Russian
positions and intentions.
However, open non-urban terrain illustrated Russian strengths, that is to
say mobility and superior firepower. Russian doctrine emphasised deception,
surprise, resoluteness and audacity. These concepts proved worthwhile in
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Chechnya’s rural areas. Moreover, Chechnya’s mountainous terrain proved less
of a problem for the Russians than did urban terrain. Significantly, in non-urban
terrain, Russian forces demonstrated greater independence and initiative.
Subunits, divested with authority, were able to decide entire battles by taking high
ground or attacking the insurgents flank by surprise. As in Afghanistan, the
Russians relied upon airborne mobility. This was an effective means of
manoeuvre. However, as in Afghanistan, SAMs endangered airborne operations.
Communications and counter-communications were significant aspects of
the Chechen strategy in rural and mountainous terrain. Chechen forces mostly
used radios for tactical communications. The Chechens also made efforts to jam
Russian communications, and hunted Russian forward air controllers through
radio triangulation. As indicated earlier, open Russian communications provided
the Chechens with an effective source of intelligence. Force protection, in the
form of mobility, was also an important component of Chechen operations.
Hence, assets such as antiaircraft weapons were constantly moved to ameliorate
the effective capability of Russian counter-fire.
This section illustrates the importance of initiative and independence in
counterinsurgency. However, secure communication, situational awareness and
the ability to mutually reinforce is also critical. Small unit tactics also require
prompt CAS and artillery support. Armoured and mechanised units are highly
effective in open terrain. However, battles are still decided by audacious small
unit tactics.
The Psychological War
The psychological aspect of the first Chechen war was decisively won by the
Chechens. Chechen forces effectively demoralised Russian field elements in the
following ways. The Chechens made widespread use of human roadblocks and
woman’s protests to halt Russian convoys and tactical troop movements.
Chechens dressed in Russian uniforms, posed as Russian guides and Red Cross
workers for mobility and surprise attacks. Disinformation was broadcasted on the
Russian radio net. Russian officers were threatened that their families would be
killed. The Chechens would hang Russian dead and wounded in the windows of
buildings to discourage Russian fire. Russian prisoners were also decapitated and
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their heads placed on spikes along reinforcement routes. Russian dead were also
booby trapped.
Strategically, Chechens demoralised the Russian public with threats of
Islamic terrorism, including nuclear and radiological attack. Chechen
psychological operations were disseminated by broadcasting on seized Russian
television and radio stations. In addition, Chechen insurgents exploited Non-
Governmental Organisations (NGOs) to pressure the Russian Government.
Simply, NGOs allowed themselves to be an unwitting conduit to Chechen
propaganda. President Yeltsin’s political position was also undermined by
information warfare directed at the Russian people. The Chechen conflict was
presented as a diversion from Russia’s economic and political problems.
As in Afghanistan, Russia did not effectively seal Chechnya’s land
borders. The Chechens exploited this by widening their operations. The Russian
towns of Budennovsk, Kizlyar and Pervomaiskoye were both occupied by
Chechen insurgents. Consequently, many of the inhabitants of these towns were
killed. In Budennovsk, the Chechen insurgents occupied key government
facilities, of which the hospital became operationally the most significant
structure. The Chechens used similar defensive tactics as in Groznyy. These
tactics were partially effective at repulsing a commando attempt to retake the
town. Russian Delta commando teams were able to retake some positions, but
were initially unnerved by Chechens using non-combatants as human shields.
The Delta commandos, and the elite anti-terrorism Alpha group, were held
responsible for non-combatant deaths. This damaged the morale and reputation of
the units.34 Russian Prime Minister Chernomyrdin negotiated a settlement,
popular at the time for saving lives.35 However, this allowed the Chechens to
escape and created an expectation of political appeasement in exchange for acts of
terrorism. The Russian Government also claimed that the special force troops,
who had stormed Budennovsk, were acting without government approval. This
critically undermined morale, and caused widespread resentment of the
government by the elite units.36
After taking the town of Kizlyar, the Chechens were able to escape with
100 hostages, but were counterattacked in Pervomaiskoye. The Russians used
artillery and air strikes before assaulting the Chechen positions. These positions
were well guarded with improvised brick barricades, trenches and raised machine-
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gun positions. The defenders were able to survive the air and artillery fire, as they
had intercepted Russian communications describing the impending operation.
Once again, the Chechens were able to escape.
The Chechens also conducted acts of international terrorism. A Black Sea
ferry, the Eurasia, was hijacked and a threat to sink the vessel was made if the
Chechen insurgents in Pervomaiskoye were not freed. Similarly, Chechens
hijacked a Turkish Cypriot Airlines Boeing 727, in an attempt to get the Russians
to leave Chechnya.37 In comparison, Russian psychological operations were
minimal. The Russians interfered with Chechen radio and made leaflet drops in
Chechnya.
This section clearly demonstrates (if that were necessary) that insurgents
do not act in accordance with the rules of war. Non-combatants are critical to
insurgents, both in a support role and operationally as physical protection.
Dressing as non-combatants, counterinsurgent soldiers or Red Cross workers are
common insurgent tactics. These actions enable infiltration and mobility.
Insurgents will threaten and kill non-combatants, dismember or booby trapped the
dead and use captured counterinsurgents as human shields. Insurgents will
attempt to use the media as a psychological tool. Future insurgencies will foster
regional and international terrorism, perpetrated by insurgents, disaffected foreign
nationals and unrelated terrorist organisations.
It also should be observed, that governments must not negotiate with
terrorists. For reasons that are well understood, negotiation encourages further
terrorist operations. Negotiation may seem expedient in the short term, but will
lead to long term terrorism. Governments must only negotiate with terrorists in
bad-faith; governments must only entertain discussions that purport to be
negotiations, so as to gain time to prepare for counterterrorist operations.
Obviously there are many factors to take into account. However, this discussion
is not central to the thesis, and will not be discussed here.
The End: Russian Defeat
On 6 August 1996, 600 Chechen insurgents began to retake Groznyy, which they
had infiltrated in advance. MVD troops were completely surprised,
notwithstanding Chechen leaflets advising Russian soldiers to defect and civilians
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to accumulate stocks of food and water in advance of the battle. The Chechen
insurgents successfully impeded access to the city, blocking MVD reinforcement.
When MoD forces finally reacted, they repeated the ineffective tactics of the
initial 1994 invasion of Groznyy. This occurred primarily because of the rotation
of conscripts. Armour was destroyed, helicopters were ineffective and friendly
fire incidents occurred. Basically, Russian forces had failed to internalise the
lessons learned in Groznyy about urban terrain. This forced recruits to learn for
themselves, in the face of a hardened enemy. The loss of Groznyy illustrates the
need for soldiers (MoD), as well as policemen (MVD), in the defence of urban
terrain. In addition, lessons must be internalised and specialised pre-deployment
training is critical.
In terms of a holistic approach to the conflict in Chechnya, Russia failed to
effectively apply political, economic and diplomatic forms of force. In fact at
times, Russian political and diplomatic moves undermined their own military
forces operating in Chechnya. Alternatively, the Chechens effectively used
political and diplomatic means to strengthen their position in the conflict. In
terms of doctrinal principles, Russia effectively sealed Chechnya from external
airborne interference, but failed to seal the Chechnya’s land borders. Russia did
not effectively install a unified command or undertake valuable civil operations.
Furthermore, Russian forces had difficulty in providing internal security. In
addition to the doctrinal issues listed above, the lack of internal security can be
explained by limited application or contravention of the military principles
outlined in this research. As in Afghanistan, the Russians gradually improved the
levels of professional personnel deployed to Chechnya, and encouraged these
troops to use their initiative and to act independently. Following the initial and
unsuccessful forced ingress into Groznyy by the Russians, combined arms
procedures and operations were vastly improved. However, critical deficiencies
in terms of military principles included a lack of human intelligence and poor
communications, which combined to undermine joint operations.
Russian Evolution between the Wars
The Russian Army attempted to institutionalise the lessons gained within the first
Chechen war. The key strategic lessons included: (1) the need to effectively
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blockade of theatres of conflict; (2) the need for efficient coordination between
armed agencies, and arms of those agencies; and (3) the need for an effective
propaganda war.38 Training was improved to facilitate these objectives.
Specifically, coordination was enhanced, mountain and counterinsurgency warfare
were practiced in exercises, crew training was improved to enhance the
survivability of armour, and sniper training was reintroduced. Unfortunately,
urban combat was not seen as inevitable, but as something to be avoided. Due to
the strategic imperative to avoid urban warfare, urban warfare training was
unfortunately neglected.
Chechen Insurgents and Foreign Interference
Between the Chechen wars, the Chechen insurgents were highly active in
obtaining external training and assistance. There were approximately 100 foreign
instructors in six significant training camps: (1) Alos Abudzhafar camp taught
partisan tactics and marksmanship; (2) Yakub camp specialised in heavy weapons
training; (3) Davlat camp taught psychological and ideological warfare; (4) Abu
Baker camp instructed personnel in diversionary and terrorist tactics; (5) Said ibn
Abu Vakas camp, which maintained links with the Pakistani Dzhamaat Isalami
group and it’s military arm Hizb – ul’ – Mujahedeen; and (6) the Caucasian
Islamic Institute (IIK), where religion and Arabic was taught. The IIK also
allegedly maintained links with the Muslim Brotherhood. In addition to Hizb –
ul’- Mujahedeen, there were a number of other Pakistani groups that trained
soldiers and supplied weapons to the Chechen insurgents. These groups included
Kharakat –ul’- Mujahedeen, Al’ Badr, Lashkar-e-Taiba, Sepakhe Pakistan and the
International Islamic Front. Furthermore, a number of sources assert financial
assistance flowed to Chechnya from Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates,
Turkey, Qatar and Jordan. In return, Chechen insurgents hosted and trained
extremist students from Jordan, Saudi Arabia, China, Egypt, Malaysia and
Palestine.39 Mercenaries from Sudan, Niger, Nigeria and the Ivory Coast were
also present in Chechnya, some of whom disguised themselves as International
Islamic Relief Organisation workers.40 Direct state support was provided by the
Taliban in the form of combat troops.41 In addition, Iraqi combat engineers,42 and
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intelligence operatives from Saudi Arabia, Lebanon and Iran also supported the
Chechen insurgents.43
Al Qaeda’s influence in Chechnya is undoubted, but its significance is
highly contested. Al Qaeda appears to have sent up to 300 personnel from
Afghanistan and Yemen to fight alongside the Chechen insurgents.44 The
Russians also allege Al Qaeda provided US$25 million in financial support to the
Chechen insurgents. Chechen insurgents had also gained much experience in
other international conflicts. Many Chechens had previously fought in
Afghanistan, alongside the Taliban, or within Al Qaeda. Chechen insurgents had
also fought in other wars in the former Soviet Union, including: (1) the civil war
in Tajikistan; (2) the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict; and (3) the Bosnia-
Herzegovina conflict.
This section illustrates the globalisation of terrorism and insurgency. This
globalisation of political violence will have a significant influence on the future of
LIC. Future insurgencies will commence with an established form of effective
combat, international support linkages and battle hardened combatants.
The Caucasus Revisited 1999 – 2000: Russia’s War
The interwar period heightened Russian concerns with regard to Chechnya.
Russia in 1999 was plagued by an economic meltdown, faced Chechen incursions
into Dagestan and Chechen terror bombings in Moscow. These concerns steeled
Russia’s resolve to contain and thwart Chechen insurgence.
Russian operations in Chechnya commenced in October 1999, with a long
and determined Russian siege of Groznyy. This siege was supplemented with
heavy air strikes and artillery bombardment of the city. Skirmishes by the
Russians to take key suburbs and positions occurred. However, these Russian
actions were countered by Chechen night raids, with the Chechens invariably
wearing Russian uniforms.45 Furthermore, Russian assessments of Chechen troop
strength were again erroneous, partly due to the porous siege of the city.46 An end
to the Russian preparation was signalled by: (1) advisories issued to the
population to leave Groznyy; (2) intensification of reconnaissance missions; and
(3) the seizure of Groznyy’s airport.47
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Russian forces entering Groznyy on 23 December 1999, numbered
between four and five thousand troops. This force included two MVD brigades
and an Army regiment with associated armour, artillery, air assets, Spetsnaz,
snipers, combat engineers and Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC) troops.
The Russian forces were supplemented by Bislan Gantimirov’s pro-Moscow
loyalist Chechen militia. In opposition, Russia estimated two to two and a half
thousand Chechens with limited stocks of armour, BM-21 MRLS, 152mm
howitzers, 120mm mortars and SAMs.48
Russian planning for the occupation of Groznyy in 1999 was
comprehensive, unlike the 1994 war. The strategic plan described the division of
Groznyy into fifteen sections. Reconnaissance assets would locate enemy
positions and call in air and artillery strikes. These operations would be followed
by combat engineers clearing corridors of advance with sniper and mortar support
to suppress the enemy. Spetsnaz and Gantimirov’s militia would then advance
down the corridors, so creating a ‘spider’s web’ of Russian presence. In theory
this latter tactic would deprive the Chechens of mobility. Any Chechen resistance
that did occur, was then to be overcome by a Russian motorised division in ‘storm
detachments’, with air and artillery support.49
Organisationally, these storm detachments of 30-50 men were a product of
Russian experience in the first Groznyy war. These detachments basically
replicate the Chechen fighting cell. The core of the storm detachments were
groups of three soldiers, equipped with a RPG, an assault rifle and a sniper rifle.
These troops were generally supported by two other soldiers with assault rifles.
Additional support was provided by troops armed with RPO-A thermobaric rocket
launchers, forward air and artillery observers, combat engineers and
reconnaissance troops.50
The Russian forces entering Groznyy in 1999 were not conscripts, as in
the previous war. These forces were a mix of elite, specialised and professional
troops with urban training. Spetsnaz, paratroopers and naval infantry were central
to operations in Groznyy. These forces were cohesive and demonstrated the value
of superior training. Lower casualties, adequate re-supply, reinforcement and
rotation also aided morale. The effectiveness of the troops was vastly improved
due to: (1) enhanced and simplified C2; (2) small unit independence; and (3)
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coordination between air and ground force elements. Further, pre-deployment
urban training was conducted prior to the assault on Groznyy.
The Russian advance was deliberate, vigilant and cautious. Infantry was
supported by armour. Correspondingly, armour was protected by disembarked
personnel, who were under orders to avoid close contact. To minimise Russian
casualties, artillery strikes preceded infantry advances. In addition, further air and
artillery strikes were called in after contact was made with the enemy.51
However, organisational problems remained between MVD and MoD
troops, and Russian and Chechen loyalist troops. Communications remained an
issue for Russian forces, as some equipment was incompatible. In addition, MVD
commanders were still poorly trained at directing air strike, artillery and armour.52
Bislan Gantimirov’s pro-Moscow Chechen loyalists also complained of
insufficiently Russian support when under fire. Furthermore, Gantimirov’s forces
sustained friendly fire casualties caused by Russian troops, due primarily to poor
communications.53 The duration of combat in Groznyy, further reduced the
fighting capacity of the Russian troops. This was because recruits had to be used
as reinforcements, since there were few professional soldiers in reserve.54
In general, Russian communication, anti-communication and counter-
communication were vastly improved. Better training and equipment insured
more effective operations. However, some soldiers, due to a lack of training still
broadcast in the open. Electronic Warfare was used throughout the Caucuses by
the Russians. Chechen communications were hunted electronically, then jammed
or destroyed, or Arabic and Chechen interpreters were used to glean information
from Chechen broadcasts.55
A wholly new aspect of Russian national security doctrine was
successfully implemented in the second Chechen war: the control of the media.
The media in Chechnya had to be accredited and escorted. The Russian
Government allowed officers and soldiers to be interviewed, and portrayed
Chechnya as a counterterrorist operation. Bravery, low casualties and successful
missions, also reinforced a positive public perceptions of the Russian Government
and Army.56 These psychological operations assisted in the successful conclusion
to the conflict.
Aviation was far more effective in the second Chechen war. Similar
aircraft and weapons were used. However, air-ground cohesion, C2,
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reconnaissance and information sharing improved firepower and accuracy.
Airpower accounted for 80 percent of all indirect fire support and helicopters
assumed 50 percent of all surveillance, supply, extraction and deployment tasks,
especially in mountainous terrain. As in the previous Chechen war, Su-24Ms
performed night and foul weather strike missions, while Su-25s and Mi-24s
constituted the primary daytime strike assets. Pairs of roving Mi-24s conducted
effective, independent search and destroy missions against enemy positions,
columns and supply depots. Reconnaissance was gathered by Su-24MRs, Su-25s,
MiG-25RBs, An-30Bs and A-50s. C2 was maintained by An-26s and Il-20s,
while search and rescue (SAR) was accomplished by Mi-8s. UAVs once again
performed a much needed function, while new night capable, PGM equipped Su-
25Ts made their debut.
Poor weather, fog and deliberate oil fired smoke screens restricted the
utilisation of airborne units in Groznyy. This situation was exacerbated by the
lack of adequate night flying and navigational aids. Airborne operations were
also limited by a lack of supplies and technicians. Communication and real time
information from ground commanders to Mi-24s still required improvement.
However, Mi-8 pilots could often operate as C2 manages to improve situational
awareness.57
The decentralisation of artillery C2 to junior infantry commanders, and the
junior commanders’ confidence in requisitioning artillery support, notably
demonstrated the essential nature of assigned indirect fire support. Indirect fire
support was provided by an assortment of: (1) 122mm and 152mm towed guns
and self propelled howitzers; (2) BM-21 and BM-22 MRLSs; and (3) 82mm and
120mm mortars. The Krasnopol laser guided 152mm artillery round was first
used in the second Chechen war. The Krasnopol was highly effective, due to the
accuracy provided through terminal guidance.58 However, when indirect fire
support was inappropriate, inadvisable or unavailable, direct fire PGMs performed
an essential role in pacifying enemy positions.
The definitive Russian operation, which expelled Chechen insurgent
forces from Groznyy, occurred in February 2000. This operation has been
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described as a well planned FSB ‘Black Op’.C The operation generated heavy
Chechen casualties, including approximately 1700 Chechen dead.59
This section illustrates a number of lessons learned by the Russians. The
Russians came to recognise the vulnerability caused by unit isolation, and the
combined resilience generated by situational awareness. Hence, thorough
reconnaissance and effective communications became central to the second
Chechen conflict. Furthermore, the Russians identified the force multiplication
effect of highly trained and professional combat engineers, snipers, Spetsnaz,
forward air and artillery observers and reconnaissance troops, upon general units.
The Russian’s also demonstrated the essential nature of organic heavy firepower,
within small infantry units. This heavy firepower was provided by RPGs, RPO-
As and AGS-17s. In addition, logistics, C2, air-ground synergy, EW and secure
communication was improved by the Russians in the second Chechen conflict.
Once again, Russian fixed wing and rotary wing CAS was critical in Chechnya.
However, the Russian’s still required: (1) improved night and foul weather visual
and navigation aids (2) more supplies and technicians; and (3) quicker
communication of real time intelligence from ground units to air units. The
Russians also demonstrated the critical nature of public affairs in Chechnya.
Basically, the media must be managed and public opinion must be reinforced by
accounts of bravery, low casualties and successful missions. Clearly, managing
the media may appear to contravene liberal democratic principles. However, there
are obvious problems if the counterinsurgent does not manage the media, which
were clearly demonstrated in the Russian case. Basically, if a counterinsurgent
does not manage the media, the insurgent will fill the void with propaganda. The
truth will only be told if the counterinsurgent manages and assists the media in
obtaining facts. Importantly, this is not an argument for censorship and
counterinsurgent propaganda as such controls are undesirable in liberal
democracies. It should also be recognised that such controls are difficult to
suspend, following their institution. That said counterinsurgents need to
C FSB Operation Wolf Hunt: An FSB agent offered to organise a breach in the Russian blockade
of Groznyy, so the Chechens could escape, in exchange for US$100,000. Subsequent radio
transmissions persuaded the Chechens that Russian forces were moving to create the breach. A
small group of insurgents were allowed to escape, the main insurgent force then followed. The
main force then encountered a significant force of Russian land force elements, with gunship
support.
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appreciate this problem, because if they do not, they will be undermined by the
insurgent’s use of the media as a conduit of propaganda.
From the outset of the second Chechen conflict, the Russians used political
and diplomatic forms of force to supplement their military capability. Due to this
more holistic approach the Russians attained greater levels of national and
international support in the conflict. The Russians were also careful to ensure all
military operations would have positive political consequences. The Russians
focused greater attention in the second Chechen conflict on controlling
international interference and ensuring that their command systems were unified.
In terms of military principles, the Russian’s strategy more precisely
corresponded with the conflict, as were the combat and support forces that
deployed to the theatre. The use of professional personnel, enhanced intelligence
and communications, and enhanced combined arms and joint warfare were all
central to the improved Russian operations that occurred in the second Chechen
conflict. The forces deployed were also encouraged to use their initiative and act
independently. The Russians were more effective in the second Chechen conflict
because they applied doctrinal and military principles more precisely tailored to
the conflict they faced.
Chechen Resistance
Chechen tactics had evolved little since the first Chechen conflict. Primarily, the
Chechens utilised the previously examined column ambush tactics. However, the
effectiveness of these tactics had reduced due to improved Russian tactics. As an
example, only one Russian tank was lost in Groznyy throughout the second war.60
This is a significant Russian improvement, given 105 Russian armoured vehicles
were destroyed on day one of the first Chechen war. However, the Chechen
forces were highly effective at infiltration tactics. The Russians found Chechen
forces infiltrating buildings and positions that had been cleared, and in some cases
were defended. In addition, Chechen forces were often able to break out of
surrounded positions, and then surround Russian forces.61 The Chechens also
effectively utilised subterranean networks for logistics, reinforcement and medical
requirements.62 A significant change to Chechen operations in the second
Chechen conflict was improved communications and electronic warfare
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capabilities. Communications were improved with the establishment of an
analogue cellular network, with two base stations in Chechnya, and an Advanced
Mobile Phone Service (AMPS) provider in Ingushetia. International Maritime
Satellite (INMARSAT) and Iridium satellite communications systems were also
used for intercity and international exchanges. Chechens also used electronic,
acoustic, radio-technical and radar as means of gaining intelligence.63 However,
as aforementioned, extensive Russian EW and the potential for covert SIGINT
against Chechen communications and electronic assets significantly reduced the
effectiveness of these assets.
This section indicates the significance of Russian force protection and
constant situational awareness. This was because of the Chechen’s abilities at
infiltration and disguise. In addition, Chechen communications and electronic
intelligence capabilities clearly indicated the need for the Russians to wage EW
and have the potential to gather signals intelligence. Moreover, the significance
of intelligence agencies and armed forces possessing interpreters was illustrated.
Without these interpreters raw intelligence would have been worthless.
Conclusion – Doctrine
The rejection of LIC as a separate form of warfare was the primary impediment to
effective Soviet operations in Afghanistan. This same mistake was again made
by the Russians in the 1994-1996 Chechen war. However, the Russians accepted
the reality of LIC in the second Chechen war. Correspondingly, operations
improved considerably in the second Chechen conflict. The doctrinal lessons here
is simple: militaries must train for all possible contingencies and doctrines must
reflect the unique nature of differing types of conflict. If they do not, weaknesses
will be revealed for the enemy to exploit.
Intelligence
Internecine rivalry between intelligence and military agencies is: (1) highly
disruptive; and (2) will vastly reduce military effectiveness, especially when
coalitions are formed. The Russian GRU and KGB, MVD and MoD, and later
FSB, all lacked unity in command and created mutually detrimental obstructions
in planning, intelligence gathering and sharing, and in the application of force.
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These problems were not overcome until the 1999 intervention into Chechnya.
Human intelligence is the leading form of intelligence in counterinsurgency, as
was demonstrated in Afghanistan and both Chechen campaigns. The use of photo
intelligence improved throughout the Soviet/Russian campaigns, generally
enabling intelligence gathering without risk. However, photo intelligence is not
well suited to human targets or urban warfare. Signals intelligence and electronic
intelligence were completely irrelevant in Afghanistan, and poorly utilised in the
first Chechen war. However, with the increased use of advanced electronic
communications by the Chechens in the second war, and the deployment of
Russian interception means, these intelligence gathering forms became more
relevant. In addition, Arabic and Chechen speakers were widely used in the
second Chechen war, so as to exploit intercepted Chechen signals intelligence.
Accurate intelligence is one of the key principles in counterinsurgency.
Small Scale Operations
Small scale operations are fundamental to counterinsurgency. Independence,
training, authority, trust, secure communications, mobility and the confidence to
take the initiative must be conceptual imperatives in any counterinsurgency
doctrine. All terrain types must be planned and trained for. Small scale mountain
and desert warfare were neglected by the Soviets in Afghanistan, and similarly
urban warfare was neglected by the Russians in Chechnya. These deficiencies led
to casualties and the loss of equipment. Once these training issues were resolved,
Russian operations became far more successful. The Soviet/Russian equivalent of
counterinsurgency troops, which proved most effective in Afghanistan and
Chechnya were airborne, reconnaissance and Spetsnaz. Their operations included
raids, infiltration, mining, search, disruption and destroy missions. Moreover,
these forces were invariably inserted and extracted by air. Airlift and strike
enabled the application of greater force at the point of conflict, this reclaimed
surprise, deception and the initiative. C2 improved in the second Chechen war,
becoming decentralised and enabling initiative, situational awareness and mutual
reinforcement. Thus elite operations were successful when combined with
prompt aerial or land based indirect fire support. The use of conscripts was
detrimental to Russian urban operations. This was because urban training was not
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widely disseminated. In addition, the skills learned in combat were lost when
soldiers were rotated. Moreover, NCOs and junior officers were continuously in
short supply, so were radios, night vision devices, silencers and binoculars.
Terrain
Topography, weather and infrastructure are critical factors in effectively planning
and conducting counterinsurgency operations. The extremes of temperature in
Afghanistan severely hampered the use of mechanised equipment and the
durability of troops. Given that air mobility and air strike are important in
counterinsurgency, adverse conditions caused by smoke, wind, fog, cloud or rain
highly are highly significant issues. This is particularly the case when all weather,
night capable aircraft are unavailable or scarce. Air strike assets in LIC must be
armoured, heavily armed, able to loiter on the battlefield and be slow enough to
acquire targets. However, these requirements can be discounted or disregarded if
air-launched PGMs are utilised. This is because PGMs can be launched further
from the target than unguided ordnance, which in turn means aircraft can remain
outside the range of enemy fire. Moreover, heavier munitions (especially those
launched from the air) that are to be utilised in cities should be limited to PGMs.
There are two reasons for this: (1) so as to limit collateral damage and harm done
to civilians; and (2) prevent urban terrain from being turned into rubble, which is
a terrain better suited to defence than undamaged urban structures. This of course
is an ideal principle that may be impossible to achieve in certain circumstances.
Consequently and importantly, this principle should not prevent the use of those
weapons that are available, if the ideal weapon is unavailable.
Aviation
The Mi-24 and the Su-25 proved versatile and decisive in both Afghanistan and
Chechnya. The survivability of attack helicopters in both conflicts was improved
with the introduction of defensive manoeuvres. These manoeuvres included
terrain hugging and pop-up tactics, complex target approach manoeuvres, high
speed approaches and mutual cover fire. When utilised as convoy defenders, Mi-
24 pilots were granted operational independence. This enabled the use of
embarked infantry to deny the enemy key tactical positions. The Mi-26 and Mi-
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8TV2/3 were found to be effective and reliable helicopters. However, there is a
need for an all-weather, day and night, PGM-capable replacement for the Mi-24.
The Ka-50 and the Mi-28 constitute the likely replacements. The Ka-50 was
deployed in field trials in Chechnya, although cost is prohibiting the widespread
introduction of this aircraft. The Su-24M provided all weather and night
reconnaissance and strike capabilities. However, the most significant requirement
for the effective use of airborne assets is timely intelligence. Tactical intelligence
is most effectively provided by UAVs, the integration of helicopter and strike
aircraft and synergy between air and ground units. However, these requirements
can only occur after realistic and extensive training. Within such a complex
environment, C2 and long-range surveillance assets, analogous with the A-50
were also required. In terms of military principles, air assets must be viewed as
tools that perform most effectively when seamlessly connected to intelligence and
command nodes in a joint environment.
Armour
The initial use of armour in Afghanistan’s mountains and in Chechen urban areas
provides analogous operational lessons. The least suited armoured vehicle in
Afghan and Chechen close terrain was the wheeled BTR. This vehicle lacked
armour, firepower and manoeuvrability. Absolute vigilance, impenetrable
infantry escort and stand-off support tactics must be maintained if such vehicles
(wheeled BTRs) are deployed in mountainous or urban terrain. The T-
55/62/72/80 tanks and BMP also lacked manoeuvrability and had a constrained
firing envelope. The airmobile BMD was lighter and more manoeuvrable, while
the self propelled AA ZSU series performed a critical field suppression role. In
general, Russian armoured vehicles suffered from a lack of visibility, a propensity
to overheat, track loss in mountainous terrain, poor maintenance and an inability
to survive without air cover. When fitted with chain guns, AA guns, AGS-17s
and ATGMs, armour became more adept at creating suppressing fire and was thus
more suited to LIC. The importance of reactive armour became apparent in the
Chechen campaigns, as armoured units were predominantly destroyed by fire on
non-protected surfaces. One effective Russian improvised defence for armoured
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units, against RPG and other shaped charges, was a wire mesh cage installed 25-
30cm from the hull.
Combined Arms
The use of armour in close terrain requires skilled procedure. Soldiers must be
trained to disembark, if not already disembarked, to defend armour and strike at
targets of opportunity. Ground reconnaissance and the control of high ground
(and subterranean structures in cities) are critical. AA guns provide effective
suppression fire against ground targets, and have an unconstrained fire envelope.
Overlapping indirect fire support is essential for shielded mobility. Thus, fire
bases with heavy artillery or MRLSs are important. In mountainous and urban
terrain, the essential combat element is the soldier. However, in contemporary
engagements their firepower should be supplemented with compact artillery
pieces, heavy mortar, automatic grenade systems, forward air and artillery
observers, combat engineers and reconnaissance troops. Combined arms is an
important military principle because the combination of differing weapons
systems amalgamates individual strengths and diminishes individual
vulnerabilities.
Combat Service Support
Logistics, health care, living conditions, isolation and maintenance problems will
detract from morale, discipline and effectiveness. LIC generally occurs in
underdeveloped countries, which have underdeveloped internal road and rail
networks. This underdeveloped nature of the road and rail networks has two
consequences. First, tactical airlift will have to facilitate a high degree of combat
service support. This in turn will reduce the availability of these tactical airlift
aircraft for combat missions. Second, the initiative and flexibility of the
counterinsurgent will be undermined and the insurgent will be able to more
effectively anticipate operations. Therefore strategically, air mobility will become
more significant for strike, reconnaissance, surveillance and transport. However
over-reliance on a single system, to the detriment of a combined arms approach,
will enable single weapon counter-tactics. Furthermore, air units require guarded
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bases and approaches, considerable logistics trains and create static base defence.
These issues were consistent problems for the Russians.
Civil-Military Affairs
Domestic and theatre civil affairs operations are critical to counterinsurgency, as
the legitimacy of the government is being fought over. The Soviet operations in
Afghanistan were so appalling that the allegiance of the Afghan people was
forfeited to the Mujahedeen. However, the Russians won the media war in the
second Chechen conflict, by more effectively managing the media. The Chechens
were described as terrorists, reporters were controlled and events were shaped to
maintain public support and reduce international condemnation of the war. The
Chechens fought their own public affairs war, exploiting non-combatants,
committing acts of terrorism, spreading disinformation and booby trapping
wounded and dead Russian combatants. The objective of these Chechen
operations was to intimidate Russian soldiers and the Russian public. However,
the Chechen public affairs operations were unsuccessful, as support for the
Chechen cause was alienated and support for Russian operations in Chechnya was
fortified. Civil operations are an important doctrinal principle in
counterinsurgency. The Russians applied political and diplomatic forms of force
in the second Chechen war, which can be partly viewed as civil operations.
However, the Russians failed to use social and economic tools to win the hearts
and minds of the civil population in the aforementioned conflicts.
Urban Dominance
The Russian example of urban dominance in the second Chechen conflict
emphasised the following. Theatre isolation and ground based reconnaissance are
critical aspects to preparation of the urban battlefield. Key positions on the
outskirts of cities must be occupied before the principal assault is made, and in
doing so infantry movements should be preceded by artillery bombardment. All
sections of the city must be occupied sequentially and individually cleared of
enemy personnel and weapons. The most significant lessons the Russians learned
in the second Chechen war, was to know the enemy. Once the Russians
comprehended the Chechens, the Russians achieved victory.
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Nationalism versus Clan, Blood or Sect
Knowing the enemy’s loyalties is also critical in counterinsurgency. National
identity, in both Afghanistan and Chechnya, was a veneer. Loyalty to the family
and the clan are the paramount considerations for the average Chechen and
Afghan. Outside the capital cities, vestiges of modernity fade, economically,
politically and socially. Set in virtually a feudal environment, loyalty to the clan
is the foundation for internal tension and struggles for power. The semblance of
nationalism is predominantly discernible when external threats bond the mutually
antagonistic clans together. Counterinsurgents must be aware of how their actions
will disparately influence the concerned clans, how this will alter internal power
structures, and how these factors will influence the long term stability of the state
and region. Counterinsurgents must also be aware of clan motives behind both
detrimental and constructive actions, these actions may have everything or
nothing to do with the counterinsurgency.
Summary
Soviet operations in Afghanistan and Russian operations in the first Chechen war
were relatively ineffective. This ineffectiveness in counterinsurgency principally
occurred due to: poor doctrine; internecine rivalry among intelligence and military
authorities; a neglect of small scale operations, combined arms and joint warfare;
as well as an application of military force that was so indiscriminate and harmful
that it actively reduced the support of the population for the counterinsurgent.
Many of these problems were solved by the second Chechen conflict and because
of these changes Russian counterinsurgency operations were far more effective.
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Chapter Three
The American Experience in LIC:
Somalia and Afghanistan
This chapter provides an analysis of the American intervention into Somalia, from
1992 to 1994, and the American involvement in Afghanistan, from 2001 to 2004.
The Somali example illustrates the complexity of ethnic division and cultural
values, and how these can adversely influence forces committed to
counterinsurgency operations. The Somali example also demonstrates the adverse
influence rules of engagement (ROE) can have on coalition operations, and how
these ROE can be exploited by opposition forces. In terms of tactics employed by
the American led coalition, Somalia illustrates the importance of projectable
forces, and the absolute requirement for jointness, combined arms, speed and
intelligence for counterinsurgency operations in Low Intensity Conflict (LIC).
The Somali case also shows how coalition partners both should and should not
operate together, and exemplifies the critical nature of training to create coalition
synergy prior to deployment.
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), or the Afghan War, is demonstrative
of many of the same cultural complexities, as in the Somali case. However, OEF
was a highly effective campaign, and is indicative of the capabilities of a modern
coalition led by the United States. The critical nature of joint operations,
transformational weapons, airpower, technological and command improvements
were proven in OEF. So too was the effectiveness of psychological operations in
modern warfare.
The principal research theme of this thesis, as elucidated in the previous
chapters, is to analyse, collate and present operational, tactical and strategic
guidelines that can be used by counterinsurgent forces in LIC. It is important to
note that these guidelines combine four basic forms of force: political, economic,
diplomatic and military. These four forms of force, which are sub-themes within
this research, are tools that can be applied so as to achieve the four primary
principles of counterinsurgency: the control of international interference, the
provision of internal security, the application of civil operations, and the
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installation of a unitary command. This research in mainly focused on the
military force sub-theme elucidated above. So as to analyse the effectiveness of
specific military force actions in counterinsurgency, there are ten military force
principles that form a normative standard that bind this research. These military
force principles include doctrinal precision, professionalism, independence,
initiative, force precision, restraint, combined arms, joint force, integrated
communications and accurate human intelligence.
Each of the subsequent sections is initially historical, broadly examining
the background of the aforementioned conflicts. This background is further
deconstructed, so as to analyse specific aspects of each conflict. Within each
section, initial implications are examined. These initial implications are then
analysed collectively. This collective analysis is a component part of the broad
theoretical analysis of LIC, contained in the second part of this thesis.
The American Intervention in Somalia 1992-1994
The risk of embarking upon peace enforcement missions was illustrated by the
American intervention into Somalia between 1992 and 1994. In this conflict, the
promotion of peace descended into the confounding violence of LIC. Somalia has
been characterised by, and embroiled in, violence, almost since its inception as a
state in 1960. The reign of Somalia’s fourth president, Mohamed Siad Barre,
epitomises the apparent futility of central governance in Somalia. Nationalism, as
a uniting force, has eluded the state because of clan loyalty and nepotism.
Moreover, nationalism in Somalia has only been genuinely recognised in times of
international conflict. For example, nationalism was most evident in Somalia,
while Somalia was at war with Ethiopia. Somalia’s failure in this war signalled
the end of Somalia’s age of nationalism. The diffusion of power in Somalia was
only slowed by the despotic nature of the Barre regime. The clan basis of Barre’s
regime and the political/clan organisation of the state are analysed, with reference
to the American led intervention.
All Somalis can be categorised into one of the following six clans: Darod,
Digil, Dir, Hawiye, Issaq or Rahanwin. However, each of these clans is further
segregated into subgroups. For example, the Darod clan is comprised of the
Dolbahante, Majerteen, Marehan and Ogadeni family clans. Barre was of the
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Darod clan, and specifically the Marehan family. Hence, Marehan family
members held the majority of key government appointments. Members of the
Darod lineage were, almost without exception, also elevated to positions of
economic and political prominence in Somalia. The exception was the Majerteen
family, who were excluded from central political power. However, the Majerteen
family held positions of power in the army, and were behind the failed 1978 coup.
A relationship was also maintained with the Dolbahante and Ogadeni clans due to
Barre’s family connections. The Ogadeni clan maintained significant political
power, as it constituted the majority of the officer corps in the armed forces. This
concentration of the state’s power and resources in the hands of a few inevitably
created intense opposition from the other clans.
As has been elucidated above, there was resistance to the Barre regime
from within the Darod clan. Specifically, the Majerteen family opposed Barre,
under the aegis of the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF). However,
Barre’s main opposition was constituted by three clan based insurgent groups: (1)
the Somali National Movement (SNM) established by the Issaq of Northern
Somalia; (2) the United Somali Congress (USC) based on the Hawiye of Central
Somalia; and (3) the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM) of the Ogadenis.
Barre’s old age and ill health signalled the end of the Darod dynasty. The
Darod sub-clans all vied for political power. At the time a peace agreement with
Ethiopia was proposed by the Somali Prime Minister, Ibrahim Egal. This
agreement was designed to remove the SSDF’s and the SNM’s cross border
sanctuary. This infuriated the Ogadeni clan and Somali nationalists, who saw the
action as giving away their homeland. In a move to ward off the impending
destruction of the Barre regime by the Darod clan, the President refused Ethiopian
reconciliation and decentralised power within Somalia.
Due to Barre’s increasingly severe subjugation of all non-Darod clans, a
major armed uprising began in 1989. Formations of the SNM and USC thrust
south-east from the Ogaden through central Somalia, while a SPM force advanced
from the south. As the USC and SNM advanced on Mogadishu, armed civilians
under USC control began an armed revolt on December 31, 1990. Barre’s regime
was overthrown on January 26, 1991.
A new president, Ali Mohammad Mahdi, and prime minister, Omar Arteh
Galib, along with new ministers, were installed. Many of these new politicians
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were of the Hawiye clan. General Aideed, the leader of the USC, was greatly
angered by the new distribution of power, as he coveted the position of president
for himself.
The anti-Barre alliance of the three main insurgent groups (SNM, USC
and SPM) split immediately after the downfall of the Barre regime. These groups
hated each other as much as they hated Barre. The ensuing internecine conflict
between the insurgent clans, in conjunction with a severe drought, caused over
three hundred thousand casualties, displacement of two million refugees, and the
destruction of all government functions and most of Somalia’s infrastructure.
Some of the worst fighting occurred in Mogadishu between rival factions of the
USC. The strongest faction was Habr Gedir, led by Aideed.1
United Nations Involvement
The humanitarian crisis in Somalia caused the United Nations (UN) to intervene.
This operation was not only a humanitarian mission, but ultimately was intended
to rectify the political and economic causes of the famine.2 The latter United
Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM) were “to take appropriate action,
including enforcement measures, to establish throughout Somalia a secure
environment for humanitarian assistance. To that end, UNOSOM II was to
complete, through disarmament and reconciliation, the task begun by UNITAF
[United Task Force] for the restoration of peace, stability, law and order. Its main
responsibilities included monitoring the cessation of hostilities, preventing
resumption of violence, seizing unauthorised small arms, maintaining security at
ports, airports and lines of communication required for delivery of humanitarian
assistance, continuing mine-clearing, and assisting in repatriation of refugees in
Somalia. UNOSOM II was also entrusted with assisting the Somali people in
rebuilding their economy and social and political life, re-establishing the
country’s institutional structure, achieving national political reconciliation,
recreating a Somali State based on democratic governance and rehabilitating the
country’s economy and infrastructure”.3 To accomplish this objective, the UN
mission was augmented militarily and politically, with the aim of disarming the
militias. This UN action directly contravened the interests of the Habr Gedir clan
and Aideed.
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Significantly, discussing intervention in Somalia is akin to discussing
intervention in Germany before the Bismarkian unification. As applied in the
instance of Somalia, the notion of the state as a single entity is an erroneous belief
and will corrupt any consequent reasoning.4 Since external action will redistribute
power between divergent groups in the state, their interests must be understood to
anticipate their reactions. Correspondingly, the UN’s prescribed actions took on
an unintentional character.
UNOSOM and UNITAF: Provide Relief and Restore Hope
As of April 1992, UNOSOM was tasked primarily with monitoring the ceasefire
in Mogadishu and protecting the delivery of humanitarian supplies, personnel, and
logistics hubs and links. These operations were extended, in August of 1992, to
envelope all of Somalia. By December 1992, security in Somalia had degenerated
to a point whereby, humanitarian assistance and the function of daily life were
impeded. Thus, UNITAF was created to enforce a peaceful environment.
On March 27 and 28, 1992, ceasefire agreements were signed between the
factions fighting in Mogadishu. This allowed the first deployment of observers
and security personnel, for the protection of humanitarian relief staff. 50
observers and 500 infantrymen were deployed to enable humanitarian assistance
to reach five million people. This humanitarian and security effort was extended
to the rest of Somalia, beginning on September 8, 1992. UNOSOM strength was
projected to increase to 4,219 troops and 50 observers. The humanitarian effort:
(1) provided food, water, medical provisions, shelter, seeds and tools; and (2)
attempted to halt refugee flows and rebuild institutions and civil society.
These efforts were undermined by continued disagreements between
Somali clans throughout the country. However, the most significant conflict
occurred in Mogadishu. General Aideed, on October 28, 1992, ordered the
UNOSOM humanitarian coordinator and Pakistani battalion to leave Mogadishu.
Aideed then attacked Pakistani forces at the Mogadishu airport, while his
opponent Mohammed Mahdi shelled a merchant vessel bringing food into the port
at Mogadishu. Unlike Aideed, Mahdi wanted UNOSOM to take full control of
the port facility. Due to these circumstances the UN adopted a resolution on
December 3, 1992, for UNITAF to be formed. This action was taken to create a
64
secure environment in Somalia for aid to be distributed. The United States (U.S.)
offered to lead the force.
UNITAF’s objectives included securing ports, key installations and food
distribution points. In addition, UNITAF was to provide protection for
humanitarian relief personnel. These operations were to be accomplished by
28,000 U.S. troops and 17,000 troops from 20 other nations. UNITAF improved
the security environment in Somalia significantly. However, threats were still
posed to humanitarian staff, especially in Mogadishu. As a product of the
improved security environment, national reconciliation began, whereby 14 Somali
political units agreed to ceasefires, disarmament and general reconciliation. As a
result UNOSOM II was established, to rebuild political, economic and social
order in a new democratic Somali state.5
UNOSOM II
Beginning in March 1993, UNOSOM II had integrated the operations of UNITAF
with the reconstruction of Somali infrastructure, mine clearance, arms seizure
tasks, the repatriation of refugees and the enforcement of peace. On March 27,
1993, in Addis Ababa, all 15 of the warring Somali factions signed an agreement
for national reconciliation. The agreement was a framework for disarmament,
reconstruction, the restoration of property rights and a means for social transition
toward peace. Although Aideed had signed the agreement, it became clear in May
1993 that he would not abide by the agreement.
On June 5, 1993, while undertaking a disarmament operation in
Mogadishu, Pakistani soldiers were attacked by Aideed’s United Somali
Congress/Somali National Alliance (USC/SNA) militia. This attack resulted in
significant Pakistani losses, including 25 dead, 54 wounded and 10 soldiers
missing in action. As a result of this ambush, SNA weapons facilities and caches
were disabled or destroyed and Mogadishu Radio was removed from Aideed’s
control. Aideed was asked to surrender by an UNOSOM II representative, while
a civil affairs operation was undertaken to explain these actions to the population
of Mogadishu.
The U.S. Quick Reaction Force (QRF) was deployed in support of
UNITAF. QRF was augmented by Task Force Ranger (TFR), which incorporated
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130 Delta commandos, a Ranger company and elements of the Army Special
Operations Aviation Unit. This deployment was provoked by continued SNA
attacks on UNOSOM II personnel, and specifically after a U.S. Military Police
convoy was ambushed, causing the death of 4 U.S. soldiers.6
At the strategic level, political, economic, diplomatic and military tools
were being used by UN forces in Somalia to bring about a resolution to the
conflict. However, as illustrated below, the political ramifications of military
losses taken in an attempt to create internal security and establish an environment
conducive to civil operations can cause operational failure.
Blackhawk Down: Mogadishu, Somalia, 3-4 October 1993
On October 3, 1993, a company of 75 U.S. Rangers and a squadron of 40 U.S.
Delta commandos fast roped (deployed via hovering helicopter) into Mogadishu.
Their objective was to: (1) envelope a meeting between Habr Gedir leaders; (2)
secure all hostages, especially two of Aideed’s lieutenants; and (3) escort them
back to the U.S. base via military convoy. Initially the raid was successful, until
two UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters were lost to enemy fire. The downing of these
two helicopters caused U.S. units to be immobilised within Mogadishu.
The SNA appeared to be a relatively insubstantial enemy. The SNA were
only equipped with AK-47/74 assault rifles and Rocket Propelled Grenade
launchers (RPGs). Moreover, SNA tactics relied principally upon the ambush.
However, their sheer weight of numbers caused U.S. positions to be overrun.
Furthermore, the SNA knew their enemy. The SNA had come to understand the
U.S. order of battle, as six similar U.S. raids had been performed in Mogadishu.
The previous raids had been executed at night, without success. Hence, U.S.
planners decided a daytime raid was worth the extra risk to capture Aideed.
Consequently, when TFR fast roped into Mogadishu, the SNA was aware a relief
convoy would be sent to extract the TFR soldiers and their hostages. As a
consequence, the SNA began to set up ambushes along the expected routes of the
convoy. After the first helicopter was shot down, Super 6-1, TFR was able to
manoeuvre to and control the first crash site. The relief convoy was despatched,
but was unable to reach the crash site of Super 6-4. A further convoy was
66
despatched from the U.S. base. However, it too was continually ambushed and
forced to exit Mogadishu.
The inadequate nature of the mechanised assets under American control
(five-ton trucks and lightly armoured High-Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled
Vehicles (HMMWVs) rather than armoured vehicles) forfeited the American’s
ability to gain control of the Super 6-4 crash site. The lack of armour also caused
heavy American casualties due to unimpeded Somali rifle and RPG fire.
Eventually, the Super 6-4 crash site was overrun by SNA militiamen, whilst the
Super 6-1 crash site and TFR were extracted on the morning of October 4. The
extraction force included 4 Pakistani T-55 tanks and 28 Malaysian commanded,
German Condor Armoured Personnel Carriers (APCs).7 This rescue did not
proceed without incident and will be discussed below. The rescue was further
undermined by the scarcity of American mechanised assets. Simply, the
extraction troops could not be transported quickly back to the main American base
at the airport to further their mission.
The Extraction of U.S. Forces: Mogadishu, Somalia, 3-4 October 1993
On October 1993, Companies A and C of the 2nd Battalion, 14th Infantry
Regiment, 10th Mountain Division were ordered to force an ingress to and extract
American forces from Mogadishu. Company A was tasked with extracting the
American forces from Super 6-1’s crash site, while Company C performed the
same function at Super 6-4’s crash site.
Following the embarkation of American troops into the APCs, the
Pakistani led column proceeded towards the first waypoint, the Super 6-1 crash
site. Mid way to the first waypoint the T-55s left the column. At this point RPG
shrapnel hit the first APC, unnerving its driver, who proceeded to speed away
from the remainder of the column. The first two APCs, which were separated
from the column, deviated from the original plan. These two APCs were stopped
by a Somali ambush, which immobilised both vehicles.
Following the immobilisation of the two APCs, the embarked American
forces dismounted and formed a secure perimeter. This force consisted of
approximately two squads of dissimilar troops. The force was unable to establish
a communications link, due to the urban environment. Due to incoming enemy
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fire and wounded personnel (Malaysian), the American forces entered a building
and deployed in defensive positions.
The squad’s Radio Telephone Operator (RTO) was still unable to establish
communications, until a PRC-77 radio was used in the clear (non-encrypted) to
establish communications. Hence a further force of Americans was separated
within Mogadishu, requiring extraction. Company C was then tasked to move
towards the separated forces, and an AH-1 Cobra gunship was deployed as fire
support. However, Company C was unable to change positions due to excessive
resistance. The separated forces attempted to reach Company C, but took further
casualties and were immobilised. At this point, transport was confirmed inbound
(two Condor APCs). Concurrently, an AH-6 Little Bird gunship arrived on
station to provide fire support. When the APCs arrived a smoke screen was laid,
the soldiers embarked and were transported to safety.
For this specific mission, the American forces were not provided with
sufficient information concerning the route between waypoints and the
composition of the column. The American forces could not communicate with
the Malaysian APC crews. The Americans were not familiar with the German
Condor APC. They were disoriented and unaware of their separated status from
the column until disembarkation. Communication between American units was
also dysfunctional, due to the urban environment. Fortunately, training and
professionalism and airborne fire support saved the soldiers lives.
Tactics, Communications and Intelligence: American and Somali
American tactics in Mogadishu consisted primarily of urban infantry tactics,
devoid mostly of combined arms support. Manoeuvre was facilitated by squads
fighting in tandem, one generating suppression fire, while the other would move.
The movement of American vehicles was constrained by continual Somali
ambushes. These ambushes often forced vehicles to stop on intersections, which
consequently drew considerable enemy fire.
Somali tactics utilised urban terrain and non-combatants for concealed
movement, ambushes for surprise and dispersion of personnel to enable
survivability. Not only did the SNA use non-combatants as human shields, but
also to gather intelligence. For example, Somali civilians would often point out
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U.S. positions to concealed Somali gunmen. However, these tactics were not as
effective as they could have been. Somali gunmen caused unintentional friendly
fire deaths, as they would fire from both sides of streets simultaneously. Unlike
Chechen insurgents, the Somali’s did not attempt to disable lead and tail vehicles
in convoys, in an effort to trap the rest of the convoy. RPGs were used both as an
anti-vehicular and anti-personnel weapon, and against low flying helicopters.
American intelligence in Mogadishu was little better than Russian
intelligence in Groznyy, estimating SNA troop strength between one and twelve
thousand. Somali anti-intelligence efforts were simple but effective. As the U.S.
helicopters closed upon Mogadishu airspace, fires were lit to summon SNA
fighters. A secondary effect of these fires was to reduce airborne visibility, and
command and control of ground forces by airborne units.
Tactically, the October 3 mission was a success for the U.S. Hostages
were taken and 18 U.S. casualties occurred, while approximately 500 casualties
were inflicted on the SNA. Strategically though, the U.S. was defeated since: (1)
the U.S. withdrew from Somalia; and (2) U.S. resolve was questioned by
adversaries and this continues to be the case.
Coalition warfare proved non-cohesive. Communication was completely
inadequate, and disparate goal orientation undermined personnel survivability and
the potential for success. Interoperability must be addressed prior to the
deployment of coalition troops. Even seemingly simple exercises, like loading
troops into troop transports must be trained for. Moreover, transportation is a
force multiplier. Thus, there must be a sufficient supply to address the needs of
entire units.8
Restraint and Civil Resolve
The fallacy of restraint in war was Clausewitz’s first dictum. The side that
imposes self restraining principles will cede the advantage.9 Restraint
undermined U.S. tactical, strategic and public resolve to remain in Somalia. This
restraint was indirectly imposed by way of the media’s unrestrained and
imbalanced broadcasting, which was accepted by the administration. For a
counterinsurgent operating in LIC, public resolve will always be an issue, since
national interests may not be central to the engagement. In Somalia, millions of
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lives were at risk of starvation and subjection to violence, yet the U.S., and as a
result, the UN, would not remain in Somalia.
Unrestrained media coverage of the Somali conflict focused public
opinion directly upon jus ad bellum and jus in bello. As a result, combatant and
non-combatant casualties and excessively constrained firepower options were
forced upon the U.S. forces. This translated into restrictive ROE for U.S. forces,
and the exploitation of non-combatants by the SNA.
The conclusion here is that Civil Affairs (CA) –relations with the
population in the war zone- and Psychological Operations (PSYOPs) are
absolutely essential to: (1) undermine the morale of the insurgent; (2) reduce the
support of the population for the insurgent; (3) remove non-combatants from the
battlefield; and (4) foster an environment conducive to Human Intelligence
(HUMINT).
ROE must be flexible. There must be limits to the ROE, but they must be
applied at the discretion of commanders, throughout the command structure.
ROE must balance non-combatant casualties and collateral damage against
friendly casualties. The outcome will have a direct bearing upon the Public
Affairs (PA) –relations with the home population – campaign. ROE will also
have a direct bearing on tactics, but should not prevent the combined arms effect
of armour, artillery and airpower.10 Walzer’s adage remains salient “soldiers must
feel safe among civilians if civilians are ever to feel safe from soldiers”.11
Counterinsurgent PA operations cannot simply compete with the
insurgent’s use of the media; the counterinsurgent must manage and assist the
media in obtaining facts. The media can polarise perceptions and prescribe
popular public debate about conflicts. The media should be managed on the
battlefield and assisted in reporting insurgent transgressions against human rights
and just war conventions. But this should not undermine the perception of
honesty which the public has for the military. Images of dead soldiers and a lack
of clear national interest will undermine any PA strategy. The media has become
highly significant in LIC, as has been outlined in the previous chapter. The
counterinsurgent must manage and assist the media, because if they do not the
insurgent will use the media as a conduit of propaganda. The counterinsurgent
must also make clear their objectives to the media and public. If the public
understands the objectives of the counterinsurgent, they will be more likely to
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support a lengthy conflict. Exit strategies that are not directly related to objectives
should be avoided. This is because exit strategies can appear as concessions to
the insurgent, which will only foster further violence.
Hardware and HUMINT
The 10th Mountain Division were constrained by ROE in their use of firepower, so
much so that standard operating procedures were undermined. Specifically, the
10th Division was prevented from deploying tanks or Infantry Fighting Vehicles
(IFVs), which are essential to urban manoeuvre warfare. Air cover was restricted
to AH-6 Little Birds and AH-1 Super Cobras, while AC-130 Spectre gunship
operations were grounded. The use of artillery was also prevented.
Adequate situational awareness eluded the U.S. forces in Somalia. This
was due to a lack of intelligence, and an urban environment non-conducive to
effective command, control and communications (C3). Intelligence was provided
by UN military forces, including special forces, CA operations, in addition to 20
Somali Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) operatives, humanitarian agencies and
Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs). Despite these intelligence sources,
Aideed eluded capture. There was a further obstruction to real time intelligence,
one of dissemination. The effectiveness of wireless communications was severely
reduced by urban terrain. Interference from structures and other electromagnetic
traffic undermined tactical communications. This meant units were artificially
separated, and thus, unable to achieve objectives, or support and reinforce friendly
units. Furthermore, aerial reconnaissance by aircraft, satellites and unmanned air
vehicles (UAVs) was underutilised, due to an inability to communicate gathered
information to combat units. The SNA used runners, beat drums and flashed
lights as a means of communication.
Airpower in Mogadishu was constrained by ROE, Somali air defences,
urban terrain, poor visibility and difficulties with precision engagement.
However, this belies the psychological and physical significance of CAS and
airborne manoeuvre. The AH-1 Cobra and AH-6 Little Bird attack helicopters
had a positive psychological effect on American infantry, while deterring Somali
vehicles and personnel. Of the weapons systems deployed on the American attack
helicopters, the Cobra’s Tube-Launched, Optically-tracked, Wire-guided missile
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(TOW) and AIM-1 20mm laser designated cannon proved highly effective due to
their ability to provide precision firepower. However, within urban terrain, slow
moving helicopters become vulnerable to small arms fire and RPGs.12
Combined arms operations are essential for counterinsurgents operating in
LIC, as combined arms reduces the opportunity for the enemy to cause friendly
casualties (Although, combined arms may lead to collateral damage). However, if
the insurgent chooses urban terrain and if non-combatants tacitly and overtly
assist combatants, it is impossible to reduce collateral damage. Issues such as
this, concerning the distinction between combatants and non-combatants will be
discussed in the subsequent section of the thesis. There is another conclusion that
might be drawn here and that is that CAS and airborne manoeuvre are critical for
a counterinsurgent operating upon the LIC battlefield, even in urban terrain.
Joint operations depend upon effective and timely communications.
However, this was negated by the lack of tactical communications,
electromagnetic interference, and the inability for different services to
communicate directly.
Acting upon non-military sources of intelligence can also create
vulnerabilities within a counterinsurgent’s strategy. Private individuals who
supply information may not be acting out of altruism. They may be attempting to
manipulate military operations to further their own interests or undermine the
counterinsurgency. Humanitarian agencies may be an effective source of
information. However, they too may be vulnerable to exploitation by the
indigenous employees working for them, who remain loyal to their country or
clan.
An effective Coalition Task Force: Kismayu, Somalia, February-March 1993
Within the operational period of the UNITAF mission (Restore Hope) major clan
warfare erupted in Kismayu, southern Somalia. American Task Force (TF) 2-87
was redeployed to Kismayu to replace TF 3-14 and reinforce the Belgian 1st
Parachute Battalion. Once deployed in Kismayu, TF 2-87 and the Belgian forces
conducted a combined search of all buildings, hunted insurgents and treated
wounded Somalis.
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Integrated command and control is critical to coalition warfare. To
facilitate an integrated approach to operations in Kismayu, the American and
Belgian forces exchanged liaison officers (LNOs) between command posts and
down to company level. To effectively coordinate the joint forces, LNOs must be
provided with equipment capable of communicating with all friendly forces. All
coalition communications should operate at a similar standard in all combat
environments. Most significantly, the LNO must be fully versed with the use of
the equipment.
In Kismayu, integrated command and control (C2) was further enhanced
by the utilisation of a coalition crewed Allouette observation helicopter. This
helicopter was on station throughout the major coalition operations. The
helicopter enabled integrated actions, prevented friendly fire incidents, tracked
insurgents and identified potential enemy positions. Due to the dearth of Somali
electronic countermeasures the C2 platform could operate efficiently and
effectively. However, when planning for the provision of C2 platforms, a
consideration must be made for enemy countermeasures. It is possible that
insurgents may have the means to listen to clear communications, and will attempt
to interfere with electronic communications.
Indirect agency was a central tenet of the Somali insurgent’s tactics.
Insurgents would fire upon counterinsurgent forces or non-combatants and then
flee the scene. Counterinsurgent tactics developed which stressed cordons and
flanking movements to inhibit the insurgents’ escape. Due to the urbanised
operational environment, counterinsurgent forces were deployed with a light kit.
This included body armour, weapon, five magazines, water and a first aid kit.
This, increased mobility and the probability of successfully apprehending the
insurgent/s. In these circumstances, counterinsurgent units only have a matter of
seconds to engage their targets. To train for such an environment, rapid movement
followed by instantaneous enemy recognition and engagement proved essential.
Due to the soldier’s light kit, it was essential to have logistics assets close to each
unit to supply water, ammunition and first aid. It would also be essential in such
an environment to have a rapid reaction force, which could be deployed if any
unit was outnumbered or surrounded, as occurred in Mogadishu.
In Kismayu, combat support missions were limited to illumination
missions (heliborne lights) and counter-mobility missions. Both of these were
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significant, however, the latter was indispensable for effective sector searches.
Counter-mobility was accomplished by placing concertina wire around city
blocks. This needed to be done at speed to encircle enemy combatants and
weapons.
Intelligence sources were predominantly human, voluntarily provided or
acquired through interrogation. Information provided by special forces and
intelligence personnel was the most accurate, while voluntary information was
generally provided to enhance the informant’s position vis a vis an enemy clan.
Local translators were also suspected of nefarious objectives. Thus,
counterinsurgent forces require dependable translators or endogenous linguists.13
There are important considerations, in terms of military principles outlined
in this research, which can be drawn from the aforementioned operations in
Somalia. The professionalism of counterinsurgent personnel involved in these
operations was the key factor that enabled success or minimised failure. In
Mogadishu, there was a lack of force precision, and joint and combined arms
operations because of restrictive ROE. The urban environment in Mogadishu also
undermined the capacity for units to communicate. There was also a lack of
intelligence available on insurgent strength in Mogadishu. Notwithstanding the
aforementioned statements, when effective joint force and combined arms
operations did occur, they were highly significant. Operations in Somalia also
illustrated the critical nature of force cohesion between coalition members.
The American Intervention in Afghanistan 2001-2004
The American intervention into Afghanistan was precipitated by the September
11, 2001 terrorist attack against the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon. This
part of the thesis will examine the background to the American intervention in
Afghanistan, and explain why Afghanistan and this act of terrorism are connected.
This is undertaken to set the context of the intervention.
February 15, 1989 marked the end of the Soviet withdrawal of forces from
Afghanistan. Expectation at that point predicted the imminent overthrow by the
united Mujahedeen forces of the Afghan Interim Government (AIG), of the
People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), the then ruling communist
regime. However, the initial AIG campaign to take control of Jalalabad, on the
74
Pakistani border meet with stubborn, well planned resistance, which caused the
AIG to begin to disintegrate. The various Mujahedeen groups preferred thereafter
to attack logistics routes, which was an effective tactic perfected against the
Soviets. The PDPA’s presence in Afghanistan’s urban environments remained
relatively stable until October 1991. This date marked the end of Soviet Union,
the PDPA’s sponsor, whereas Saudi and Pakistani resources continued to flow to
the Mujahedeen. By April of the following year Kabul had fallen, but to Tajik
and Uzbek forces from the north of Afghanistan rather than the southern,
historically dominant Pashtun. The Tajik forces were commanded by Ahmed
Shah Massoud and the Uzbek forces were commanded by Abdul Rashid Dostum.
In 1993 the Tajik-Uzbek alliance was bolstered by Ismail Khan, the
warlord of Herat, and Burhanuddin Rabbani, the Tajik head of the Islamic
Society. This new alliance subsequently fortified its dominance across the north
of Afghanistan. In 1994 two significant events occurred in Afghanistan. First,
Iran coerced the Hazaras, a Shi’a group from the Hindu Kush, to unify. They
swiftly joined Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, the foremost Pashtun commander, in
assaults against the Tajik-Uzbek held Kabul. Dostum then swapped allegiances,
deserting Massoud for Hekmatyar. However in the face of adversity, Massoud’s
forces repulsed the combined forces from Kabul and made advances in the north.
Second, the Taliban appeared, under Mullah Mohammed Omar, amid the anarchy
which reigned in southern Afghanistan.
From the south, Taliban forces occupied a swath of cities, applying strict
and brutal Islamic Sharia law where there was anarchy, amassing captured and
surrendered arms, and massing a horde of volunteers or defeated Mujahedeen that
changed sides. Hekmatyar’s forces were defeated by the Taliban, who then
focused upon Kabul and Massoud. Massoud repulsed their advance towards
Kabul. The Taliban then focused their efforts in the west of Afghanistan. Ismail
Khan, Massoud’s ally, thrust south from Herat, imposing a second defeat upon the
Taliban. These actions were to show that the Taliban possessed poor logistics
when operating far from Pakistan. In addition, Iran preferred to support Ismail
Khan.
Ismail Khan attacked the Taliban again, driving them to the Helmund
River. However, unbeknown to Khan, the Taliban had been reinforced by new
religious recruits. The Taliban counterattacked, ultimately destroying Khan’s
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forces. The Taliban then returned their concentration to Kabul. The Taliban did
not attempt to directly force Massoud out of Kabul, but instead began to encircle
him, cutting his supply lines. On September 26, 1996, Massoud evacuated Kabul
and returned to the Panjshir Valley, along the border with Tajikistan. Under
Massoud’s direction, all groups opposing the Taliban were united under the
auspices of the Northern Alliance. The Northern Alliance included Tajiks,
Uzbeks, Turkmen and Hazaras. Despite the formation of the Northern Alliance,
the Taliban had expanded it’s presence over all of Afghanistan by 2001, bar the
Panjshir Valley.
Al Qaeda terrorists of Algerian extraction killed Massoud on September 9,
2001, while pretending to be journalists. Since its inception, Al Qaeda had
utilised Afghanistan as its primary base of operations. Al Qaeda taught jihad and
the art of insurgency, and exported terror worldwide. September 11, 2001 marked
the turning point for both Al Qaeda and the Taliban, leading to the American
intervention into Afghanistan. However, it was not the only determinant for the
invasion.
Osama bin Laden endangered the Taliban, by becoming America’s most
reviled adversary, and having turned Afghanistan into Al Qaeda’s base of
operations. It had taken bin Laden ten years and eleven terrorist attacks to fully
infuriate America; 3,000 civilian deaths on home soil were too much to bear.
The first of these terrorist attacks was a failed attempt to destroy the World
Trade Centre in 1993. The second was perpetrated against American soldiers in
Somalia in 1993, killing 18. The third was a successful attack on the Egyptian
Embassy in Pakistan, occurring in 1995, killing 15 and injuring 60. The fourth
and fifth attacks were on further U.S. troops stationed in Saudi Arabia in 1995 and
1996, which killed 24 and seriously strained Saudi-American relations. In
addition, these attacks put a further strain on maintaining a U.S. presence in a vital
area.14 The last six terror attacks are described in the remainder of the chapter.
Afghanistan’s ruling Taliban and Al Qaeda maintained a mutually
dependent relationship. The Taliban was supplied with material, financial and
military support from Al Qaeda, in exchange for terrorist training camps and
protection. This relationship also benefited from the drugs trade that the Taliban
allowed, and Al Qaeda nurtured. The territorial integrity of Afghanistan, under
the Taliban, was instrumental to Al Qaeda. Al Qaeda functions as an international
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supporter of Islamic terrorism wherever it resides, but this function was
augmented by the physical and secure base it had in Afghanistan. Al Qaeda’s
camps in Afghanistan trained terrorists from many of the forty countries, with
which Al Qaeda had links. Furthermore, through the training of foreign terrorists,
Al Qaeda had garnered sympathy from individuals who would undertake Al
Qaeda’s operations.
In 1998, the culmination of five years planning came to fruition with the
bombing of the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, killing 224 and injuring
nearly 5000. The next two Al Qaeda attempted terrorist actions where foiled.
The first foiled attack occurred in 1999, when an Algerian was stopped at the
Canadian-U.S. border, with over one hundred pounds of explosives in his car.
This bomb was designed for an attempted attack on the Los Angeles International
Airport. The second failed attempt occurred in 2000, when a group of Al Qaeda
members tried to attack a U.S. destroyer with a small boat full of explosives.
However, the Al Qaeda boat sank without the desired effect. The United States
Ship (USS) Cole was not so fortunate, in late 2000 a boat packed with explosives
detonated beside its hull, killing 17 and injuring a further 40.15
Operation Enduring Freedom
By the 17th of September 2001, the American Government had assembled a
mosaicA of evidence, which indicated Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda were
behind the 9/11 terror attacks. The Taliban misjudged the American resolve to
apprehend bin Laden. Initially the Taliban refused to surrender bin Laden, for
reasons of self-interest rather than altruism. Basically, bin Laden was a critical
source of hardened and dependable soldiers, as well as a source of financial and
political support. A Pakistani delegation was then dispatched to persuade the
Taliban to relinquish bin Laden. Mullah Omar, head of the Taliban regime, then
attempted to use bin Laden as a bargaining chip. Omar demanded political
recognition of the Taliban regime, a cessation of aid flows to the Northern
Alliance and a resumption of foreign aid.
The U.S. believed the Taliban’s negotiation was duplicitous, merely
intending to delay and cause the coalition to vacillate. Also, much of the
A Mosaic Theory refers to the compilation of diverse intelligence material into a coherent whole.
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international community was ready to eliminate the threat posed by Al Qaeda and
the Taliban. America’s historic allies promptly joined the coalition, having
viewed the evidence of Osama’s guilt. Significantly, Pakistan, Russia, the former
Soviet central Asian republics and Iran all supported, in varying degrees,
Operation Enduring Freedom. The Taliban had created in Afghanistan,
circumstances conducive to the destabilisation of the region. Russia’s interest in
removing Al Qaeda and the Taliban from Afghanistan was due to the
destabilisation of the former Soviet Central Asian states, which were menaced by
Afghan-based terrorist support. Pakistan’s northern tribal provinces and internal
cohesion was also jeopardised by the fundamentalist influences of the Taliban and
Al Qaeda. Iran’s discreet support for the coalition was provided because of the
Taliban’s abuse of the Iranian’s religious and ethnic brethren in Afghanistan.
Thus, at the outset of Operation Enduring Freedom, the Taliban had no allies, bar
Al Qaeda. However, the Taliban was faced by a military coalition of 15 nations,16
endorsed by much of the international community and the United Nations, ready
to intervene in Afghanistan.
On October 7, 2001, Operation Enduring Freedom began. 40 American
aircraft and 50 British and American cruise missiles destroyed the Taliban’s
rudimentary Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence,
Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (C4ISTAR) assets and air
defence forces to gain battlefield dominance and air superiority. Strategic
battlefield preparation was accomplished by United States Air Force (USAF) B-1
and B-2 bombers, AC-130 Gunships and United States Navy (USN) F-14 and F-
18 fighter-bombers. The first reported large scale American Special Forces raid
occurred on October 19, for the purpose of reconnaissance. Front line tactical
bombing of Taliban troops commenced on October 21. The initial sorties were
predominantly delivered by U.S. fighter-bombers, employing an unprecedented
high level of satellite and laser guided munitions. These strikes were later
supplemented by B-52 strikes. In total, 60 percent of all air launched munitions
used in Afghanistan, were Precision Guided Munitions (PGMs). The
psychological and physical effect of the aerial bombardment of Taliban positions
was decisive. It ensured a Northern Alliance victory in Afghanistan.
Initial reports from the Northern Alliance and the Taliban asserted the air
strikes were of marginal utility. Allied ground forces had not been deployed to
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Afghanistan and the front lines had not moved. At the time, Ismail Khan returned
to the west of Herat to remobilise his Tajik forces. Abdul Rashid Dostum
regrouped his Uzbek forces around Mazar-i-Sharif. In addition, Haji Mohaqiq
mobilised the Harazas of the Hindu Kush. Unfortunately, the first attempt to
destabilise the Taliban’s support in the Pushtun south was undermined, when
Abdul Haq was caught and hung by the Taliban. The future leader of
Afghanistan, Hamid Karzai, was more fortunate in his attempts to undermine the
Taliban in the south.
By November 10, it was shown that the initial stage of the war had paid
off. Taliban began to desert their units, evacuate cities and fortifications or defect
to the Northern Alliance. Mazar-i-Sharif was the first city to fall to the Northern
Alliance. Within an hour of fighting for the city the Taliban garrison defected,
surrendered or fled. Taloqan was taken by the Northern Alliance on November
11, without serious fighting. However, north of Taloqan, Northern Alliance
troops were repulsed by foreign Taliban volunteers. The foreign volunteers,
unlike their Afghan comrades, were more determined to fight rather than defect or
surrender. Herat fell on 12 November, after a Taliban defection of over six
thousand men to Ismail Khan. Kabul was occupied on 13 November, after the
Taliban had deserted the city. Kunduz, a city near Taloqan, did not fall until 26
November, due to a garrison of foreign Taliban volunteers and Al Qaeda
members. By December 9, all remaining vestiges of Taliban rule had
surrendered.17
The factors that caused the collapse of the Taliban were as follows: (1) the
internalisation of Afghan victory through the prudent employment of the Northern
Alliance as combat forces; (2) the precision application of combat air support,
guided by elite ground forces; (3) CIA finances; (4) the renunciation of overt
official Pakistani support; (5) the Afghan people’s detestation of the Taliban; (6)
the prohibition of opium cultivation; and (7) potentially the delay in deploying
allied regular forces.
The promotion of the Northern Alliance as the main combatant force was
critical to the victory in Afghanistan. Had the Northern Alliance been disregarded
and allied forces deployed to defeat the Taliban, the result may have been very
different. The Northern Alliance was adept at fighting within Afghanistan.
Northern Alliance participation internalised the victory and enabled former
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Taliban soldiers to surrender or defect. This may not have occurred if allied
forces were used. If allied troops had been deployed, resistance may have built
against another ‘foreign invader’. Conversely, the Northern Alliance troops were
welcomed as internal liberators. Allied troops may have been more effective as
an out of theatre threat, than a deployed offensive force. Thus, rather than a
Vietnam syndrome fear of casualties, the delay in deploying allied forces, may
have enabled the overthrow of the Taliban to be as unproblematic as it was. The
significance of the defection of Taliban troops cannot be underestimated. Without
this there would have been a far greater loss of life and property.
Although regular allied military forces were not deployed, Combat
Support was critical to defeating the Taliban. Close Air Support was the overt
application of allied military force, reaching previously unprecedented levels of
precision. This precision increased the number of legitimate targets struck, while
reducing collateral damage and unintended casualties. Target designation for
these weapons was provided by allied Special Forces. Without their elite soldiery,
the war could not have proceeded as it did. The cause of the disintegration of
Taliban forces also owed a great deal to CIA personnel. The CIA, prior to the
war, had bought the defection of Taliban commanders and troops. This enabled
the occupation of cities and regions with minimum violence. The ending of
Pakistani support for the Taliban was also invaluable in the Afghan victory. It
cannot be understated, that the ultimate victory was largely due to the absence of
popular Afghan support for the Taliban. The extreme theological nature of the
Taliban had alienated most of the Afghan populace. There was also tension
between those who were not ethnically Pushtun and the Taliban. A further action
of the Taliban, that undermined their legitimacy, was the prohibition of opium
cultivation. Opium, before its partial prohibition, was the key source of income
for rural Afghanis, international traders, corrupt regional officials and the Taliban.
At the strategic level, Operation Enduring Freedom was a holistic military
operation, in that political, economic, diplomatic and military force was combined
to achieve a successful outcome. It should also be observed that in terms of
military principles, doctrinal precision, force precision and professionalism were
critical elements in achieving the outcome.
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Operation Anaconda
The first significant ground operation undertaken by coalition troops, following
the demise of the Taliban, began on 2 March 2002 and was codenamed Anaconda.
This operation is important because it demonstrates the strengths and weaknesses
of the coalition in a situation of LIC.
The objective of the operation was to encircle and destroy or capture a
joint Al Qaeda and Taliban force (hereon noted as Al Qaeda force). This force
was positioned near the town of Gardez, in the Shah-i-Kot Valley of eastern
Afghanistan. The combatants involved in the operation were: (1) approximately
1,000 Al Qaeda troops; (2) hundreds of friendly Afghan troops led by American
Special Forces; and (3) 1,500 American soldiers from the 101st Airborne and the
10th Mountain Divisions.18 The combat environment was characterised by
extreme mountainous terrain, reaching heights of around 10,000 feet, with limited
vehicular access. The terrain provided Al Qaeda with means of concealment and
mobility. Conversely, the terrain limited the coalition’s mobility,
communications, intelligence and firepower.
Simply, the operational plan was akin to the Soviet ‘hammer and anvil’
approach, used widely in Afghanistan. The 1,500 American troops were deployed
along the western boundary of the valley. Concomitantly, the Afghan forces were
tasked with advancing from the east to force the Al Qaeda troops out of their
positions and into the American line. However, the battle did not proceed as the
plan prescribed. The terrain had concealed from the allied Intelligence,
Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets the majority of the Al Qaeda forces,
half of their positions and the strength of their fortifications. Allied intelligence
had also identified civilians in the valley. However, this information proved to be
incorrect when hostilities commenced.19
Due to this intelligence weakness in locating concealed Al Qaeda
positions, a Special Force unit was deployed via MH-47 Chinook helicopter on
top of an active Al Qaeda position. The position, on the crest of Takur Ghar
Mountain had previously been bombed by American aircraft and evaded
reconnaissance sweeps. Upon disembarking the MH-47 the American forces
came under heavy fire. The MH-47 sustained damage and vacated the scene.
However, on doing so, an American soldier fell from the aircraft.20
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To save the lost soldier an extraction force was dispatched, comprising of
a heliborne Army Ranger unit and Apache helicopters. In the ensuing extraction
attempt the Ranger unit was shot down, and several AH-64 Apache helicopters
were disabled. Additional attack helicopters were deployed, including the AH-1
Super Cobra. However, due to the extreme altitudes in the Shah-i-Kot Valley, the
helicopters were unable to remain on station for extended periods. In addition, the
helicopter’s handling was negatively influenced and their accuracy was reduced.
To remedy the situation a further Ranger unit was tasked with ascending the
mountain on foot, this force was successful in their mission. However, the
operation revealed issues regarding inappropriate equipment, clothing and
footwear. In addition, airpower alone performed inadequately when opposing
personnel in concealed positions, upon difficult terrain in bad weather.21 Ground
forces had also become completely reliant on airpower, as artillery had not been
transported to the battlefield.
The Afghan forces, which were to evict the Al Qaeda forces from their
positions, were instead ambushed and repulsed. American soldiers were then
deployed by CH-47 and MH-47 helicopters. However, upon disembarkation they
were attacked by heavy rifle, RPG and Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) fire. Once
again, the adverse nature of the combat environment attributed to a lack of
effective intelligence. This operation clearly demonstrates that electronic imagery
and SIGINT is not an intelligence panacea in LIC. It must be supplemented by
sound HUMINT. However, HUMINT is far from infallible. The Americans
found local Afghan intelligence to be imperfect.22
Due to the coalition ground force’s initial lack of success, heavy aerial
bombardment was resumed. Subsequently, allied ground forces were able to
operate more effectively. The need for major aerial bombardment illustrates the
reliance of ground forces upon airpower. In addition, the vulnerability of ground
forces that lack air support was also illustrated.23 Air support was constrained in
Operation Anaconda primarily because of the mountainous terrain and poor flying
weather. However, there were also human, technical and procedural difficulties.
First, the Combined Air Operations Centre was given only two hour prior warning
about the operation. Second, after the operation began, air controllers and their
systems lacked capacity to handle the quantity of requests for close air support.
Third, intelligence requirements stipulated cave entrances were not to be bombed
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(in order to facilitate access to intelligence after the caves were taken). Fourth,
rules of engagement forbade pilots from engaging certain targets (such as civilian
vehicles used for military purposes) without authorisation. Fifth, battlefield
preparation by aerial bombardment was not undertaken, as surprise was seen as
critical for the operation. These factors, when combined with the ground force’s
lack of endogenous firepower and fire-support, put coalition soldiers at risk from
enemy fire.24 In addition, the deployment of helicopters in this terrain put them at
risk from small arms fire. Thus, A-10 Warthogs were deployed to support
helicopter operations.25
By March 18, 2002, Operation Anaconda was over and had been hailed an
“unqualified and absolute success” by General Franks, the commander of United
States Central Command (CENTCOM).26 Eight American troops were killed in
the operation and 76 were wounded. 2,500 bombs were dropped in the operation,
while the number of enemy killed or escaped was disputed.27
In terms of military principles, the extreme terrain on which the operation
took place limited the coalition’s ability to collect intelligence and communicate
effectively. The terrain also discouraged the use of combined arms and elevated
the need for seamless joint force operations. It should also be noted that the
professional nature of the personnel deployed played a significant role in making
the operation a success.
Suppressing Fire
Operation Anaconda was executed without artillery, degrading suppression and
fire support. This was partially due to a lack of logistics capability. In short,
artillery units could not be brought to the field. Neither could some of the 101st
Division’s UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters. General Shinseki, the U.S. Army’s
Chief of Staff, stated that artillery could provide security for ground forces,
through area suppression, within 3 minutes, rather than an average of 25 minutes
for aerial support. Battlefield suppression was also constrained, by the lack of
dumb bombs carried by aircraft. Smart bombs require precise coordinates, and
ground forces could not always provide these coordinates, as their targets were
often concealed. This further congested communications systems between airmen
and soldiers, which had in fact failed on the first day of operations.28 In addition,
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suppressive mortar fire caused 28 American casualties, while the use of artillery
could have minimised these friendly fire casualties.29 General Franks contested
Shinseki’s argument, stating mortars were more appropriate for Operation
Anaconda, due to the incompatibility of artillery and altitude. These problems,
caused by altitude, included a lack of lift capacity and poor munitions trajectory
characteristics.30 The lack of roads in the Shah-i-Kot Valley, understandably
constrained the 101st Divisions ability to deploy their M-109 Self propelled
howitzers. However, it does not fully explain why towed 105mm or 155mm
artillery could not have been airlifted into position. Moreover the 82nd Airborne
Division, who replaced the 101st Division, did deploy their artillery unit.
Soldier’s Kit
Operation Anaconda demonstrated that the weight of a soldier’s kit must be
reduced. Extreme terrain and lack of oxygen at altitude significantly limited
soldier mobility, causing equipment, including body armour, to be discarded.
Coalition soldiers were routinely carrying 30 to 40 kilograms of equipment, which
was reported to have felt like 60 kilograms at 2,500 to 3,000 metres. The U.S.
Army intends to reduce equipment weight by 50 percent, through the Objective
Force Warrior project. Planned kit improvements include a uniform with a
climate conditioning system that will also protect against chemical and biological
weapons. Interceptor body armour has been introduced, which weights 8
kilograms, 4.5 kilograms less than previous body armour. This new body armour
is credited with significantly reducing severe injuries and deaths. A new
generation of weapons is envisioned to replace the M-16 Rifle, M-4 Carbine and
the M-249 Squad Automatic Weapon, and will be approximately 35 percent
lighter.31 Operations in Afghanistan have once again signalled the lack of
stopping power of the 5.56mm round, used in all the aforementioned individual
weapons.32 The benefit of the lighter 5.56mm round, over the conventional
7.62mm round, is that a larger quantity of individual rounds can be carried. One
aspect of the inherent lack of firepower of the 5.56mm round was addressed in the
battlefield, by the use of anti-tank weapons. Further equipment improvements
include, lighter batteries and individual sensors to monitor the battlefield and
troop health. Global positioning systems, lightweight binoculars and laser range
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finders are indispensable on the modern battlefield. However, the Ground Laser
Designator System (GLDS), that ‘paints’ targets for laser guided bombs to strike,
must be reduced in size and weight. There is also a robotic all terrain vehicle
(ATV) under development. The robotic ATV is intended to deploy, advance with,
and carry the equipment of combat troops.33 The ability for a robot to manoeuvre
in difficult terrain has been questioned. However, the M-Gator 6x6 ATV
performed with “great success” in the mountains and bases of Afghanistan.34
Communications, Command and Control
The U.S. C4ISTAR network was highly successful in Afghanistan. However,
topography and the coalition’s structure revealed fundamental weaknesses central
to the system. Basic frequency modulation (FM) communications were hindered
by the mountainous terrain, causing a reliance on satellite communications. The
satellite communication systems in use included the Defence Satellite
Communications System (DSCS), Milstar and National Aeronautics and Space
Administration’s (NASA’s) Tracking and Data Relay Satellite (TDRS), in
addition to National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) relays and Ultra High
Frequency (UHF) follow-Ons. These various satellites relay and provide for,
information to flow between commands and combatant units. Unfortunately, each
communications system requires a separate terminal, meaning combat units must
carry numerous communications devices. This problem is being addressed, so
that one communications device will provide for all communication and
information needs of the increasingly mobile user. A single system is virtuous
because it does not deprive the user of mobility, as multiple systems do.
However, secondary communications systems must be maintained in case of
primary communications failure or detection.
Knowledge of the environment is critical to command and control of
combat forces. However, the aforementioned communications problems were
aggravated by the lack of joint command for the various Special Forces involved.
Special Force units under separate commands could not communication with each
other. Thus, they were artificially isolated. In addition, UAV reconnaissance
information is not available via the current satellite network to all users. This
reduces operational awareness and initiative. Furthermore, it is expected that the
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bandwidth (quantity of data transferred) of the satellites will only supply half of
what is required by 2010. This will obstruct U.S. communications, control and
ISR capabilities on the future battlefield.35
Command and Control must be flattened in both coalition and joint
warfare scenarios. All forces must fight as one. There can be no communications
capacity restrictions between troops, commanders and combat support forces.
Initiative is of critical importance for counterinsurgents operating in LIC. The
provision of real time imagery to high commands, especially out of theatre, is
reducing the initiative and combat effectiveness of on station combat assets.
Between Joint Warfare Synergy and Combined Arms
Joint warfare is not a new concept, originating, as it did, in World War Two.
However, the emerging synergy with which it is applied is transforming the
modern battlefield. Communications, Special Forces and allied aviation
transformed the last vestiges of the stoic Northern Alliance into a force that
dominated Afghanistan in less than four months. Operation Anaconda graphically
demonstrated the capability of joint warfare to create victory. Extensive and
precise aerial firepower guided by C4ISTAR assets are the primary elements of
joint warfare. However, the potent, yet isolated nature of joint warfare can cause
risk, which if mismanaged can become danger.
Risk is assumed in warfare so that an enemy’s weakness can be exploited
from a position of strength. In practical terms, when forces are massed
geographically to strike at a target, all other areas become vulnerable. Similarly,
in LIC, counterinsurgent ground forces are dispersed throughout the battlespace to
identify and strike at scattered targets. In so doing, the ground forces face the risk
of becoming isolated and assaulted.
Joint warfare manages risk with intelligence, communications and fire
support. The latter is increasingly taking the form of air support. However, if any
component in the system is damaged or unable to operate freely, the entire system
has the potential to fail. Hence, redundant systems are needed. Future enemies
will strive to threaten components of the C4ISTAR system, especially
communications and air superiority. It is unlikely that in the near future, theatre
wide interruption to joint warfare will occur, although, localised enemy
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dominance may cause risk to become danger. There must be procedures,
technologies or mobile reserve forces ready to counter this threat.
The danger posed by the denial of C4ISTAR and airpower, can be reduced
by preserving aspects of combined arms. Combined arms as a concept dates from
Napoleon; however, infantry and artillery are now supported by armour rather
than cavalry (generally). This concept may seem archaic, however, the
interdependence and mutual support of the three combined arms, creates joint
strength by diminishing independent weakness.
Special Forces, forward air controllers and linguists were among the most
important Western ground units of the Afghan war. They are a case in point for
the combined arms – joint warfare debate. Special Force units are among the
most potent weapons upon the battlefield. Since they operate in relative isolation,
they are also one of the most vulnerable. Their risk becomes danger if they are
denied secure and viable communications with fire-support assets, or combat
service support resources, such as logistics. Operation Anaconda illustrated the
loss of combat effectiveness when artillery was not deployed in support of ground
forces. Afghanistan also showed that Special Forces from the U.S. Army and
Marine Corps, lacked light armoured vehicles (LAVs) and ATVs.36 Moreover,
strategic, operational and tactical airlift assets were in short supply. Thus, if the
Special Forces had been supplied with LAVs and ATVs, their risk would have
been diminished. However, these mechanised forces would have caused further
logistics problems.
Unfortunately, combined arms and joint warfare are in part, incompatible.
Joint warfare emphasises agility, overwhelming precision strike, force
concealment and superior intelligence. Combined arms accentuates firepower,
manoeuvre (only to bring its firepower to bear), and force protection through
disproportionate force. In practical terms, the application of combined arms
principles to joint warfare slow operations and potentially reduce stealth, in return
for increased local firepower.
U.S. Deputy Defence Secretary Paul Wolfowitz characterised the
initiative, agility and flexibility of Special Operations in Afghanistan in the
following quote. “In Afghanistan, a country we think of in somewhat medieval
terms, our Special Forces have taken a page from the past, from the history of the
horse cavalry and soldiers armed with swords and rifles, manoeuvring on
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horseback,… But now they use radios to direct close air support and bomber
strikes, sometimes from halfway around the world.”37 Harold Kennedy added that
many Army Rangers “dressed in standard khaki-coloured desert camouflage
battledress, complete with lightweight Kevlar helmets and body armour”38, and
armed themselves with the latest small arms. Special Force units often adopted
traditional Afghan robes, turbans, beards and the ubiquitous AK-47 or sword.
This was not an attempt to conceal their combat status. Special Force personnel
were specific targets of the Taliban, so the dress of indigenous combatants was
worn. Tactics were also highly flexible, as a Special Forces soldier reported in a
declassified situation report to the U.S. Defence Department, “I am advising a
man on how to best employ light infantry and horse cavalry in the attack against
Taliban T-55s, mortars, artillery, personnel carriers and machine guns – a tactic
which I think became outdated with the invention of the Gatling gun. The
Mujahadeen have done that every day we have been on the ground.”39 Special
Forces were critical to the Afghan campaign, and are deployed in most combat
situations. Historically, Special Forces (SF) have been under-funded, often
because their covert nature restricts public knowledge of their roles. The U.S. has
realised this and has significantly increased SF funding. The SF, along with the
later deployment of Marines at Camp Rhino, were critical elements of the
coalition’s psychological campaign. With the SF embedded in Northern Alliance
units, confidence in the coalition grew. This would not have happened had the
West only deployed air power. Similarly, the Marine presence in southern
Afghanistan enabled the southern warlords to desert the Taliban, which in turn led
to the liberation of Afghanistan.40
The Air Campaign
The significance of aviation on the modern battlefield cannot be underestimated.
Aviation provided intelligence, logistics and firepower, which was critical to
victory in Afghanistan. The same Special Forces soldier, as quoted above, had
this to say about the importance of close air support: “We couldn’t do what we are
doing without the close air support.”41
Initially, the greatest difficulty for U.S. and coalition airpower was
Afghanistan’s remote location. Until in-theatre airbases became available, much
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of the coalition’s combat air support was provided by naval aircraft based in the
Indian Ocean and the bombers based in Diego Garcia. Due to range limitations of
attack helicopters, A-10 Warthogs and AV-8 Harriers, such aircraft were not
deployed until theatre airbases became available.
In the initial phase of Operation Enduring Freedom (October 3 through
December 17, 2001), Navy F-14s and F/A-18s and Air Force F-15s and F-16s
flew approximately 80 percent of all combat sorties over Afghanistan, yet only
delivered approximately 35 percent of all munitions. Concomitantly with
maintaining this critical overhead vigil, these short range aircraft imposed a huge
strain on the aerial replenishment fleet.
Easing this strain on aerial replenishment will be essential in any future
conflict. Without the USAF’s operational fleet of 415 KC-135s and the Royal Air
Force’s (RAF) VC-10 and Tristar replenishment tankers, Operation Enduring
Freedom would not have prevailed. A number of KC-135s also performed an
essential communications function. Palletised communications systems carried
by the KC-135, overcame some of the communications failures caused by terrain.
This enabled ground forces to communicate with C2, firesupport and targeting
assets.
B-2s provided preliminary battlefield preparation with 12 stealth sorties.
Remarkably, the eight B-1s and ten B-52s based at Diego Garcia flew 10 percent
of the combat sorties, but dropped 65 percent of all munitions. The AC-130H
Sceptre and AC-130U Spooky Gunships, deployed to Afghanistan, proved so
effective the USAF is seeking to enlarge the AC-130H fleet by 50 percent and
upgrade the remainder of fleet.
Maritime reconnaissance aircraft, such as the P-3 Orion and the British
Nimrod performed important and uncharacteristic SF C2, fire-support and
reconnaissance roles. The P-3 was said to be the SF’s favoured surveillance asset.
This was due to its sensors and personnel capacity. This allowed for SF members
to be embarked, to assist their comrades on the ground. More recognisable
C4ISTAR aircraft included the E-2C Hawkeye, E-3A AWAC, E-8C JSTAR, RC-
135 Rivet Joint, and the U-2. These aircraft found targets, coordinated air
movements, enabled communications and were also critical to the victory in
Afghanistan.42
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Aviation: Strike and Support
There were a number of causes for the unusual character of air operations over
Afghanistan. First, the disposition of Air Force missions will be analysed.
The F-16 was employed almost twice as often as the F-15. The F-16C/D
Fighting Falcon and the F-15E Strike Eagle can operate a similar range of
armaments and weapon systems. An implication drawn from Afghanistan stated
that the F-16 was highly successful, due to it’s fuel efficiency. The F-16 was said
to use only half the fuel of the F-15 to accomplish the ‘same’ mission. This was
significant, as aerial replenishment was a limiting factor in the air campaign.
Colonel Dave, the commander of the 332nd Air Expeditionary Group stated,
‘twice as many F-16s could be deployed as F-15s for the same fuel used, and this
made the F-16 a force multiplier’.43 This statement is correct. However, it
oversimplifies the situation on two counts. First, the F-15 can carry
approximately twice the general armament of the F-16. In addition, the F-15 can
carry twice the number of joint direct attack munitions (JDAM) as the F-16. The
significance of the JDAM will be discussed later in this chapter. Thus, the F-16 is
no more fuel efficient, in comparison to the F-15 if weapons load is accounted for.
Second, Afghanistan provided few high value targets for aircraft to bomb. In this
situation, it is more combat effective to have aircraft distributed over the theatre of
operations. Whether aircraft are spread wider over time or geographic area, the
outcome is the same, a quicker target identification to target destruction loop. The
identification – destruction loop is officially known as the Find-Fix-Track-Target-
Attack-Assess (FFTTAA) loop. This refers to the time between finding a target
and destroying that target. This is highly significant for two reasons in LIC. In
LIC insurgent targets are highly mobile, thus, difficult to destroy by close air
support; requiring the consolidated identification – destruction loop. Because of
this, smaller, fuel efficient aircraft like the F-16 may be more suited to LIC, when
fuel is a consideration. The amalgamated reaction time of the F-16 fleet is
quicker than the F-15, as there are more F-16s spread more widely over the
theatre of operations.
The B-1 and B-52 made evident the essential nature of a bomber fleet for
operations over a distant target. The effect of the B-1 and B-52 had on Afghan
operations was described by General John Jumper, U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff,
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as being “transformational”.44 The range of the B-1 and B-52 enabled both
aircraft to make the 8,000 kilometre return flight from Diego Garcia to
Afghanistan and loiter over the battlefield for extended periods. So effective was
the combination of heavy bomber and JDAM, that in a 20 minute period four B-1s
were able to deliver 96 bombs. The 96 JDAMs delivered are the equivalent in
firepower to 1,920 aircraft sorties undertaken in the first Gulf War.45
Transformational Weapons
The JDAM is a global positioning system (GPS) attached to a Mk-83 or Mk-84
bomb. This weapon transformed the Afghan war by providing a cheap, smart, all
weather weapon, which made each aircraft vastly more potent. Statistics estimate
an F-16 with two JDAMs, is equivalent to 40 F-16s equipped with dumb bombs.46
Due to the modest cost of the JDAM (U.S. $18,000), they will increasingly be
utilised in the future, with some sources asserting doubts whether dumb bombs
will remain in the U.S. arsenal. A leading factor causing the improvement in
weapons intelligence is the reducing payload capability of future American
combat aircraft. The F-22 and F-35, which will replace much of the U.S. combat
fleet, including the F-14, F-15, F-16, F-18, carry fewer bombs, but within internal
bays, to maintain their stealth capabilities.47
In Afghanistan, the widespread use of PGMs reduced collateral damage
significantly. When civilians were killed it was by munitions hitting their targets,
rather than weapon error. The failure is thus in intelligence and surveillance.
Simply, aircraft, UAVs and sometimes SF troops cannot tell the difference
between civilians and combatants. The U.S. is continuing the development of
weapons such as the JDAM and the wind corrected munitions dispenser, which
increasingly put weapons on targets.48 However, if the enemy chooses to use
civilians as shields, some will be sadly, but inevitably killed, and this
responsibility can only be assumed by the insurgents.
ISTAR : Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance
In Operation Anaconda, the difficult Afghan terrain and lack of roads assisted Al
Qaeda’s concealment, mobility and fighting capability. However, during the
initial stages of Operation Enduring Freedom the Taliban presented exploitable
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targets for the coalition air forces. The Taliban wanted to hold key cities from
opposition forces. This forced the Taliban to concentrate armour, artillery,
vehicular and communications assets near cities. These Taliban weapons became
targets of opportunity for allied strike aircraft, Special Forces, UAVs and
JSTARs. Furthermore, Taliban forces used the minimal road network to supply
and reinforce positions. These supply vehicles were easily engaged by airpower.
It is also reported, that the utter helplessness of Taliban forces to respond to the
aerial threat led first to low morale, then to mass desertions. The Special Force
troops on the ground calling in airstrikes were very aware of psychological
warfare. Reports state that while SF positions were being overrun, the SF troops
would continue calling in close air support to ensure Northern Alliance victories.
Thus, Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR)
was highly valuable in the early period of Operation Enduring Freedom.
However, as targets diminished the requirement for HUMINT escalated.49
Post Taliban Afghanistan: Psychological and Physical Warfare
Of Afghanistan, after the defeat of the Taliban, Cordesman stated “the US and its
Western allies [do not] have a solution to the problems associated with combating
an enemy whose forces are dispersed, fluid, and not seeking a conventional
fight.”50 This statement wrongly gives the impression that LICs are won in a
decisive battle akin to Waterloo or Trafalgar, this is not the case. Very simply,
LICs are won if a counterinsurgent can entrench the freedom for the population to
choose a civil and peaceful means of existence, while suppressing the structures
and persons who promote violence.
The remnants of Al Qaeda, and those individuals who remain actively
supportive of the Taliban, are adept at evading coalition intelligence, surveillance
and reconnaissance. However, the coalition is developing its means of defeating
combatants. Tora Bora highlighted the deficiencies of relying to heavily upon
Afghan troops to thwart Al Qaeda retreat. Many of the Afghan troops were
bribed, chose not to fight or were undermined by ethnic division. When coalition
SF have engaged Al Qaeda forces since Tora Bora, they have been more
successful.51
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Ground troops and coalition sourced intelligence has been relied upon
more heavily when searching for the remaining vestiges of Al Qaeda and the
Taliban. Airstrikes, on the other hand, were scaled back. This change in strategy
has illustrated critical flaws in American capabilities. Intelligence was a major
weakness in the American campaign. The U.S. needs to train more linguists, area
experts and psychological warfare operatives. All intelligence collection, analysis
and dissemination capabilities must be improved. In addition, helicopters such as
the UH-47 Chinook and UH-60 Blackhawk need to be upgraded or replaced to
overcome their technical failures and lack of instrument flight, night vision, aerial
refueling and ISR capabilities.52
Taliban Civil Affairs: Fear and Propaganda
The Taliban CA programme emphasised disinformation and relied upon the lack
of conflicting sources of information. If such sources emerged they were killed.
Taliban CA used civilian casualties and collateral damage, caused by
coalition forces, as their main means of creating support among the population.53
Less tangible propaganda centred upon the American domination of the Muslim
world and the assertion that the Jews committed the September 11th terror attack.
Education was a factor in the effectiveness of the Taliban CA programme.
The educated urban population (by Afghan standards) were less likely to believe
Taliban propaganda. This was demonstrated by Maulavi Khattib, the deputy head
of the Kandahar Clerics Council, speaking from the birthplace of the Taliban.
Maulavi stated that ‘the American forces were in Afghanistan to liberate the
people, but not rule. The American’s upheld freedom of religion and the UN
supported the coalition.’54
To counter such assertions, the Taliban turned to terrorism as a means of
coercion. Clerics were systematically murdered if they would not support a call to
Jihad against the coalition.55 Maulavi asserted Jihad was impossible to declare,
Clerics had no right to, as the new Afghan Government had been elected by the
people, and the government supported the coalition.
In isolated Pashtun regions of Afghanistan, and in the tribal frontier of
Pakistan, people are less sophisticated but very fixed in their ideas. These ideas
are potentially impossible to alter. A common perception in Pashtun regions of
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Afghanistan insists that the core of American policy is a hatred of Muslims and
that bin Laden was not responsible for September 11. To most Westerners, these
views are false and unrelated. This is unfortunately not so in parts of Afghanistan
and Pakistan. Shakirullah Jan Kokikhel, chief of the 100,000 member Kokikhel
tribe, situated in northern Pakistan, claimed, in support of bin Laden’s innocence,
that “our research has shown that the Jews did it”,56 referring to September 11.
Indicative of the psychological nature of the potential supporters of the Taliban,
Shakirullah also stated that “Now we hate Americans. Under our tribal rules, we
designate an enemy. America is now the enemy.” The dilemma posed by this
statement is, how to change their way of thinking, because America is not their
enemy. Education will not suffice. Ajmal Khan, the leader of Pakistan’s
Madelakhel tribe, a university graduate, former military officer and former
minister of sport, agreed with Shakirullah, “it must have been the Jews”.57 This
complete renunciation of responsibility for terrorism, committed by bin Laden is
unbelievable, and almost impossible to defeat.
U.S. Intelligence Sources
Most civilian casualties caused by coalition forces in Afghanistan were not results
of weapons failure, but rather incorrect intelligence. Afghans provided
incomplete, inaccurate or deliberately misleading information to the coalition.
The cause of the disinformation is attributed to rivalry between mutually
competitive Afghan warlords, who were generally friendly towards the coalition.
However, this internecine rivalry, which causes civilian deaths, is supporting the
Taliban’s CA programme. This is a view supported by General Hagenbeck.58
This endangers the coalition’s aim of bringing peace, stability and freedom to
Afghanistan. America must be aware that in Afghanistan some sources of
intelligence are treacherous. An Afghan security official, ethnically Pashtun, and
supportive of the American presence concurred, “unfortunately they [Americans]
don’t have faithful Afghan friends,… that is very dangerous for them.”59 It is
also, very dangerous for Afghanistan, and hence international security.
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Pakistan’s Approach
The United States has pressured the central government of Pakistan to intervene in
the Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA) of northern Pakistan, since the
inception of the latest Afghan war. America’s intention was for Pakistan to
eliminate any support for Al Qaeda and the Taliban.60 However, no outside
military force has ever been successful in waging a counterinsurgency in the
FATA region. Thus, Pakistan employed an old technique used by the British Raj,
collective punishment. In short, military commanders give tribal elders a list of
wanted men and an ultimatum. If those who are wanted are not caught and
handed over to the authorities, the entire tribe can be punished. This includes
homes being destroyed, withdrawal of public funds and detention of other tribe
members. This tactic has proven itself. In one such action, out of 72 men wanted
by the Pakistani authorities, 42 were handed over and 8 who would not surrender
had their homes blown up by the tribe. Curiously, this tactic is supported by the
tribe’s people, who are immensely independent and want to deal with their own
internal problems. Shakirullah of the Kokikhel tribe stated, there were “no Al
Qaeda or Taliban”61 in his tribal area, and if the American’s were to supply
evidence to say there were Al Qaeda or Taliban, they would detain them.
Unfortunately, it is difficult, initially, to ascertain whether these people are
genuine and trustworthy or not.62
Conclusion
OEF and the Somali operation demonstrate the regional and cultural complexity
which must be taken into account or effectively engaged with by intelligence and
regional analysis, prior to the deployment of armed forces. Technological
capabilities and military professionalism incorporated into the coalition were also
highly significant to the operational outcomes. Force was applied to targets that
were highlighted by intelligence gained. However, both case studies indicated the
critical nature of insuring that intelligence is based upon genuine information.
Within the sphere of American military capabilities, the Somali and
Afghan examples show the critical nature of a synergistic operational
environment. Where intelligence, command, communications, ground and air
forces were combined in joint warfare, they were effective because of the entire
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force’s interdependence. In addition, psychological operations were also
prominent in the two case studies. The advantages of prior training among
integrated coalition forces within the region of operations were also exemplified.
A more substantial discussion of the above findings will follow in the following
section.
In terms of strategic principles, the counterinsurgency operations in
Somalia and Afghanistan were both holistic in reference to the political,
economic, diplomatic and military tools employed. However, political
ramifications at the strategic level caused counterinsurgent retreat from Somalia.
In Afghanistan, the strategic application of holistic force ensured that a politically
caused failure would not occur. Operations in Somalia demonstrated the critical
link between the provision of internal security and the application of civil
operations: one cannot occur without the other. Operations in Afghanistan
showed the essential nature of a unified command, at all levels of command,
including the strategic, tactical and operational. Both operations illustrated the
critical nature of professionalism, independence, initiative and joint force to
contemporary counterinsurgency operations. However, in both of these case
studies intelligence and communications were found to be limiting factors, which
at times caused the breakdown of joint force precision and cohesion. In addition,
latter operations in Afghanistan illustrated the problem caused by inaccurate
intelligence: innocent people die.
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Chapter Four
The Iraq War of 2003 – 2004:
The Coalition’s Experience in LIC
This chapter examines Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) (British designation:
Operation Telic), the war against Iraq’s Ba’athist regime and Saddam Hussein.
This conflict will subsequently be defined as OIF or the Iraq War. Significantly
for this thesis, OIF seemed to exhibit an amalgam of High and Low Intensity
Conflict. More precisely, OIF incorporated two distinct battlefield strategies in
two more or less distinct phases. The strategies of the initial occupation included:
(1) High Intensity operations waged by the Coalition; and (2) Low Intensity
operations waged by Iraqi forces loyal to Saddam. Simply, Saddam loyalists
lacked the cohesion to generate anything other than Low Intensity Conflict (LIC)
in response. Both sets of forces were attempting to fight a war consistent with
their own strengths and offsetting of their own weaknesses. The Coalition was
highly successful, while the Iraqi forces were extremely ineffective. However, the
competing strategies of the conflict that followed the occupation have been more
characteristic of LIC. The subsequent terrorist and insurgency operations
(conducted by forces opposed to the Coalition and government of Iraq) have often
confounded the Coalition.
Prior to addressing the complexity of the subject matter, the thematic
scope of this research should be observed. This research examines conflict as a
holistic endeavour that combines politics, economics, diplomacy and military
force. The research analyses operational, tactical and strategic actions and from
this basis makes recommendations. There are four doctrinal principles that are
examined as critical enablers in counterinsurgency, these include the control of
international interference, the provision of internal security, the application of
civil operations, and the installation of a unified command. Given that this
research concentrates on the actions of military forces operating as
counterinsurgents, there are ten military principles that form a further focus of this
research. These ten principles include doctrinal precision, professionalism,
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independence, initiative, force precision, restraint, combined arms, joint force,
integrated communications and accurate human intelligence.
Due to the fusion of subject matter examined in this chapter, the
subsequent analysis will consider battle analysis holistically. It is recognised that
this chapter may draw criticism for this holistic approach, which may be seen as
convoluted or subjective. However a holistic approach, rather than a selective
approach, will reduce flawed conclusions. These flaws would be created by
deriving conclusions from specific engagements, which could prove atypical.
Furthermore, a holistic approach will illustrate emerging vulnerabilities and
strengths on the battlefield. These vulnerabilities or strengths, whether they occur
in conventional or asymmetric conflict, may have generic implications for the
future.
The Iraq war is indicative of a strategy amalgamating irregular and regular
tactics. This integration of tactics is a consequence of the opposition of dissimilar
military units. The inferior military force will attempt to utilise unconventional
techniques to compensate for inherent weakness. In practical terms, the pre-
eminence on the conventional battlefield of Western military forces will cause an
unconventional response.
The analytic method of this chapter is supported by Anthony Cordesman’s
synopsis of the Iraq war. Cordesman asserts the “Iraq war was an asymmetric war
in several senses of the term. Iraq made extensive use of irregular forces and
unconventional warfare techniques, ranging from the use of its cities as
sanctuaries for light armed paramilitary forces like Saddam’s Fedayeen to the use
of suicide bombers. It disguised some forces in civilian dress and may have
attempted to make others look like they were wearing America uniforms. The
fundamental asymmetry, however, lay (1) in the radically different capabilities of
the Iraqi forces and those of the coalition in technology, training, and readiness,
and (2) in Iraq’s lack of joint warfare capability against [United States] U.S. and
British forces that had a degree of “jointness” that had never been approached in
any previous war”.1 Hence, the holistic analysis of the Coalitions operations,
tactics, procedures and concepts in Iraq, will advance the military capability of
counterinsurgents in LIC. Prior to this analysis, there will be a brief examination
of the historical and political dynamics of Iraq. This historical and political
analysis sets the context for the 2003 Iraq War.
102
The Politics of Saddam
‘Knowing your enemy’ is a critical and timeless requirement for victory in
conflict. Saddam Hussein’s Iraq was a brutal, regionally destabilising and
genocidal dictatorship. Saddam gained prominence in the Ba’ath Party, the
former national-socialist (fascist) Iraqi Government, through his effective
application of violence. Saddam’s violence was initially directed at political
opponents of the Ba’ath Party. Subsequently, Saddam’s violence removed his
opponents from within the party. Saddam seized the presidency on 16 July 1979,
when he overthrew President Hasan al-Bakr.
On 22 July 1979 Saddam purged the party to enforce compliance through
fear. In September 1980 Saddam invaded Iran. This war lasted eight years,
impoverished Iraq and caused between 250,000 and 500,000 casualties overall.
Iraq financed its wartime spending through credits provided by Saudi Arabia and
Kuwait. Iraq’s unwillingness to repay this debt was among the factors that led to
the Gulf War. Once the coalition had evicted Iraq from Kuwait, the international
community implemented a policy of containment and arms inspections against
Iraq. Specifically, this containment of Iraq was undertaken to eliminate Iraq’s
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD).
The Reasons behind the 2003 Iraq War
The leading impediment to peace, between Iraq and the West, was the threat
derived from Iraqi attempts to enhance their WMD. Following the Gulf War, the
United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) attempted to uncover and
eliminate Iraq’s WMD programmes. “Despite consistent and general Iraqi
dissimulation and unwillingness to cooperate, UNSCOM inspectors …
[uncovered] elaborate efforts to build an Arab nuclear weapon as well as major
programs in chemical and biological weapons”.2 The threat of these weapons was
heightened, given the use of chemical weapons against: (1) his own people (the
Kurds in northern Iraq); and (2) Iranian soldiers in the Iran-Iraq War. Hence,
Saddam armed with WMD and airborne delivery systems was a significant and
direct risk to the stability of the Middle East. Furthermore, “‘Regime Change’ in
Iraq seemed imperative not because Saddam necessarily had weapons of mass
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destruction but because his continuance in power and his oil wealth guaranteed
that he would have them again if he survived”.3
Iraq’s association and support for terrorist organisations, especially Al
Qaeda and associates, reinforced the necessity for war with Iraq. There is
circumstantial evidence connecting Iraq and Al Qaeda.4 However, Iraq overtly
supported both the Abu Nidal Organisation and the Palestine Liberation Front
(PLF). Abu Nidal is a terrorist organisation, associated with Al Qaeda, and was
situated in north eastern Iraq. Saddam supported Abu Nidal, to undermine
Kurdish resistance in northern Iraq. Saddam’s support for the PLF was an attempt
to maintain violence and discord between the Palestinian Authority and Israel.
Fomenting this issue reduced public scrutiny of, and confused debate about, Iraqi
domestic and international issues. There have been reports that Iraq directly
supported the September 11 terror attacks, this is unsubstantiated. However the
passport of Ramzi Yousef, the leading September 11 terrorist, was Iraqi. It is
argued, that the passport was supplied by an Iraqi Intelligence officer. There was
also concern relating to Iraq supplying a terrorist organisation with WMD. This
was the West’s worst fear, as Iraq’s WMD would gain a global and unpredictable
reach.5
However, it would have been unlikely that Iraq would have supplied
terrorists, especially Al Qaeda or associates with WMD. Essentially because Iraq
is a secular state and many Islamic terrorists are Salafist. Salafists support a
united Muslim caliphate, which would overthrow the governments of, and
combine, Muslim nations. Therefore, Iraq would be threatened by its own WMD.
Furthermore Saddam should have calculated that an attack on a Western target, by
terrorists using WMD, would bring a resolute response against the supplier of the
WMD. This argument however, does not factor in irrational Iraqi actions, or the
international community’s lack of decisiveness. Potentially irrational actions,
such as supplying terrorists with WMD, could imperil many more lives than those
lost on September 11. Furthermore once these lives have been lost, no amount of
decisive action can bring them back. Action, therefore, to forestall this possibility
was thus appropriate.
There were two other issues precipitating the Iraq war: (1) human rights
and war crime issues; and (2) continued threats to Kuwaiti territorial integrity and
Iraq’s Shi’a and Kurdish populations. However, these concerns were secondary
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to Iraqi support for terrorists and the pursuit of WMD. Simultaneously,
Washington’s perception of terrorism and WMD had taken on a new dimension
since September 11. September 11 made the White House realise, that active
engagement within the international environment was critical to America’s future
and national interests. This new perspective on international relations was
labelled neo-conservatism.
In practical terms, neo-conservatism, in the realm of security, emphasises
the opposition to terrorism and the accumulation of WMD by “irresponsible
states”.6 In addition, in such circumstances there are limits to the sovereignty of
such ‘irresponsible states’. Sovereignty as a principle, maintains there is no
internal equal and no external superior to the government of a state. This implies
that no other state should interfere in the internal policies of another state.
Richard Haass, the U.S. State Department’s Director of Policy Planning, gave the
following explanation of ‘limited sovereignty’ in an ‘irresponsible state’. Haass
stated, “Sovereignty entails obligations. One is not to massacre your own people.
Another is not to support terrorism in any way. If a government fails to meet
these obligations, then it forfeits some of the normal advantages of sovereignty,
including the right to be left alone inside your own territory. Other governments,
including the United States, gain the right to intervene. In the case of terrorism
[and presumably WMD], this can even lead to a right of preventive, or
peremptory, self-defence”.7 This policy of preventive defence is not synonymous
with the enforcement of a uni-polar world. This was displayed by America’s
effort to create a ‘coalition of the willing’, before embarking on the Iraq War.
UN Resolution 1441 provided a legal justification for military action
against Iraq. This Resolution stated that Iraq remained in breach of UN
Resolution 678 of 1990 and all subsequent resolutions. In 1999, UNSCOM’s
final report stated that 6,000 chemical weapons remained unaccounted for, in
addition to seven surface to surface missiles. Moreover, the precursors for 26,000
litres of anthrax and 1.5 ton of VX gas were also unaccounted for. Saddam and
the Ba’ath regime’s recalcitrant attitude towards the UN weapons inspectors also
implied an admission of guilt, to maintaining and expanding Iraq’s WMD.
Due to the WMD programmes, terrorist support, human rights and war
crimes issues stated above, the United States and the United Kingdom intervened
in Iraq. This coalition was also supported by a number of states, including
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Australia, Bahrain, Bulgaria, Egypt, Hungary, Italy, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman,
Poland, Qatar, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Spain and the United Arab Emirates.8
Operation Iraqi Freedom
Operation Iraqi Freedom began on March 20, 2003, with an attempted
decapitation strike against Saddam and his sons Uday and Qusay Hussein. The
following is a brief synopsis of the composition of opposing military forces and
the sequence of battle, leading to the demise of the Ba’athist regime in Iraq.
Central Command’s overall commander was General Tommy Franks.
Lieutenant General David McKiernan, U.S. Army, commanded the Combined
Force Land Component (CFLC). The British were represented in Central
Command (CENTCOM) by Major General Albert Whitley, British Army.
Whitley and McKeirnan had previously served together with the North Atlantic
Treaty Organisation’s Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC).9 This previous
service enabled greater coalition synergy, at the operational level.
The allied ground combat force amounted to approximately 170,000
troops, 25,000 of those were British, and the majority of the remainder were
American. Total allied force element numbers, including support troops,
amounted to 466,985 persons. The main allied troop concentration was based in
the south. This concentration included V Corps (commanded by Lieutenant
General William Wallace, U.S. Army), and 1 Marine Expeditionary Force
(commanded by Lieutenant General James Conway, U.S. Marine Corp). V Corps
initially included the 3rd Mechanised Infantry Division, the 101st Airborne
Division, the 82nd Airborne Brigade, and additional engineer and supply units. V
Corps was later augmented by the 4th Infantry Division. 1 Marine Expeditionary
Force (MEF) consisted of the 1st Marine Division (Task Force Tarawa), the 3rd
Marine Aircraft Wing and the British 1st Armoured Division. In the north of Iraq,
the 173rd Airborne Brigade, part of the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU)
and the 10th Special Forces Group (SFG) deployed. These forces were under the
command of a Special Forces General, and tasked with protecting the Kurdish
population and engaging the northern elements of the Iraqi army. In the west of
Iraq, under the command of 5 Special Forces Group, 4,000 special force troops
from Australia, America and Britain were deployed, along with a U.S. Ranger
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regiment. The primary tasks of 5 Special Force Group included: (1) the
elimination of Iraq’s capability to launch Scud missiles at Israel; and (2) the
interruption of Syrian supply lines to Iraq.10
Naval forces were important in the Iraq war, due primarily to their power
projection capabilities. These power projection capabilities became especially
significant after Saudi Arabia refused landing rights to coalition combat aircraft,
notwithstanding that they were part of the coalition. Land Strike was initially
applied by five U.S. Navy carrier battle groups, and British and American
submarines (and American surface ships) capable of firing cruise missiles. Less
visible was the significant contribution made by British and U.S. Marine aircraft
and helicopter carriers and assault ships. The airpower these vessels presented
was critical to the land campaign. In turn, the air campaign was supplemented by:
(1) the wide dissemination of precision guided munitions (PGMs); and (2)
Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance,
Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (C4ISTAR) aircraft and aerial
replenishment tankers.
Opposing the Coalition were 15,000 Special Republican Guards, 50-
60,000 Republican Guards, 150-200,000 Regular troops and an assortment of
irregular fedayeen. The Special Republican Guard force was deployed in, and
around, Baghdad, principally to prevent a coup. As of 20 March 2003, the
Republican Guard force, organised into six divisions, was deployed as follows.
Adnan Division was deployed in the north, Nebuchadnezzar Division was
deployed near Tikrit, while the Hammurabi, Medina, Baghdad and Al Nida
Divisions were maintained close to Baghdad. The regular forces were organised
into seventeen divisions, within five corps. Two regular corps were deployed in
the north, one corps was deployed in central Iraq on the Iranian border, and the
final two corps were deployed in the south. The irregular army, or fedayeen,
incorporated Ba’ath party loyalists and religious fanatics from the surrounding
Muslim nations. The fedayeen sought martyrdom and to kill Western troops.11
Prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom, military analysts envisaged Iraq’s battle
plan would cede the countryside, but fight bitterly for the retention of the cities.
Saddam threatened to turn Baghdad into another Stalingrad, with the prospect of
high allied casualties and severe collateral damage. Unfortunately for Saddam,
the threat of an internal coup and provincial rebellion had two significant results.
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First, the deployment of large Iraqi regular force elements in Baghdad may have
led to a coup. Second, the prospect of provincial rebellion required regular force
elements to be deployed in rural areas. This enabled many of the regular force
elements to merely melt away, when the Coalition approached. Moreover,
Saddam’s regular forces amounted to little more than ill-trained civilians, armed
with obsolete weapons, and commanded by political loyalists rather than
competent leaders. The Coalition’s human component was a professional, highly
trained, disciplined and confident force. The Coalition was technologically
superior in every aspect of warfare. Furthermore, the Coalition was commanded
by professionals, who were able to combine agility, jointness, intelligence and
precision into a synergistic way of war.
Operation Iraqi Freedom began ahead of schedule on the 20th of March,
2003. The 5th SFG and a combined group fought in the west and north of Iraq
respectively, the main allied drive came from the south. The strategic plan
provided for a simultaneous air, land and sea assault upon Iraqi forces. This
strategic action was intended to overwhelm and prevent any coherent command
response. Critical to the non-linear warfare envisioned was the security of supply
lines. V Corps logistics were routed through the western desert, as the terrain
inhibited covert Iraqi movement and ambushes. Conversely, 1 MEF’s supplies
followed the Marines through the populated centre of Iraq.
Briefly, there were three simultaneous thrusts from the south. V Corps
units manoeuvred through the western desert to Karbala, then on to Baghdad. 1
MEF travelled: (1) north from Kuwait to Nasiriyah, where they would cross the
Euphrates; and (2) then further north to envelop Baghdad from the south and east.
The British were to seize Basra, and with the assistance of U.S. Marine units,
were to occupy the Fao peninsula. Critical choke points along the American axes
of advance were Nasiriyah and the Karbala gap. Samawah and Najaf were also
flashpoints for Iraqi and associated resistance.
Instances of Low Intensity Conflict in Iraq
Iraqi planning for the OIF was based on incorrect assumptions about the
Coalition’s order of operations. Saddam’s regime expected the ensuing war
would: (1) begin with a lengthy aerial preparation of the battlefield; and (2) any
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land advance would be postponed until the 4th Division could be re-deployed from
the Mediterranean. On both assumptions Iraq was wrong. There were no Iraqi
units in place to halt the Coalition advance when it came. When Iraqi units
attempted to manoeuvre to engage Coalition ground forces, they exposed
themselves to Coalition air power. Iraqi units then dispersed, in an attempt to
evade Coalition air power. However, dispersal prevents a cohesive and combined
response to conventional land forces. Not only did Iraqi tactics fail, so did the
Iraqi command cycle. The Coalition’s speed, jointness, intelligence and precision
completely overwhelmed any coherent conventional response.
The following section of this chapter will incorporate four engagement
scenarios, each based upon a separate combat unit. First, the engagement in
Nasiriyah, between Marines of the 1 MEF and fedayeen irregulars will be
examined. Second, the 1st Armoured Division’s envelopment and occupation of
Basra will be discussed. Third, Baghdad’s liberation will be analysed, with
specific focus upon the actions of the V Corps. Fourth, the activities of the
combined force group in northern Iraq will be analysed. The following sections
will examine: (1) the tactics, procedures, capabilities and concepts employed; and
(2) the character of irregular conflict in the Iraq War. This examination will form
the basis of subsequent analysis.
U.S. Marine Corps battle for Nasiriyah
Nasiriyah was the site of an unanticipated clash between U.S. Marine units and
fedayeen, Ba’ath party loyalists and remnants of Iraq’s 11th Regular Infantry
Division. Nasiriyah was of strategic significance, as it dominates bridges over the
Euphrates River and Saddam Canal. These bridges were critical to the Coalition
advance. Coalition intelligence indicated Nasiriyah’s Shi’a population would be
welcoming, but did not reveal the concentration of Iraqi soldiers and irregulars
present. On the contrary, the Iraqi combat elements in Nasiriyah were aware of
the American advance. This was because: (1) a supply convoy had inadvertently
driven through Nasiriyah, sustaining serious casualties; and (2) other U.S. force
elements had secured bridges around Nasiriyah.
The purposeful entry of U.S. Marine units into Nasiriyah occurred on 23
March, 2003. Specifically, the actions of Bravo and Charlie Company (1st
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Battalion, 2nd Marine Regiment) are significant. In brief, Bravo Company
advanced into Nasiriyah against substantial resistance, and secured a bridge across
the Euphrates. However, navigational problems caused Bravo Company to
become disorientated. This led to six Amphibious Assault Vehicles (AAVs)
becoming stuck in soft sand. Charlie Company entered Nasiriyah under
significant enemy fire. In this contact, one of Charlie Company’s AAV was
immobilised by Rocket Propelled Grenade (RPG) round. As the crew and
attached marine disembarking from the immobilised AAV, Charlie Company was
hit by friendly fire. An A-10 providing Close Air Support (CAS) strafed the
Marine position, destroying another AAV and killing six Marines. Charlie
Company was then faced with evacuating casualties. The Marines were unable to
use medical evacuation helicopters, due to RPG and small arms fire Hence, the
Marines were forced to send six vehicles back through, what had been dubbed
‘Ambush Alley’, to evacuate the wounded. This was highly unsuccessful. The
convoy was ambushed and then struck by RPG and small arms fire. Two further
vehicles were destroyed, two were damaged and further casualties were sustained.
The personnel were evacuated later by a unit escorted by an Abram tank.
Substantial fighting lasted throughout the night, as the Marines repulsed
continual, but unorganised attacks against the bridgehead into Nasiriyah. The
Marines employed their M-1s and Light Armoured Vehicles (LAVs) in an
armoured cordon around the position. This position was supported by AH-1s
providing CAS. By the morning of 24 March, the Marines had consolidated
control over the bridgeheads, and were attempting to suppress the resistance in
Nasiriyah. However, the resistance was continually regenerating; American
movement drew small arms, RPG and sporadic mortar fire. This level of conflict
did not stop the 1st Regimental Combat Team from advancing through Nasiriyah.
However, the soft skinned supply units that needed to follow the combat units
could not sustain the firepower from the Iraqi’s in Nasiriyah. Thus, the irregular
threat had to be eliminated.
The Marines cordoned off the city, stopping supply and reinforcement to
the irregulars. Special Forces units and snipers were inserted to kill and restrict
the movement of the enemy. As the Marines consolidated their control, the Shi’a
population became more forthcoming with intelligence. This enabled air strikes
to destroy fedayeen and Ba’ath command facilities and combat positions. This
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sustained Marine pressure on the Ba’athists and fedayeen, secured Nasiriyah
within a week.12
The British 1st Armoured Division enters Basra
The British had enveloped Basra by the 23rd of March, taking up the positions
held by the 5th and 7th Marine Regiments. For the purpose of occupying and
subduing Basra, the British were well prepared. Although the U.S. illustrated
excellence in technical intelligence and the application joint force, the British
have been effective counterinsurgents in LIC. The British have had experience in
special operations, counterinsurgency, urban warfare and the collection of Human
Intelligence (HUMINT). Significantly, the British have conducted successful
civil-military operations with a number of target populations.13
The British proficiency in urban warfare is a direct result of operations
against the Irish Republican Army (IRA) in Northern Ireland. In addition, the
techniques of counterinsurgency, special operations and the essential nature of
embedded human intelligence sources were experienced and learned by the
British in counterinsurgency operations since 1945. Consequently, British troops
could survive and dominate Basra’s urban environment. Since the first Gulf War,
Military Intelligence 6 ((MI6) the British foreign intelligence service) had created
a network of sources throughout Basra. In addition, MI6 had assembled
intelligence from official, commercial and personal links with the region. The
British capacity to gain, analyse and apply intelligence proved instrumental in
eliminating Ba’athist and fedayeen resistance in Basra. However, subsequent
violence in Basra may indicate a reduced level of local support for the British.
The first overt step the British took to subdue Basra was to surround and
interdict communications, logistics and human flows to the city. The 16th Air
Assault Brigade blocked Highway 6 from Baghdad, the 7th Armoured Brigade and
attached sections enclosed Basra from the west, and the 3rd Commando Brigade
deployed along the western edge of the Euphrates to complete the envelopment.
The enclosure of Basra was approximately 32 kilometres in circumference, with a
buffer of 3.2 kilometres from the urban environment. Importantly, the cordon did
not cut all human flows, civilians and some civilian goods were permitted to pass.
This strategy was altruistic and pragmatic. Not only did the fleeing civilians
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provide sporadic intelligence about the military units in Basra, they also reported
that the population was being held under duress. In addition, the civilian flows
enabled the British to insert Special Air Service (SAS), Special Boat Service
(SBS), sniper teams and intelligence agents into Basra.
In terms of strategy, the opponent forces were diametrically opposed.
Major General Robin Brims, the British 1st Armoured Division commander,
planned to: (1) encircle the city, outside effective Iraqi weapons range; and (2)
insert intelligence personnel and sniper teams into Basra. The latter sniper teams
were inserted to: (1) degrade Ba’athist and fedayeen effectiveness, by killing their
commanders with sniper fire; and (2) destroying their facilities with PGMs.
Brims’ policy would ensure Basra would fall quickly and limit collateral damage
and casualties. Ali Hassan al-Majid (dubbed ‘Chemical Ali’ for his lead in
gassing the Kurds), the Ba’athist commander in Basra, had two divergent policies.
Majid planned to: (1) maintain control over the Shi’a population, by any means
including the killing of fleeing civilians; and (2) lure the British into the city, in
the hope of causing numerous casualties and considerable damage to Basra’s
infrastructure.
Majid wanted to win a psychological war, by using the ‘CNN effect’.
Majid commanded three groups of forces: (1) the Shi’a conscripts, who preferred
to desert, rather than fight for Saddam’s regime; (2) the fedayeen, who were
fanatical, but had received no more training than how to fire an AK-47/74 or
RPG; and (3) the Ba’ath loyalists, who were fanatic, but lacked even rudimentary
training. The offensive tactics of the Ba’ath and fedayeen irregulars often
included: opening fire while surrendering; shooting from behind civilians; or
playing dead, then shooting soldiers when they came close. These tactics not only
gave the irregulars an opportunity to kill British soldiers, but to undermine the
international opinion of the British jus in bello. Pictures of British soldiers
shooting surrendering, or dead, Iraqis or at civilians could have caused a major
public outcry against the war. Similarly, the irregulars mortared fleeing Shi’a, in
an attempt to get media coverage, adverse to the British cause. A further tactic of
Majid’s was to threaten the families of Shi’a soldiers with death, if the soldiers
would not attack the British cordon with their T-55 tanks. These tanks were
completely obsolete by Western standards. Hence, those Shi’a soldiers who could
not surrender died without influencing the conflict. Primarily, the tactics of the
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fedayeen constituted attacking the British lines in groups of up to twenty, with no
more than haphazard mortar support. This fedayeen tactic was highly ineffective
against the British.14
From 27 March, British incursions into Basra heightened. Warrior
Infantry Fighting Vehicles IFVs with embarked infantry made raids into the city,
and sniper teams infiltrated closer to the heart of the regime. These tactics did not
only bring about instant physical returns, but had two divergent psychological
outcomes. First, the Shi’a population began to realise the British were diligently
and cautiously liberating the city. Second, the Ba’ath loyalists and fedayeen
realised they were not safe in Basra. As these raids continued, British
psychological operations began. British leaflets were dropped on the city,
pledging to the Shi’a that “We [the British] will not desert you this time. Trust us
and be patient”.15 This encouraged the Shi’a to provide more intelligence on
personnel and weapons caches in Basra.
On 7 April, the final thrust into Basra began. The 7th Armoured Regiment
infiltrated from the west, while the 3rd Commando Brigade entered Basra from the
east. This assault was planned to only last the day; the British were to leave by
nightfall. However, the British actions were so effective against the collapsing
resistance, the British decided to stay. The fighting throughout the day utilised
divergent tactics. Joint operations were initiated where possible. In unpopulated
areas the U.S. Marines leant firepower to the British, in the form of the AH-1
Cobra. However, the fedayeen were entrenched at the university, which
prevented air support and clear identification of military targets. Hence, the
fedayeen had to be assaulted by unsupported infantry. This situation illustrated
the requirement for highly trained professional soldiers, versed in urban conflict.
On 8 April the Parachute Regiment, of the 16th Air Assault Brigade, were
deployed to destroy the final remnants of the irregulars in Basra. The Parachute
Regiment found little remained of the defeated foe. An important incident
occurred when the Parachute Regiment attempted to withdraw. Once the British
soldiers embarked their Armoured Personnel Carriers (APCs), the Shi’a
population began to throw rocks. This anger was not focused directly against the
British, but the fear their departure would herald the return of the old regime.
Fortunately, one of the British commanders correctly identified the situation. The
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commander ordered the soldiers to remove their helmets, stow their weapons and
mingle with the crowd. The Shi’a once again cheered their liberators.16
In Basra, the British Army showed effectiveness in modern war. British
operations also indicated that human intelligence, Special Forces and a diligent,
restrained strategy can be highly effective in an urban, asymmetric environment.
As John Keegan states “this sort of operation – targeting armed terrorists acting
singly or in small groups, without causing harm to the civilian population – is one
at which British troops excel”.17 Significantly, prior coalition training had
enabled the effective integration of other coalition forces within British units.
This enabled synergistic joint operations, which were critical, especially in the
form of combat air support. However, the degree to which British troops ‘excel’
in an insurgency must be questioned in the light of the growth of violence
perpetrated against the British soldiers in Iraq.
The V Corps arrives in Baghdad
Saddam’s last stand for Baghdad began on the afternoon of 3 April, 2003. A
troop, which consisted of twenty Abram tanks and Bradley IFVs, established a
position at two intersections, west of Saddam International Airport. A troop’s
presence was perceived, by the Iraqis, as a critical rupture in Baghdad’s defences.
The Iraqi’s first response was to hurl hundreds of fedayeen at the U.S. positions.
The fedayeen were mounted in civilian vehicles or on foot, and were armed with
AK-47/74s and RPGs. The American armour, with artillery support, repulsed all
of the fedayeen’s forays.
On the morning of 4 April, a detachment of two Bradleys and two
Abrams, guarding the Abu Ghraib Expressway were attacked by a large group of
Republican Guard armour. Within “five minutes the four American vehicles
destroyed twelve enemy tanks”.18 It became evident at this stage, that most
Republican Guard formations defending Baghdad’s outer limits had been
destroyed by air and ground strikes in early April. Within Baghdad, intelligence
estimated two Republican Guard brigades remained, in addition to 15,000
fedayeen.19 Iraqi command and control had been rendered ineffective, while
many regular and Republican Guard units had been persuaded to desert. This
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desertion had occurred due to either Coalition Psychological Operations
(PSYOPS) or aerial bombardment.
Deep reconnaissance raids began on 5 April. As the British had done in
Basra, the Americans had inserted special force teams into Baghdad to gather
intelligence. This intelligence indicated that the Iraqis had built road blocks and
deployed armour, to ambush the expected American probes. However,
preparatory artillery strikes had destroyed many known Iraqi concentrations. This
preparatory fire was followed by the 2nd Brigade Combat Team’s incursion into
the city. The raid came as a surprise to the Iraqis, due mainly to the
disinformation being spread by the Iraqi Ministry of Information. However, large
scale fedayeen attacks against the armoured convoy soon built, but were almost
completely ineffective. The fedayeen would rush the column, in open terrain and
be slaughtered by the armoured units. In one case an Abrams was disabled. To
extract the crew, other armoured units had to form an immobile cordon around
their disabled counterpart. Even in this static position, the fedayeen were still
unable to press home an effective assault. The result of the first raid was: (1)
hundreds of fedayeen dead; (2) one Abram disabled; and (3) zero American
casualties. The raid demonstrated the value of heavy armour in urban terrain. It
also demonstrated the competence of U.S. soldiers.
The final occupation of Baghdad commenced on 7 April, with Task Forces
1-64 and 4-64 taking up positions in the city. These armoured units, with mortar
and air support, spent the day repulsing fedayeen, on foot and in ‘technicals’. The
critical point in this operation came, when re-supply was required. The supply
line was to be defended by Task Force 3-15, at three points, designated Larry,
Curly and Moe. These strongpoints surrounded highway underpasses, from where
it was expected the fedayeen would launch ambushes. Larry and Moe were to be
defended by companies of Abrams and Bradleys. Alternatively, Curly was
defended by an ad hoc group of four Bradleys, a platoon of M-113 mortar carriers,
two engineer vehicles and four M-113 APCs. This assortment of soldiers
displayed tremendous valour, as they withstood numerous fedayeen assaults.
The proficiency of the fedayeen attacking the three strongpoints was
superior to that of other irregulars in the Iraq war. These fedayeen turned out to
be mostly Syrian jihadists. These Syrians were equipped with RPGs and AK-
47/74s, and were supported by mortar and artillery fire. The Syrians also
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undertook vehicular suicide attacks on the U.S. position. The fedayeen proved so
numerous and suicidal, that strongpoint Curly had to be reinforced and re-
supplied. This brought intensified fedayeen resistance against the thin skinned re-
supply vehicles. Four of these vehicles were destroyed in a single fedayeen
attack. As an indication of the magnitude of the fedayeen assaults on the three
positions, strongpoint Moe reported sixty enemy vehicles destroyed and hundreds
of fedayeen killed. In face of these odds, Larry, Curly and Moe held, enabling the
supply units to move within the city and facilitate the liberation of Baghdad.
Audacity, courage, training, and morale, combined with superior
equipment and effective intelligence, enabled the American force to take
Baghdad. Saddam’s fedayeen and loyalists were effectively overcome in all
combat environments. This is important, as analysts prior to the war envisioned
significant operational problems for a conventional force, which faced an
asymmetric threat in urban terrain. This has been proven incorrect in OIF.
However, subsequent terrorist and insurgency operations have confounded forces
in Iraq.20 These issues will be discussed later in this chapter.
The combined force group, Northern Iraq
Turkey’s refusal to provide the Coalition with basing and over-flight rights
prevented the 4th Infantry Division from deploying to northern Iraq. As a result, a
light combined force group (CFG) deployed. The CFG included the 173rd
Airborne Brigade, part of the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) and the 10th
Special Forces Group (SFG). This subsection will focus primarily on the actions
of the 10th SFG. The 10th SFG was co-assigned the task of dominating northern
Iraq, due to the unit’s extraordinary success in Afghanistan.
Overall command of the Special Forces in Iraq was assigned to Brigadier
General Gary Harrell. General Franks issued Harrell and the 10th SFG with three
objectives in Iraq: (1) the elimination of the terrorist group Ansar al-Islam; (2) to
keep the one Republican Guard and three regular divisions occupied in the north,
preventing them from redeploying to defend Baghdad; and (3) to capture the
northern oilfields of Kirkuk and Mosul. Operational command of the 10th SFG
belonged to Colonel Charlie Cleveland. Cleveland had attained an understanding
of the regional armed and civilian culture, through years of in theatre training and
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exercises. This enabled Cleveland to transfer the battle skills that the Special
Forces had attained in Afghanistan, to the Iraqi conflict.
Overt deployment of the 10th SFG began on 20 March, 2003. This
deployment followed an earlier infiltration mission, which occurred in February.
The first component of the SFG flew from their forward operating base in
Romania, over Greece, to Jordan. In Jordan the SFG’s transports refuelled for
their insertion into northern Iraq. The transport aircraft were MC-130s, which
flew at 50 feet above ground level (AGL) to thwart Iraqi radar on the final flight
leg. However, this covert insertion drew heavy ground fire, severely damaging
three of the MC-130s.21
The 10th SFG, or Task Force Viking, was formed from the 2nd and 3rd
Battalion, 10th SFG, and the 3rd Battalion of the 3rd SFG. The soldiers of the 3rd
SFG were armed with the Special Force (SF) High Mobility Multipurpose
Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV or Humvee). These Humvees were equipped with
organic command and control (C2), machine guns, automatic grenade launchers,
Stinger Surface-to-Air Missiles (SAMs), Javelin Anti-tank Guided Missiles
(ATGMs). These weapons and systems augmented the SF personnel’s own small
arms. The C2 capabilities employed in the Humvees included advanced
communications, global positioning systems (GPS) and laser designators. These
systems enabled the target designation for air delivered PGMs. In contrast, the
10th SFG utilised the Land Rover, which can be airlifted by a CH-47 Chinook.
However, due to the lack of strategic airlift throughout March, the 10th SFG’s
Land Rovers remained in Romania until April. Thus, the 10th SFG’s personnel
were forced to commandeer civilian cars, utilities and buses for transport.22
To supplement the firepower of the 10th SFG, the U.S. Air Force’s 352nd
Special Operations Group (SOG) was deployed to northern Iraq. The SOG,
commanded by Colonel Mannion, coordinated air support from Navy and Air
Force fighters, and AC-130 gunships. This CAS greatly augmented the capability
of the 10th SFG. Subsequently, as more strategic and operational airlift became
available, the 10th SFG was augmented by the following units: (1) the 173rd
Airborne Brigade; (2) an armoured unit from the 1st Armoured Division; (3) the
26th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU); (4) a Battalion (1-14 Infantry) from the
10th Mountain Division; (5) the British Special Forces Task Force 7; and (6) two
Civil Affairs (CA) units.
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Notwithstanding the above description, the 10th SFG was itself, a
supplementary force. The 10th SFG had been deployed to coordinate and control
the Peshmerga. The Peshmerga describes the Kurdish militias of northern Iraq.
The Peshmerga numbered approximately 65,000 troops. Of these Peshmerga
soldiers, 45,000 were members of the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP), while the
remainder were members of the Party for a Unified Kurdistan (PUK). Both of
these organisations opposed Saddam, and each other. Thus, it was significant that
these two organisations could be coordinated by the Americans, and turned into
an effective force.23
The initial target of the 10th SFG and the Peshmerga was Ansar al-Islam.
This operation was a prerequisite for PUK support in opposing Saddam. Ansar al-
Islam is a terrorist organisation (designated so by UN Security Council Resolution
1267), which attempted to create an Islamic state in northern Iraq. Ansar al-Islam
is also supported by Iran. Ansar al-Islam consisted of between 700-1000
members, trained in Al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan. Ansar al-Islam also
provided a sanctuary in Iraq for Al Qaeda members fleeing Operation Enduring
Freedom in Afghanistan. Ansar al-Islam’s main activity was the opposition to
PUK. This opposition included assassinations, ambushes and attacks in PUK
territory. Ansar al-Islam also claimed to possess weaponised biological and
chemical substances.24
Ansar al-Islam occupied 300 square kilometres of mountainous terrain in
Iraq’s northeast. It was the 3rd Battalion, 10th SFG and its surrogate Peshmerga
forces that closed with and destroyed Ansar al-Islam’s main base in the Sargat
Valley. The Coalition troops infiltrated the base, along six avenues of advance.
Each of these routes were defended by Ansar al-Islam members in fortified
positions. The Ansar al-Islam and Peshmerga were armed in a similar fashion,
with AK-47/74 assault rifles, sniper rifles, machine guns, and RPGs. In Contrast,
U.S. SF troops carried significant kit. This kit included weapons,
communications systems, computers, laser designators and global positioning
systems. As the Ansar al-Islam bunkers were revealed, SF troops called in air
support from Naval fighters and AC-130 Sceptre gunships. Joint Direct Attack
Munitions (JDAMs) were used to destroy heavier Ansar al-Islam positions, while
the Sceptre’s 105mm rounds were guided onto softer targets by onboard sensors.
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These actions ended the Ansar al-Islam presence in the Sargat Valley and allowed
the Coalition to focus upon their second objective: the northern Iraqi divisions.25
The lack of military leadership and excessive savagery, on the part of
particular Iraqi force elements, was clearly evident in northern Iraq. These factors
greatly reduced the fighting capacity of the Iraqi Divisions. The Iraqi Divisions
were concentrated in open terrain, along the ‘Green Line’, the informal Iraq-
Kurdish border. Hence, these concentrated units were easily targeted by Coalition
aviation. Unfortunately for the regular Iraqi troops, they were caught between the
Coalition and Saddam’s Republican Guard and special security teams. These
latter units were deployed to fortify frontline Iraqi troops, by shooting them if they
retreated. Peshmerga, led by SF troops and supported by Coalition air support,
maintained pressure on the Iraqi lines with coordinated air and ground assaults. In
addition to these combined assaults, the 173rd Airborne Brigade was deployed to
defend the Kurds against any attempted Iraqi advance. The Iraqi advance never
came, and two days after Baghdad was liberated, Mosul fell to the combined
forces.26
In northern Iraq, Special Forces and air support combined to be
extraordinarily effective. This joint Special Force and air support combination,
also acted as a highly effective force multiplier for surrogate forces. One of the
most significant problems faced by the 10th SFG was airlift. Although airborne
troops could be projected, there was insufficient airlift early in the campaign, to
supply vehicles and other heavy equipment to the front. These and other issues
are discussed in the following section of this chapter.
The four operations analysed above utilised military force as the principal
strategic level instrument, while politics, economics and diplomacy were
infrequently applied or applied at the tactical and operational levels. The British
did utilised political, economic and diplomatic forms of force in the process of
taking control of Basra. Where time allowed, the Americans also employed
political, economic and diplomatic forms of force. However, when faced with
compressed timeframes, as in the case of Nasiriyah, military force provided the
only timely mechanism that could be used to achieve certain tactical objectives.
These four operations also highlight the critical nature of professionalism,
intelligence, initiative, independence, force precision, combined arms and joint
force in achieving counterinsurgency objectives.
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Lessons Learned: Rapid Manoeuvre and Military Professionalism
The importance of armour was highlighted in the Iraq War, in terms of protection,
mobility, firepower and integrated communications. Moreover, armour was
significant against both regular and irregular threats. Due to the non-linear
battlefield in Iraq, which effectively isolated Coalition combat units, the fighting
capability and protection of armoured units was critical.
American Bradley and British Warrior IFVs provided effective medium
firepower, in offensive and defensive operations. These IFVs were effective
against conventional, irregular and suicide attacks. IFVs also provided mobile and
protected firepower in urban environments. Armoured Personnel Carriers (APCs)
were also effective in their intended role of providing armoured mobility but
lacked significant armaments. The Coalition’s light and medium armoured
vehicles demonstrated no significant faults. This category included Warrior and
M-2A2/3 Bradley IFVs, Light Armoured Vehicles (LAVs), Amphibious Assault
Vehicles (AAVs) and M-113 APCs. However, it is important to recognise why
Coalition medium and light armoured vehicles were effective. Coalition units
derived capability and all spectrum protection from: (1) joint and combined
operations; and (2) the competency of their commanders and crews.
APCs and IFVs were designed to operate with attached Main Battle Tanks
(MBTs). This is because the lighter armoured vehicles were not intended to
engage heavy enemy forces unilaterally. In practice, the primary source of
protection for the Coalition APCs and IFVs was provided by British Challenger 2
MBTs and American M-1A1 Abram MBTs. These MBTs effectively shielded
Coalition forces from ranged Iraqi direct fire. The sights, fire control systems,
sensors and guns of the British and American MBTs were superior to the Iraqi
MBTs. These systems rendered the latter MBTs operationally ineffective.
Coalition MBTs provided localised security for Coalition forces, in both
open and urban terrain. However man-portable anti-armour weapons, like the
RPG, did cause armoured unit damage and losses in closed terrain and in ambush
situations. There is no official or reliable data available on total vehicular combat
losses in the Iraq War.27 The data available compares unlike units in dissimilar
damage categories. What can be inferred from the data sets is that heavily
armoured units are less likely to be destroyed or suffer crew casualties, than
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lighter armoured units. This is a simple deduction, but it has reinvigorated the
debate over the reduction in weight of future armoured vehicles.
Objective Force, a conceptual framework for future U.S. combat systems,
envisages “strategically responsive, deployable, agile, versatile, lethal [and]
survivable” units, able to operate “across the entire spectrum of military
operations”.28 The Stryker will fulfil this role and is described as a “highly
deployable-wheeled armored vehicle”.29 The advantage of the Stryker is that it
can be rapidly deployed by strategic airlift. Multiple vehicles can be transported
onboard C-5s, C-17s, while the C-130 can transport one Stryker. In contrast, the
Abram and Bradley are heavier and require greater airlift. However, the weight of
the Abram and Bradley is partially due to heavier armour. This armour improves
the sustainability of these vehicles in combat. Since 2002, two of the six Stryker
brigades have been cancelled by the U.S. Department of Defense. This
cancellation has occurred, so as to pay for the upgrading of the remaining four
brigades.30 Since OIF, the U.S. House Armed Services Committee has also
approved U.S. $726.8 million to upgrade the armour on current American
armoured units, including the Abram and Bradley.31
Simply, there are two competing elements in the debate about light and
heavy forces: power projection versus firepower and protection. General
Shinseki, U.S. Army, stated that ‘a Stryker brigade can be deployed anywhere in
the world within four days by air’.32 Conversely, the deployment of a heavy
armoured brigade of Abrams and Bradleys would require sealift or substantially
greater airlift capabilities. As an example of the stress armour places on airlift,
the deployment of five Abrams and five Bradleys to in northern Iraq, required an
equivalent airlift capacity employed to deploy the entire 173rd Airborne Brigade.
Thus lighter units have their advantages: (1) they can be deployed in non-littoral
contingencies, where no friendly seaport is available; and (2) when an immediate
strategic response is critical. However, heavier forces will provide greater
survivability and firepower.
The Director of Force Transformation (U.S. Department of Defense) came
to an opposite conclusion, asserting that OIF demonstrated heavy armour was
irrelevant on the modern battlefield. This assertion was however, countered by an
unknown analyst quoted by Anthony Cordesman.33 This analyst averred that
persons outside of the U.S. Army are attempting to deprive armoured units of
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their MBTs. Due to complex terrain on the battlefield, armoured units must
maintain passive defences against ATGMs and antitank shells. This is because
there is a lack of active countermeasures available to thwart these threats. The
analyst also states that “doctrine, tactics, … training, … armor technology,
weapons, [and] active protection suites” have not been developed to support
future fighting vehicles, which will replace heavy armoured units.34 However, the
crux of the argument is not centred upon the capability of light and heavy forces,
but upon force projection. Simply, the projection of heavy armoured units by air,
requires heavier transport aircraft. This reality has been accepted by many
Western defence forces, as is illustrated by the growth of airlift fleets.
Improvements in command, communications, intelligence, target
acquisition and precision guided rounds augmented the effectiveness of artillery
units in the Iraq War. Command was improved, most notably, through situational
awareness. Greater situational awareness was provided by the blue force tracker.
The blue force tracker is a computer based system, which enabled friendly units to
be aware of other friendly units on the battlefield. Communications were
enhanced by the Army Tactical Communications System (ATACS), which
enabled theatre wide command. Superior target acquisition information was
provided by the Long Range Advanced Scout Surveillance System (LRAS).
LRAS incorporates: (1) a forward-looking infrared system (FLIR) for targeting
enemy armour at long range; and (2) a radar system capable of calculating enemy
mortar and artillery positions,35 which enables instantaneous counter-battery fire.
Precision guided rounds improved the accuracy of artillery systems, this enabled a
broader tactical use of artillery support. In addition, artillery illustrated a day and
night, all weather capability, which no other support system can match. Simply,
when dust storms and ground fire prevented CAS, artillery became the only
indirect fire support available.
Special Forces are now a central and growing element of Western
warfighting, and will be critical in any future counterinsurgency. This is due to
the synergy displayed between SF troops, precision airpower and/or surrogate
forces. Special Forces are highly projectable forces, which rely upon precision
firepower and advanced command and communications equipment to generate
results. Special Forces also rely on extended capability air and land vehicles, and
external combat and service support.
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Special Forces are technologically advanced in nature. Special Forces also
display a high degree of force multiplication. Force multiplication was illustrated
when Special Forces operated with the Kurdish Peshmerga in northern Iraq, and
with conventional Coalition field elements. In the words of General McKiernan,
Special Forces “have been a huge combat multiplier in this joint campaign to
topple this regime”.36 Special Forces demonstrate greater area and language skill
than conventional forces. Hence, they were able to communicate, integrate with,
and support anti-regime forces. However, this cultural, religious and language
skill requires further reinforcement. Consequently, Special Force units are being
expanded by the U.S. Department of Defense.
The core element of a decisive victory in war is military professionalism.
The men in uniform matter the most. Soldiers are the bedrock of any new
technology, tactic or procedure. Furthermore, skill, determination, initiative and
courage are the foundation of soldiering. Militaries are designed to apply force.
The Coalition achieved this objective with effective training, applied through an
advanced technological architecture. It is training, readiness and familiarity with
weapons and systems, which enabled unparalleled situational awareness,
jointness, agility, intelligence and precision. The essential nature of military
professionalism will be further discussed in the next chapter.
Urban Conflict and Asymmetric Warfare
Prior to the Iraq War, defence analysts presumed urban terrain would mire the
Coalition advance and eventual victory. Significant casualties and collateral
damage were expected. Yet, this did not eventuate. The initial Coalition invasion
plan was one reason for the lack of urban warfare. The land and air campaign was
so swift and deadly, that most Iraqi forces were destroyed in open terrain before
they could retreat to the cities. When urban areas were approached, Coalition
forces manoeuvred on significant roads, so as to deny the Iraqis an opportunity to
attack Coalition forces at short range. When close urban warfare was necessary,
armoured units and the soldier’s professionalism made engagements survivable
and winnable. In the examples of Basra and Baghdad, urban conflict occurred on
the Coalition’s terms. The cities were isolated, intelligence was obtained and
123
Iraqi forces were undermined. This enabled Coalition troops to fight from a
position of superiority, with airborne and land based intelligence and fire-support.
Across the spectrum of asymmetric warfare (including mechanised
fedayeen (‘technical’) raids, suicide attacks and urban combat) the British and
U.S. forces were successful in defeating their opponents in OIF. Apart from the
inherent quality of the Coalition’s soldiers and weapons, the dynamism of the
advance, and jointness and combined arms were significant factors that enabled
the Coalition to defeat asymmetric threats. First, the speed and agility of the
initial advance into Iraq, coupled with the destruction of Iraq’s command, control
and communications facilities, prevented a coherent defence by the Iraqi
irregulars. Second, jointness and combined arms functionally dislocated irregular
tactics. Simply put, infantry and armour combined to reduce individual unit
weakness. In addition, CAS augmented ground based surveillance and firepower.
Asymmetric warfare will be further discussed in the following chapter, while the
post-war asymmetric environment is analysed below.
Sea Power: Power Projection
The need for power projection made naval forces critical to the Iraq War. Sealift
constituted the basis for projecting land forces strategically into the region. In
addition, amphibious lift was critical for the tactical movement of land forces
early in OIF. Aircraft carriers provided the bases for the majority of the
Coalition’s strike aircraft, while other maritime units launched the primary cruise
missile strike. Jointness and agility in reacting to target data has been central to
the U.S. Navy, so as to achieve true integration of all intelligence and weapons
systems onboard naval groups. Synergy has also been a focus, so that naval,
marine, air force and army units are fully integrated.
The Marine Corps, as a seaborne force, was instrumental in the Iraq War.
This was due to the agility of Marine deployment. Marine Amphibious Task
Forces and the maritime pre-positioning ship (MPS) concept enabled 60,000
Marines to be deployed within 45 days.37 As a result, considerable forces were
ready to advance into Iraq, before Iraqi could react. This means that in the future
regional contingencies can be resolved at greater speed with greater force. For
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allies of the U.S., joint warfare will require greater efficiency and agility in
deploying and sustaining expeditionary forces.
Asymmetric warfare has had a further impact on sea power: cargo and
combat vessels must now be protected from terrorist threats. In this activity, 50
percent of the Royal Navy’s (RN) fleet was tasked with securing communication
links from terrorist attack. These duties were highly significant as protection was
provided for: (1) 95 percent of the British land force equipment that deployed to
the Gulf; and (2) the 16 RN and Royal Fleet Auxiliary (RFA) vessels that
supported OIF.
Air Power: Precision Strike, Joint Warfare and C4ISTAR
Strategically, precision strike combined with the Effects Based Bombing (EBB)
concept was fundamental to the liberation of Iraq. Precision strike and EBB also
limited casualties and collateral damage. Put simply, EBB initially designates
unit and system threats that need to be deactivated on the battlefield to enable
victory. Subsequently, EBB prescribes the most efficient targets and means of
eliminating those threats to minimise casualties and collateral damage caused. In
short, EBB impedes “the very ability of the enemy to control its vital functions”.38
However, it is important to keep strategic level EBB in perspective. Of the
20,000 airstrikes performed in the Iraq War, 1,800 were against Iraqi government
facilities, 1,400 were against Iraqi Air Force and Air Defence targets, 800 were
against surface to surface missile installations and suspected WMD, whilst 15,800
were against Iraqi ground forces.39 These figures signal that EBB is a battlefield
preparation concept. Once applied, strike aircraft then tactically supported the
ground advance. As in Afghanistan, laser and GPS guided weapons multiplied
ground force capabilities significantly and prevented Iraqi forces closing with
Coalition units. In addition, those precision strike capabilities were dependent on
airborne and ground based C4ISTAR assets and air refuelling tankers.
One highly significant result, which was outlined by U.S., British and
Australian reports, emphasised the need for greater integration of artillery,
airstrike, attack helicopter and ground force air-defence operations. Technical
advances in C4ISTAR capabilities have improved indirect fire support operations.
However, there is a need for human improvement in the areas of internal and
125
coalition integration. This improved human integration will only be achieved
through better training, joint exercises, standardised operating procedures and
homogenisation of equipment.40
A further imperative displayed in the Iraq War, is the critical nature of
joint warfare. Individual units and systems were vastly more significant when
incorporated into a synergistic whole. This is the theory behind modern warfare,
which aims at ‘all spectrum dominance’, through a net-centric command and
control system. All units in theatre are integrated into this system, so that action
by the enemy cannot threaten any specific friendly unit without becoming
extremely vulnerable to a counter-strike. In practical terms, neither the land nor
air forces involved in Iraq could have been successful individually; their
capability was derived from the simultaneous application of joint force. The
Coalition ground operation required air support to advance, this in turn
necessitated Iraqi defensive manoeuvre, making the Iraqis visible targets for the
air forces. All of the aforementioned factors will be given more extended
treatment in the following section of the thesis.41
Logistics and Airlift
Sealift accounted for 90 percent of all heavy forces deployed in the Iraq War.
Excluding amphibious and light air inserted forces, all other forces deployed
required friendly forward ports and airfields for the disembarkation of equipment
and logistics. Thus, the need for regional allies was determined by the realities of
logistics. The other reality of the sealift operations to the Gulf was the stress it
placed on the U.S. and British transport fleets. The U.S. fleet was utilised at 80
percent capacity and further civilian ships were chartered. The British were
forced to rely to greater extent on civilian cargo ships.
This dependence on civilian transport for strategic lift has been a
necessity, rather than a deliberate choice. Hence, U.S. Transport Command
(TRANSCOM) has been authorised to purchase 180 further C-17s. This purchase
could cause a dramatic improvement in intra-theatre airlift, given that the U.S. and
Britain deployed only 11 C-17s permanently to the Iraq War. This purchase may
also signal the realisation that greater airlift is required for contemporary conflict.
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This is because future combat: (1) may not be littoral; and (2) light forces may not
be an absolute substitute for heavy forces in conflict.
Intra-theatre land based logistics were a further imperative in the Iraq War.
Without adequately defended supply lines the victory would not have been
possible. Importantly however, supply troops were not equipped with the same
computerised systems (including navigation and effective communications) as
were the fighting arms of the Coalition. Despite this, supply units were able to
create ad hoc communication and navigation systems, or use private civilian
equipment. However, this is not acceptable. Civilian equipment can be easily
jammed or intercepted, and inadequate equipment will put supply units in
positions of risk, as did occur in Iraq. Supply units should be provided with
comparative communications and navigation systems as combat units, as logistics
are critical to military operations. Although in practical terms, if supply units are
deployed without communications and navigation systems, ad hoc systems will
provide some assistance (but this is not ideal).
Psychological and Media Warfare
Iraqi strategy emphasised psychological warfare (or propaganda), directed
primarily at the Western public rather than coalition forces. These PSYOPS were
disseminated through the Western media, and primarily involved accusations
about the abuse of Iraqi people. The Iraqi command structure had emphasised
urban warfare prior to the initiation of OIF, for two primary reasons: (1) to
diminish Coalition technological advantages; and (2) to cause civilian and
Coalition casualties, and collateral and unintended damage. The Iraqi command
anticipated this strategy would slow the Coalition advance and create horrendous
images of casualties and infrastructure damage. Hence, the Iraqi regime expected
these images to cause the Western public to pressure their governments to end the
war.
A secondary and possibly unintended psychological effect was produced
by fedayeen irregulars. The fedayeen would attack Coalition positions in civilian
vehicles, under the facade of surrender or while pretending to be dead. This was
unnerving for Coalition troops, as the identification of combatant and non-
combatant was difficult. However, images of Coalition soldiers killing ‘civilians
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and surrendering or dead soldiers’ could have significantly undermined Coalition
operations. It is unclear whether this was a pre-planned Iraqi psychological tactic,
or whether it was a by-product of broader fedayeen tactics. Certainly, such
psychological tactics do not appear to have been conducted as part of a coherent
strategy and the representations of combatants as non-combatants appear to have
been random.
What these Iraqi and fedayeen PSYOPS illustrate is the essential nature of
psychological warfare in non-conventional conflict. In LIC, insurgent violence is
not the only result armed actions endeavour to achieve. Rather, each act of
violence combines to form an indirect approach toward a strategic end. Critically,
the media is an effective tool in the application of this indirect approach; through
disseminating images of violence. Hence, controlling this influence must be a
central tactic in a counterinsurgent’s strategy. Simply, counter-psychological
operations are as significant as PSYOPS for the counterinsurgent.
There were two distinct categories of Coalition PSYOPS: (1) tactical
operations directed against the Iraq armed forces; and (2) strategic operations
directed at the Iraqi people. In the case of the tactical PSYOPS, the Coalition was
highly effective. Leaflet, radio and television broadcasts effectively deprived the
Iraqi armed forces of many of its soldiers. The effectiveness of these PSYOPS
was further augmented by Coalition ‘shows of force’ (the presence of, and
demonstrations by, Coalition forces). This combination caused many Iraqi units
to disintegrate. These PSYOPS also carried the message that the Coalition was at
war with Saddam’s regime, rather than Iraq’s people or armed forces. As a result,
these PSYOPS saved the lives of many Iraqi soldiers, civilians and Coalition
members.
Conversely, strategic level Coalition PSYOPS have been criticised. This
criticism is specifically in reference to the post-war situation in Iraq. Cordesman
describes the Coalition’s PSYOPS failure as stemming from: (1) a lack of
intelligence, or regional understanding; and (2) an inability to assure the Iraqi
people that the Coalition would serve their interests. Cordesman asserts the
Coalition’s strategic PSYOPS failed because the Coalition did not understand the
Arab mindset. This Arab mindset was essentially unsupportive of the Coalition.
To quote Cordesman, the “United States, in particular, missed the cumulative
impact of: (1) its failure to support the opposition uprising in Iraq in 1991; (2) its
128
failure to conduct a meaningful public diplomacy campaign to explain that it was
not responsible for the suffering of the Iraqi people under UN sanctions; (3) [the]
Iraqi and Arab hostility to the United States because of its support of Israel and
the Arab portrayal of the Second Intifada; and (4) the coalition’s failure to
convincingly rebut various regional conspiracy theories, such as an assumption
that its goals were “neoimperialist” or that it was fighting to seize Iraqi oil.”42
The implications here are simple: (1) U.S. human intelligence must be improved
internationally; and to do so (2) the U.S. needs to improve relations with many
foreign states.
Post-War Iraq: the Coalition’s adversaries
The Coalition’s adversary in Iraq is a composite assortment of Saddam’s
fedayeen, Ba’ath party loyalists/Sunni activists, foreign Islamic terrorists and
discontented Iraqi citizens. These groups commit acts of terrorism and/or conduct
guerrilla warfare. Essentially, these groups target civilians or Coalition soldiers
for the purpose of influencing Iraq’s political formation. Their tactics include
shootings, remote controlled roadside bombings and vehicular suicide attacks.
Their conventional weapons are mostly an assortment of the old regime’s AK-
47/74 assault rifles, RPK/PKM light and medium machineguns, rocket propelled
grenades (RPG), and a small number of Soviet designed SA-7/14 man-portable
surface to air missiles. Improvised explosive devices (IEDs) constitute the
heavier firepower of Iraq’s terrorists. These weapons include artillery shells and
weaponised civilian products used as bombs. IEDs were primarily directed
against Coalition and non-governmental facilities or as remotely detonated anti-
vehicular devices. However, IEDs have increasingly been used against civilian
targets.
A significant threat to Iraq’s stability is the support foreign governments
provide to Iraqi based terrorist organisations. Iran and Syria are the primary
supporters of terrorism in Iraq. The most significant of the Iranian supported
Shi’a terror organisations are the BADR Corps, the al-Sadr army and Ansar al-
Islam. The BADR Corps is an Iranian supported terrorist organisation. The
BADR corps held territory along Iraq’s north eastern border with Iran, and
opposed to Saddam’s regime. The BADR Corps did not oppose the invasion of
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Iraq by the Coalition. However Michael Rubin, a Pentagon official and advisor to
the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), stated that the BADR corps activities
increased after the Coalition liberated Iraq. Iran’s Revolutionary Guards had: (1)
assisted BADR members cross the Iranian border into Iraq; and (2) supplied
equipment, funds and propaganda material to BADR offices. The Iranian
intervention in Iraq brought a stern warning from the U.S. Secretary of Defence,
Donald Rumsfeld, to desist. Despite the American warning, the Iranian
intervention continued and has remained an impetus to the post-war violence
throughout Iraq.43 Conversely, Ansar al-Islam was the primary target of the 10th
SFGs operations in northern Iraq, and it is an affiliate of Al Qaeda. However
during OIF, many Ansar al-Islam members were able to escape Iraq. These Ansar
al-Islam personnel were assisted in making their escape by Iran. After the
cessation of OIF, Ansar al-Islam’s members infiltrated back into Iraq and
continued their terrorist activities. Sheik Moqtada al-Sadr, a Shi’a extremist, has
also profited from Iran’s backing. Moqtada al-Sadr has been actively fomenting
terrorist violence against Coalition forces, their supporters and Iraqi civilians.44
Al Qaeda affiliates and foreign terrorists have further destabilised post-war
Iraq. The Tawid and Jihad Movement, led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, have
created a new level of violence in Iraq. It is clear not all post-war violence is
directly attributable to foreign terrorists. However, they are responsible for the
majority of suicide attacks against the Coalition, Iraqi police and the Shi’a
population. They are also suspected of perpetrating televised beheading of
Coalition personnel. Initially after OIF, Sunni insurgents (generally Saddam
loyalists) were reluctant to commit suicide missions. Sunni insurgents preferred
mines, mortars and missile attacks, from which they themselves are less likely to
die.45 Sunni insurgents were also more likely to attack Coalition forces, rather
than civilians. Subsequently however, the political contest for power in Iraq has
led to a growing synergy between foreign terrorists and Sunni insurgents. Hence,
as Sunni objectives have changed, so have their tactics. These tactics are
increasingly targeting civilians, with an aim of influencing the politics of Iraq.
Counterinsurgent tactics are described below.
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Coalition security building in Post-War Iraq
As has been outlined by the British Ministry of Defence, the primary task of the
Coalition was to create a stable environment, in which economic recovery and
political transition to self rule was possible.46 In brief, the stable environment was
to be created through humanitarian assistance, the reconstruction of essential
services and the provision of security. Significantly, the elements of this
triumvirate are not mutually exclusive. However, security is the focus of the
thesis.
The provision of security has not been centrally planned. Operations are
disparate and changing. Each sector (Coalition Provincial Authority (CPA)) of
Iraq is secured by separate national forces. Moreover in the northern sector,
which is administered by the U.S., each rotation can cause a change in policy.
These policy changes are due to the Marine Corps and Army post-conflict
doctrines being dissimilar. This diversity in policy implementation enables an
analysis of many doctrines that are applied throughout Iraq. However, Iraq is not
a homogenous state, and the lessons from one region may not be applicable to
other regions.
The initial and ubiquitous development in post-war Iraq was looting. This
looting was of a scale greater than that envisioned. This occurred due to a lack of
civil security provisioning: (1) Ba’athist law enforcement had disintegrated; and
(2) Coalition troops were busy engaging Iraqi regular and irregular forces. In the
British CPA, integrated patrols of British troops and Iraqi police began on the 13
of April 2003. This enabled the British CPA to be quickly declared safe for
humanitarian operations. Thus, civilian crises in the south were averted.
However, pacification operations in the north proved more difficult for the
Americans. Ba’ath loyalists and foreign insurgents created an environment more
dangerous than the war itself for American soldiers.47
Following the fall of the Ba’athist regime, and acting upon national
intelligence estimates, American forces approached Iraqi pacification with a high
degree of judiciousness and care. This approach was effective among the majority
of Iraqis. Iraqi civilians were aware U.S. soldiers were not dangerous, as they
discriminated between combatants and non-combatants. Moreover, 70 percent48
of the Iraqi population desired the Coalition’s presence for at least a year, while
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25 percent49 wanted the Coalition to remain for more than two years. However, a
minority were fervently in opposition to the Coalition and have waged an
insurgency since April 2003.
The violence in Iraq peaked in October 2003, throughout the ‘Sunni
Triangle’. Some of the worst fighting occurred in Baghdad, Tikrit and Fallujah.50
Four American initiatives moderated the level of violence. First, Sunni sheiks
were advised by U.S. forces to cease their anti-coalition and anti-infidel (anti-
Western) sermons. Second, localities from which violence was perpetrated were
physically isolated. Subsequently within these isolated areas, buildings were
destroyed that posed an operational risk, and relatives of insurgents were arrested
and questioned. The latter action led directly to Saddam Hussein being captured.
Third, patrols and raids were intensified, averaging 12,000 patrols and 250 raids
per week. These operations were highly successful: (1) hundreds of insurgents
were killed and thousands were captured; (2) numerous regime personalities were
detained; and (3) significant caches of weapons, ammunition and funds were also
seized. Fourth, radar guided counter-battery fire, interdiction fire and patrols
reduced nightly mortar and rocket attacks on U.S. bases. The interdiction fire
consisted of artillery rounds being launched at known insurgent firing positions.
The patrols were designed to ambush Iraqi insurgents as they attempted to deploy
in the field. In addition, Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) was gathered through
communication intercepts and HUMINT was gained from interrogations,
informant reports and field intelligence gathering. Within three months, these
operations had reduced both insurgent operations and Coalition casualties by three
quarters.51 At this point a correlation became evident, as the Coalition improved
the security environment the civil population became more willing to provide
information on the insurgents and terrorists. This observation is important but in
no way complicated. Essentially, fear impeded intelligence flows and human
dialogue. As fear is reduced, the provision of population based intelligence
increases. This phenomenon has a positive ‘butterfly effect’ on future operations.
Hence, there has been a degree of Coalition success in Iraq, which has not been
perceived internationally. Essentially, operational success has not been well
reported, failure has.
As outlined above, control of adversary propaganda is crucial to the defeat
of Iraq’s post-war violence. For this purpose many of the mosques in Iraq were
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monitored, so as to assess the nature of the sermons conducted. Such operations
indicated which Sheiks were inciting violence. Few sheiks actually commit acts
of violence. However, the rhetoric of 10-20 percent of the mosques surveyed has
been linked to those who commit violence. The sermons were based on the same
fictitious information televised by the Arab media, unsubstantiated and based on
rumour. Unfortunately, the Iraqi public was limited in their access to other
information sources. When presented with evidence of their misdeeds, most
sheiks have desisted from further incitement. However there were a number who,
when interviewed, attempted to lie, deceive and outwit Coalition interviewers.
This tended not to work, as their sermons had been recorded by the Coalition, and
could be replayed as evidence of incitement.
Coalition forces have been ordered to respect all individuals and not
embarrass any. This is important, so as not to give terrorists a motive for
committing violence. However, this severely tests the professionalism of soldiers,
especially when they must respect those who kill their comrades and Iraqi
civilians. A further strain placed on soldiers is caused by indigenous interpreters,
who have in some cases been agents for insurgents and terrorists. This is not
always the case, many Iraqi’s are honest and provide critical intelligence.
However, this issue indicates a further problem caused by a lack of language and
regional skills embedded in Coalition armed forces.
American raids and patrols through civilian neighbourhoods take the form
of joint force operations. Basically, infantry is assisted by light armour, close air
support (CAS) and PSYOPS forces. In more violent areas these forces are
supplemented with heavy armour and more substantial CAS and strike
capabilities. In one such raid on a Baghdad Mosque, 2,000 rockets, 357
landmines, 207 artillery shells and copious quantities of small arms ammunition
were discovered.52 This raid occurred in response to an IED bombing which
killed four U.S. soldiers.
In such operations, it is important that military forces remain professional,
applying precise justice (in the sense that those who are harmed are only those
who deserve to be harmed) and not vengeance. Counterinsurgency operations
require insurgents and terrorists to be caught, in addition to ‘hearts and minds’
being won. The persecution by Coalition soldiers and civilian contractors at Abu
Ghraib prison of Iraqi prisoners could endanger the lives of Iraqi civilians and
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Coalition troops. Recent analysis found that the common causal link, which
caused Palestinians to commit suicide bombings, was the humiliation of male
family members by Israeli soldiers.53 Although the actions of the Abu Ghraib
staff were not physically violent, the psychological result of the abuse could cause
future suicide bombings.
The locally inspired insurgency was initially suppressed by the Coalition.
However, a further threat evolved, which was foreign inspired, orchestrated and
supported terrorism. Their operations emphasise strategic imperatives: (1) suicide
bombings to create fear and undermine humanitarian work; (2) beheadings to
force nations to leave the Coalition; and (3) attempts to disrupt strategic and
commercial air corridors. International terrorists also maintain a cellular structure
in their organisations. This structure is separate from the Iraqi population, which
reduces intelligence collection. The Western media has also been successfully
utilised to reduce the support for the Iraq war. Furthermore, the anti-war rhetoric
of Western politicians and media has encouraged the terrorists in Iraq.54
Further Lessons from the Post-War Environment
The post-war campaign has been criticised for failing to create a secure Iraq,
immediately after the fall of Saddam. This disapproval has emphasised the tactics
used in OIF as one of the key reasons for post-war violence.55 Such assertions are
inaccurate. The approach undertaken by the Coalition in liberating Iraq
minimised civilian and friendly and enemy combatant casualties. Different tactics
and strategies could have been utilised. For example, relocating the 4th Infantry
Division from the Mediterranean Sea to the Persian Gulf, prior to the Coalition
invasion would have been such a strategy. However, such tactics and strategies
would have increased human suffering and collateral damage. This is because, in
the case of relocating the 4th Infantry Division, Iraqi force elements would have
had the time and strategic knowledge to redeploy to urban areas, prior to the
Coalition advance. The violence and looting, was in part, due to the lack of
combat forces deployed in the Gulf. However, the number of combat forces could
only have been increased by dramatically altering the Coalition war-fighting
strategy. This would have undermined the element of surprise, enabling Iraqi
units to deploy in urban terrain and in fighting positions that could have hindered
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the Coalition advance. This would have led to significantly heavier Iraqi combat
casualties. What is significant is whether the post-conflict phase could have been
improved, without degrading the combat phase of the war.
Retrospectively, intelligence organisations involved in the Coalition have
been criticised for misrepresenting the passivity of the Iraqi population. It must
be made clear, that forecasting the actions of an oppressed people, with perfect
clarity is impossible. Looting and violence was expected, but not at the levels
which occurred. Moreover, the vast majority of the Iraqi population is passive
towards the Coalition. It is only a minority that violently oppose both the
Coalition and the Iraqi governing bodies. A humanitarian crisis was also
envisioned, which did not occur. This crisis did not occur, as the Coalition had
contingencies in place to avert such a crisis.56
The provision of security as the priority, ahead of humanitarian operations
and nation-building operations was a necessary prerequisite to creating stability in
Iraq. However, this strategy has been criticised. The Coalition has also been
criticised for using soldiers to create internal security.57 The reality is
reconstruction cannot proceed without the provision of security. Neither will
security materialise without soldiers undertaking security missions. There are
simply no other forces, sufficiently available or capable, to apply security in any
foreign situation. The reconstruction and stabilisation of Iraq has also become
highly politicised. These factors have undermined the creation of security, and
the administration and reconstruction of Iraq. The British Minister of Defence
stated that “the continued absence –for a variety of reasons including political
concerns and the uncertain security environment – of a number of the normal
participants in post-conflict reconstruction (various [Non-Governmental
Organisations] NGOs, development agencies, etc) meant that the military had to
combine their primary role of providing security with reconstruction tasks”.58
Conclusion
The war-fighting capabilities of the Coalition succeeded in the Iraq War, while
minimising collateral damage and human casualties. However, the post-war
situation has become a violent LIC. The Coalition’s nation-building capabilities
135
and security procedures are effective, and will create a democratic and free Iraq if
given time.
The professionalism of commanders and soldiers, combined with
technological superiority, agility, jointness, intelligence and precision, created a
synergy of warfare that was critical to the Coalition. In terms of
counterinsurgency, these capabilities were critical as the Coalition was able to
defeat the enemy and ensure that the population was not deliberately harmed. The
expeditionary nature of the force was significant. This was illustrated by elements
of the Marine Corps, Airborne forces and Special Forces being projected where
heavier forces could not be. The effectiveness of these forces was important in
reference to LIC, as light forces are invariable those that can close with and
engage the enemy. This, however, does not relegate armoured forces to
obsolescence. Without these heavy forces, the southern ground campaign would
not have been possible. Combined air dominance was once again decisive in
warfare. On numerous occasions Coalition air dominance enabled ground forces
to overcome numerically superior enemy ground forces. This joint capability is
significant in counterinsurgency, as it provides ground forces with augmented
firepower and the protection that firepower can generate. In contrast to the
previous Gulf War, combat aircraft were not given permission to use friendly
regional bases. This made evident the critical nature of naval forces, in support of
ground and air forces. Joint capabilities are critical in LIC as they enable a
flexible response in difficult environments.
Given the unwillingness of the Coalition’s regional allies to support the
war, power projection capabilities have become more important. Precision,
technology and joint warfare has enabled firepower to be projected at a distance.
This ability to project power is important for counterinsurgents as they will often
be required to deploy over a great distance. However, there is a requirement to
improve logistics projection. Logistics projection is critical, so as to enable force
elements to be deployed and sustained in remote battlefields. Moreover, reducing
the weight of armoured ground forces may not be the unilateral panacea, as it has
been described. In the Iraq War, heavy armour illustrated a capability to sustain
heavier fire and survive on the battlefield. Even in LIC, heavy firepower and
protection is required by the counterinsurgent in certain circumstances, especially
when the insurgent is numerically superior or is in a concealed position.
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Furthermore, modern urban war has shown the essential nature of intelligence,
especially human intelligence. In addition, psychological operations are
fundamental in modern war.
In terms of doctrinal principles, the invasion of Iraq demonstrates that a
counterinsurgent must be able to generate internal security and apply civil
operations immediately after the authority of the previous regime is removed.
The Coalition was able to neglect political, economic and diplomatic forms of
force, at the strategic level, until the point when the Ba’athist government was
deposed. Following this point, a lack of holistic force has undermined any
attempt to re-establish order in Iraq. In terms of military principles in the initial
invasion, professionalism was a leading element in making combat survivable and
winnable. Doctrinal precision, especially in reference to the doctrine of the
special force deployed, meant that the capabilities of the forces deployed were
compatible with the combat environment. Effective communications and quality
intelligence enabled precision joint and combined force to be applied in most
combat scenarios. Notwithstanding the professional nature of the forces deployed
in Iraq, doctrine and strategic imperatives have restricted the effectiveness of
counterinsurgency operations in post-war Iraq.
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Chapter Five 
 A Doctrine for Low Intensity Conflict 
 
A doctrine is a collection of principles that are applicable to a certain subject.  
This chapter will present a counterinsurgency doctrine applicable to Low Intensity 
Conflict (LIC).  The principles of this doctrine are drawn from empirical 
examples of LIC, with specific reference to post-World War Two LICs.  
Development of this doctrine will also build on the first three chapters of the 
thesis. 
 This research, as has been indicated earlier, recognises that conflict can be 
contested through the use of political, economic, diplomatic and military forms of 
force.  This research examines how these forms of force can be applied at the 
strategic, operational and tactical levels.  It should be observed, however, that this 
research focuses on military force, as this is the principal form of force in 
counterinsurgency.  This chapter analyses and presents doctrinal principles that 
are applicable at the strategic level of counterinsurgency.  The doctrinal principles 
focused on in this chapter include the control of international interference, the 
provision of internal security, the application of civil operations, and the 
installation of a unified command. 
This chapter will consist of two main sections: first, the phases of LIC will 
be examined to bring clarity to the field of study; and second, the core principles 
for a successful counterinsurgency will be proposed.  Within the second section, 
the formation of an Expeditionary Civil Service (ECS) is suggested.  This concept 
which is without specific precedent within the literature, will aim to ensure a unity 
of effort among all aspects of the counterinsurgent’s civil approach to LIC.  
Briefly, the ECS will win the ‘hearts and minds’ of the people in theatre, and 
create conditions suitable to the precise use of force to defeat the insurgent.  To be 
exact, a preliminary move towards an ECS structure was made by two presidential 
(American) directives issued between 1993 and 2001, these will also be discussed 
in the second section. 
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The Structural Components of LIC Strategy 
LIC is not conventional warfare.  If the principles of conventional warfare are 
applied to a counterinsurgency, the counterinsurgent will fail to win the war.  A 
LIC insurgency is an amalgam of various modes of violence.  This amalgam can 
be better understood if it is separated into its four component phases.1  The 
component parts are organisation (cadre/support), terrorism, guerrilla warfare and 
mobile operations.2  In addition, the characteristics of the insurgency will vary, 
depending on the dominant operational phase. 
It is important to recognise these component phases are not unanimously 
agreed upon, even in theory.  For example, John McCuenA argues Mao Tse-tung 
undertook a two phase strategy of guerrilla and mobile warfare.3  This is false; 
Mao outlines seven phases, of which two phases emphasise organisation.4   
French military theorists made an important contribution to the understanding of 
LIC with ‘Trotsky’s Five Phases of Revolution’.  The French theory differs from 
the phases outlined above, by dividing the organisational phase into active cadre 
and passive support phases.  However, this thesis does not support separating the 
organisational phase, as the two parts are symbiotic, not mutually exclusive.  
Organisation is a single phase, but the French separation is important in 
understanding the whole phase, thus, it is described below.  It is critical to 
                                                 
A McCuen is a particularly important author in terms of the structural components of 
counterinsurgency theory.  Therefore, this research is built on a framework of his expertise, but 
has been supplemented with numerous other texts. 
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understand what the components are, and how they are applicable to 
contemporary LIC. 
First, organisation refers to the formation of: (1) active insurgent cells and; 
(2) the insurgents’ passive support networks.  The partition of organisation 
follows the French theory.  Importantly in organising passive support, the 
insurgent establishes “a network of local urban and rural organs which collect 
intelligence, infiltrate and cadre all sorts of official and unofficial organisations, 
isolate and intimidate the opposition, and foment demonstrations, strikes, sabotage 
and riots”.5  The second phase is terrorism.  This also has two parts: (1) is the 
removal of security from the population to force acquiescence and support; (2) 
actively reducing the counterinsurgent’s strength and cohesion, and aims to create 
counterinsurgent retribution against the neutral population.  Third, the guerrilla 
warfare phase involves four parts: small unit operations, organisation of target 
populations, propaganda and the clandestine replacement of governmental and 
social structures with the insurgent’s own ‘revolutionary’ structures.  Fourth, 
mobile warfare is the final phase of insurgency, when the insurgent undertakes to 
destroy the counterinsurgent in conflict approaching conventional warfare.  
However, it is critical to realise that as each consecutive phase is applied, the 
former phase remains active.  When there is mobile warfare in an insurgency, 
there will also be guerrilla warfare, terrorism and organisational operations.  In 
these circumstances the counterinsurgent will have to combat all aspects of the 
insurgent’s operations. 
These component parts may evolve sequentially; however, they do not 
always do so.  Sequential growth, from the organisation phase to the mobile 
warfare phase, was demonstrated by the Mujahedeen when fighting the Soviets in 
Afghanistan.  Sequential decline, from the mobile warfare phase back to the 
organisation, terrorism and guerrilla phases, occurred following the American led 
intervention into Afghanistan.   The sequence of insurgency may also be 
replicated across the theatre of operation at differing rates, or the lower order 
components may be disseminated by higher order operations.  Vietminh 
operations against the French and later Vietcong operations against the Americans 
in Indo-China, are indicative of the replication process of insurgency across a 
theatre of operations, spreading organisation by means of mobile warfare.  The 
Chechen attempt in 1998 to expand their insurgency into neighbouring Ingushetia, 
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is also an example of the replicating process of LIC.  Furthermore, differing 
groups may choose, consciously or unconsciously, to pursue an alternate order of 
operations or a single operation type.  Insurgents fostering a limited spectrum of 
phases will generally meet with failure.  Failed insurgencies occurred throughout 
South America in the 1960s, principally because the insurgents followed Che 
Guevara’s foco theory or Carlos Marighella’s Minimanual of urban terrorism.  
Both Che and Carlos promoted single phase insurgencies where the terrorist or 
guerrilla cell would be the nucleus of the insurgency, without gaining the support 
or enforcing the acquiescence of the population.6  Alternatively, if a nation is 
invaded, as in the cases of China by Japan or Iraq by the Coalition, higher order 
operations can occur initially alongside conventional forces.  However, once the 
conventional forces of the invaded state are defeated, the insurgent must 
undertake lower order organisation and terror operations, to attain support or the 
acquiescence of the population: essentially, insurgents must have a sea in which to 
swim.  Insurgents have increasingly found support from international actors, such 
as states, like as Iran and Syria, or terrorist organisations, like Al Qaeda, the 
Islamic Resistance Movement (HAMAS), Hezbollah or the Irish Republican 
Army (IRA).  A further consideration is regional and global stability, since there 
is potential for an insurgent to cooperate with terrorist networks and export 
organisation, terrorism and guerrilla warfare operations.  The reaction of the 
victims of these out-of-theatre raids will have a direct bearing on the 
counterinsurgency. 
What is obvious from the literature is that an insurgency that does not 
incorporate all of these components will be ineffective.  However, there are 
exceptions to this rule.  If the counterinsurgent lacks the will to fight, a small 
campaign of violence by the insurgent can have disproportionately large 
consequences: a one or two phase insurgency may win the war.  The American 
loss in Vietnam was largely due to a lack of socio-political will; the media war 
was lost, while the ground war was being won.  Similarly, American socio-
political will must be maintained if the Iraq war is to be won.  Notwithstanding 
the will of the two combatants, the insurgent’s best strategy is to apply the 
components of insurgency, while the best strategy of the counterinsurgent is to 
counter or counter-apply the components. 
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Applying appropriately tailored techniques to counter each individual 
phase is a crucial task for the counterinsurgent to perform.  For the 
counterinsurgent, countering the terrorism or guerrilla warfare phase is primarily 
synonymous with protecting the population from insurgent violence.  What is 
critical is that the counterinsurgent must counter each of these phases individually, 
with specifically tailored strategies applicable to that phase.  At the organisational 
phase, the counterinsurgent must counter the insurgent’s organisation and apply 
their own organisational methods.  The emphasis on a phased LIC is that it creates 
a logical conceptual foundation.  From this foundation, a precise analysis of 
insurgent operations can be established and specific counterinsurgent operations 
can be initiated. 
LIC may appear to be an incomprehensible morass of violence, but 
conceptual order can be imposed.  Perceiving LIC as phased violence enables 
individually tailored strategies to counter individual phase threats.  The 
significance of a phased counterinsurgency is that it insures each specific threat is 
countered, rather than the most visible threat being countered with no 
consideration for other threats.  This is important because a strategy tailored to 
one phase will have little or no effect on the other phases.  For example, a strategy 
to counter mobile warfare will have little effect upon guerrilla warfare and no 
effect upon organisation.  Such a deficiency in doctrine was a primary reason for 
the American defeat in Vietnam.  Thus, a robust counterinsurgency must 
incorporate organisation, counter-organisation, counterterrorism, counter-guerrilla 
warfare and counter-mobile warfare strategies.  With an understanding of the 
phased foundation of LIC, the core principles of counterinsurgency operations in 
LIC will be considered. 
 
Principles of counterinsurgency operations in LIC 
LIC should be characterised conceptually as a group of disassembled phases, this 
will ensure each phase is adequately countered.  Essentially, each phase threat 
must be countered with an individually tailored response, but each of these 
individual responses must be applied simultaneously.  It is absolutely critical that 
counterinsurgency strategies maintain absolute Unity of Effort; this is the first 
principle of LIC.  The remaining principles of counterinsurgency include the 
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provision of internal security and the regulation of international interference, 
which will stabilise the environment so that the final principle of 
counterinsurgency can be applied, civil operations.  Most importantly, all actions 
must combine synergistically to create a unitary approach to LIC; this is as true 
for the insurgent as it is for the counterinsurgent.  The relationship of the four 
principles is illustrated below in graphic two. 
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Graphic 2:  
Principles of LIC 
 
Internal Security: Force and Population Security/Conservation 
The first of Mao’s principles of insurgency is the “preservation of oneself and the 
annihilation of the enemy”.7  Stealth and subterfuge is the way of the insurgent, to 
strike and withdraw without taking debilitating casualties.  Since preservation is 
central to the insurgent, flexible transition between operational phases becomes 
acceptable.  The insurgent will forgo advances made, if these advances threaten 
the insurgency.  For example, an insurgent will revert to guerrilla operations and 
terrorism, if sufficiently defeated at the mobile warfare phase.  The insurgent will 
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even retreat to the initial organisation phase, in an attempt to protect cadre 
members.  Even in this relatively inactive, embryonic situation, the insurgent still 
threatens the counterinsurgent because of the possibility of re-emergence.  An Al 
Qaeda manual, titled ‘Declaration of Jihad against the Country’s Tyrants’, 
emphasises patience as one of the key characteristics of an Al Qaeda member: 
“[The member] should have plenty of patience for [enduring] afflictions if he is 
overcome by the enemies.  He should not abandon this great path and sell himself 
and his religion to the enemies for his freedom.  He should be patient in 
performing the work, even if it lasts a long time.”8  Without the real capitulation 
of the insurgent, the counterinsurgent’s organisation, counterterrorism and 
counter-guerrilla warfare operations must be sustained.  There is a risk that 
without a clear threat the counterinsurgency may become unpopular politically, 
causing a hasty withdrawal of counterinsurgency forces and a re-appearance of the 
insurgent.9  This must be resisted. 
It could be argued that suicide terrorism has undermined the principle of 
preservation.  However, the principle of preservation remains salient despite the 
advent of the suicide bomber.  Suicide attacks undermine the strength of the 
insurgent organisation, so must remain a peripheral operation in the terror phase 
of the insurgency.  If the insurgent remains in the terrorism phase, the insurgent is 
less likely to succeed. 
Conversely, preservation is as critical to the counterinsurgent as it is to the 
insurgent.  The primary objective of the counterinsurgent must be to preserve 
security and control in friendly zones.  As an insurgency progresses from the 
organisational phase to mobile warfare, agency becomes more direct, actions 
become more overt, and the operational strength of the insurgent grows.  
Invariably the counterinsurgent will strive to oppose the most visible of the 
insurgent’s violence: mobile warfare.  This becomes problematic, if in doing so, 
the counterinsurgent neglects the organisation, terrorism and guerrilla phases of 
the insurgency.  With the concentration of the counterinsurgent otherwise 
occupied, the insurgent can begin to infiltrate areas under counterinsurgent 
control.  This infiltration advances the insurgent’s cause, and will initiate the 
process of organisation, terrorism and guerrilla warfare in a previously safe zone.  
Local security and police forces, as well as the population, may initially attempt to 
resist the insurgents.  However, without the support of the regular security forces, 
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the local forces and population may find themselves overpowered and discontinue 
resisting the insurgent.  The counterinsurgent’s control structures will be removed 
and personnel may be executed.  The feeling of betrayal by the counterinsurgent 
of the population will thus undermine any attempt to reclaim the zone.  Therefore, 
despite offensive operations being necessary to defeat the insurgents, the primary 
task must be protecting areas from insurgent infiltration.10
Once the security of the counterinsurgent’s safe zones has been 
entrenched, the insurgent’s zones of control and marginal zones must be 
contested.  The counterinsurgent must preserve itself and begin to annihilate the 
enemy.  The expansion into insurgent contested areas must be deliberate, 
entrenching all phases of the counterinsurgent’s strategy.  This means contested 
areas are not secured merely by mobile counterinsurgent warfare, counter-
guerrilla, counter-terrorism and organisational operations must be equally 
expanded into the new zones.  If the counterinsurgent does not install all 
counterinsurgency phase strategies, the insurgent could easily retake the zone.  
Stealth and subterfuge are the insurgent’s most lethal attributes, which most 
threaten the security and control of the counterinsurgent’s safe zones; this should 
be the focus of the counterinsurgent.11
LICs are long-term wars, which cannot be constrained by artificial 
timelines.12  This is significant for international responses to insurgency, where 
short-term political imperatives can undermine long-term counterinsurgency 
strategies.  For example, the suggestion of a date of departure may factor well in 
domestic politics, but will also strengthen the morale of the insurgent and give a 
date for an expansion of insurgent operations.  The counterinsurgent must 
guarantee that their presence will be maintained until a peaceful and stable 
governing structure has been entrenched.   
The most effective means of shortening a LIC is to improve doctrine, 
strategy and tactics and expand the resources available to the counterinsurgent.  
Given the time sensitive nature of counterinsurgency, international forces must 
have the capacity to rapidly deploy civil, police, intelligence and military 
personnel and resources, utilising a holistic approach to ending the LIC.  
Moreover, counterinsurgency forces in LIC must maintain a sufficiently ‘heavy 
footprint’ to create stability and peace; the idea of a ‘light footprint’ is contrary to 
the principles of counterinsurgency operations in LIC. 
 148
Civil Support and Stewardship 
Force and population security can only be entrenched with the support of the civil 
population.  To gain the assistance of the population the counterinsurgent must 
undertake support, stewardship and mobilisation operations.  These operations are 
not merely psychological.  They must create political participation within the 
community and provide tangible economic and social benefits for the people. 
The counterinsurgent must consult the population to ascertain their needs.  
The public will require practical goods and services such as medical care, food, 
water, housing, clothing, employment and assistance with agricultural, 
commercial and industrial production.  Corruption, exploitation, incompetent 
officials and absentee ownership of resources are central impediments to the 
counterinsurgent.  If these social problems are not removed, the insurgent will 
promote their elimination as core benefits of insurgent operations.  These practical 
items are generally more important than abstract and distant political theory to the 
common person. 
To ensure representation of the population is adequate, individuals who 
are suitably qualified and representative of the society’s groupings must be 
present on all command councils, from the local to the national level.  This will 
also ensure that the governance structures perfected within the counterinsurgency 
can be maintained after the cessation of violence.13  Robert C. OrrB suggests 
“[l]ocal leaders will best be able to identify security risks, assess priority 
infrastructure needs, point out quick-impact opportunities for international actors 
who need to gain credibility, and identify local resources that could be channelled 
toward reconstruction.”14  However, local representations should not be 
considered a panacea for the guidance of reconstruction.  The counterinsurgent 
must be cautious of the local representative’s contribution, which must be 
considered in contrast with other sources of information.  This is because the 
local’s intent may not be purely altruistic; suggested development projects may be 
represented as being broadly beneficial, while in fact serving only narrow 
interests; or a counterinsurgent’s military capability may be misdirected to serve 
personal agendas.  This latter problem has been a dilemma for Coalition forces in 
Afghanistan, who have been responsible for causing friendly fire casualties, due 
                                                 
B Orr is a prominent author in the field of post-conflict reconstruction.  Orr’s text is an important 
foundation for this chapter, however, other texts have been analysed as supplements. 
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to following information provided by their Afghan allies.  Factionalism is 
invariably responsible for misrepresentations, thus, the degree of factionalism (or 
warlordism) within LIC will indicate the political cleavages that the 
counterinsurgent must be aware of and be able to manage. 
In September 2004, as the situation in Iraq deteriorated, James Dobbins of 
the RAND Corporation outlined priorities for the Iraqi counterinsurgency.  They 
were as follows: “the first priority is to establish public security.  Second is to 
begin rebuilding the local structures for governance.  Third is to create an 
environment in which basic commerce can occur – where people can buy and sell 
goods and services and get paid in a stable currency.  Fourth is to promote 
political reforms, stimulate the growth of civil society, build political parties and a 
free press, prepare for elections and organize representative government.  Fifth, 
and last, is improving roads, bridges, electricity, water, telephones and the rest.”15  
These are all important objectives in a counterinsurgency.  However, some are 
more critical and time sensitive than others.  As has been indicated above, the 
creation of security is the primary objective, second is the reconstruction of 
essential services, such as water, medical care and sanitation.  Political 
imperatives follow these principal needs of the population.  Democratic structures 
cannot, by themselves, create stability and essential services.  It may be argued 
that essential service construction or organisation operations cannot be undertaken 
when there is a lack of security.  If this is true, the insurgent is succeeding, 
because in a counterinsurgency all phases of LIC must be combated 
simultaneously. 
Nevertheless, political ideas are still important to gain the support of the 
population.  As Mao indicated, principles of policy must be ‘from the masses’, if 
they are to be accepted by the masses.16  This idea is consistent with democracy, 
since government is essentially a service industry, in which everyone has an 
interest.  As indicated by Mao’s comment, the insurgent is undertaking similar 
civil operations.  The counterinsurgent’s civil operations must be significantly 
better than those of the insurgents, so as to keep the support of the people.  The 
counterinsurgent’s superior resources and ability to act overtly will be an 
advantage in this area of operations. 
The highly significant nature of civil support and stewardship operations 
in LIC was confirmed by a 2003 RAND study.  The study examined the influence 
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of social and economic development on the prevalence of political violence in 
Northern Ireland (United Kingdom), Mindanao (Philippines) and the West Bank 
and Gaza Strip.  The report demonstrated a complex correlation between social 
and economic development and political violence.  The correlation was initially 
positive; the application of inadequate or inefficiently applied development 
funding caused an increase in violence.  However, the correlation became 
negative; when substantive and effective financial assistance was provided, the 
level of violence did diminish.  This correlation is represented in Graphic Three 
below; however, this graph is based on limited statistics and may not accurately 
represent all the effects of social and economic development on violence in LIC. 
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The RAND study came to five broad socio-economic conclusions in 
relation to the reduction of political violence.  First, the organisation phase of an 
insurgency can be undermined by a counterinsurgent’s social and economic 
policies: counter-organisation.  Effectively, the civil population are given an 
economic incentive to support the counterinsurgent, rather than the insurgent.  
The insurgent will also discover a diminishing supply of recruits, given the 
counterinsurgent has reduced “perceived grievances… [and created] viable 
alternatives to terrorism.”17  Second, insufficiently funded development policies 
can increase the level of violence.  This is caused by counterinsurgent policies 
“erroneously inflating the hopes and aspirations”18 of the civil population.  If civil 
expectations are not met, there is little incentive for the population to support the 
counterinsurgent.  Insufficient funding has been a significant impediment to the 
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resolution of the conflict in Afghanistan and Iraq, early Coalition promises of 
reconstruction have not materialised.  However, as in Northern Ireland, if large 
civil development schemes are undertaken, in a non-discriminatory manner, 
violence can be reduced by removing perceived grievances.  Third, development 
policies must evolve in consultation with the people, facilitate specific 
requirements and be applied in a financially transparent and ethnically 
indiscriminate manner.  In the cases of the West Bank, Gaza Strip and Mindanao, 
corruption, and impractical or plainly destructive development schemes damaged 
the peace processes.  Fourth, the control of social and economic development can 
be used to directly regulate the level of violence.  The study showed that in 
response to violence perpetrated against Israelis by Palestinians, the Israeli 
Government would implement economic sanctions against the Palestinian 
Authority (PA).  This in turn would create pressure on the PA to prevent the 
Palestinian Islamic Jihad and HAMAS from perpetrating violence.  Fifth, social 
and economic development can only reduce political violence, but cannot 
eliminate it.  It is absolutely imperative that a counterinsurgent’s strategy of 
counter-organisation is employed in conjunction with intelligence, police and 
military operations, specifically tailored to counter each phase of an insurgency. 
It is critical for the counterinsurgent to maintain a physical presence with 
the people to gain their support.  Simply, there can be no cooperation with the 
counterinsurgent if there are no counterinsurgent forces present.  For example, the 
American presence in Baghdad was scaled back, due to security concerns and the 
idea that the high U.S. profile was undermining the Iraqi authority and inciting the 
population to violence.  Subsequently, violence in Baghdad continued, U.S. 
control was reduced and civilian intelligence ‘walk-ins’ diminished.19   Thus, 
presence should be maintained and should be supplemented by other means of 
contact.  Newsletters, newspapers, books, television and speeches at schools, 
clubs and other organisations are important mediums of contact with the 
population.  However, the population must be studied to ascertain the most 
effective and popular medium of contact.  The British found film and theatre to be 
popular in Malaysian society and so used this medium to reinforce their 
counterinsurgency. 
Force and control measures form a symbiotic relationship with the 
benevolent measures outlined above.  The support of the population cannot be 
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acquired and retained while the insurgent is intimidating and terrorising the 
people.  “By force and sanctions, we are talking about stringent curfews, control 
of movements, re-groupment of people and villages, rationing food, martial law 
and maximum penalties for aiding the revolutionaries or carrying weapons.”20  
These operations are designed to protect the population, thus they must be applied 
with care.  Also, it is critical that security is provided for the population, as 
civilians may well be cooperating with the insurgents, solely due to coercion and 
violence.  Peter Dickens accurately characterises how a lack of security can be 
exploited by the insurgent, undermining all other counterinsurgent actions: “Win 
hearts as you may by being thoroughly nice guys, minds will be overwhelmingly 
influenced by force majeure when the choice is between life and death.”21
Counterinsurgency is as much about building a stable, secure and peaceful 
society as it is about combat.  The counterinsurgent must defend the people, help 
the people and respect the people.22  During the Indonesian Confrontation, the 
British Special Air Service (SAS) performed a critical role in obtaining the good 
will of the Borneo border peoples, through medical assistance.  The British also 
employed the border people as scouts, this employment won the allegiance of the 
people.23 With the support of the people the British were effectively able to drain 
the sea in which the insurgents swam. 
It must be remembered that the insurgent will also be applying an 
organisational strategy to win the ‘hearts and minds’ of the people.  Mao was 
adamant that when, and only when, the resolution of the people’s problems 
became the principal objective of the communists, would the Chinese People’s 
Army be victorious.24  The HAMAS has combined terrorism with political and 
social activities, since it was founded in 1987.  HAMAS’ ‘organisation’ 
operations have been “working openly through mosques and social service 
institutions to recruit members, raise money, organize activities, and distribute 
propaganda.”25  This is not unusual behaviour for Islamic insurgent organisations.  
Some aspects of the social and political assistance provided by these organisations 
can be positive, such as medicine and schooling.  However, the insurgents are 
creating a fertile foundation from which violence will grow.  It is common for the 
insurgents of the Middle East to be known as terrorists.  This is inaccurate 
because terrorism is only one phase of their operations.  For example, the 
Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) has used both guerrilla warfare and 
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mobile warfare, especially in Jordan prior to 1970, and in Lebanon between 1970 
and 1982.  Subsequently, the PLO has had to rely on guerrilla warfare and 
terrorism in Israel, the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, due to the expertise of the 
Israeli Defence Force (IDF) and associated organisations. 
Of critical importance in civil support and stewardship operations, is the 
British principle of minimum force.  Minimum force is a broad policy of restraint, 
unlike the tactical level application of explicit Rules of Engagement.  The 
minimum force principle enabled insurgents to be engaged in open conflict under 
regular rules of conventional conflict, using conventional military equipment.  
However, minimum force obliged British forces to be “careful to avoid the 
indiscriminate use of firepower that might have killed innocent civilians or 
escalated the conflict.”26  During the Indonesian Confrontation in Borneo, British 
attack aircraft were only used against isolated insurgent units or in prohibited 
zones.  Moreover, ‘throughout the entire campaign, there were no air-launched 
munitions fired near any known civilian habitation’.27  Because of the minimum 
force approach to warfare in civilian areas, the principle of civil security became 
more important, as the insurgent could not be allowed to cause violence to erupt 
among the urban population.  Securing the people’s welfare, in turn, secures the 
people’s loyalty. 
Minimum force may also be applicable to the combatants of the insurgent.  
It may become evident that the loyalty of the insurgent’s combatants is irresolute.  
In such a case subversion of the insurgent’s force is highly desirable.  Small scale 
un-indoctrination of insurgents is a common feature of counterinsurgencies.  The 
ideological retraining of captured insurgents is vital if they are to be released back 
into civil society or enlisted into the employment of the counterinsurgent.  
Historically, the French and British made good use of former insurgents in 
Algeria and Malaya, respectively.  Both Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in 
Afghanistan and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) provided interesting insights into 
the loyalty of ‘national’ troops.  In the case of Afghanistan, large Taliban forces 
deserted enmasse to the Northern Alliance.  In the face of Coalition firepower the 
Iraqi Army was also faced with desertions, except when Republican Guard or 
Special Republican Guard formations were present to enforce loyalty.  In 
addition, all religious and most tribal backgrounds were present among the 
deserters.  Only foreign fighters and Ba’athist or Taliban hardliners were not 
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amenable to surrender.  When the combatants have been disengaged from the 
insurgent, it is critical they are re-indoctrinated, to insure they do not return to the 
insurgent. 
 
Regulation of International Influence 
For the purpose of this thesis, international influence is defined as encapsulating 
both the physical and psychological interference (rather than direct action) in LIC, 
performed by an organisation or nation that is not a counterinsurgent.  
International influence is not the decisive factor in a counterinsurgency.  
However, external manipulation can have disproportionately large effects upon 
the conflict.  For example, the Western influence in the Afghan-Soviet war 
fundamentally altered the balance of power towards the Mujahedeen.  Similarly, 
the terrorist, jihadist and Iranian influence in Iraq has largely facilitated the 
insurgency there.  What’s more, all of the case studies incorporated in this thesis, 
and many historic examples were and are influenced by foreign pressures.  There 
is, however, one notable exception to this norm: the Malayan Emergency was a 
conflict isolated from external interference.   
Long porous land borders are central to the magnitude of international 
interference experienced in LIC.  However, there are examples of 
counterinsurgencies, where the territory has been isolated artificially.  Following 
France’s disastrous defeat in Vietnam, French forces were responsible for 
physically isolating Algeria from foreign interference.  This isolation eliminated 
the insurgent’s ability to train and gather resources from the safety of 
neighbouring states, which forced the insurgents to retreat from the mobile 
warfare phase to organisation and terrorism (nevertheless, the insurgent did 
eventually succeed in the Algerian case).  The British also successfully utilised 
the technique of artificial isolation in the Omani insurgency.  A series of barriers 
were built parallel to the Yemeni border, interdicting inbound insurgent lines of 
communication and preventing the escape of defeated combatants.  This measure 
was critical in the suppression of the Omani insurgency, as it was in the Boer 
War.  One war where a physical barrier was unfeasible, but the principle of 
isolation was nonetheless employed, was in the Indonesian Confrontation in 
Malayan Borneo and Brunei.  The British established free fire zones during 
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curfew to diminish cross border insurgent activity, and implemented covert pre-
emptive cross border raids.  These raids were carried out by veteran troops, 
unbeknown to the public and unreported by Indonesia, against concentrations of 
insurgents and terrorists massing on the Indonesian side of the border.  These 
raids were pre-emptive and not punitive.  They were designed to stop terrorism 
and guerrilla warfare before violence could be committed in Borneo.  These raids 
were never in retribution for attacks, but were specifically targeted at insurgents 
and covert Indonesian Army support bases.  The covert nature of the cross-border 
conflict was supported by both the British and the Indonesians.  The Indonesians 
were aware they would be defeated in direct confrontation with British and 
Commonwealth troops, thus, covert operations were established.  The British 
were capable of defeating the insurgency and were not willing to escalate the 
conflict, given the potential for an adverse public and international response, thus 
they too supported covert operations.  The British also knew that keeping the war 
covert enabled the Indonesians to withdraw their support for the war, with their 
honour intact.  Therefore, physical isolation of LIC is fundamental to 
counterinsurgent victory, as is an understanding of the opponent. 
Psychological and political support are forms of force that influence the 
will of the insurgent and the counterinsurgent.  The insurgent, those who support 
the insurgent and those whose interests are served by the insurgent will attempt to 
undermine the counterinsurgent’s operations.  The counterinsurgent will often be 
faced with subjective or blatantly untrue reporting.  Reports of casualties, 
collateral damage and other injustices will be central to the insurgent’s 
psychological warfare.  The counterinsurgent must ensure there is no truth in such 
reporting, as insignificant injustices will be blown out of proportion.  The 
counterinsurgent cannot rely upon Western media organisations to provide an 
objective and comprehensive commentary of the LIC.  The media is ignorant of, 
or severely limited in, their understanding of LIC.  Thus, it is the responsibility of 
the counterinsurgent to ensure objective reporting of the conflict.  This reporting 
will be central to the counterinsurgent’s international psychological operation. 
The counterinsurgent must recognise the significance of an internationally 
acknowledged cause for war.  The counterinsurgent: must gain support from 
international organisations, especially the United Nations (UN); should attempt to 
gain the support of various powers, such as America and the European Union 
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(EU); and should encourage intimate relations with the governments in the region 
of the LIC.  International speculation or condemnation of jus ad bellum can 
severely undermine the counterinsurgent, while fomenting insurgent violence and 
support.  Domestically, support for the counterinsurgency must remain non-
partisan.  Creating an election issue or criticising the governing party in 
parliament and is unacceptable if it is not balanced and rightly justified (which the 
parties concerned will always claim). 
As an aside, if a counterinsurgent requests aid in combating an insurgency, 
it may be an indication that the counterinsurgent’s doctrine is ineffective.  
McCuen argues external assistance in a counterinsurgency should be focused on 
one of the phases of LIC, but should avoid operational contact with the civil 
population in theatre.28  This assertion by McCuen is founded in the fact that the 
security forces of the counterinsurgent must be disproportionately large in 
comparison to the insurgent.  Thus, the logical extrapolation suggests that the 
counterinsurgent’s forces cannot cover all phases of the LIC, so they should be 
supplemented with foreign troops.  This thesis does not argue against the 
deployment of external counterinsurgent forces.  Rather, this thesis only supports 
the effective application of counterinsurgent forces.  A request for foreign 
assistance may indicate an ineffective doctrine of counterinsurgency.  As an 
example, American forces in Vietnam were undermined by their South 
Vietnamese ally’s counter productive counterinsurgency operations.  In contrast, 
the British intervention in Oman was in support of the Omani King; however, the 
British effectively controlled the counterinsurgency.  Thus, if aid is to be provided 
to a counterinsurgent, the control and the quality of the operations must be of 
primary importance. 
 
Unitary Command and Synergistic Joint Operations: An Expeditionary Civil 
Service 
Insurgency is a phased array of operations that challenge the integrity of the 
sovereign state.  The insurgent creates an alternative governmental structure 
within society, and generates insecurity among those who support the incumbent 
sovereign.  Thus, a counterinsurgent must take a holistic approach to ensuring the 
stability of the sovereign state, by unifying civil, police, intelligence and military 
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services.  This holistic approach requires a unified command and the formation of 
an Expeditionary Civil Service (a civil organisation designed to operate in foreign 
states), much like the old British Colonial Office (BCO).  A unified command will 
ensure unity of effort, while the Expeditionary Civil Service will guarantee that 
the civil units, which are essential in LIC, are as capable as, and fully integrated 
with, their military counterparts. 
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The Expeditionary Civil Service (ECS) is a derivative of the concepts and 
strategies outlined in this chapter, which are essential to the counterinsurgent in 
combating LIC.  The literature has lacked discussion of a functional entity, which 
can be deployed to administer a failed state.  The ECS has been suggested by the 
author as an entity to unify the principles of counterinsurgency, and as a 
framework for strengthening civil society. 
Briefly, the rationale for the old British Colonial Office being used as the 
conceptual model for the ECS is due to: first, the BCO’s expeditionary nature; and 
second, the fact that the BCO encompassed the means so strengthen all facets of 
civil administration.29  However, it is imperative that those who serve within the 
ECS attain their position purely on merit; unlike some early British Colonial 
Service appointments, which were based on political (and social) factors.30
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As represented above, Graphic 4 is a schematic representation of the ECS, 
with units, interconnections and responsibilities presented.  The civil, police, 
intelligence and military units, along with the unitary command have been the 
central factor in effectively combating insurgency.  The police, intelligence and 
military units must function synergistically to defeat insurgent operations and 
create security.  The civil units are central in winning the hearts and minds of the 
population, so as to ensure the support of the population for the counterinsurgent.  
The central command is essential to guarantee a unity of effort among the 
divergent functional units, enabling effective information flows and creating a 
coherent and balanced strategy. 
The general structure of the ECS would emulate the organisation of a 
Territorial/Reserve Force.  The ECS would constitute a cadre of full time civil 
staff, supplemented by a part time civil reserve.  As indicated above, the ECS 
would include police, intelligence agents, civil central command personnel, and 
other public service and private employees in civil employment.  The latter 
category of civil employees would incorporate all sectors of the public service and 
some private sectors; for example personnel from, the Ministries of Justice, 
Health, Works (Infrastructure development), Police, Agriculture and Fisheries, 
Foreign Affairs, Education, Defence, Internal Affairs, and other private 
individuals essential to the function of the state, would be integrated into the ECS.  
The ECS and associated personnel must then coordinate counterinsurgent policy 
and strategy for employment in LIC, which will complement the activities of their 
military counterparts.  Regular training sessions must then incorporate the 
functions of soldiers, engineers and civil servants, in simulated LIC environments, 
not merely in the classroom.  ECS personnel must build personal and interagency 
relationships with those they will deploy with, in addition to learning the strengths 
and weaknesses of the organisations involved.  Developing the ECS as a standing 
entity, with a participatory approach to interagency organisation will ensure 
unrestricted and coordinated intelligence flows, a coherent unity of effort within 
and an instantaneous response to LIC.  The formation of the ECS will require 
adequate legislation, funding and a significant interagency effort to ensure success 
in LIC. 
An ECS should be formed by every sovereign state which anticipates 
conducting operations in LIC.  Each ECS should incorporate a central command, 
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and police, intelligence and civil sections.  The individual nature of each ECS will 
depend upon financial and human capabilities, and the defence relationships of the 
state in which the ECS is formed.  Not only must the ECS ensure internal synergy, 
there must be synergy between the ECSs of allies.  In practice, when the armed 
forces of allies exercise together, each nation’s ECS should also be incorporated 
into the training exercise. 
In theory, the United Nations could sponsor an international ECS.  
However, there are three significant obstacles that would undermine a UN ECS.  
First, the multinational composition of UN forces would severely weaken the core 
principles and synergy of the ECS.  Second, the UN has condoned only one war 
(the Gulf War), with full participation of the Security Council.  Thus, it is unlikely 
that the UN Security Council would approve counterinsurgency operations, given 
the long-term and violent nature of insurgency.  Moreover, the UN Security 
Council has not implemented Article 47 of the UN Charter:31 for the formation of 
a Military Staff Committee.  Therefore, the UN Security Council lacks the 
institutional foundation for the ECS, which could be an extension of the Military 
Staff Committee.  Third, even if the aforementioned problems were overcome, the 
self-interest of the UN Security Council members may impede the timely 
deployment of the ECS.  Simply, there would be inquiries into whose interests or 
policies the ECS served.  Thus in reality, the UN is not an ideal institution for an 
ECS (or for conducting counterinsurgencies in general). 
A unitary command is critical in unifying the divergent principles and 
phases of counterinsurgency.  In physical terms a unitary command should be 
encapsulated by a unitary commander or a council.  This unitary command will 
oversee and command all phases of the counterinsurgency: organisation, 
counterterrorism, counter-guerrilla operations and counter-mobile warfare.  In 
practical terms, civil support, intelligence, police and military personnel will 
represent differing sections of the counterinsurgent’s response to the phases of 
LIC.  This will ensure all aspects of the counterinsurgency will be given an 
equitable status in the formation of strategy.  In addition, this unitary, combined 
command must function as effectively at local level, as it must at the national 
level. 
A unified command does not imply the rigid centralisation of planning.  
The headquarters of the counterinsurgent must be in theatre, be intimately aware 
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of and adjusted to the situation, be secure but open to the population and other 
agencies, and prevent inappropriate out of theatre ‘command push’ strategies 
being imposed.  An effective counterinsurgency must maintain decentralised 
control to ensure initiative and flexibility.  However, the individual decentralised 
units must guarantee unity of effort; the combination of every individual operation 
must promote the central aim.  The unified command must provide leadership and 
purpose, and ensure synergy, while the elements of the command must provide 
detailed planning, area expertise and specialised professional competence.  This is 
a participatory approach to warfare.  A participatory approach is essential to: first, 
ascertain the key areas of development; and second, prioritise the given tasks 
without specific interest groups (domestic agencies, foreign governmental 
agencies, international organisations (IOs) and non-governmental organisation 
(NGOs)) becoming disenfranchised.  All of these organisations have a broad 
range of specific capabilities, which must all be integrated into the strategy and 
command structure of the counterinsurgent.  Unity of effort will guarantee all 
phases of the insurgency will be defeated, with minimum force and maximum 
effect.   
McCuen comments, “[u]nity of effort, however, is extremely difficult to 
achieve because it represents the fusion of civil and military functions to fight 
battles which have primarily political objectives.”32  In democratic states, the 
authority of the civil and military apparatus is separated, so as to guarantee the 
rule of law.  However, it would be a complete misconception to compare the 
function of a democratic state to the social anarchy in LIC.  Essentially, civil units 
cannot function without the security created by military units, and the military 
units cannot gain the allegiance of the people, and the timely intelligence, which 
only the people provide, without the economic, social and psychological efforts of 
the civil units.  Thus, without this symbiotic relationship there can be no security 
or peace.  Such a situation will result in the insurgent gaining control of the LIC, 
and instituting forms of ‘black’ governance and ‘black’ security (as in the black 
market (analogous to criminal structures)).  Orr describes this phenomenon as 
‘spoilers’ gaining ‘leverage’.33   Thus, the civil and military components of the 
counterinsurgent must be fully united, as sovereignty must be asserted or 
strengthened before the rule of law and a purely civil governing apparatus can be 
established. 
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The enabling factors that facilitate the symbiotic relationship between civil 
and military units are coordination and unity of effort within a unitary command 
structure.  This in turn creates the most significant aspect of a successful 
counterinsurgency, unrestrained intelligence flows.  “Intelligence remains the vital 
ingredient for effective military operations in internal conflict.  The selective use 
of force can only be achieved with good intelligence; the hearts-and-minds 
campaign seeks to win the trust of local people so that they will provide such 
intelligence.”34  Intelligence must be unrestrained, moving from the source to the 
security apparatus immediately and absolutely.  This need has been undermined 
especially by the antipathy between IOs, NGOs and security forces.  Scott Feil 
observed “IGOs [International Governmental Organisations], IOs, and NGOs 
frequently possess valuable information but are reluctant to share intelligence with 
security forces for fear of reducing their rapport with the population they serve 
and increasing their own risk by appearing partial.  For their part, security 
organizations loathe sharing information with NGOs because sharing information 
risks compromising operations and sources.”35  Thus, all organisations involved 
in the counterinsurgency must be internalised within the ECS, be connected to the 
ECS intelligence hub and have established a trustworthy relationship. 
Given the imperative to establish comprehensive security and a fair 
judicial system, the ECS must contain a police/legal unit.  To create 
comprehensive security in LIC, a counterinsurgent’s military and police forces 
must cooperate to inhibit civil lawlessness, corruption and criminal activities.  
These illegal activities prevent society from re-establishing civil behaviour, and 
generate an environment conducive to insurgent organisation.  Criminals and 
insurgents may cooperate directly, as their actions are mutually beneficial.  It has 
been established that police forces which operate within an integrated and fair 
judicial system are more effective, humane and responsive.36  These effects build 
civil security, and, due to the considerable contact with the population, create 
dependable intelligence data.  There are two requirements needed to establish 
effective police/legal unit: (1) a recognised provisional legal code, as 
recommended by the UN’s Brahimi Report of 2000;37 (2) a standing police/legal 
unit in an ECS to enforce the law, form an impartial judiciary and constitution, 
and ensure human rights, humane corrections and reconciliation.38  The 
police/legal unit must be ready to deploy immediately on detecting a security 
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vacuum, which will be apparent in all cases of LIC.  Recent LICs, in Somalia, 
Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan and Iraq, have 
desperately needed the deployment of police.  In the best cases, it has taken a year 
or more to deploy sufficient international police, in the worst cases security is not 
re-established.39  This is not at all acceptable; it is the responsibility of the 
international community to provide security for those unfortunate enough to be 
caught up in LIC.  Thus, the police/legal unit must be a permanent organisation, 
capable of reacting rapidly.  Moreover, there must be contingencies made for the 
level of violence in the LIC.  Police may find themselves faced with ‘normal’ 
conditions, as in Rwanda and Kosovo, or in ‘near war’ conditions, as in Sierra 
Leone, the Balkans from 1995 to 199640 and Iraq.  Police forces will be needed to 
create security in all of these situations, to be fully integrated and coordinated 
with military forces, and be able to train national police forces in all conditions of 
LIC. 
It is important to recognise that the counterinsurgent’s civil units are prime 
targets for the insurgents, as they are ‘soft targets’ and vital to the 
counterinsurgent’s strategy.  As such, the civil units that provide essential services 
need to be well protected, fully integrated into the counterinsurgent’s structure 
and provided with training prior to deployment.  Thus, an Expeditionary Civil 
Service must be created which will deploy immediately alongside, and be 
completely integrated with a counterinsurgent’s military forces, under a unified 
command.  Alternatively, reconstruction and security may be hindered, or military 
forces will be forced to assume tasks they are not suitable for.  The pre-war 
preparation of this unified civil-military organisation will disassemble the friction 
and mistrust between civil and military units, and create synergy in countering 
any insurgency.  “Although the soldier and administrator should continue to 
operate generally within their own spheres of competence, their functions must be 
fused toward achieving the common objective of winning the war.  All other 
objectives, no matter what may be their long-term importance, should be 
secondary until the first has been achieved.  All the political, economic, 
psychological, and military means must be marshalled as weapons under 
centralized co-ordination and direction… [F]or failure of the governing authorities 
to achieve unity of effort is one of the shortest roads to defeat.”41
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Given the essential requirement of a unitary approach to 
counterinsurgency, it would seem unusual if a unified, civil-military organisation 
had not been created.  For example in 2003, U.S. General John Abizaid, 
commander of the reconstruction force in Iraq, characterised the need for a unified 
strategy in LIC as follows: “There is no strictly military solution to the problems 
we face [in Iraq]…  It requires that we move together on the political front, on the 
economic front, on the reconstruction front in a manner that is synchronized and 
coordinated.  If we don’t [sic] do that, I do not believe that we can be successful.  
So you can pay the military to stay there, but you are only paying us to stay 
forever.”42  The lack of unified strategy is not merely a failure of American 
doctrine, as indicated by UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan: “All [the] tasks – 
humanitarian, military, political, social, and economic – are interconnected, and 
the people engaged in them need to work closely together.  We cannot expect 
lasting success in any of them unless we pursue all of them at once as part of a 
single coherent strategy.  If the resources are lacking for any one of them, all the 
others may turn out to have been pursued in vain.”43  Essentially, the lack of 
coordinated strategy has been a reported failure, by virtually all international 
actors (counterinsurgents), in most cases of LIC.44
Given Abizaid’s comments, it would seem there was no American 
interagency coordination prior to the Afghan and Iraqi interventions; this, 
however, is incorrect.  Following the abrupt U.S. departure from Somalia in 1993, 
“the absence of rigorous and sustained interagency planning and coordination… 
[were found to] hamper effectiveness, jeopardize success, and even court disaster 
[in LIC].”45  In 1994, as Haiti descended into violence, the U.S. National Security 
Council (NSC) established an Executive Committee (ExCom) to generate “policy 
options and plans”,46 so that the mistakes made in Somalia would not be recreated 
in Haiti.  The resultant interagency plan was a pioneering first; politico-military 
mission objectives were outlined, strategies were formed and agency 
responsibilities were specified.  In 1997, Presidential Decision Directive 56 
(PDD-56) on Managing Complex Contingency Operations was authorised by 
President Bill Clinton.  This action institutionalised ExCom’s function, “to assist 
in policy development, planning, and execution of complex contingency 
operations; … [to develop] a political-military implementation plan as an 
integrated planning tool for coordinating U.S. government actions; [to ensure] an 
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interagency rehearsal or review of the plan’s main elements prior to execution; [to 
establish] an after-action review of each operation; and [to guarantee] interagency 
training to support this process.”47  While never fully implemented, PDD-56 
significantly improved the U.S. Government’s capacity to plan inclusively and 
coherently for interagency humanitarian responses, information operations, civil 
security and counterinsurgency operations in LIC.  President George W. Bush, 
following his inauguration, augmented PDD-56 with National Security Policy 
Directive XXC (NSPD-XX).  NSPD-XX was designed to ‘provide warning, 
advanced planning, outline prevention mechanisms, and response options’48 for 
counterinsurgency forces in LIC.  In addition, NSPD-XX basically promoted an 
expanded ExCom function, in the form of the NSC led Contingency Planning 
Policy Coordination Committee (CP-PCC).  The CP-PCC’s role was to develop 
“interagency contingency plans for emerging crises with a focus on U.S. 
objectives, a desired endstate, policy options, interagency responsibilities, 
resource issues, and strategies for various aspects of the operation.”49  Thus, 
PDD-56 and NSPD-XX were the foundations of a united and coherent 
interagency response to LIC, analogous with the ECS. 
PDD-56 has enhanced the U.S. response in Haiti, Kosovo and East Timor, 
and NSPD-XX had positively augmented PDD-56.  However, both directives 
were largely excluded from the formation of policies and strategies for Operation 
Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom.  In Afghanistan, U.S. strategy 
was formed contrary to the guidance of the NSPD-XX.  In addition, there was no 
person or organisation to plan and coordinate the military, diplomatic and civil 
operations in Afghanistan, below the high level NSC deputies committee.  Once 
again, the benefits of PDD-56 and NSPD-XX were mitigated, when the NSC was 
replaced by U.S. Department of Defence (DOD) as the lead agency in post-war 
Iraq.  Consequently, the U.S. Government’s civil agencies were basically 
excluded from policy creation and actualisation.  This was highly regrettable 
given the area expertise, capabilities and planning completed by the United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID), the U.S. Department of Justice 
(DOJ), the U.S. Department of Commerce (DOC), and especially the U.S. 
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Department of State (DOS), which had led all post-conflict missions since World 
War Two (WW2).50
This episode illustrates the crucial importance of establishing the ECS, to 
ensure a comprehensive approach to counterinsurgency operations in LIC, 
reinforced by a unity of effort.  Various difficulties that surfaced in the American 
interventions into Afghanistan and Iraq, which the ECS would have to ameliorate 
are; bureaucratic inertia towards interagency cooperation, potential for personal 
rivalry, the lack of communications, the lack of support for external agency 
leadership, anti-planning biases, potential for information leaks, obstruction of 
functional experts, the disinclination of regional experts to cooperate in 
coordinated planning, and the low priority given to strategic advice from field 
agents.51  It has also been suggested that political interference caused the unusual 
DOD approach to the Iraq war, “[t]hey preferred to find a model for successful 
nation building that was not associated with the previous administration.”52  
However, the Rumsfeld doctrine (with emphasis on smaller and more agile forces) 
had a direct bearing on the planning for the Iraq war, as did intelligence estimates 
concerning the post-war situation.53  It is essential that HIC doctrines and 
strategies do not impact upon LIC policy.  Moreover, human intelligence must be 
improved, as it is indispensable when analysing the consequences of LIC. 
 
Summary 
It is said that if we desire peace, we must prepare for war.54  However, it must be 
the right kind of war that we prepare for.  Like Churchill’s observation about the 
Soviet Union, LIC seems like a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma.55  
LIC appears as an incomprehensible amalgam of violence.  It is difficult to 
understand, thus, it is challenging to defeat.  Given this complexity, a clear 
counterinsurgency doctrine is needed for the suppression of LIC.  This doctrine 
provides a theoretical framework and a set of practical principles that are essential 
to the counterinsurgent facing LIC. 
Awareness of the phased array of violence encountered in LIC forms the 
theoretical framework presented in this thesis.  The phased array characterises the 
structured, yet fluid nature of LIC.  Each phase of LIC, organisation 
(cadre/support), terrorism, guerrilla warfare and mobile warfare, merge in a 
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symbiotic relationship that cause an array of threats that are difficult to precisely 
counter.  However, perceiving LIC as phased violence enables individually 
tailored strategies to counter individual phase threats.  The significance of a 
phased counterinsurgency is that it insures each specific threat is countered, rather 
than the most visible threat being countered with no consideration for other 
threats.  This is important because a strategy tailored to one phase will have little 
or no effect on the other phases.  Within this theoretical framework, the leading 
principles to counter LIC can be outlined. 
They are the provision of internal security, the regulation of international 
interference, the application of civil operations, which must all be applied 
synergistically under a unitary central command.  The provision of internal 
security involves: preserving full phase security in friendly zones, and the 
deliberate expansion of friendly zones by entrenching all phases of the 
counterinsurgency.  The regulation of international interference entails isolating 
the battlespace from negative foreign physical and psychological operations.  This 
principle is significant because international interference can mean the difference 
between victory and defeat for a counterinsurgent in LIC.  Civil operations are 
critical in LIC because they form a symbiotic relationship with the internal and 
external security operations of the counterinsurgent.  Civil operations must 
encourage political participation within the community and provide economic and 
social benefits for the people.  LICs are won and lost in the hearts and minds of 
the people, their support and intelligence is the basis for counterinsurgent 
operations. 
All of the aforementioned principles will be ineffectual if the 
counterinsurgent does not take a holistic approach to ensuring the stability of the 
sovereign state, by unifying civil, police, intelligence and military services.  This 
holistic approach requires a unified command and the formation of an 
Expeditionary Civil Service.  A unified command will ensure unity of effort, 
while the Expeditionary Civil Service will guarantee that the civil units, which are 
essential to counterinsurgency operations in LIC, are as capable as and fully 
integrated with their military counterparts. 
This chapter analysed and presented doctrinal principles that can be 
applied by a counterinsurgent facing LIC.  These principles are one aspect of the 
overall counterinsurgency strategy analysed in this research.  The following 
 167
chapter, which collates, analyses and makes recommendations in reference to 
military force principles, is a further aspect of the counterinsurgency strategy 
examined in this research.  The principles contained in both of these chapters form 
a holistic approach to counterinsurgency. 
The theoretical framework and four principles outlined in this chapter are 
distilled from empirical examples of LIC, and are consistent with the lessons of 
contemporary LIC.  Their adaptation in light of future cases of LIC will improve 
the counterinsurgent’s probability of success. 
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Chapter Six 
Military Force in Low Intensity Conflict 
 
As has been established in the previous chapter (A Doctrine for Low Intensity 
Conflict), security is the cornerstone of any doctrine that addresses 
counterinsurgency operations in Low Intensity Conflict (LIC).  While not 
exclusively a panacea, military force on the part of the counterinsurgent is the 
primary provider of security in LIC. 
 In terms of doctrinal principles, the military forces of a counterinsurgent 
involved in LIC will be the primary actors in controlling international 
interference, providing internal security, applying civil operations and in forming 
a unified command.  So as to implement the aforementioned doctrinal principles, 
military forces must adhere to a multitude of often contradictory military tenets.  
Ten of these military principles are a principal focus of this research; they include 
doctrinal precision, professionalism, independence, initiative, force precision, 
restraint, combined arms, joint force, integrated communications and accurate 
human intelligence.  These military principles are founded on the analysis of the 
three case study chapters of this thesis and on lessons learned in numerous 
conflicts that occurred since World War II. 
 Given the primacy of military force in LIC, this chapter will analyse and 
make recommendations on the composition of counterinsurgency forces.  The 
chapter’s empirical focus will be based primarily on the case studies of this thesis.  
The focus of the chapter will be broad, encapsulating the following topics: 
doctrine; infantry; armour (armoured vehicles) and artillery; helicopters; aircraft; 
command, control, initiative, communications and intelligence (C2ICI).  The 
military principles outlined above form a thematic thread that is intertwined 
through the aforementioned topics. 
 
Doctrine 
The case studies of this thesis clearly indicate a pervasive lack of 
counterinsurgency doctrine applicable to LIC.  A lack of precisely tailored 
doctrine will undermine counterinsurgent operations in LIC.  It is clear that 
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military establishments consistently apply conventional force principles to the 
non-conventional reality of LIC.  Lessons learned in past counterinsurgencies are 
not internalised, so the same mistakes are continually made. 
The Soviets made a clear error of judgement when intervening in 
Afghanistan.  The doctrine applied was a universal theatre concept of war, 
designed to defeat North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) forces in Europe, 
rather than dispersed guerrilla bands.  A similar mistake was made in Chechnya 
by the Russians, except that the Russians failed to seize even the initial primary 
objectives: Groznyy and Chechnya’s strategic infrastructure.  However, many of 
Russia’s mistakes were rectified by the second Chechen war. 
In Somalia, the United Nations (UN) ‘doctrine’ so undermined the 
standard operating procedures of the United States (U.S.) and other forces in 
Mogadishu, that UN defeat was almost guaranteed.  So significant was the defeat 
in Somalia for the U.S., that major doctrinal formulation and restructuring 
throughout the Clinton administration and into the early stages of the Bush 
administration (Presidential Decision Directive 56 (PDD-56) and National 
Security Policy Directive XX (NSPD-XX)) was undertaken.  This doctrinal 
evolution created positive results throughout the 1990s, for example in Haiti and 
East Timor.  However, the imperatives set forth by the new U.S. 
counterinsurgency doctrine were first ignored in Afghanistan and then 
contravened in Iraq. 
Poor doctrine has been a limiting factor in low intensity conflict, but 
should not be so.  LIC is not an anomaly in warfare; it has been and will always 
be the most common form of war.  By contrast, conventional war is the atypical 
form of war.  Given this reality, military establishments should devote more 
attention to LIC.  The following discussion is an account of the various force 
elements that form the military basis of the counterinsurgency. 
 
Infantry 
Infantry have always been the principal counterinsurgent units in LIC, given their 
higher propensity to engage with the enemy.  In LIC, the smaller the 
counterinsurgent’s infantry unit is, the more likely it will be to make contact with 
the enemy.  Hence, squads and platoons must be highly independent, highly 
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trained, invested with authority and trusted to use it, and prepared to take the 
initiative.  This section on infantry is divided into three subsections: (1) personnel; 
(2) tactics, techniques and standard operating procedures; and (3) equipment.  The 
subsections analyse and suggest optimal infantry force structuring for 
counterinsurgency forces in LIC.  
 
Personnel 
The first issue under analysis is whether conscript or reserve forces are suitable 
for counterinsurgency operations in LIC.  The Soviet-Afghan war and the first 
Russo-Chechen war are useful in answering this question, as most Soviet/Russian 
troops deployed were conscripts or reservists.  Many of these soldiers were sent to 
Afghanistan as punishment, or volunteered due to a sense of bravado.  In 
Chechnya, their cohesion was further degraded by combining Internal Ministry 
(MVD), Federal Security Service (FSB) and Army troops.  It appears that the lack 
of training and cohesion within the Soviet/Russian Army severely undermined the 
military effectiveness of these combat units, and reduced the discipline of soldier 
interactions with non-combatants.  Hence, the Russian conscript operations in 
Afghanistan and Chechnya were plagued by heavy personnel and material losses.  
In addition, indiscriminate violence perpetrated against the population by these 
inexperienced and ill-disciplined forces was highly counterproductive, as it 
strengthened the opposition. The violence was further aggravated by alcoholism, 
drug abuse, ethnic rivalry, poor living conditions, insufficient medical care, 
isolation, smuggling and widespread corruption.  However, the deployment of 
American reservist personnel in OIF, and hence in Iraq, has been relatively 
unproblematic, although there have been a number of incidents, like the defiling 
of prisoners at Abu Graib, which were due to a lack of discipline.  Humiliating the 
population is counterproductive to the counterinsurgent and must be avoided at all 
costs.  It appears professional soldiers, with superior training, fitness, combat 
capability and discipline, are preferable to conscripts in counterinsurgency.  This 
is primarily because combat in LIC is brief, and violent, and occurs in terrain 
unfavourable to the counterinsurgent. 
In addition to the poor training received by Russian conscripts, their 
leadership was also deficient.  This is a substantial problem.  As Mockaitis has 
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noted the likelihood of small unit contacts and the wide dispersal of forces across 
the combat zone in LIC, “decentralization of command and control based on 
superior junior leadership [is] a hallmark of counterinsurgency”.1  The 
Soviet/Russian experience in Afghanistan and the first Chechen war clearly 
demonstrated the substantial degradation of combat performance caused by a lack 
of junior leadership.  In Afghanistan, Soviet non-commissioned officers (NCOs) 
were rotated too often and received substandard training.  This caused operational 
experience to be lost at each NCO rotation.  Again, the officer corps was enticed 
to fight in Afghanistan by financial inducement or unwarranted career 
advancement.  These policies tended to draw unprofessional and undesirable 
officers to Afghanistan.  The experience was similar in Chechnya.  The effect of 
poor junior leadership was to reduce troop effectiveness, cohesion and discipline. 
In comparison, the elite Soviet troops deployed in Afghanistan were more 
suited to counterinsurgency operations in LIC.  Elite Soviet units were 
professional, well trained, well led and cohesive; proving effective against the 
Mujahedeen.  Again, after the initial defeats of the Russians in Groznyy, Naval 
infantry and Special Forces (Spetsnaz (Spetsialnoye naznachinie)) trained in 
urban warfare, were deployed.  MVD and FSB snipers were also deployed to 
Groznyy, supplementing the inadequately trained MoD snipers.  These special 
units and snipers were also able to exploit the night, when the situational 
awareness of the Chechens was reduced. 
The advantages of having professional troops operate as 
counterinsurgency forces were not lost on the Russians in the second Chechen 
war.  Russian infantry entering Groznyy was elite, specialised, professional and 
trained in urban warfare.  Reconnaissance, combat engineers, snipers, naval and 
airborne infantry, Spetsnaz, and forward air and artillery observers were heavily 
employed in Groznyy.  These units were then supported by a division of Russian 
infantry, organised into ‘storm detachments’.  These storm detachments 
incorporated Rocket Propelled Grenade (RPG), sniper and rifle infantry into three 
man groups, supported by Thermobaric Rocket Launcher (RPO-A) equipped 
troops, forward artillery and air observers, engineers and reconnaissance troops.  
These detachments were heavily armed, largely autonomous and professional (not 
conscripts).  Furthermore, improved supply, reinforcement and rotation aided 
morale.  Improved and simplified command and control, leadership, urban 
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training, and air-ground synergy also vastly improved Russian combat 
capabilities.2
Since the end of World War Two, Special Force (SF) elements have 
displayed a highly effective capability as counterinsurgent forces.  The latter three 
case studies of this thesis, United Task Force (Somalia), Operation Enduring 
Freedom (Afghanistan) and Operation Iraqi Freedom, have indicated a 
continuation of this trend.  Special Forces are a growing element of Western war-
fighting, for four main reasons.  First and foremost, force can be accurately 
targeted by the Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance 
(ISTAR) capabilities of SF personnel.  Even within difficult urban terrain, as in 
Basra and Baghdad, SF personnel could create an accurate intelligence picture, 
restrict enemy actions, and act as forward air and artillery observers.  Second, SF 
personnel exhibit outstanding joint warfare synergy; air support is accurate and 
devastating with SF guidance.  Third, SF units are light and highly projectable.  
Hence, a significant, and/or covert presence can be deployed rapidly, as when the 
lead elements of the 10th Special Forces Group deployed to stabilise the OIF 
northern front after Turkey prevented the U.S. 4th Division’s deployment.  Fourth, 
the force multiplication effect of SF personnel distributed among indigenous 
troops or regular infantry can revolutionise the adopted unit’s combat power.  SF 
troops can integrate effectively due to advanced language and cultural skills, and 
through joint force, can apply combat power with advanced communications and 
targeting equipment.  In both Afghanistan and Iraq, SF support transformed the 
combat power of local forces with the practice of joint warfare. 
The professionalism of soldiers has been central to the victories in 
Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom, and prevented the 
loss of further personnel in Somalia.  The skill, determination, initiative and 
courage of soldiers cannot be underestimated in warfare.  Soldiers are the bedrock 
of any technology, tactic or procedure.  The individual soldier’s training, 
readiness, familiarity with weapons and systems is the most important component 
of awareness, jointness, agility, intelligence and precision.  Furthermore, 
counterinsurgency operations are the greatest test of a soldier’s professionalism, 
as judiciousness, care and combat discrimination must be applied in difficult 
surroundings against a mercurial foe. 
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Tactics, Techniques and Standard Operating Procedures 
Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) and Standard Operating Procedures 
(SOPs) are applied in combat until initiative and experience create better ways of 
conducting operations.  Hence, TTPs and SOPs must be well honed before 
combat, and effective TTPs and SOPs must be adhered to.  This subsection 
addresses the lessons learnt in this thesis’ six case studies regarding TTPs and 
SOPs. 
Inadequate and erroneous TTPs and SOPs were central to the poor 
performance of the Soviet/Russian conscripts studied in this thesis.  For example, 
embarked regular troops were unlikely to disembark under-fire from armoured 
vehicles, contravening combined arms theory.  Light infantry sweeps were also 
ignored, forfeiting intelligence on enemy positions and activities.3  The lack of 
small scale infantry operations began to be addressed between 1982 and 1984, but 
were never made central to Soviet strategy.   
The lacklustre fashion with which effective TTPs and SOPs were applied, 
also limited Soviet/Russian elite infantry operations.  Elite units were primarily 
suited to aerial assault, rather than the long range, foot-mounted intelligence 
gathering and search-and-destroy missions, which are indispensable in 
counterinsurgency.  The Soviets also showed, but failed to internalise, that high 
ground, reconnaissance, training, spirit and resourcefulness are timeless 
ingredients to effective counterinsurgencies. 
Unfortunately, many of the same mistakes were remade in Chechnya.  The 
initial conscript force deployed to Groznyy were ordered to fight from within their 
Infantry Fighting Vehicles (BMPs), obviating the principles of combined arms 
and exacerbating the dangers of urban warfare for armoured units.  However, the 
Chechen wars did cause the Russian military to modify their TTPs.  Unit sizes 
were reduced to increase operational freedom.   Unit firepower was augmented 
with flame throwers, rocket propelled grenades (RPGs), AGS-17 automatic 
grenade launchers and RPO-A thermobaric rocket launchers.  The security of 
communications was also enforced. 
The strategic defeat of American forces in Mogadishu, Somalia was 
exacerbated by restrained SOPs and TTPs.  The cause was non-standard operating 
procedures imposed by United Nations Rules of Engagement (ROE).  These ROE 
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so undermined the elite American troops deployed in Somalia, that they were 
unable to sustain combat against a numerically larger foe.  The primary weakness 
was not internal to the troops, but caused by: (1) the lack of armour capable of 
withstanding RPG fire; and (2) constraints on close air support (CAS).  Armour 
was available, but was restricted from entering Mogadishu.  Infantry operating 
without armoured support was in contravention of standard TTPs and combined 
arms theory.  More CAS was available, but was also withdrawn from operations 
due to concerns about collateral damage.  Secondary problems in the urban 
fighting included: communication deficiencies due to urban terrain; a lack of 
situational awareness; unfamiliarity with coalition equipment; and language 
impediments to coalition communication.  The critical lessons from Somalia are 
that communications and combined arms must not be undermined, nor TTPs and 
SOPs.   
As indicated earlier, the American and allied actions in Afghanistan and 
Iraq feature an increased integration of Special Forces (SF) and combat aircraft.  
This experience highlights the critical nature of effective joint force principles 
within a counterinsurgent’s combat force destined for LIC.  Hence, a mastery of 
joint warfare must be attained, through intensive training and exercises prior to 
deployment.  Joint warfare cannot be an anomaly in training; it must become a 
standard procedure.  Supply of the necessary communications, designators and 
other combat supplies must also be assured.  While, regulations that undermine 
SOPs and TTPs should be minimised, if authorised at all.  When contravention of 
the above principles did occur, coalition casualties were taken and outcomes were 
less positive.  For example, U.S. combat effectiveness was undermined by 
Afghanistan’s mountainous terrain, causing communications, Intelligence, 
Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) and logistical problems.  This limited 
support for American infantry, contravening combined arms and standard 
procedures.  As is discussed in case study five (U.S. in Afghanistan), the adoption 
of joint warfare principles has increased risk on the battlefield for friendly units.  
This is because ground units have little primary firepower, protection or 
endogenous mobility.  Their combat capability comes via a tenuous 
communications link with friendly support and combat support units.  Hence, 
militaries must be diligent in defending these tenuous communication links.  
 178
Training is central to safeguarding the weaknesses of joint warfare; joint warfare 
principles must become second-nature to the soldier, airman and commander. 
It is evident from coalition actions within OIF and subsequently in Iraq 
that combined arms and joint warfare have become standardised principles in 
urban warfare.  These principles were trained for under urgency by the British and 
American troops rotated through urban training schools in Israel.  When larger 
concentrations of Iraqi units and fedayeen were identified in urban centres, the 
cities were isolated and intelligence was gained.  As a consequence, the Iraqis 
were undermined and the coalition fought from a position of superiority.  As was 
indicated above, SF and sniper units were used effectively as forward observers in 
cities.  SOPs prescribed combined arms and joint warfare to be observed when 
fighting in cities.  This has continued in the post war environment where infantry 
and support units are dispatched on combined patrols.  The use of armour is also 
tailored to the specific areas to be patrolled, for example difficult areas are 
patrolled by heavier armoured forces.  However, shortfalls in airlift early in OIF 
caused SF units in the north of Iraq to undertake operations without support 
vehicles and other heavy equipment.  Hence, airborne logistics require expansion, 
so that logistics issues do not breach SOPs and TTPs. 
 
Equipment 
Improvement of communications is the most critical requirement for infantry 
operations and is therefore one of the leading military principles analysed in this 
thesis.  Simply, an absence of communications will impede combined and joint 
warfare.  Basic frequency modulation (FM), or line-of-sight communications, 
have proven inadequate in all the case studies of this thesis.  FM communications 
do not provide adequate support for operations in jungle, wooded, mountainous or 
urban terrain.  At times, satellite communications can provide a link with support 
services.  However, satellite communications do not function in urban terrain, and 
provide only limited transmissions in mountainous terrain.  U.S. military 
observers in Iraq concluded that in urban terrain, “the lack of functional radios 
hampered soldiers’ ability to execute their missions without undue risk.”4  
Soldiers have resorted to yelling their positions to comrades, compromising unit 
security and stealth.  Counterinsurgency requires decentralised unit operations, 
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which in turn require a broader dissemination of effective communications.  The 
problem can be resolved with “network radios”, which use “frequency hopping” 
technology and other “network radios” in the unit to relay communications to the 
intended target.5  Future needs will also require “data images, maps and other 
navigational aids”6 to be communicated within the squad and higher echelons of 
command. 
The arming of a soldier requires an intricate balance of firepower, 
information, armour and mobility.  The infantryman’s primary source of 
firepower is the rifle.  The standard rifle of the counterinsurgent examined in this 
thesis has fired a 5.56mm (NATO) or 5.45mm (Russian) round.   While generally 
adequate, this small calibre round has been criticised for insufficient firepower, 
range and piercing qualities.  The 5.56mm calibre rifle was designed for ‘typical’ 
engagements of between 100-300 metres.  However, this ‘typical’ engagement 
range may not be sufficient.  In all but two of this thesis’ case studies, sniper units 
and sniper rifles have been urgently requested.7  Furthermore, current and future 
optical and electronic sights are increasing the range at which a soldier can engage 
a target: necessitating a larger calibre rifle.8  5.56mm ammunition is lighter than 
7.62mm ammunition, improving the mobility of the soldier.  However, the two 
rounds are not equivalent; it often takes more 5.56mm rounds to stop a target.  In 
so far as 5.56mm rounds are also designed to wound, rather than kill, they create a 
need for medical evacuation, which reduces the enemy’s ability to fight.  On the 
other hand, soldiers want the certainty of a weapon that will fully incapacitate the 
enemy.  Thus, a reappraisal of calibre sizes is necessary. 
Operations in mountainous and urban terrain have shown that soldiers 
require lighter kit.  American infantry armour and mobility were augmented in 
OEF and OIF, with the introduction of lighter and more effective interceptor body 
armour.  The case studies of this thesis indicate future weapons systems need to 
be lighter, including rifles and laser designators.  However, a number of ongoing 
infantry development programmes are increasing the weight of rifles with 
electronic optics and data transmission devices.  The extra weight is problematic.  
However, the ability to fire around objects (by way of an articulated scope) will 
provide security for the user in future urban conflict.  Navigational aids, 
communication devices, personnel identification units and batteries will also need 
to be more effective, non-intrusive and lighter.9
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Armour (Armoured Fighting Vehicles) and Artillery 
Armour and artillery are not the primary combat units in LIC.  However, the 
combined arms effect of armour and artillery are indispensable in supporting 
infantry operations.  The essential nature of armour and artillery in support of 
infantry operations makes combined arms an indispensable military principle of 
this research.  This section will analyse and suggest optimal armour characteristics 
and best use of artillery.  This section will be divided into four subsections: 
protection, manoeuvrability, firepower and visibility; and tactics, Command, 
Control and Communication (C3) and other issues.  Artillery will also feature at 
the end of this section. 
 
Protection 
Armour provides protection to crewmembers and adjoined infantry.  Equally, 
adjoined infantry provides protection to armour.  As indicated by Anthony H. 
Cordesman,A operating armour heavy forces without adequate infantry 
screening,10 will result in serious loss of armoured units.  This was illustrated by 
the Iraqis (in the Iran-Iraq war) and the Israelis (in the Yom Kippur and Lebanon 
(1982) wars).  The Russians (in Afghanistan and in the first Chechen war) also 
suffered heavy armoured losses due to insufficient infantry protection.  The 
converse is also true.  The Iranians in the Iran-Iraq war and the Americans in 
Somalia endured infantry casualties, due to the lack of armoured support.  Hence, 
simple combined arms theory should always be adhered to.  The use of either, 
without the other, will invariably court casualties and the loss of equipment. 
However, protection is also derived from firepower and manoeuvrability.  
Manoeuvre is greatly inhibited in urban and mountainous terrain, where armour is 
confined to roads.  Mountainous and urban terrain also limits armoured firepower, 
since it tends to create three dimensional targets, unlike the two dimensional 
targets found in open terrain.  Mountainous and urban terrain also vastly reduces 
engagement distances.  In this time-critical and confined environment, it is 
difficult to bring main and auxiliary guns to bear on numerous, concealed and 
                                                 
A Cordesman is a leading expert on the principles of military force.  Therefore, Cordesman’s 
numerous texts have been utilised as a partial foundation of this chapter.  However, Cordesman’s 
texts have been supplemented with numerous accounts from military practitioners and works by 
other authors. 
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fleeting targets.  In this environment, passive and reactive armour is elevated to a 
more important status of protection. 
There are three primary categories of weapons faced by armour in 
counterinsurgency: small-arms; unguided anti-armour weapons; landmines and 
improvised explosive devices.  Insurgents are ‘foot-mounted infantry’; any 
reliance on mechanised assets reduces the insurgent’s stealth and chances of 
survival.  Hence, small-arms (5.45mm-7.62mm calibre) are the primary weapon 
of the insurgent.  Larger calibre small-arms (12.7mm-14.5mm) are not man-
portable and are unlikely to be fielded by the insurgent.  However, as in 
Mogadishu, urban terrain may permit the limited use of some larger calibre small-
arms.  Rocket propelled grenades (RPGs) constitute the majority of unguided anti-
armour weapons (henceforth described as RPGs), while recoilless guns are 
seldom used.  The case studies of this thesis have shown RPGs are a growing 
threat to counterinsurgency forces, especially in urban terrain.  Bianchi asserts 
landmines cause the largest percentage of a counterinsurgent’s mounted casualties 
in LIC.11  Anti-personnel mines are not a serious threat to armoured vehicles.  
However, anti-armour mines present a significant threat to armour, including 
catastrophic kills (complete crew annihilation).  Improvised explosive devices 
(IEDs) are numerous, and pose a medium threat to armour.  IEDs generally 
contain more explosive than anti-armour mines.  However, IED explosive is often 
ineffectively shaped, reducing armour piercing qualities.  Hence, blast and 
shrapnel are the predominant effects of an IED. 
It is evident from examples of LIC in the former Yugoslavia, Africa and 
the Middle East that vehicles operating in such a combat zone must be armoured.  
In urban or other closed terrain an un-armoured vehicle will not survive.  In OIF, 
post-war Iraq and Somalia, the use of un-armoured vehicles (such as the M-1113 
HMMWV (Humvee)) permitted friendly casualties.  The Americans in Iraq have 
been dedicated to up-armouring Humvees and up-armouring trucks, while more 
“tanks and Bradleys [are being sent] to Iraq, to help protect troops from roadside 
bombs and rocket attacks”.12  The U.S. Marine Corps is also up-armouring 
amphibious assault vehicles (AAVs), mainly to thwart rocket attacks.13 The 
British also added armour to personnel carriers operating in Ireland, as did UN 
forces operating in Bosnia.  Similarly, the Australians are producing a light 
armoured vehicle (Bushmaster), with high strategic mobility and sufficient armour 
 182
for operations in LICs.  Generally, there has been a shift by counterinsurgent 
forces towards armouring vehicles in LIC.  Due to the non-linear LIC battlefield 
and the effective isolation of combat units, on both urban and non-urban terrain, 
the protection armoured units possess is critical.   
Light Operational Vehicles (LOVs), with a gross weight of approximately 
5,000 kilograms, have sufficient power and dimensions to receive all-dimension 
armour plating.  This armour will generally withstand 7.62mm anti-personnel 
rounds, remote artillery-round detonations, smaller anti-tank mines and most IED 
explosions.  This is sufficient armour for low-level threats, non-urban battlespaces 
and strategic manoeuvre.  However, the significant and recurring threat posed by 
RPGs necessitates a higher level of protection.  Light Armoured Vehicles (LAVs), 
with a gross weight around 15,000 kilograms, can be protected against large-
calibre small-arms and partially protected against the RPG threat.   
The hull of an armoured vehicle will be constructed of either steel, or 
laminated or composite armour.  All of these armour types have deflection 
envelopes.  The least protection is provided when a projectile impacts the armour 
at the perpendicular (normal incidence).  As the oblique angle increases, so does 
the potential for deflection.  However, not all surfaces of an armoured vehicle are 
equivalently armoured.  The top and rear of an armoured vehicle are invariably 
thinner than the belly and sides, while the front is heavily armoured.  This 
conventional armouring practice has proven inappropriate in LIC.  This is because 
the probability of all aspect engagements increases in LIC.  In these 
circumstances, protection can be improved by increasing the oblique angle of the 
sides and rear.  This will however, reduce useable cabin space. 
Reactive or appliqué (additional) armour can improve the survivability of 
armoured vehicles.  Explosive Reactive Armour (ERA) consists of explosive 
packed between metal plates.  ERA detonates outwards when struck, deflecting 
explosive anti-armour projectiles.  ERA is the most effective solution to RPG and 
High Explosive Anti-Tank (HEAT) rounds.  “The limit of this concept lies in the 
fact that the vehicle’s basic hull structure must be sufficiently robust and thick as 
to withstand the explosion of the ERA tiles”.14  ERA tiles have however been 
applied to M-113 APCs by the Israelis, and to the Centauro by the Italians.  In 
such cases, shielding plates between the ERA and the hull may be required.  
Internal spall liners, in a Kevlar type substance, will reduce the internal effects of 
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RPG and HEAT rounds.  For example, the use of available ERA technology in 
Chechnya, would have vastly improved the survivability of Russian armour.  
Following American operations in Iraq, the M1A1/2 Abrams is also being 
provided with additional ERA.15  In contrast, appliqué armour incorporates all 
other passive forms of additional armour.  Appliqué armour puts no additional 
demands upon the vehicle, except for weight.  Appliqué armour comes in two 
forms.  First, steel, laminated or composite armour applied directly to the hull of 
the armoured vehicle.  Second, angled or inclined steel, laminated or composite 
armour sections, offering increased armour obliquity.  The latter angled armour is 
more expensive and more effective than the former plate armour.16
 
Manoeuvrability 
At the strategic level, manoeuvre represents the capability to shift personnel and 
firepower or secure lines of communication for supply units, as quickly and 
effectively as possible.  Firepower and protection generally have an inverse 
relationship with strategic manoeuvre, as the former two are heavy, and reduce 
vehicle mobility.  However, the proliferation of wheeled armoured vehicles and 
weight-saving technological improvements in firepower and protection has had a 
positive effect on firepower, manoeuvrability and protection at the strategic level. 
However, this equilibrium depends upon terrain; complex terrain (urban 
and mountain) inhibits manoeuvre.  Hence, the requirements for manoeuvre at the 
operational level differ from the strategic level.  While Bianchi argues wheeled 
armoured units offer “[b]etter agility in built-up or wooden [sic] areas”17.  Soviet 
operations in Afghanistan illustrate the ineffectiveness of both wheeled armour 
(BTRs) and tracked infantry fighting vehicles (BMPs) in complex terrain.  The 
Soviet tracked airborne infantry combat vehicle (BMD) operated more 
successfully in Afghanistan’s harsh off-road terrain, where wheeled and heavy 
armour could not manoeuvre.  In Lebanon’s urban terrain, the Israelis found the 
M-113 to be completely inadequate.  The M-113’s capacity for operational 
manoeuvre was completely undermined by a lack of armour, poor visibility, 
insignificant firepower and high silhouette.  The Israeli Merkava tank was a 
partial solution to the Israeli lack of operational manoeuvre, with its unique 
heavily armoured infantry carrying capacity.  The use of non-armoured and very 
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lightly armoured vehicles in Somalia by the Americans, also illustrated how a lack 
of armour can prevent operational manoeuvre completely.  Other nations who 
deployed heavier armour to Somalia were not impeded in their manoeuvre.  
Subsequent operations in Chechnya, Afghanistan and Iraq have demonstrated the 
value of well armoured vehicles (LAV-3s; Warrior and Bradley IFVs and BMPs; 
T-72/80, Abrams and Challengers MBTs) for manoeuvre by counterinsurgents in 
modern LIC.  Heavy armour is especially important for manoeuvre in urban 
terrain.  Hence, either wheeled or tracked armour can be deployed in LIC by 
counterinsurgents, provided the vehicles are well armoured, as armour is an 
absolute requirement for manoeuvre. 
 
Firepower and Visibility 
Protection and manoeuvre are dependent on a third element: Firepower.  
Firepower kills or suppresses enemy combatants.  This precludes the enemy’s 
ability to effectively engage targets.  As indicated by the case studies of this 
thesis, the effective firepower derived from a counterinsurgent’s armoured 
vehicles in LIC is dependent on three sub-elements: suppression, visibility and 
elevation. 
Suppression of the enemy is caused by firepower directed in the general 
locality of the enemy, rather than precisely aimed shots.  However, suppressing 
fire is only effective while it is sustained.  Hence conventional armaments, such as 
large calibre antitank guns, are inappropriate for counterinsurgency operations in 
LIC.  The Soviets established, in both Afghanistan and Chechnya, that chain guns, 
antiaircraft guns and automatic grenade launchers (AGL) provide effective 
suppression fire.  In addition, antitank guided missiles provide useful fire against 
fortified positions.  Consequently, Soviet armoured vehicles were often retrofitted 
with these weapons.  The armament of the M-1117 armoured security vehicle 
(ASV (Military Police)), which comprises a machinegun and an AGL, is optimal 
for light vehicles.18  American operations in Iraq have also illustrated the need for 
weapons with high rates of suppressing fire.  M-1 Abrams tanks deployed in 
urban operations in Iraq, were generally well protected by 0.50inch and 7.62mm 
calibre machine guns.  However, when unsupported by dismounted infantry in 
urban terrain, these weapons required the crew to fight open-hatched and to utilise 
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their personal weapons (M4 carbine, M16 rifle and M9 pistol).19  This tactic 
enabled the crew to easily identify and engage the enemy.  However, this is a 
dangerous tactic for the crew.  Therefore, both the Israelis and the Americans are 
fitting remote controlled weapons stations, extra thermal sights and additional gun 
shields to various armoured fighting vehicles.20
The greatest impediment to internally controlled weapons stations is a lack 
of visibility.  Soviet tanks in Afghanistan were impeded by narrow optics and 
targeting aids unsuited to targeting insurgents.  However, when Soviet tank crews 
attempted to fight open-hatched, they suffered heavy casualties.  The visibility 
from Soviet APCs and IFVs was also poor, as the firing ports on Soviet armoured 
vehicles impeded the embarked infantry’s ability to see and engage the enemy.  
Hence, the Soviets learnt that “troops cannot fight successfully from such vehicles 
in many types of terrain and tactical conditions”.21  Therefore, troops should not 
fight exclusively from within vehicles.  However, the Israelis in the 1982 Lebanon 
war found M-113s provided completely inadequate visibility for both embarked 
and disembarking troops.  While firing ports may improve visibility, they may 
also discourage troops from disembarking.  A lack of visibility is a reason why 
American armour crews fought in urban areas open-hatched.  The installation of 
remote weapon systems, without improving visibility, may not eliminate the need 
for armour crews to fight open-hatched. 
Fighting open-hatched also eliminates targeting problems caused by 
restrictive firing envelopes.  Once an enemy is acquired visually, the elevation and 
depression envelopes of weapons become critical in engaging the target.  If a 
weapon cannot be trained on the enemy, he cannot be killed or suppressed.  In 
Afghanistan and Chechnya, Soviet/Russian tank and BMP main armament could 
not be aimed at the enemy.  Neither could these armoured units defend themselves 
adequately with machine gun fire.  Hence, armour was often retrofitted with freely 
traversable weapons with high rates of fire.  This included weapons fired from 
turret cupola or as the internally fired main weapon.  Armoured self-propelled 
antiaircraft guns were indispensable in Afghanistan and Chechnya, because their 
envelopes of fire were so broad.  Guns need to elevate to 50-70 degrees in 
mountainous terrain, in addition to depressing sufficiently (-10 degrees plus) to 
fire into basements in urban terrain.  Iraqis tended not use urban terrain as 
effectively as the Chechens did.  However, unescorted American tank crews were 
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still forced to defend themselves with small arms, from open-hatches.  Hence for 
counterinsurgency operations in LIC, armour weapon systems must have high 
rates of fire, excellent visibility and unobstructed firing envelopes. 
 
Tactics; Command, Control and Communications (C3) 
The pre-eminence of armour in counterinsurgency operations should not be 
overstated.  Armour is important, but only in conjunction with combined arms 
principles.  Armour cannot operate effectively without support from infantry.  The 
Soviets/Russians took heavy armoured casualties in Afghanistan and Chechnya 
because combined arms was discounted.  The Israelis also made this mistake in 
the Yom Kippur war and the 1982 Lebanon war.22  Conversely, American and 
British operations in Iraq have derived all spectrum protection from the jointness 
of operations, and the professionalism of their commanders and crews. 
Coalition jointness was created by C3 infrastructures that enabled 
situational awareness and the application of precision fire.  Armour must be able 
to communicate effectively among like units, infantry and higher commands.  
Intelligence must also be disseminated quickly to and among front line combat 
units. Jointness and combined arms insured the correct weapon could be 
employed at the right time.  Furthermore, on the non-linear battlefield, combined 
arms are critical to address unforeseen threats. 
Finally, poor maintenance and unreliable equipment can be as debilitating 
as enemy fire.  Soviet operations in Afghanistan were plagued by poorly 
maintained vehicles.  Little attention was paid to pre-emptive maintenance, and 
field maintenance was ineffectual.  Similarly, the Iranians in the Iran-Iraq war 
may have lost as many armoured vehicles to poor maintenance and a lack of 
recovery capability, as it did to enemy fire.23
 
Artillery 
Artillery is an indispensable component of counterinsurgent operations in LIC.  
Artillery is the soldier’s all weather, day and night instrument of fire support.  
However, the use of artillery by counterinsurgents in LIC must conform to three 
principles: combined arms, precision and the use of firebases. 
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Combined arms and precision are mutually supportive principles.  
Artillery must be responsive to manoeuvre elements (combined arms), who must 
accurately designate point targets for the artillery.  Artillery must fire instantly 
and accurately wherever manoeuvre elements require.  In LIC, fleeting glimpses 
of insurgents must be exploited by a counterinsurgent’s artillery.  Area 
bombardment is ineffective in LIC, apart from causing collateral damage.  Hence, 
artillery units must be provided with accurate targeting coordinates.  The Soviets 
in the Afghan war quickly changed their use of artillery from “generalised mass 
fire to carefully targeted mass fire”.24  However, this targeted mass fire was only 
effective in short bursts, before the Mujahedeen could seek shelter.  The 
mountainous terrain of Afghanistan was an impediment to both Soviet and 
American artillery units.  The Soviets found artillery to be difficult to manoeuvre 
to points of contact, or with manoeuvre elements.  The Soviets also found the 
elevation of some artillery pieces to be insufficient to target, or fire over the crests 
of mountains.  This problem was partially alleviated with the deployment of the 
76mm Mountain Gun (M-1966).  The M-1966 is light (780 kilograms), small and 
has good elevation performance (-5 to +65 degrees).  In Operation Anaconda, 
American troops were also forced to fight without the suppression or fire support 
of artillery.  This degraded the infantry’s performance significantly, and enabled 
the enemy to escape.  This was also an avoidable mistake given U.S. forces have 
the British 105mm light gun.  The deployment of self-propelled artillery was 
impossible in the terrain.  However, the 105mm light gun should have been 
airlifted or towed to the area of operations. 
Artillery is also a necessary force element in urban terrain.  However, 
Russian artillery strikes in Groznyy were ineffective until planning and improved 
communication enabled rounds to strike point targets.   Russian artillery, guided 
by forward artillery observers and Special Forces, then became an effective shield 
against enemy action.  In addition, artillery-fired precision guided munitions 
(PGMs) were found to be highly effective and accurate in the second Chechen 
war.  Throughout Operation Iraqi Freedom, artillery was an effective tool to 
remove regular and irregular enemy units from battle.  Forward observers, snipers, 
unmanned air vehicles, human intelligence (HUMINT) sources and Special 
Forces enabled urban battlefield preparation by artillery fire.  All the case studies 
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of this thesis verify the requirement for artillery fire to prepare the urban 
battlefield for manoeuvre units. 
Artillery effectiveness in the Iraq war was influenced by command, 
communications, intelligence and target acquisition improvements.  Command 
was improved through greater situational awareness; notably due to friendly force 
tracking equipment.  Theatre wide communications were generally effective, 
except at the squad level in urban terrain.  Intelligence and target acquisition was 
improved by long range surveillance and infrared systems, as well as counter-
battery radar.  The precision strike of infantry guided artillery fire will be critical 
in future counterinsurgency operations.   
As indicated earlier, the placement of a counterinsurgent’s artillery 
systems in LIC is highly significant, and contrary to the usual principles of 
conventional warfare.  In a conventional conflict, artillery systems are dispersed 
across the battlefield to moderate the effects of enemy airstrike and counter-
battery fire.  However, air and artillery threats are unlikely to be faced by a 
counterinsurgent in LIC.  Given the non-linear nature of the battlefield, artillery 
units should consolidate into firebases.25  Both the Americans and Soviets 
constructed firebases which could adequately protect themselves from insurgent 
assaults; and provide intersecting fire-support for manoeuvre units. 
 
Aviation 
All of the case studies encapsulated by this thesis reveal the essential nature of 
aviation assets to a successful counterinsurgency strategy.  Aviation is 
multidimensional in purpose, ranging from facilitating logistical support, to 
commanding the battlefield with Command, Control, Communications, 
Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance 
(C4ISTAR) capabilities, to applying precision strike.   Given this complexity, 
each aspect of air support will be analysed individually within two sections: 
Helicopters and fixed-wing Aircraft.  In terms of military principles, aviation is a 
essential element in joint force operations and elevates the importance of 
professionalism, communications and accurate intelligence. 
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Helicopters 
The following section covers the use of helicopters by counterinsurgents in LIC.  
The subsections focus on the development of helicopter use by counterinsurgents 
in LIC, and the essential nature and use of helicopters in contemporary LIC by 
counterinsurgents. 
 
The development of Helicopter use in LIC 
Since their development, helicopters have been an indispensable part of 
counterinsurgency warfare.  However, the methods by which they have been 
utilised have varied greatly.  This subsection briefly outlines the development and 
early use of helicopters by counterinsurgents in LIC. 
The British, while operating in Malaya, were the first to illustrate the vital 
nature of heliborne lift, supply and medical evacuation, to counterinsurgency.  
Essentially, the British used helicopters in a combat support role, following 
principles of combined arms.  The force multiplication effect was 
disproportionately positive, in comparison to the small number of British 
helicopters deployed in Malaya.  The helicopter greatly improved the mobility and 
agility of British infantry and artillery units.  Ground units with heliborne support 
were thus able to ‘exploit opportunities to attack, block and ambush insurgents’26 
on British terms.  Simply, helicopters were a requisite component of British 
doctrine, which enabled the British to choose ‘points of contact’.  If the 
counterinsurgent can choose the point of contact, he will secure a distinct 
advantage. 
The effective use of British heliborne forces in Malaya, illustrates how 
helicopters have a higher factor of force-multiplication than fixed-wing aircraft in 
counterinsurgency operations. For example, French paratroopers (in Vietnam) 
jumping from fixed-wing aircraft, could ‘exploit opportunities to attack, block and 
ambush insurgents’27, as in the British case.  However, the French paratroopers 
were unable to be extracted efficiently after an effective contact with the enemy.  
French paratroopers were forced to march out of the jungle, which could take days 
or weeks and enable the Vietminh to ambush the dismounted French soldiers.  
Given the French paratroopers spent large amounts of time ‘self-exfiltrating’ and 
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not engaged with the enemy, their effective force strength was far below their 
nominal strength. 
The problem of paratrooper self-exfiltration was rectified by the French in 
Algeria, by deploying troop-lift and later rudimentarily armed helicopters.  This 
enabled the French to exploit intelligence on insurgent positions, saturate the area 
with heliborne forces, provide these disembarked forces with immediate heliborne 
firepower, and extract all forces immediately after the engagement for rapid 
redeployment.  Hence, helicopters functioned as an effective force multiplication 
tool.  The French doctrine on heliborne warfare contrasted in two important ways 
from the comparative British doctrine.  First, the French used heliborne forces as a 
component part of large-scale mobile operations.  These large-scale operations 
were, (1) formed as a result of experience attained in Indochina, (2) facilitated by 
Algerian terrain that enabled rapid land manoeuvre, (3) permitted due to the large 
French presence in Algeria, and (4) founded on the belief that Algeria was a 
province of France itself, rather than a colony.  On each of the points, the British 
experience was almost diametrically opposed.  Due to personnel, equipment, 
financial and terrain restrictions, the British were forced to devise a doctrine that 
implemented an efficient, precise and principally land-based use of force.  These 
differences are critical in the formation of doctrine, while both the French and 
British were effective in combating the respective insurgencies, only the British 
did so efficiently.  Given the cost-effectiveness of the British model, it may be 
advisable that under-resourced counterinsurgencies internalise British principles.  
Second, the French used armed helicopters, while the British did not.  The reason 
behind this difference in doctrine is not definite.  In the French case, heliborne 
troops were being suppressed by enemy fire while disembarking; as a solution, the 
French experimentally armed known and available airframes.  The initial French 
attempts were rudimentary, seating army machine-gunners on the external litters 
of the Bell 47 Sioux.  This practice proved effective at routing inaccessible 
machine-gun nests in Algeria’s open but mountainous terrain.  However, this did 
not alleviate the vulnerability of transport helicopters, when inserting infantry.  
Fixed-wing fighter-bombers also proved unable to provide instantaneous or 
lasting suppression of insurgent defensive positions.  However, rocket, machine 
gun and cannon equipped helicopters were found to be highly responsive and 
capable of suppressing enemy resistance at a landing zone, and proved equally 
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capable of responding to the needs of French troops in later combat.  The French 
were so impressed by the effectiveness of the armed helicopter, that units were 
deployed on independent search and destroy operations.  Hence, French use of 
helicopters included both combined arms and independent combat unit operations. 
However, these French practices are contrary to early British helicopter 
operations in LIC.  There are three issues that may have contributed to this 
deviation.  First, the British lacked the number of helicopters available to the 
French in Algeria.  This made the British helicopters too valuable to endanger in 
direct conflict.  Second, the British principle of minimum force may have 
obviated the possibility of arming helicopters.  In contrast however, the British did 
employ fighter-bombers.  Third, the British may not have had a need to arm their 
helicopters.  The British used helicopters to lift personnel and artillery into pre-
positioned landing zones (LZs).  From these LZs, British infantry would regroup, 
manoeuvre and engage the enemy, with artillery support.  This obviated the need 
for helicopter support, since the British infantry would not be disembarking under 
fire, and the British would maintain the element of surprise when engaging the 
enemy.  A requirement of this tactic was excellent intelligence, which the British 
attained through small unit tactics, the employment of local trackers and a close 
relationship with the civil population.  This may have been a result of earlier 
efforts at empire policing, where the British learnt to deal with native unrest with 
few resources.  The British may have also achieved greater synergy between strike 
aircraft and ground units, which the French did not achieve until armed 
helicopters were introduced.  Terrain is also important in analysing the different 
approaches to helicopter use; Algeria may have allowed the use of armed 
helicopters, as did Afghanistan in the early 1980s. 
Given the technical assistance provided by the Americans to the French in 
Indochina and Algeria, French procedures influenced American 
counterinsurgency doctrine in Vietnam.  The 173rd Airborne Division was the first 
overt and regular American military unit to be deployed in Vietnam.  The 173rd, 
being a well-trained heliborne unit, performed well in Vietnam, using similar 
small-unit tactics to the British in Malaya.  The helicopter lift generated agility, so 
that the 173rd could concentrate their force to exploit intelligence on enemy 
positions.  However, it cannot be extrapolated that the mass use of helicopters, as 
a force multiplier of infantry, will automatically engender counterinsurgent 
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victory.  All units, tactics and procedures must be incorporated into a coherent 
strategy; no one component can bring victory.  Helicopters, especially attack 
helicopters and airborne strike in general, were found to be largely ineffective in 
Vietnam’s vegetation covered mountainous terrain. 
 
Essential Nature and Use 
As indicated above, helicopters quickly became an indispensable part of 
counterinsurgency operations.  The use of helicopters by counterinsurgents varies 
widely in LIC.  However, manoeuvre, support, evacuation, protection and 
firepower can all be enhanced by the effective use of helicopters.  Helicopters can 
also provide C4ISTAR tasks.  Air-ground synergy created by helicopters has also 
proven far more effective in most combat environments, than that of aircraft. 
The case studies of this thesis have shown the following categories to be 
important to the use of helicopters in LIC by counterinsurgents: Protection; 
Firepower and Target Acquisition and Designation Equipment; the ‘Friendly Fire’ 
Problem; Trained Personnel; Tactics; and Flying Conditions.  Each of these 
subsections will be analysed and recommendations will be made for the future use 
of helicopters in LIC by counterinsurgents. 
 
Protection 
As with any weapons system, the effective use of helicopters in combat created a 
need for countermeasures.  While dwarfed by the numbers of helicopter losses in 
Vietnam (approximately 4,000), Soviet losses of helicopters in Afghanistan were 
significant (well over 800).28  These losses were caused by the effective use of 
man-portable surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) and heavy anti-aircraft (AA) guns by 
the Mujahedeen.  It is clear that airpower was essential in Afghanistan, where 
immediate force was needed to target an elusive enemy.  It is also clear that 
ground operations were significantly undermined by the restriction of helicopter 
operations. 
Similarly, in rural Afghanistan and Iraq, American lift helicopters and 
gunships were also vulnerable.  UH-47s, AH-64s and AH-1s all experienced 
battle damage, and were disabled or shot down by enemy forces.  Lessons that 
began to appear in Operation Enduring Freedom were resolutely corroborated by 
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operations in Iraq.  The synergy between regular and irregular Iraqi resistance, 
using small arms, RPGs and man-portable SAMs, effectively undermined well-
established helicopter doctrines and procedures. 
In urban terrain, slow moving helicopters were shown to be vulnerable to 
small arms fire and RPGs, as illustrated in Groznyy and Mogadishu.29  Hence, 
helicopters require active protection suites, passive armour or improved tactics to 
survive in modern LIC. 
The case studies show heliborne forces were important due to their agility, 
synergy and effective communications with ground units and their ability to loiter.  
These characteristics, however, make helicopters vulnerable.  Thus, helicopters 
require an effective electronic warfare (EW) suite, onboard infrared (IR) and radar 
jamming capabilities, and all-aspect signature suppression (noise, radar and heat).  
Such a protection suite will greatly reduce the threat to helicopters of all signature 
seeking SAMs.  While Soviet/Russian and American helicopters with EW suites 
were lost to enemy SAMs, EW systems have been credited with saving lives and 
equipment in Afghanistan, Chechnya and Iraq.30
All helicopters deployed in LIC by counterinsurgents should be provided 
with radar and infrared warning, jamming systems and countermeasures.  A lack 
of protection systems onboard some helicopters will undermine the performance 
of the helicopter fleet.  Due to the lack of self-protection suites on some Italian 
and Polish helicopters operating in Iraq, dedicated escort operations had to be 
maintained by other coalition members.  Such escort duties degrade the overall 
operational effectiveness of the airborne fleet, and put unprotected aircraft at 
significant risk. Coalition members should not have to rely on their allies for 
protection.  Also, in LIC all areas outside fortified counterinsurgent bases are 
potentially hostile zones; the lack of frontlines necessitates eternal vigilance.  EW 
systems must be active and crewmembers must be alert at all times to potential 
enemy engagements.   
Armour can improve the survivability of helicopters against small arms 
and RPGs.  However, armour can quickly degrade the flight performance of 
helicopters.  Hence, protection should also be provided through improved tactics.  
The survivability of Soviet/Russian attack helicopters in Afghanistan and 
Chechnya was improved with the introduction of defensive manoeuvres.  These 
manoeuvres included terrain hugging and pop-up tactics, target approach 
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manoeuvres, high speed complex approaches and mutual cover fire.  However, 
these manoeuvres were performed too rigidly, due to Russian pilot-training 
methods.  Also the range of engagement was increased, reducing the accuracy of 
sorties and increasing collateral damage.31  In addition, Russian helicopters are 
less manoeuvrable than their Western counterparts, increasing their vulnerability.  
However, Western tactics have also been forced to develop in the face of growing 
insurgent threats to helicopters.  American helicopter gunships have been forced 
to discontinue using nap-of-the-earth (NOE) approach tactics.  These NOE tactics 
protected helicopters against medium altitude SAMs.  However, low altitude 
insurgent small arms fire is a greater threat in Iraq and Afghanistan.  Stationary 
attack procedures have also been stopped, in exchange for mobile strafing fires 
(100-160 kph).  These tactics will remove helicopters from the effective range of 
small arms, and better enable the helicopter’s technical systems to target 
insurgents. 
In Groznyy, the Russians modified non-urban helicopter tactics to function 
in urban terrain.  These tactics involved the helicopters using the urban terrain.  
Helicopters would advance below the cityscape to safe areas behind friendly 
buildings, then ‘pop-up’ to fire on the target before hiding again.  These tactics 
dramatically improved the survivability of Russian helicopters in urban terrain. 
The Soviet/Russian operations in Afghanistan and Chechnya enable a 
comparative analysis of specially built helicopter gunships and armed troop 
helicopters.  Arming troop helicopters provides force multiplication, at little cost, 
on a known airframe.  However, such aircraft are slower, less manoeuvrable, less 
armoured and less technologically advanced than specifically designed helicopter 
gunships.  A gunship’s armour, manoeuvrability and technological superiority 
increases its survivability in hostile environments, improving accuracy, 
discrimination and reducing collateral damage.  There was however, a need for 
more modern gunships, like the Ka-50 or the Mi-28.  These modern helicopters 
should be able to locate and engage targets from a safe distance, at night and in 
any weather.32
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Firepower and Target Acquisition and Designation Equipment 
Firepower and target acquisition and designation systems have gradually 
improved to more effectively engage targets, while remaining outside the range of 
enemy fire.  The predominant weapons fired from helicopters are machineguns, 
cannons and rockets, some of which are guided.  Unguided weapon systems are 
generally effective against insurgents armed with small arms and RPGs.  
However, precision guided munitions (PGMs) are required in urban operations, 
and when facing insurgents in fortified positions or armed with SAMs or heavy 
AA guns. 
Anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) are the predominant PGM fired by 
helicopters.  Soviet AT-2/3/4/5/6 antitank missiles were extensively used and 
effective in Afghanistan, until the introduction of improved SAMs and AA guns.  
The improved Mujahedeen air-defences meant that Soviet helicopters could not 
remain static when firing antitank missiles.  This was however a requirement for 
early ATGMs, which were not fire-and-forget capable.  Most modern ATGMs are 
fire-and-forget capable, with ranges between 4,000 and 8,000 metres.  This is 
generally a sufficient range to keep out of harm’s way.  Such weapons systems 
include the AH-1 Cobra’s Tube-Launched, Optically tracked, Wire guided missile 
(TOW).  With a range of 1,000 to 1,500 metres, the Cobra’s AIM-1 20mm laser 
designated cannon has also proved highly effective due to its ability to provide 
precision firepower.  The Russian Mi-8TV2/3 was found to be effective, due to its 
improved target acquisition system.  However, there was a need for an all-
weather, day and night, PGM capable replacement for the Mi-24.  The Ka-50 and 
the Mi-28 constitute the likely replacements.  While the Ka-50 was deployed in 
field trials in Chechnya, cost remained prohibitive.  The cost of PGMs also 
prevented their extensive use by the Russians in Chechnya. 
However, the aforementioned missile ranges exceed the range of 
acquisition and designation equipment to see, identify and target enemy 
personnel.  These technical systems, such as the AN/ASQ-170 Target Acquisition 
and Designation System (TADS) and the AAQ-11 Pilot Night Vision System, are 
optimised for conventional anti-armour warfare.  For the onboard systems of an 
AH-64A/D Apache to register dismounted personnel, the helicopter is forced to 
fly within 1,500 metres of the target, and most engagements have commenced at 
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ranges below 1,000 metres.  This has been common in Iraq, placing helicopters 
well in range of man-portable SAMs and AA guns.  Hence, formidable self-
protection (electronic warfare (EW)) suites, manoeuvre tactics and armour are 
essential for attack helicopters.   
Such defensive systems are also essential for troop-lift helicopters that 
must operate within range of targeted enemy positions.  It was also found that 
helicopters such as the UH-47 Chinook and UH-60 Blackhawk need to be 
upgraded or replaced to overcome their technical failures and lack of instrument 
flight, night vision, aerial refuelling and ISR capabilities.33
To optimise modern gunships a number of challenges must be overcome, 
these include reducing collateral damage, improving pilot proficiency, alleviation 
of the intelligence vacuum around fortified villages, the use of UAVs, night vision 
and proficient, and immediate, non-retaliatory close air support (CAS) tactics. 
 
The ‘Friendly Fire’ Problem 
The ‘Friendly Fire’ Problem (otherwise known as Fratricide) has proven a 
significant issue in Iraq and Afghanistan, given the propensity for the Coalition’s 
indigenous allies to use civilian vehicles and the same weapons as the insurgents.  
This is further complicated in post-war Iraq and Afghanistan, when heliborne 
support is requested by ground troops, who have not been trained in procedures 
applicable to counterinsurgency operations in LIC.  Ground units have been 
requesting non-doctrinal tasks, which are ambiguous and can lead to 
misjudgement at the point of contact.  Ground to air tasking procedures that are 
applicable to counterinsurgency operations in LIC are evolving in reference to 
recent lessons learned in Iraq and Afghanistan.  These procedures require detailed 
information on friendly and enemy positions, and pertinent intelligence.  This is 
critical because first generation forward-looking infrared (FLIR) and night vision 
equipment is limited when distinguishing and targeting individuals.  It must also 
be clear what actions ground and air units will take if contact is made; as there 
must be synergy between air and ground units.34  There is also the problem of 
deliberate misinformation being provided by interested parties.  This problem is 
discussed later in the intelligence section of this chapter. 
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Trained Personnel 
As discussed earlier, the tactical rigidity of Soviet/Russian helicopter operations 
put both crew and equipment at risk from enemy fire.  “This tactical rigidity partly 
reflected the fact that most Soviet helicopter pilots and commanders had limited 
and relatively rigid training and had to learn combat techniques on the job”.35  
Lieutenant Colonel Nikolai Malyshev stated Soviet “training [was] obsolete, over-
rigid, and unrealistic.  [While] Soviet regulations forbade the maneuvers that 
pilots had to use to escape the Stinger missile”.36  Tactics to evade enemy fire and 
engage enemy targets are critical in the protection of helicopters.  Hence, pilots 
and commanders must be trained in realistic tactics, and instilled with the 
initiative to evolve effective tactics.  In the Falklands war, “[t]he high 
professionalism of British pilots and maintenance crews provided a classic 
demonstration that readiness and training can substitute for force numbers”.37  
With the sinking of the cargo vessel, Atlantic Conveyer, the British had lost 75 
percent (3 of 4) of their heavy-lift Chinook fleet.  This could have jeopardised 
British operations.  However, the remaining helicopter fleet (106-150 light and 
medium helicopters) provided critical mobility and logistics support.  This support 
required “extraordinarily high sortie rates per helicopter”,38 which is a testament 
to both aircrew and support staff. 
The services that maintenance and logistics personnel provide are as 
important as the warfighting abilities of the soldier.  If equipment does not work, 
or is not available, the outcome is dead troops.  In Afghanistan and Chechnya, 
Soviet/Russian airborne operations were often limited by a lack of supplies and 
technicians.  This problem was further exacerbated by the age of the helicopters in 
use.  Hence, readiness should not be undermined by a lack of support personnel 
and equipment, or combat airframe age.  Low readiness slows operations and puts 
combat troops and crews at increased risk from equipment failures. 
 
Tactics 
In Afghanistan, Chechnya and Iraq, Mi-24s, AH-1s and AH-64s were employed 
effectively as convoy defenders, independent search and destroy units and close 
air support providers.  Attack, observation and support helicopters were also 
instrumental in command and control, communications and surveillance missions. 
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The Soviets/Russians also made good use of embarked assault troops 
onboard Mi-24 attack helicopters.  These troops were often Special Forces, since 
the Soviets/Russians lack dedicated counterinsurgency troops.  Such helicopter 
inserted Special Forces missions have generally been highly effective.  However, 
Special Forces, and other infantry, can be put at risk when embarked on 
helicopters.  Small arms, SAMs and aircraft armed with air-to-air munitions can 
be a significant threat to helicopters.  Numerous Soviet helicopters were lost to 
small arms and SAMs in Afghanistan, as were many American helicopters lost in 
Afghanistan and Iraq.  As a further illustration, approximately 200 Egyptian 
Commandos were killed when their helicopter transports were intercepted by 
Israeli combat aircraft in the Yom Kippur war.  This significantly degraded 
Egyptian offensive operations. 
An essential element of combined arms warfare is synergy between air and 
ground units.  Synergy can be attained through good communications, well 
trained personnel and effective tactics.  In the Soviet/Russian case however, air 
inserted regular or reconnaissance troops were often unable to communicate with 
other infantry or air units.  Key to the communications limitation was a lack of 
radios.  Further limitations also included the lack of night vision devices, silencers 
and binoculars.  Hence, many problems were those of embarked infantry, rather 
than those of helicopter units.  Given this lack of combined arms synergy, 
gunships failed to eliminate targets, or understand Afghan and Chechen air 
defences.  However in the Afghan and first Chechen wars, helicopter units were 
undermined by a lack of effective command, control, communications and 
intelligence (C3I).  Hence, the improved performance of a counterinsurgent’s air 
assets and air crews in LIC is dependent upon the recognition that the location and 
timely interception of an insurgent is critical.  Timely intelligence is vital to pilots, 
so too is the integration of helicopter and air combat assets, and synergism 
between air and ground units.  Helicopter gunships can also be effective in urban 
terrain, if used cautiously and well integrated with ground units and other 
intelligence sources.  Effective training is essential to create this necessary 
synergy.   
By the second Chechen war, Russian heliborne forces were more effective.  
This was due to improved air-ground cohesion, command and control (C2), 
reconnaissance, information sharing, firepower and accuracy.  Helicopters 
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accounted for 50 percent of all surveillance, supply, extraction and deployment 
tasks, especially in mountainous terrain, and were heavily committed in combat 
operations.  As in Afghanistan, pairs of Mi-24s conducted effective independent 
search and destroy missions against enemy positions, columns and supply depots.  
Mi-24s were also used as convoy defenders, their pilots were granted operational 
independence, and with embarked infantry could deny the enemy key tactical 
positions. 
In Afghanistan, Chechnya, Somalia and Iraq, helicopters were essential 
command, control and communications (C3) assets.  Helicopters could relay 
critical information to combat units, as the terrain made other communication 
means impossible.  The Americans also found that airborne C3 units were more 
effective than ground based C3 units.  Airborne C3 units have excellent 
communications ranges, and can move quickly on a fluid battlefield.  Hence, 
commanders can better appreciate the conditions over which they command.  In 
Kismayu (Somalia), integrated command and control (C2) was also enhanced by 
the utilisation of a coalition crewed Allouette observation helicopter.  This 
helicopter was on station throughout the major coalition operations.  The 
helicopter enabled integrated actions, prevented friendly fire incidents, tracked 
insurgents and identified potential enemy positions. 
Operations in Afghanistan, Chechnya and Iraq indicate that air mobility 
will become a more significant provider of a counterinsurgent’s strike, 
reconnaissance, surveillance and transportation requirements in LIC.  Helicopter 
operations will however be forced to adjust to each combat environment. One 
threat to counterinsurgent operations is an over reliance on a single weapons 
system.  Such reliance is detrimental to a combined arms approach, and will 
enable a single weapon counter-tactic, manoeuvre or weapon.  American ground 
forces in Operation Anaconda (Afghanistan) became completely reliant on 
airpower, as no alternative was provided.  Such an over reliance on helicopters 
was distinctive in Soviet operations in Afghanistan.  This reliance indicates the 
possible vulnerability and weakness of ground forces, should airpower not be 
available.  This is significant given the attitudinal change towards lighter ground 
forces, which are increasingly reliant on airborne firepower.  However, this 
attitudinal change towards increased airborne firepower was not reflected in the 
capacity of a number of critical American units and deployable military 
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infrastructures.  For example, the Combined Air Operations Centre was not 
consulted prior to Operation Anaconda.  Once operational, the Centre lacked the 
human and technical capacity to coordinate the available air units with land based 
requests.  In addition, a lack of intra-theatre tactical lift meant some UH-60s could 
not be deployed operationally, exacerbating the problems of terrain on mobility 
and available firepower.  And overall, airpower alone performed inadequately 
when opposing personnel in concealed positions on difficult terrain in bad 
weather.39   
 
Flying Conditions 
The mountainous terrain of Afghanistan, Chechnya and parts of Iraq, together 
with poor flying weather degraded helicopter operations.  Due to extreme 
altitudes, helicopters were unable to remain on station for extended periods, their 
handling was negatively influenced and their accuracy was reduced.  In addition 
to poor weather and fog, deliberate oil fired smoke screens restricted the 
utilisation of airborne units in Groznyy and Mogadishu.  These factors degraded 
the capability to engage targets visually or with infrared equipment.  Adverse 
weather conditions also increased risk in combat for crew and equipment.  Hence, 
such natural weather conditions and human generated visual and infrared 
obstructions must be trained for prior to deployment. 
In addition, the high temperatures and poor visual and electronic visibility 
in the Iraqi desert reduced the operational capability of both aircrew and 
equipment.  High temperatures stress aircrews and reduce aircraft lift.  Reduced 
lift, in turn, degrades both endurance and potential weapons, stores and cargo 
helicopters can carry.  Airborne dust from winds and rotor downdraft have 
reduced visual limits and clogged the AN/ALQ-144 infrared countermeasures 
system of the OH-58 Kiowa, UH-60 Blackhawk and AH-64 Apache.  The latter 
problem has been rectified, albeit after the loss of a CH-47 Chinook and two UH-
60 Blackhawk helicopters, crew and embarked soldiers, over a five day period in 
Iraq.  Again, provisions for such contingencies should be made prior to 
deployment, in relation to known weather-related conditions in theatre.40
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Aircraft 
This section analyses the use of aircraft in by counterinsurgents in LIC.  The 
subsections cover the development of aircraft use by counterinsurgents in LIC and 
the essential nature of aircraft for counterinsurgent forces in contemporary LIC.  
Aircraft have been essential elements in applying joint force in counterinsurgent 
operations, but require ground forces to operate with great professionalism, 
especially in terms of the provision of soundly communicated intelligence. 
 
The development of Aircraft use in LIC 
Much like helicopters, fixed wing aircraft have been pressed into service in LIC, 
by counterinsurgent forces, since their development.  The first to use aircraft 
effectively in LIC were the British.  In the interwar period, aviation was heavily 
utilised within the British Empire, in the role of colonial ‘Air Policing’.  In the 
Middle East, the Royal Air Force (RAF) had almost total control of newly 
acquired tracts of land.  Aircraft provided effective strike, reconnaissance and 
logistics without the risk of retribution.  Concurrently, the French undertook a 
conventional land-based counterinsurgency in their section of the Middle East.  
The French experience was one of continual harassment by Arab insurgents. 
Unlike the Middle East, the close and mountainous terrain of Malaysia and 
French Indochina did not allow for the use of aircraft (not including helicopters) 
as a primary counterinsurgency tool.  Aircraft were generally subordinated to the 
demands of infantry units.  As outlined in ‘The Conduct of Anti-Terrorist 
Operations in Malaya’41 (the (unofficial) British doctrine for early 
counterinsurgency), “[t]he Royal Air Force in Malaya [was] to support 
Emergency operations”.42  Hence, aircraft were used for visual and photo 
reconnaissance, offensive air support, supply, troop lift, casualty evacuation and 
psychological warfare (voice aircraft and leaflet drops).  The significance of 
offensive air support was nonetheless properly emphasised: “The jungle provides 
unlimited cover from the air and targets are rarely visible to the Offensive Strike 
Force.  Because of this the RAF [Royal Air Force] work in close co-operation 
with the ground forces, upon whom the RAF must rely to provide worthwhile 
targets.”43  Hence, the British comprehended one important principle of 
counterinsurgency operations in LIC: ordnance must strike valuable targets.  The 
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French doctrine in Indochina was based on unsound doctrinal procedures, 
emphasising the use of aircraft as a substitute for ground troops, sufficient funding 
and a coherent strategy.  This was dramatically displayed at the climactic battle of 
Dien Bien Phu, where elite French forces were decimated and air-strike and air-
supply were shown to be ineffective, in the face of a determined foe in close, 
mountainous terrain. 
 
The Essential Nature of Aircraft in LIC 
Strategic bombing, interdiction and close air support were regarded as an 
indispensable part of counterinsurgent operations in LIC.  However, the 
usefulness of aircraft in a combat role in counterinsurgency operations has often 
been overstated.  Unless ordnance can be brought to bear upon legitimate targets, 
air-strike is ineffectual, although when aircraft work closely with ground units and 
their fire is precise, airpower can be decisive.  In addition, aircraft can also be 
instrumental in facilitating troop manoeuvre, evacuation and supply, as well as 
command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, target 
acquisition and reconnaissance (C4ISTAR). 
The case studies in this thesis have shown the following categories to be 
important to the use of aircraft in counterinsurgency operations: Firepower; 
Protection; Tactics and Training; Supply; and Command, Control, 
Communications and Intelligence (C3I).  Each of these subsections will be 
analysed and recommendations will be made for the future use of aircraft by 
counterinsurgents in LIC. 
 
Firepower 
The introduction of precision guided munitions (PGMs) has transformed the use 
of aircraft in counterinsurgency operations.  Precision, coupled with air-ground 
synergy, has enabled otherwise inaccessible targets to be designated and 
eliminated.  PGMs have enabled aircraft to remain out of range of air-defences, 
providing safety for combat aircraft and enabling combat missions that could not 
have been supported by unguided munitions. 
Prior to the development and widespread dissemination of PGMs, 
dedicated attack aircraft were foremost in providing close air support.  The Soviet 
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Su-25 (A-10 equivalent) was the most significant strike fighter of the Soviet-
Afghan war.  The Su-25 also provided effective fire-support in Chechnya.  Being 
highly armoured and armed, the Su-25 had the capacity to loiter over the target 
and had airspeeds low enough to engage small scale targets.  The overall 
effectiveness of the Su-25 however, was limited by a lack of guided munitions 
and advanced navigation and avionics.  Hence, the Su-25 is being replaced by the 
Su-39.  Developed after the Afghan war, the Su-39 has enhanced night flight 
capabilities and has been fitted with precision weapons systems.  The strength of 
advanced attack aircraft was displayed by the A-10 in Iraq.  With advanced all-
weather, day and night navigation and sensors, and precision weapons systems, 
the A-10 was effective in close air support, armed reconnaissance and force and 
logistics security missions.  However, the A-10 was vulnerable to enemy small 
arms fire and SAMs.  Hence, in future LIC there will have to be a choice made by 
counterinsurgents between aircraft security and strike requirements.44  There are 
also financial constraints to be analysed.  For example, the Russians are likely to 
deploy the Su-24M multi-role fighter, rather than the Su-39 in the near future.  
The all weather, day and night precision strike capabilities of the Su-24M were 
critical in Chechnya, and the precision capabilities enabled some air support in 
Groznyy.  The Su-24M is less vulnerable to enemy fire, as it operates at a higher 
altitude.  However, high altitude operations reduce the capacity of aircraft to 
acquire enemy targets in a reconnaissance or armed reconnaissance role. 
As stated earlier, PGMs have transformed the use of aircraft in 
counterinsurgency operations.  However, only first world countries are able to 
bear the cost of the widespread use of PGMs.  For example, the Russians limited 
the use of PGMs due to cost.  The French also limited the use of the HOT anti-
tank missile in the 1991 Gulf War on the basis of cost.45  However, 80-90 percent 
of weapons fired in Afghanistan and Iraq, by the British and Americans were 
PGMs. In addition, all case studies show PGMs to be effective in urban terrain, if 
controlled by strict operating procedures.  However in urban Iraq, the Coalition’s 
self imposed rules of engagement were found to be too restrictive in some 
instances.  Hence, changes were made in the rules of engagement.46  The PGM 
has also enabled both fighter and bomber aircraft to provide CAS and interdiction; 
this both improves available firepower and the effective range of these missions.  
“Without these [precision guided] weapons, disproportionately powerful 
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munitions would be needed to achieve the same effect, increasing the devastation 
caused”.47
Significantly for future counterinsurgency operations was the successful 
use of CAS and battlefield interdiction, using PGMs, directed by SF troops 
deployed in OIF.  Such operations seized critical avenues of advance, as in 
Nasiriyah48, prevented any attempted Iraqi assaults on the Kurdish north, and 
destroyed Ansar al-Islam’s terrorist training camps.  These operations showed that 
CAS can be a decisive factor in warfare.  The two challenges of CAS, terminal 
control and immediate action, were overcome by providing dedicated air assets to 
specific ground units, who were fully conversant with CAS.  This need for 
persistence, or availability, of air units over the battlefield is central to the 
development of future manned and unmanned air vehicles; such as the F-35 Joint 
Strike Fighter (JSF) and the X-47 Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle (UCAV).49   
The air combat mission most suited to counterinsurgency is CAS.  
However, American, Australian and British sources have expressed a need to 
improve organisation, support and training for CAS.50  An American study found 
that ground units are still not trained sufficiently to use close air support, and that 
the United States Air Force (USAF) focuses on long range interdiction rather than 
CAS.51  The lack of synergy between air and ground units has been an 
impediment in all of the case studies of this thesis, plus numerous other conflicts 
over the last half century.  Synergy between air and ground forces should be a 
foremost area of development in all defence forces.  Even in America, Australia 
and Britain, interoperability requires enhancement in procedures, equipment and 
training.  “It is also clear from the Iraq War that every advance in [Intelligence, 
Surveillance and Reconnaissance] IS&R, communications systems, and digital 
management of the battlefield both increase the capability to carry out close air 
support and the need for tighter integration, better training, and more standardized 
procedures and equipment”.52
 
Protection 
A counterinsurgent’s aircraft in LIC must be well armoured (or remain out of 
small arms range) and possess effective infrared and electronic countermeasures.  
Attack aircraft like the A-10 and Su-39, which venture within the range of enemy 
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small arms and SAMs require effective defensive measures.  For example, the Su-
39 has an improved electronic warfare suite and has achieved a four-fold 
reduction in thermal signature.  However in Iraq, several A-10s suffered from 
enemy fire and one was lost to an enemy SAM.53  However in LIC, man-portable 
surface to air missiles (SA-7 or Stinger types) are the only SAMs available to 
insurgents.  This is because a technologically advanced counterinsurgent will have 
the capacity to eliminate medium and long range SAMs.  Hence in LIC, 
counterinsurgent aircraft that fly above the ceiling of man-portable SAMs are 
relatively safe units.  In Iraq and Afghanistan, PGMs enabled aircraft such as the 
F-15/16/18, Tornado and Super Etenard to remain safe and effectively engage 
enemy units.  
Future enemies will strive to interdict the effectiveness of PGMs and 
C4ISTAR capabilities, especially communications, GPSs and air superiority.  This 
is unlikely to be theatre-wide, but local area disruption may occur.  This is highly 
significant for all militaries that are developing doctrine for light and agile ground 
forces, equivalent to the Stryker Brigades or the NATO Rapid Reaction Force.  
Operation Anaconda displayed that CAS is challenging for two reasons: air 
assistance must be immediate, and requires perfect synergy between ground and 
air units.  If ground forces are going to rely upon airpower, then there must be an 
assurance that CAS will function as envisioned.  This can only be assured through 
combat or realistic and rigorous training. 
 
Tactics and Training 
This subsection covers four subjects important to the use of aircraft by 
counterinsurgents in LIC: air defences, synergy, ROEs and coalition integration. 
SAMs, Anti-Aircraft machine-guns, and to a lesser extent small arms have 
had a significant impact on the use of aviation by counterinsurgents in LIC.  In the 
Afghan-Soviet conflict, the tactics employed by the Su-25 were dramatically 
undermined by the introduction of SAMs.  The Su-25 was forced to increase 
attack altitudes, which in turn degraded accuracy.  Similarly in Iraq, American A-
10s were vulnerable to enemy ground defences.  Ground defences can however be 
overcome by air-launched stand-off guided munitions.  Hence, conventional 
fighter-bombers flying high-altitude air support armed with PGMs will be 
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effective in future counterinsurgencies.  Man-portable SAMs with higher ceilings 
could be a future threat to a counterinsurgent’s aircraft in LIC.  However, future 
stealthy aircraft, like the F-22 or JSF, may present a difficult target for SAMs. 
As was shown in Afghanistan, Chechnya and Iraq, airpower can be 
effective in open, mountainous and urban terrain, if air-ground synergy is insured.  
One of the clearest principles learnt by the Russians in Chechnya was that air and 
ground forces must be trained to operate jointly.  Prior to the second Chechen war, 
joint force principles were introduced to Russian air doctrine.  While similar 
equipment was used, airborne and land based synergy was improved.  The 
Russians illustrated that ground units must be effectively integrated with air units, 
to optimise fleeting contacts with the enemy.  The Russian experience also 
showed that realistic training is critical to implement these joint force 
requirements. 
Operation Enduring Freedom was the most significant demonstration of 
airpower in LIC since the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.  However, U.S. 
technological and numerical superiority, coupled with advanced and effective 
C4ISTAR, and significant indigenous cooperation created unprecedented synergy 
and combat power in this particular LIC.  However, within Operation Anaconda, 
which constituted the first use of allied ground troops in Afghanistan, airborne 
and land based synergy was deficient.  The distinction is between effective air 
operations in OIF and ineffective air operations in Operation Anaconda and can 
be understood by analysing the following categories of air operations: strategic 
attack, air interdiction, battlefield air interdiction, and close air support. 
Strategic air operations were undertaken to gain battlefield dominance and 
guarantee air superiority.  These operations were highly effective, employing U.S. 
Air Force and Navy bombers, fighter-bombers, as well as C2 and intelligence 
assets.  Air interdiction and battlefield air interdiction were also highly effective, 
utilising an unprecedented level of Precision Guided Munitions (PGMs).  CAS, as 
shown in the case of Operation Anaconda, was constrained by atmospheric, 
terrain, human and technical difficulties.  While critical in the occasional modern 
battle, CAS has not been a major part of U.S. operations (and hence academic 
debate) since the Vietnam War.  This, in part, has resulted in the disbandment of 
the Airborne Battlefield Command and Control Center (ABCCC (EC-130E)), for 
prioritising and queuing air support requests.  Hence, air controllers lack the 
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technical and human capacity to handle support requests.  Ground troops had 
difficulty targeting PGMs and communicating with airborne strike pilots. Hence, 
there is still a requirement for unguided airborne weapons to be accessible for 
field suppression, when exact coordinates are not available. It should be realised 
that airpower alone remains unable to decisively engage enemy personnel in 
concealed positions on difficult terrain in bad weather.  There remains a need for 
significant training to be undertaken and procedures to be formulated for the 
future use of CAS.54
However, Operation Anaconda may have uncovered a broader doctrinal 
misconception.  The current doctrinal debate, combining CAS with agile, but light 
ground forces (Army Transformation (U.S. Objective Force)), may be founded 
upon unrealistic assumptions.  Ground troops do not request CAS as a matter of 
course; CAS is requested in emergency situations.  Such circumstances may arise 
from unexpected enemy numbers, firepower, resistance, or exceptional 
manoeuvre; which are all typical to LIC.  Ground troops are trained to rely 
primarily upon indirect ground support weapons (IGSWs), like mortars and 
artillery.  Doctrinal transformation has meant command echelons are beginning to 
rely heavily upon CAS, while front line troops have not been indoctrinated, 
trained or equipped to internalise CAS.  In Operation Anaconda, ground troops 
were not provided with IGSWs or sufficient air controllers (or terminal attack 
controllers); effectively ground troops had very limited support.55  The crux of the 
problem is a lack of synergy, caused by a communications and doctrinal 
breakdown between air units, ground units and command units.  If force 
transformation requires ground troops to respond to threats with greater use of 
airpower, the entire system must be fully integrated and functional.  First, troops 
and airmen must be fully conversant with technical systems and procedures.  
Second, commanders and staffs must be aware of the strengths and limitations of 
combat units.  Third, sufficient liaison (air controllers and terminal attack 
controllers) and battlefield management (generally C2 or specifically ABCCC) 
must be tailored to each individual mission.  It appears from open source 
literature, that the human C2 that liaised with SF troops was highly effective.  
However, regular forces are more numerous and operate under differing 
circumstances; this requires greater technical and human assistance with battle 
management and CAS.  This said, the significance of airpower to the victory in 
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Afghanistan should not be underestimated; intelligence, intra-theatre lift and 
firepower were all largely facilitated by airpower. 
American operations in Somalia graphically displayed the difficulties of 
urban conflict.  First, due to the presence of non-combatants, U.S. forces were 
forced to adhere to restrictive ROEs.  These ROEs were contrary to U.S. standard 
operating procedures for urban operations.  Hence, close air support was reduced 
in Somalia, endangering friendly personnel.  As stated earlier, in Iraq “[t]he 
coalition found that its initial targeting constraints and rules of engagement were 
too restrictive.  They sometimes forced restrikes or failed to accomplish their 
mission, forcing additional combat without reducing collateral damage.  As a 
result, the coalition increased the intensity and concentration of some types of 
strikes against urban targets, inevitably increasing collateral damage”.56  
Therefore, ROEs are important to protect people and property in combat zones.  
However, ROEs must be flexible enough to allow missions to be accomplished 
and friendly combatants to be protected. 
OIF also showed that even between close allies (America, Britain and 
Australia), there is always a need for improved human integration.  Joint force and 
coalition training, a standardisation of operating procedures and further 
homogenisation of equipment is required.  The alternative to coalition joint force 
is national force independence; independence is impossible for almost all national 
armed forces. However, this is not an exemption from creating reasonable force 
independence, as national forces are sometimes required to operate individually.57
 
Supply 
Supply is fundamental to any operation.  The Soviets in Afghanistan could not use 
land based means of supply, and lacked the tactical airlift required to compensate.  
The Americans also had logistics limitations in Iraq, as the deployment of combat 
forces to northern Iraq necessitated dedicated airlift.  The difficulties of providing 
CAS in Operation Anaconda were also exacerbated by a lack of strategic, tactical 
and operational airlift.  This lack of airlift limited the mechanised and support 
equipment available to regular and SF soldiers.  Purchase orders for and increased 
interest in the C-17 strategic transport aircraft,58 since the OIF, indicates the 
requirement for greater strategic and tactical airlift for modern military operations.  
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The potential for future wars to be non-littoral or be artificially isolated by 
unfriendly states has been indicated by the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.  
Furthermore, there is still a significant requirement for air-projectable heavy 
forces, which necessitates heavy airlift capabilities.59
Supply also includes the provision of airborne aviation fuel.  Airborne fuel 
requirements provided difficulties in Afghanistan and Iraq, due to basing 
shortages and extended loiter and flight times.  Given the sparse nature of targets 
and aerial fuel constraints in Afghanistan, the fuel efficiency of the F-16 was 
noteworthy.  The F-16 could perform the same functions as other combat jets, but 
do so more fuel efficiently. 
 
Airborne Command, Control, Communication and Intelligence (C3I) 
Effective command and control is critical to air operations, especially in 
counterinsurgency.  In counterinsurgency timing is critical to engage elusive 
targets with air-launched weapons.  This was illustrated by the Russians in the 
second Chechen war.  A superior command and control system was deployed, 
which could more adequately turn intelligence gained into targets destroyed.  This 
command and control systems effectively added firepower and greater accuracy to 
joint air-ground operations.  Russian operations clearly showed the requirement 
for the integration of advanced strategic reconnaissance and C2 assets (A-50s, An-
26s, An-30Bs, Il-20s, MiG-25RBs and Su-24MRs), with strike and tactical air 
units, such as the Su-25, Mi-24 and various UAVs.  This also enabled the 
Russians to successfully isolate Chechnya from air re-supply.  A-50 Airborne 
Warning and Control Systems (AWACS) and MiG-31 interdiction fighters denied 
the potential for external air links.60
While the use of strike aircraft in Somalia was minor, airborne C2 was 
critical to U.S. operations in Mogadishu.  The P-3 Orion was the primary C2 
provider, which was handled well by the numerous communication nodes of the 
P-3. 
Maritime patrol aircraft are increasingly being used as command and 
control centres.  A once uncharacteristic role was assumed by maritime patrol 
aircraft in Afghanistan and Iraq: human C2, support and intelligence was 
performed by P-3 and Nimrods, especially where SF troops were operating.  
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Conventional C4ISTAR aircraft were also critical to the victory in Afghanistan.  
Early OEF air operations depended heavily upon C4ISTAR aircraft.  At this early 
stage, the Taliban presented concentrated armour, artillery, vehicular and 
communications targets, which were easily targeted by UAVs, JSTARs and allied 
strike aircraft.  Later operations required greater ground force terminal control, as 
targets became smaller and concealed. 
In addition, an infrastructure of command and control, intelligence and 
supply, constantly enabled the strike units to function in Iraq.  This infrastructure 
will be further improved by the proposed development of the E-10; an integrated 
replacement for the RC-135 Rivet Joint (Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) aircraft), 
E-8 Joint Strategic Attack Radar System (JSTAR) and the E-3 Airborne Warning 
and Control aircraft (AWAC).61  However, improvements in ISR and 
communications have overwhelmed command and control personnel.  Air 
Officers of the Marine Division in Iraq reported an inability to process all 
targeting and reconnaissance data.  While CAS missions were prioritised, due to 
their time critical nature, deep area interdiction and battlefield preparation was 
either “redundantly executed or not executed at all.”62  It was also found that 
doctrinal inflexibility prohibited the engagement of fleeting targets; air tasking 
orders can take up to 96 hours to engage a target.  Hence, the Marine Corps 
stacked aircraft over the battlefield, awaiting CAS requests.   
For C2 to function, control, ground and air units must be able to 
communicate.  In Somalia, ground units were deprived of airborne intelligence 
and firepower, due to communication failures caused by the urban terrain.  In 
addition, due to Afghanistan’s mountainous terrain, the replenishment fleet was 
also required to facilitate a communications role by carrying palletised 
communications gear.  In Iraq, Marine Corps forward air controllers could not 
always communicate with divisional air controllers.  This meant requests for 
CAS, situational awareness reports and other vital information could not be 
conveyed.  Many of these problems were alleviated when airborne air controllers 
were on station, and other redundant air strike units could be used to fulfil CAS 
requirements.  The Marine Corps findings are important, as they indicate how a 
smaller coalition partner could expect, or train for, operations with a U.S. led 
coalition. 
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Command, control and communications are of no consequence without 
timely intelligence.  Imagery, electronic, signals and human intelligence are all 
important in producing a coherent picture of enemy operations.  However, 
conventional technical intelligence is constrained by wooded, mountainous and 
urban terrain.  “The [American] IS&R sensor and analytic effort [in Iraq] focused 
more on major combat forces, with heavy weapons, [rather] than on infantry and 
irregular forces”.63  Human intelligence is important for counterinsurgent 
operations in LIC, and is generally provided by ground units.  In the Afghan-
Soviet war, intelligence gathering devices were constrained by difficult terrain and 
a lack of human intelligence.  The first Chechen war provided an opportunity for 
modern Russian equipment to be tested, but also imposed the restraints of urban 
warfare.  However, Unmanned Air Vehicles (UAVs) presented an effective, 
although partial, technical answer to the Russian problem of gaining real time 
intelligence.  UAVs, while expensive, enabled situational awareness without risk.  
UAVs are a growing part of counterinsurgent intelligence gathering operations in 
LIC.  This is especially so when the insurgent produces no other signatures, bar 
visual ones.  Unlike helicopters and low flying aircraft, UAVs are also fairly 
secure against countermeasures and anti-aircraft weapons.  However in Iraq, “[i]t 
was generally difficult or impossible to locate distributed forces in a built-up or 
urban environment until they were driven into some form of open military 
activity, and the United States often lacked the density of specialized assets like 
UAVs to carry out this mission even when open activity took place”.64  Other 
optical devices have also been instrumental in gaining intelligence on the 
battlefield, such as infrared and other remote sensing devices.  However, in all of 
the case studies, the time between target discovery and elimination is still too 
long.  This problem is not entirely an intelligence problem.  However, there are 
intelligence problems.  The integration of intelligence agencies to provide united 
intelligence has been a problem in the Soviet-Afghan war and in OEF and OIF.  
The analysis of intelligence has also provided difficulties, when systems are not 
capable of such large quantities of information.  “The United States [in Iraq] 
simply did not have enough area experts, technical experts, and analysts with 
language skills at any level to make optimal use of its sensors and collection”.65 
Dissemination is also problematic, analysed intelligence can sometimes not be 
accessed by the combat and support units on the front line.  Combat units also 
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have trouble gaining intelligence they want, rather they are given whatever 
intelligence has been gathered. 
 
Command, Control, Initiative, Communications and Intelligence (C2ICI) 
This section analyses overall command and control of counterinsurgent military 
forces in LIC.  Effective command and control is important because it can exploit 
strengths and annul vulnerabilities.  This is because individual units and systems 
are more potent when incorporated into a synergistic whole.  If all units are 
integrated, an action by the enemy cannot threaten a specific unit without 
becoming vulnerable to counter-fire.  The capability derived from the 
simultaneous application of joint force is generally overwhelming.  In essence, 
effective command and control ensure all the military principles analysed in this 
research operate in a cohesive and effective fashion. 
Within the current military lexicon, the acronym C4ISTAR (Command, 
Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, Target 
Acquisition and Reconnaissance) is used to describe the elements required for 
effective command and control.  However, this acronym is not well suited to 
counterinsurgency.  Hence, C2ICI (Command, Control, Initiative, 
Communications and Intelligence) has been developed and is recommended by 
this thesis. 
For ease of explanation, the acronym needs to be dissected.  The acronym 
will be explained in three parts in this section: C2I (Command, Control and 
Initiative); Communications; and Intelligence. 
 
Command, Control and Initiative 
All of the cases under study in this thesis have incorporated coalition armed force.  
In the cases of Somalia, Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi 
Freedom (OIF) armed forces of differing states were employed.  While in the 
Soviet-Afghan and Chechen wars the armed forces of separate states were 
employed and separate Soviet/Russian armed ministries were deployed.  In 
Afghanistan, the first Chechen war and Somalia there was significant disunity of 
command.  This disunity of command was debilitating for the armed forces 
deployed. 
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In Afghanistan, there was no unity of command between Afghan and 
Soviet forces.  Nor was there unity of command between Soviet military, political 
and intelligence assets in theatre.  In Somalia, disparate goal orientation and a lack 
of interoperability between some coalition members undermined personnel 
survivability and the potential for a successful operation. 
In the second Chechen war, in parts of Somalia, and in OEF and OIF, 
command was unitary and effective.  This enabled the combat arms deployed to 
function successfully.  In the second Chechen war, Russian soldiers were more 
effective, due to enhanced and simplified C2.  This enabled independence among 
junior officers and greater coordination between air assets and ground 
commanders.  In Kismayu (Somalia), American and Belgian forces exchanged 
liaison officers (LNOs) between command posts and down to the company level.  
The LNOs were enablers for the coalition combat troops in the city.  However, to 
effectively coordinate joint forces, LNOs must be provided with effective 
communications.  In Iraq, British and American forces commanded in a unitary 
manner from a joint headquarters.  At this level of command, a personal working 
relationship should be fostered prior to deployment.  The British and American 
commanders had worked closely together prior to OIF.  Hence, greater cohesion 
and understanding in the joint headquarters enabled synergy between the combat 
forces in Iraq.  However, there is a need for human improvement in the areas of 
internal and coalition integration, through better training, joint exercises, 
standardised operating procedures and homogenisation of equipment.66
Small unit Initiative (Decentralised Command) is as significant in 
counterinsurgency as unity of command.  Given the sporadic and elusive nature of 
targets in LIC, counterinsurgency units must be trained to aggressively and 
independently engage the enemy.  These small counterinsurgency units must be 
capable of commanding support units, so as to engage the enemy with superior 
firepower.  Hence, counterinsurgency doctrine must encourage command pull 
strategies. 
In the Soviet-Afghan war and the first Chechen war decentralised 
command and initiative was lacking.  The Soviets did improve initiative among 
combat units in Afghanistan.  However, this improvement was based on airpower.  
Aircraft and helicopters were used for command and control, mobility and fire-
support.  Once the Mujahedeen received effective antiaircraft weapons, 
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decentralised command and initiative were undermined.  Command and control 
was re-centralised.  This caused low tempo, large and ineffective operations.  This 
centralised C2 system also slowed the dissemination of timely intelligence.67  
This made much of the intelligence gathering effort worthless, as combat units 
could not engage the enemy in a timely fashion.   
In Chechnya, centralised C2 was one of the foremost impediments to 
effective operations.  Russian small unit command was centralised, this prevented 
initiative and independence on an ever changing battlefield.  However, in the 
second Chechen war C2 was decentralised, enabling initiative, situational 
awareness and mutual reinforcement.  This enhanced initiative among junior 
infantry commanders and more effective use of fire-support from artillery and 
aircraft.  In the remaining case studies, it was found that control still needs to be 
flattened among coalition members.  This would then enable all forces to fight as 
one. 
In both OEF and OIF the deployment of Special Forces personnel 
provided highly effective decentralised command and control of coalition troops.  
The 10th Special Forces Group (SFG) effectively coordinated the operations of the 
Kurdish Peshmerga with coalition airpower.  The success of Special Forces is 
derived from both human and technical abilities.  Special Forces excelled in area 
and language skills, enabling them to communicate, integrate and support anti-
regime forces.  The C2 capabilities employed by the Special Forces in Iraq 
included advanced communications, global positioning systems (GPS) and laser 
designators.  These qualities enabled vastly different armed forces to fight 
together effectively. 
Command and control is adversely influenced by mountainous and urban 
terrain.  This is because communications and electronic sensors are unsuited to 
obstructed terrain.  In difficult terrain soldiers need to be deployed as sensors.  In 
difficult terrain, communications will need to be provided by satellites or airborne 
platforms. 
In all of the case studies, integrated C2 has been enhanced by the 
utilisation of airborne C2 platforms.  The airborne platforms have included 
helicopters, maritime reconnaissance aircraft and more recognisable C2 aircraft.  
The helicopter has enabled integrated actions, prevented friendly fire incidents, 
tracked insurgents and identified potential enemy positions.  However, helicopters 
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require a relatively secure electronic and physical environment, as they are 
generally deployed well forward.  Maritime reconnaissance aircraft, such as the P-
3 Orion and the British Nimrod have become important as C2 platforms for 
Special Force operations.  The P-3 was favoured for its sensors and personnel 
capacity.  This allowed for Special Force members to be embarked, to assist their 
comrades on the ground.  C2 in counterinsurgency operations also require the 
conventional capabilities of aircraft like the E-2C Hawkeye, E-3A AWAC, E-8C 
JSTAR, RC-135 Rivet Joint, U-2, An-26 and Il-20.  However in LIC, these are 
more likely to coordinate counterinsurgent air movements and enable 
communications for friendly units, rather than identify enemy targets.68
 
Communications 
If soldiers cannot talk to each other, they cannot fight alongside each other.  Good 
communications is a basic requirement of modern warfare.  However, 
communications has been a significant failure in all of the cases under study.  
Most communication failures were caused by mountainous or urban terrain.  
However, some communication failures were caused by poor training, inadequate 
operational procedures and a lack of communications capacity. 
In all but OEF and the Somali conflict, there have been reports of 
problems in communications interoperability between combat units.  Soviet 
Special Forces were unable to communicate with regular infantry in Afghanistan, 
due to undisclosed operating frequencies and a physical lack of radios.  American 
Special Forces also had a similar problem in Afghanistan, whereby Special Force 
units from differing commands could not communicate with each other.  In 
Chechnya, inter-unit communication was restricted.  This was because Russian 
troops lacked encryption training, and were giving away their positions with each 
clear communication.  This restriction on communications severely degraded 
situational awareness.  Also, some radios used in Chechnya by the Russians, were 
physically interoperable. 
In Mogadishu, American soldiers were unable to communicate effectively 
due to urban terrain.  PRC-77 radios provided sporadic communications, but only 
if used without encryption.  A more sophisticated foe could have exploited this 
flaw in communications security.  A lack of communications can also inhibit real 
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time intelligence, given that the effectiveness of wireless communications in 
urban terrain is largely inhibited.  This means units are artificially separated and 
unable to support and reinforce friendly units.  Furthermore intelligence is 
underutilised, due to an inability to communicate gathered information to combat 
units.  In addition, American reconnaissance information is not available via the 
current satellite network to all users.  This reduces operational awareness and 
initiative.  Furthermore, it is expected that the bandwidth (quantity of data 
transferred) of the satellites will only supply half of what is required by 2010.  
This will obstruct American communications, control and ISR capabilities on the 
future battlefield.69  This is significant for other coalition members, who will be 
relying upon the American intelligence system.  A lack of communications also 
means support units will be unable to provide fires or mobility to combat units. 
In Afghanistan there was also a problem with communications-net 
congestion.  In Operation Anaconda, the communications system between airmen 
and soldiers was ineffective due to congestion.70  This was exacerbated by a lack 
of operational intelligence on the enemy. 
While the American communications network was mostly successful in 
Afghanistan, topography and the coalition’s structure revealed fundamental 
weaknesses central to the system.  Basic frequency modulation (FM) 
communications were hindered by the mountainous terrain, causing a reliance on 
satellite communications.  Unfortunately, there are a number of satellite 
communications systems, and each requires a separate transmition terminal. This 
problem is being addressed, so that one communications device will provide for 
all communication and information needs of the increasingly mobile user.   
Against a technologically advanced foe, as encountered by the Russians in 
Chechnya, communication security must be provided.  Friendly communications 
must be secured from enemy interference and exploitation, while the enemy’s use 
of communications should be undermined or exploited.  In the second Chechen 
war, Russian communication, anti-communication and counter-communication 
were vastly improved, facilitating deception, creating surprise and hampering the 
enemy.  Better training and equipment insured more effective operations.  
However, some soldiers, due to a lack of training, still broadcasted in the open.  
Chechen communications were hunted electronically, then jammed or destroyed, 
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or Arabic and Chechen interpreters were used to glean information from Chechen 
broadcasts.71
  Combat units operating within a framework of joint warfare will be put at 
risk if denied secure and viable communications with fire-support assets, or 
combat service support resources, such as logistics.  Future enemies will strive to 
threaten components of the communications system.  It is unlikely that in the near 
future, theatre wide interruption to communications will occur, although localised 
enemy dominance may cause risk to become danger.  There must be procedures, 
technologies or mobile reserve forces ready to counter this threat. 
 
Intelligence 
Timely intelligence is critical for counterinsurgent operations in LIC.  Rivalry 
between intelligence and military agencies can severely obstruct intelligence 
flows.  Hence, all counterinsurgent intelligence agencies in LIC must be 
integrated with one another and within the command structure of the 
counterinsurgent.  In Afghanistan and in the first Chechen war, there were 
significant failures in the Soviet/Russian intelligence apparatus.   
Soviet/Russian field operatives were often successful in garnering 
intelligence in Afghanistan and Chechnya.   However, the intelligence they gained 
often failed to reach combat units in a timely manner.  In Afghanistan, the Soviet 
intelligence agencies, military and other ministries, as well as the Afghan 
intelligence services worked separately.  This isolated flows of intelligence from 
being corroborated or disseminated to combat units or the police. The dubious 
loyalty of employees in the Afghan Intelligence Service further undermined the 
willingness of the Soviets to use indigenous intelligence.72   
Internecine rivalry between intelligence and military agencies continued 
until the second Chechen war.  Conflict and rivalry between intelligence services 
is highly disruptive and will vastly reduce military effectiveness, especially were 
coalitions are formed.  Hence, integration, personnel focus, mutual support and 
decentralisation are the ideal qualities of effective intelligence agencies in 
counterinsurgency.  As the correlation and dissemination of timely and accurate 
intelligence is the primary element for attaining victory in counterinsurgency. 
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Human Intelligence (HUMINT) is the leading form of intelligence used by 
counterinsurgents in LIC.  The use of Photo Intelligence (PHOINT) can also be a 
valuable source of intelligence, as PHOINT generally enables intelligence without 
risk.  However, PHOINT is more suited to verifying targets, rather than 
discovering them; especially in urban or covered terrain.  Signals Intelligence 
(SIGINT) and Electronic Intelligence (ELINT) were generally irrelevant in terms 
of providing counterinsurgents with useful information in LIC.  However, as 
illustrated in the Chechen conflicts, technologically advanced insurgents provide 
exploitable electronic sources of intelligence.  Moreover, intercepting enemy 
electronic emissions will discourage the use of these electronic devices.  Hence, 
undermining the enemy’s ability to openly communicate and gain intelligence.  
The counterinsurgent should also be able to exploit other sensor systems to find 
and eliminate heavy enemy units (ie. Trucks, Armoured Vehicles). 73
Throughout all of the cases under study, the most significant impediment 
to the use of SIGINT was a lack of linguists to interpret the available information.  
Without sufficient interpreters to make timely use of intelligence gained, the 
intelligence is worthless.  In the first Chechen war, Chechens and Arab volunteers 
could openly communicate on their radio nets.  This occurred while the Russians 
were intercepting the transmitions.  However by speaking Chechen or Arabic, the 
Chechens were confident their communications would not cause an undue 
security risk.  By the second Chechen war, the Russians had deployed significant 
numbers of Arabic and Chechen speakers to exploit intercepted Chechen SIGINT.  
Similar problems in Somalia, OEF and OIF also illustrated the need for the U.S. 
and the rest of the world to invest more heavily in more linguists, area experts and 
psychological warfare operatives. 
Real time intelligence requires real time intelligence gathering.  In all of 
the case studies of this thesis, soldiers have been the primary real time intelligence 
gathering unit.  This is especially so in urban terrain.74
In Somalia, the second Chechen war, OEF and OIF, Special Forces, 
snipers, reconnaissance troops and forward observers have illustrated their value 
as urban intelligence tools.   These soldiers can themselves eliminate enemy 
personnel, call in air or artillery strikes, or provide intelligence for follow-on 
forces.  Other important human intelligence sources are embedded operatives, and 
civilians who must pass through military cordons that envelop target cities.  These 
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civilian flows also enable the covert movement of military personnel in and out of 
urban environments.  Such an intelligence picture will ensure cities fall quickly, 
and will limit collateral damage and casualties. 
PHOINT is a secondary, but valuable source of intelligence for 
counterinsurgents operating in LIC.  PHOINT can be provided by either satellites, 
or manned and unmanned air vehicles.  In the second Chechen war, OEF and OIF, 
Unmanned Air Vehicles (UAVs) have presented an increasingly effective answer 
to the problem of acquiring real time photo intelligence.  UAVs are expensive, but 
enable situational awareness without placing reconnaissance personnel at risk.  
UAVs have also been used with good results in urban terrain.  UAVs were 
important for gaining intelligence over Groznyy, and have proven essential in 
post-war Iraq. 
However, urban terrain, especially in post-war environments, requires 
infantry based reconnaissance.  In Iraq, patrols and raids were intensified, 
averaging 12,000 patrols and 250 raids per week in 2004-2005.  These operations 
were highly successful, hundreds of insurgents were killed, and thousands were 
captured, along with significant regime personalities, weapons, ammunition and 
funds.  In addition, patrols were effective in ambushing Iraqi insurgents as they 
attempted to deploy in the field.75   
In all of the case studies, intelligence provided by indigenous persons has 
provided significant problems for the counterinsurgent.  This was for a variety of 
reasons.  The intelligence provided may have simply become corrupted.  Also 
private individuals may attempt to manipulate military operations, for their own 
interests or to undermine the counterinsurgency.  Information provided by 
humanitarian agencies may also be corrupted.  This is because humanitarian 
agencies may be vulnerable to exploitation by their indigenous employees, who 
remain loyal to their country or clan.  Local translators may also have nefarious 
objectives.  In relation to the latter problem, counterinsurgent forces require 
dependable translators or endogenous linguists.76  The former problem requires 
discrimination by agent handlers. 
Inaccurate intelligence is a great threat to both the counterinsurgent and 
the civil population.  For example, most civilian casualties caused by coalition 
forces in Afghanistan, were caused by incorrect intelligence.  A similar problem 
of falsified intelligence was faced by the Soviets in Afghanistan.  Afghans often 
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provided incomplete, inaccurate or deliberately misleading information to the 
coalition.  The cause of the disinformation is attributed to rivalry between 
mutually competitive Afghan warlords. Although, these warlords were generally 
friendly towards the coalition.77
 
Summary 
Military force is the foremost element in achieving victory in LIC.  However in 
LIC, force is applied amongst a civil population.  In LIC, the counterinsurgent 
must defeat the insurgent, and win the hearts and minds of the civil population.  
This requires force to be used with precision and care. 
 As explained throughout this research, a counterinsurgent must possess a 
doctrine that is precisely corresponds with LIC.  Professional infantry are essential 
to counterinsurgent operations.  These professional personnel must be able to 
operate independently with initiative, but also cohesively as part of a joint force.  
Infantry personnel will invariably need the combined arms support of armour and 
artillery.  Similarly, the aforementioned ground force elements will require the 
support of fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters.  At the core of combined arms and 
joint force is the requirement for effective communications technologies and 
accurate intelligence.  All of the force elements described above must operate 
effectively within a unified command and control system, which encourages 
independent action and enables joint cohesion.  These latter requirements are 
difficult to attain simultaneously, as they can become mutually exclusive if not 
applied carefully. 
The counterinsurgent must have a doctrine that is focussed on LIC.  The 
doctrine must clearly establish how force is to be used in LIC.  The doctrine must 
state how LIC differs from conventional warfare.  The extent to which this 
divergence will affect military operations must also be clearly elucidated in the 
doctrine.  The doctrine must prohibit the use of force that would endanger 
civilians, while remaining realistic enough to protect friendly units and enable the 
defeat of the insurgent.  Military establishments and governments must appreciate 
that LIC is not an anachronism in warfare. 
Infantry units are the principal units employed by counterinsurgency 
forces in LIC, as they are most likely to make contact with the enemy.  A 
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counterinsurgent’s infantry forces must be highly trained, independent, invested 
with authority and trusted to use it, and prepared to take the initiative.  A 
counterinsurgent’s personnel must be professional, and trained as extensively as 
practicable; Special Forces are ideal troops for counterinsurgency.  Individual 
soldiers must be precise in their application of force, while demonstrating respect 
and care for the civil population.  Unit cohesion and initiative are critical for 
successful counterinsurgent operations in LIC.  Combined arms and joint warfare 
principles must also be core to the soldiers training.  Tactics, Techniques and 
Procedures (TTPs) governing the actions of soldiers must be specifically written 
for LIC.  However, TTPs must also be flexible enough to incorporate the combat 
initiative and experience.  Infantry that is employed by a counterinsurgent must be 
well equipped to engage in LIC.  Principally, soldier communications must be 
reliable and designed for the specific operational environment.  The individual 
soldier’s weapons must also be capable of eliminating the enemy; rifle calibres 
should be returned to 7.62mm.  Soldier’s armour, optics, weapons and navigation 
and communications equipment must be reduced in weight.  This is an ongoing 
requirement, which enables the individual infantryman to possess more equipment 
in battle. 
The combined arms effect of armour and artillery are indispensable in 
supporting infantry operations.  The three primary aspects to armour are: 
protection; manoeuvrability; and firepower and visibility.  Vehicles in LIC must 
be armoured.  Vehicle armour must be designed to thwart rifle, machine gun and 
rocket propelled grenade fire, as well as mines and improvised explosive devices.  
Firepower and protection have an inverse relationship to strategic manoeuvre.  
The two former elements entail weight, hence slowing the third element.  
However at the operational level, for manoeuvre to occur, protection and 
firepower are required.  Hence, there must be a balance struck between the three 
elements.  In counterinsurgency the firepower of armoured vehicles must be 
relatively heavy, but capable of maintaining a high rate of fire.  Hence, cannon 
and automatic grenade launchers have been highly successful.  However, for these 
armaments to be truly effective, armoured vehicles must provide good visibility 
and a broad firing envelope.  Combined arms must be followed to protect both 
infantry and armoured units.  Armour must have excellent communications, and 
have trained extensively with infantry units.  Artillery is also critical for 
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counterinsurgency forces operating in LIC.  However, artillery units must operate 
synergistically with direct-fire units, be precise in their application of force, and 
use firebases for self-protection. 
Aviation has been a critical enabler of counterinsurgency operations since 
its invention.  Helicopters can provide effective manoeuvre, support, evacuation, 
protection and firepower, as well and command, control and intelligence.  
Helicopters have also proven to be more responsive to ground units than aircraft.  
Given that the use of helicopters by counterinsurgents has been so extensive in 
LIC, insurgents have been forced to acquire effective countermeasures.  Hence, 
helicopter tactics and protection suites have been forced to improve.  In addition, 
helicopter firepower, and target acquisition and designation equipment has also 
been forced to improve.  Contemporary LIC has shown that a counterinsurgent’s 
helicopters must be able to detect and fire upon dismounted insurgents, outside of 
the insurgent’s own weapon range.  This requirement is severely taxing the 
capabilities of electronic detection suites.  The improvement of helicopter 
equipment and insurgent human and technical capabilities is requiring greater 
pilot training and enhanced tactics.   
This chapter has demonstrated that even advanced equipment employed by 
a counterinsurgent, without effective piloting and tactics, is of limited utility in 
LIC.  The aforementioned strengths and limitations are also applicable to aircraft, 
and therefore will not be restated.  However in contemporary counterinsurgency, 
aircraft are critical for the application of precise force and the provision of 
command, control, communication and intelligence.  Insurgents only provide 
point targets, which have eluded aircraft weapons until the early 1990s.  With the 
introduction and wide dissemination of precision guided munitions, aircraft have 
become essential providers of fire-support.  This effectively multiplies the combat 
power of ground units.  To multiply the combat power of ground units, airpower 
must often act as a command, control, communications and intelligence hub.  
These four elements of joint operations must flow freely and speedily, to engage 
elusive targets in a timely manner. 
The four combat arms mentioned above, infantry, armour and artillery, 
helicopters and aircraft, must be employed synergistically by an effective 
Command, Control, Initiative, Communications and Intelligence (C2ICI) system.  
Command and Control must be unified, joint and able to encourage and facilitate 
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initiative among combat units.  The fostering of initiative among combat units is 
critical in counterinsurgency, and is one of the most important aspects of a 
counterinsurgent’s command structure.  Initiative will enable combat units to 
exploit first hand knowledge of the enemy, and defeat the enemy in a timely 
manner.  In contemporary counterinsurgency, communications is critical.  The 
expansive nature of LIC requires combat units to be spread thinly over the theatre 
of operations.  Hence, combat units must have the ability to communicate and 
mutually reinforce.  An effective communications system will allow timely 
intelligence to flow to combat units, who can then engage the enemy.  However, 
this requires effective and timely intelligence.  Intelligence gathering and 
analysing agencies must be united and efficient at disseminating analysed 
intelligence.  This intelligence will be mostly human intelligence, which creates 
the possibility of intelligence corruption.  Corrupt intelligence can undermine 
possibilities of counterinsurgent victory in LIC.  Hence, the counterinsurgent must 
have other means of corroborating intelligence.  This corroboration will be best 
provided by imbedded intelligence sources, working in an environment where the 
hearts and minds of the population are being won. 
 This chapter and the previous chapter provide a collection of doctrinal and 
military principles that are essential for counterinsurgency forces to apply in LIC.  
These principles are applied to the New Zealand Defence Force and the Australian 
Defence Force, respectively, in the following two chapters.  These latter chapters 
are critical to the research because: (1) they demonstrate how the principles within 
the thesis can be applied to both small and medium defence forces; and (2) 
illustrate how elements within the two defence forces can be enhanced so as to 
improve their respective capabilities in counterinsurgency. 
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Chapter Seven 
New Zealand Defence Force 
 
This chapter analyses the implications of Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) for the 
New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF).  The chapter then makes recommendations 
concerning the NZDF approach to counterinsurgency operations in LIC. 
This research recognises that conflict is contested through the application 
of political, economic, diplomatic and military forms of force.  This research 
analyses how these forms of force can be applied strategically, tactically and 
operationally by a counterinsurgent involved in LIC.  This chapter analyses, 
principally, how effectively the NZDF has applied these forms of force in LIC.  In 
terms of doctrinal principles, this chapter analyses how effectively the NZDF has 
controlled international interference, provided internal security, applied civil 
operations and installed a unified command, when operating as a counterinsurgent 
in LIC.  There are also ten military principles that are analysed with reference to 
the NZDF when operating as a counterinsurgent in LIC; they include doctrinal 
precision, professionalism, independence, initiative, force precision, restraint, 
combined arms, joint force, integrated communications and accurate human 
intelligence.  From this basis of holistic analysis, recommendations are suggested 
that would improve the effectiveness of the NZDF as a counterinsurgent in LIC.  
The analysis and recommendations made in this chapter will also be of interest to 
other small defence forces, which will be confronted with similar issues as the 
NZDF when operating as counterinsurgents in LIC. 
The sections of this chapter represent critical elements of force applied by 
a counterinsurgent in LIC.  Frequently these elements of force have proven to be 
as essential to conventional warfare as they are to LIC.  However, there are a 
number of sections below that emphasise the distinct forms of force required by a 
counterinsurgent in LIC. 
 
Overview 
This chapter analyses the New Zealand Defence Force’s (NZDF) involvement, 
over the past 15 years, in a range of LICs.  These were Operation Golden Fleece 
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(1989); United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) Bosnia (1994-1995); 
Truce Monitoring Group (TMG) Bougainville (1997-1998); International Force 
East Timor (INTERFET) and United Nations Transitional Administration in East 
Timor (UNTAET) (1999-2002); and the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) 
and Special Air Service (SAS) operations in Afghanistan (2001-present).  
Operation Golden Fleece was a large counterinsurgency training exercise. It is 
nonetheless relevant to the analysis.1  The four remaining conflicts were active 
service deployments. 
 The rationale for the above selection of operations is as follows.  First, the 
operations cover a recent and high tempo period of NZDF operations.  This 
enables the analysis of lessons learnt and an assessment of the implementation of 
those lessons by the NZDF.  Analysis of these recent operations should also give 
some indication of what will be required in the future from the NZDF.  Second, 
the stated operations represent different parts of a force-deployment spectrum, 
within the broader envelope of counterinsurgency operations in LIC, and their 
analysis will add breadth to the discussion of the thesis. 
Graphic 5: Force Deployment Spectrum 
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The above graphic shows both potential operations in theatre and NZDF 
deployments of the type indicated above.  This spectrum is partly related to the 
level of violence in theatre, but is not restricted by that level of violence.   
In the case of Bougainville, the TMG’s purpose was to monitor an 
established peace. Given the operational environment in Bougainville, it was 
deemed that the TMG should be unarmed.  Additionally, the TMG was a small-
scale joint force, under a New Zealand command.2
On the other hand, the NZDF commitment to UNPROFOR in Bosnia 
(NZFOR) was a regular-force infantry company group with attached armour, 
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tasked with peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance under the command of a 
British battalion.3
The NZDF commitment to INTERFET and UNTAET in East Timor was a 
joint force under an Australian command.  The NZDF INTERFET and UNTAET 
commitment constituted an infantry company, then an infantry battalion group 
with attached armour, transport helicopter and aircraft support, along with a naval 
contingent.4
The main NZDF contribution to Afghanistan was a Provincial 
Reconstruction Team (PRT) and an SAS contingent.  In this case, the NZDF has 
deployed two disconnected groups, serving different functions within the force-
deployment spectrum.  The SAS engage directly with enemy combatants, across 
an unspecified geographic zone.  Alternatively, the PRT operates to provide 
humanitarian assistance within a confined geographic zone, under the protection 
and command of the British.  For the NZDF, Afghanistan may demonstrate two 
important issues.  Humanitarian assistance and special force operations may be: 
(1) an area of NZDF excellence; and (2) politically viable operational options for 
the New Zealand Government. 
 The force-deployment spectrum and the recent development and 
deployment of disconnected niche capabilities will be analysed later in the 
chapter.   
 
Doctrine and Policy 
In February 2004, the NZDF released the first edition of the ‘Foundations of New 
Zealand Military Doctrine (NZDDP-D)’.  This document is the ‘philosophical’ 
doctrine for the NZDF.  The document has two important functions: (1) acts as a 
guide to unify the doctrinal thinking of the three services (Army, Navy and Air 
Force); and (2) minimises the potential for ‘doctrinal divergence’ to disrupt or 
inhibit operations between allies.  Simply, defence force level, ‘philosophical’ or 
‘military’, doctrine better enables joint and coalition warfare.5  From a 
conventional force standpoint, NZDDP-D is a progressive and essential step 
towards a more effective defence force. 
 Beneath the NZDF military doctrine are the ‘operational’ and ‘tactical’ 
doctrines of the three services.  As described by Major General Piers Reid, among 
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the operational and tactical doctrines of the three New Zealand services resides a 
problem: ‘doctrinal divergence’.  Doctrinal divergence is a fundamental 
inconsistency of doctrine between New Zealand’s separate service doctrines.  The 
source of this discrepancy was contemporaneous New Zealand defence policy, 
history, and differing mind-sets these factors caused in the three services and the 
Defence Force Headquarters.   
Before an explanation of doctrinal divergence can occur, it is critical to 
rationalise and moderate the debate within an historical-doctrinal framework.  
This is because doctrinal divergence is only an issue when joint warfare is 
elevated to become a prominent doctrinal principle or methodological perspective.  
The doctrines of the three New Zealand services, except the Air Force, are 
products of centuries of war.  These doctrines instil within personnel the 
combined experience and knowledge of the service in which they serve.  This 
process produces effective soldiers, sailors and aviators, who are conversant with 
their own service environment.  This outcome is critical and must be defended.  
The doctrines are divergence because they were developed for dissimilar 
operational environments – land, sea and air.  However, warfare is becoming 
increasingly joint.  Hence, soldiers, sailors and aviators must be able to operate 
together jointly.  Joint cooperation can only be created with joint training, joint 
operations, joint experiences, joint thinking and joint mindsets.  Hence doctrine, 
which guides training, operations, experiences, thinking and mindsets must 
always promote, and never constrain, jointness. 
 In almost all deployments of combat forces overseas since the Boer War, 
New Zealand has contributed “elements to coalition forces by Service”.6  Units 
from the Air Force, Army and Navy were incorporated into larger coalition units.  
Subsequently, these larger coalition units may have been deployed in separate 
theatres, following divergent tactical and even strategic directives.  As a result, the 
three services developed a force structure and doctrine that focused on 
interoperability with, and complementary of, allied forces.  To this point, Derek 
Quigley commented, “the three Services seem to be preparing for three different 
wars”.7
 Quigley was partly right, the three services were preparing for three 
divergent sets of engagement scenarios.  As an example, the Navy was preparing 
to control sea-lanes of communication, the Air Force was training for airborne 
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interdiction, and the Army was readying to capture critical nodes and terrain.  
Each of these actions is in an environment which is essentially inhospitable to the 
other services.  Thus, such training schedules were historically realistic and 
operationally appropriate.  However, as Quigley inferred, the three services 
dedication to single service readiness left little time or resources for joint training, 
awareness and readiness. 
  Since the New Zealand deployment to Bosnia, joint command and control 
(C2) has become a reality for the NZDF.  However, the Bougainville deployment 
illustrated that the NZDF was not well prepared for joint C2.  As described by 
Major General Piers Reid, in actuality “[t]he three services essentially operated 
independently, such that co-located Air and Army units in Bougainville[,] 
although under one commander in theatre[,] took direction from different 
commands in New Zealand.  The commander in theatre frequently found himself 
being second-guessed by Service operational commanders at home [in New 
Zealand].  The situation was even more confused by deployed army elements 
answering to different army commands in New Zealand on different matters”.8  
This chapter’s section on Command and Control elaborates on joint C2 in 
Bougainville. 
 A further development, heightened by the deployment to Bosnia, was the 
promulgation of confused doctrinal premises.  These unrealistic doctrinal 
premises feed directly into New Zealand defence policy, and were as follows.  
First, NZDF deployments would remain separate, single service contributions to 
larger coalition forces.  Second, due to New Zealand’s inability to deploy 
anything other than light force elements among heavily equipped and 
technologically sophisticated coalition forces, it was reasoned that NZDF force 
elements would only operate “as rear area security and on the flanks”.9  Third and 
most significantly, since New Zealand force elements would be deployed 
separately within broader coalition structures, it was inferred there was no 
requirement for a synergistic and holistic joint force.  Hence, the ‘balanced and 
niche force’ debate came about. 
 Bougainville and East Timor illustrated that the first point is only partially 
correct; the NZDF will contribute both joint and single service elements to future 
operations, which New Zealand may lead.  In the post Cold War era, New 
Zealand has deployed forces to approximately twenty conflict zones.10  Over half 
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of these operations have been small-scale humanitarian, de-mining or peace-
monitoring missions.  Other missions include maritime blockade, reconstruction, 
medical and logistics support for warfare (Gulf War 1), larger-scale peace-keeping 
and peace-enforcement, and large-scale low-intensity counterinsurgency 
operations.  Most of these operations were single service contributions to larger 
coalition forces. In the deployment to Afghanistan, the NZDF supplied two 
ground force deployments (one multi-service group and one single service group) 
that are operationally dissimilar and geographically separate.  In contrast, 
Bougainville was a joint-force operation led by New Zealand and East Timor was 
a complex operation, including both a joint-force and separate service element 
contributions to a coalition.  The critical inference is: New Zealand will deploy 
both single service and joint force elements to future conflicts.  Hence, New 
Zealand defence policy needs to recognise and assimilate the following.  First, 
New Zealand will in the future deploy significant force elements (company to 
battalion) to conflict zones, globally.  These global deployments will incorporate 
either single service or joint force elements, or both.  It is also probable, due to 
current doctrine, that global deployments will become more joint.  Furthermore, 
while unlikely, New Zealand may deploy large national contingents or command 
non-regional military contingents.  In addition, the force elements supplied by the 
NZDF must be conversant with Brigade level command and control.  This is 
because the Brigade is the common unit/command structure deployed in 
contemporary peace operations, as the Brigade is the smallest deployable unit 
capable of independent action.  Second, conflict in Southeast Asia and the South 
Pacific will require New Zealand to contribute a range of military contingents.  
These contingents: may be large, up to Battalion Group size; will probably be 
joint; and New Zealand may be the lead coalition member or sole nation involved.  
If New Zealand is the lead coalition member, the need for a deployable Brigade 
headquarters will be a requirement. 
 Bougainville and East Timor also demonstrated that the second of the 
policy points noted above was plainly wrong.  The second point, which stated that 
NZDF forces would only operate “as rear area security and on the flanks”11 was 
proven wrong by all subsequent operations, especially Bougainville and East 
Timor.  In Bougainville, New Zealand was the lead nation and committed the 
main force contingent.  In East Timor, New Zealand occupied a front line 
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position, which was initially in the most dangerous sector in East Timor.  
Furthermore, the SAS unit operating in Afghanistan is a highly mobile, modern 
and combative joint element. 
 The third aforementioned point concerned the niche versus balanced force 
debate.  To this debate, Major General Piers Reid has the following to say: 
“[n]othing could be more unbalanced than forces designed to be mere 
contributions to larger components, rather than balanced to operate together.  
Similarly nothing could be less niche than forces designed to work together and 
operate as a force-multiplied synergistic whole”.12  Both of Reid’s comments are 
true.  Once deployed, force elements will invariably operate in a joint 
environment.  Single service elements will generally operate within a joint 
coalition force, as will joint multi-service elements.  To insure readiness and 
operational effectiveness, a force must be trained in the manner in which it is to 
fight.  Hence, to insure single service and joint NZDF contributions are effective, 
NZDF units must train jointly. 
 Currently the Army is leading the evolution of doctrine in the New 
Zealand military.  For operational doctrine, the Army utilises the American Field 
Manual 3-0 (FM 3-0) Operations.  For tactical doctrine, the Army uses the 
Australian Fundamentals of Land Warfare manual.  The adoption of these 
operational and tactical manuals ensures the New Zealand Army is interoperable 
with major allies, through the American, British, Canadian, Australian Armies’ 
Standardisation Program (ABCA).  Similarly, the Air Force maintains 
interoperability through the Air Standardisation Coordinating Committee (ASCC), 
and the Navy preserve commonality by way of the Australia, Canada, New 
Zealand, United Kingdom, United States agreement [on] Naval Command, 
Control and Communications Board (AUSCANNZUKUS).  Any move toward 
‘niche’ capabilities (whether implicitly as is the case currently, or explicitly as has 
been the case) is incongruent with the leading tenets of joint warfare.  Since joint 
warfare is central to coalition doctrine and interoperability, ‘niche’ capabilities are 
incongruent to coalition standardisation.  Furthermore, this thesis has 
demonstrated that synergistic joint warfare is fundamental to effective 
counterinsurgency operations. 
 Present New Zealand Army doctrine is entitled Precision Manoeuvre, 
which is a derivative of the United States Marine Corps’ (USMC) Manoeuvre 
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Warfare doctrine.  USMC’ Manoeuvre Warfare doctrine evolved in unison with 
the United States Army’s AirLand Battle doctrine.  AirLand Battle and 
Manoeuvre Warfare doctrines were an attempt to exploit the technological and 
information system benefits of the contemporaneous Revolution in Military 
Affairs (RMA) and combine these benefits with a manoeuvre/blitzkrieg approach 
to war.  AirLand Battle and Manoeuvre Warfare doctrines were demonstrated in 
the 1990/1991 Gulf War.  Manoeuvre Warfare differed from AirLand Battle, in 
that the former attempted to take advantage of the RMA, albeit with the inferior 
resources available to the USMC.  Consequently, AirLand Battle has given way to 
Rapid Dominance.  “Rapid Dominance … evolved out of the post-Gulf War 
1990/91 evaluations, the incoming availability of network-centric systems and the 
revolution in “precision strike, dominant manoeuvre, situational awareness and 
focused logistics””.13  Similarly, the USMC has further developed Manoeuvre 
Warfare by incorporating the leading tenets of Rapid Dominance, but again with 
fewer resources than the U.S. Army. 
 As an aside, the USMC is the most joint force ever established and 
maintained.  The adaptation of the USMC doctrine indicates the Army’s intention 
of forming force elements that are advanced and joint.  The requirement for joint 
operations will, and are, putting significant pressure on the Army’s resources, as 
well as those of the Navy and Air Force.  However, there seems to be a significant 
divergence between doctrinal intention and operational effect.  At the operational 
level, doctrinal progression and the establishment of the Joint Headquarters has 
created a “better awareness of overlap and support”.14  Given that jointness takes 
generations to develop, there is a concern among senior personnel that support for 
joint operations will wane before the effects of jointness are visible.15
Of the U.S. Army doctrines since World War 2 (Defence in Place, Active 
Defence, AirLand Battle and Rapid Dominance), Rapid Dominance most 
resembles the leading principles of a counterinsurgency doctrine.  As such, the 
USMC and the NZDF, using Manoeuvre Warfare or Precision Manoeuvre 
respectively, should be well placed as counterinsurgency forces in LIC.  As an 
important aside, as outlined in this thesis’ chapter, ‘A Doctrine for Low Intensity 
Conflict’, there is a need for counterinsurgents to possess more than just a 
warfighting doctrine in LIC.  The idea of a supplementary doctrine is addressed 
below, in the Infantry and Other Agency Integration subsections of this chapter.  
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Nevertheless, the New Zealand Army’s doctrine is congruent with a winning 
counterinsurgency strategy.  To be effective however, the Army’s Precision 
Manoeuvre doctrine requires a balanced joint force, which is well trained, led and 
equipped.  “The critical point is that wherever New Zealand Forces go, they will 
find themselves either forming or being components in Joint Forces [, which will 
be guided by Manoeuvre Warfare or Rapid Dominance doctrine].  Given that 
military forces “fight as they train”, then New Zealand’s forces should “train as 
they intend to fight”, and this means in a joint environment [, guided by Precision 
Manoeuvre].”16  In terms of the military principle, doctrinal precision, NZDF 
doctrine is becoming more suited to LIC, but needs to continue developing a joint 
approach to such operations. 
In addition, Precision Manoeuvre has caused New Zealand to assimilate 
new technology and war fighting theory into NZDF training and operations.  The 
current doctrine also creates an opportunity for the Joint Headquarters to make 
best use of existing NZDF resources’.17  However, ‘Precision Manoeuvre does not 
negate the equipment deficiencies in the NZDF, especially in the Air Force’.18
Furthermore, doctrine should assist in guiding policy.  The Inquiry into 
Defence Beyond 2000 (DB2000) neglects to illustrate doctrinal implications for 
defence policy.  This is a clear deficiency, given that “[d]octrine is what 
experience has shown usually works best”.19
 
Infantry – Personnel 
The strength of the New Zealand Army’s culture, as described by Captain David 
Strong (New Zealand Army Officer and former Waikato University Masters 
Student), is based on “initiative, adaptability, practicality, integrity and trust”.20  
This culture and the professional structure of the New Zealand Army (rather than 
the small size and isolation of the Army, as Strong suggests), has created a “well 
trained and disciplined force”.21  Strong also suggests that the Nation and Army’s 
isolation has created “a degree of naïveté concerning the intent of others, a lack of 
expertise regarding modern battlefield technology, and an ability to provide and 
sustain a large force overseas”.22  These apparently divergent sentiments are 
credible, and describe a dichotomy within the NZDF.  The dichotomy illustrates 
high personnel effectiveness in peace operations, which is not reflected in the 
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capability or technological advancement of operational equipment, levels of 
training or rates of remuneration.  The evidence for the above statement follows. 
 Culture, as described above, is a convoluted mix of Army ethos and 
values, which is embedded in a deeper national psychology.  Culture has been an 
unexpected enabler in the cases of this thesis.  The use of culture as an 
unconventional instrument to facilitate conventional requirements for security and 
stability is an unfamiliar and undeveloped concept in the field of defence.  The 
concept is also prone to bias; Canadians, Australians and New Zealanders will all 
accentuate the competence of their service personnel and defence forces in peace 
operations and combat.  Nevertheless, if culture is an alternative form of force that 
is effective, then the positive forms of culture need to be qualified.  Alternatively 
speaking, the following question must be posed: what aspects of culture allow an 
understanding of the ‘enemy’ and integration with the people within an area of 
operations?  Simply, know your enemy and know yourself.  Hence culture is 
important, because it is the context from which we make decisions.  It is also 
important to note, that culture is more ‘primal’ than service ethos and values.  
There are four significant cultural traits examined below.  First, Major General 
Piers Reid asserts that because New Zealand is a small country, New Zealanders 
have a different and possibly ‘softer’ geopolitical outlook, particularly with regard 
to the application of power.  Hence in a situation of conflict, New Zealand service 
personnel have a more reasoned approach when dealing with warring factions, 
which is coercive but not forceful.  The result of this approach may be a greater 
understanding that leads to agreements being reached.  Second, Reid and 
Lieutenant Colonel Antony Hayward site multiculturalism as a creator and 
illustrator of tolerance towards other cultures.  The consequence of cultural 
tolerance is an ability to sometimes overcome tribal, racial and ideological 
fissures.  To this point, the Ni Vanuatu personnel deployed with the TMG proved 
to be a quintessential conduit to understanding the Bougain(villian) culture.  
Third, but interconnected with the aforementioned factors, New Zealanders are 
egalitarian, treating everyone as equals.  This egalitarian nature fosters 
understanding and forbearance of differing points of view.  Fourth, New Zealand 
service personnel appear to strive to accomplish the best for the people in their 
area of operations. 23
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 In addition to culture, there are specific geopolitical and resource related 
issues that naturally force personnel effectiveness.  First, to fulfil the numerous 
roles required of the Army, junior officers and non-commissioned officers receive 
training in certain areas that larger armies would impart on higher ranked 
individuals.  This factor causes young, physically fit and well trained personnel to 
be deployed.  Second, due to history and geographical isolation, the NZDF’s 
thinking is expeditionary, rather than territorial.  This facilitates a simpler 
transition to operations on foreign soil, as New Zealand personnel operate as they 
train.  Third, the NZDF has maintained a sufficient degree of interoperability with 
allied forces.  This enables New Zealand personnel to achieve a working 
relationship with allied personnel and systems in theatre, relatively quickly.  
Fourth, New Zealand has a good post-war track record for participation in peace 
operations.  Fifth, (as Brigadier Roger Mortlock states) the New Zealand Army 
has achieved the ultimate paradox in warfare: maximum obedience and initiative.  
Hence, the ideas of ethos, values and culture are an interconnected mix, which has 
fostered an effective counterinsurgency approach to civil-military affairs in LIC. 
The case studies of this chapter will show New Zealand personnel display 
initiative, especially older personnel who are willing to question command.  
However, some aspects of initiative have not been institutionalised through the 
lessons learnt process to form doctrine and Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) 
for future operations.  Lessons must be relearned or learned again by others, if 
they are not initially recorded, remembered and shared.  A reluctance or inability 
to institutionalise new approaches and lessons can cause risk, as individual 
initiative is depended on to re-develop a solution to a known and re-occurring 
problem.  The Auditor-General’s report on East Timor illustrates resource issues 
that compromised the lessoned learned process, at the Centre for Army Lessons 
Learned (CALL).24  The problem is more complex, and is examined below. 
The Realisation Issues plan formed by New Zealand 5 Battalion 
(NZBATT 5) was significant in creating internal security and stability in East 
Timor. The Realisation Issues plan has, however, not been institutionalised as a 
template for future operations.  Furthermore, the Realisation Issues plan was the 
product of a small group, under an individual commander, Lieutenant Colonel 
Antony Hayward, rather than being part of an institutionalised strategic plan.  
Hayward stated in an interview that the plans development was ad hoc, based 
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upon the use of common sense.  Hayward also emphasised that some of the ideas 
used in East Timor by NZBATT 5, were based on a reading of Christopher 
Pugsley’s book – From Emergency to Confrontation: the New Zealand Armed 
Forces in Malaya and Borneo 1949-1966.25  The Realisation Issues plan raised 
reservations with the Chief of Defence Force (CDF) and Chief of Defence Force – 
Operations (CDF-Ops), in New Zealand.26  These reservations centred on whether 
NZBATT 5 was capable of delivering core objectives, of security and 
intelligence, and undertake the Realisation Issues plan.  To the credit of the two 
Chiefs, the initiative was allowed, but not institutionalised.  Colonel Hayward, the 
commander of the 2nd Land Force Group, stated ‘the Realisation Issues plan is not 
taught to officers because there is not enough time for that training.  Indeed, the 
Army is struggling to adapt to C4ISR.  Civil-Military Affairs (CMA), in the New 
Zealand Army context does not become apparent until personnel are on 
operations’.27   Moreover, many of the lessons learned contained in the 
Realisation Issues plan are being redeveloped by the PRT in Afghanistan. The 
content of the Realisation Issues plan is analysed further in a subsection below, 
entitled Other Agency Integration.  The remainder of this section analyses the 
structural elements of personnel preparation. 
 The NZDF maintains a two stage level of preparedness. This two stage 
policy reduces military expenditure and, as the New Zealand Ministry of Defence 
asserts, increases opportunities for training and ‘reconstitution’.  Hence, the 
NZDF is maintained at a Directed Level of Capability (DLOC), which in an 
agreed timeframe can be improved (through additional training and critical 
equipment purchases) to an Operational Level of Capability (OLOC).28  
Basically, (with respect to any unit, at any time) there is a designated level of 
capability that each unit must maintain (DLOC).  From that level, each unit must 
be able to achieve a capability level (OLOC), within a specified timeframe, which 
enables the unit to perform effectively on operation. 
 In the case of Bosnia, the New Zealand Company Group undertook 
training in New Zealand and Britain before their deployment.  Strong states the 
training was comprehensive but ad hoc, and was unduly influenced by senior 
officers.  The British training package included country briefings, specialist skills, 
medical and marksmanship training, vehicular and convoy procedures, language 
training and urban training.  The New Zealand Force (NZFOR) was then deployed 
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to a quiet sector (Lasva Valley) within a British Battalion’s (BRITBAT1) area of 
operations.  NZFOR was positioned in this quiet sector for two reasons: (1) for 
further British field evaluation and (2) so NZFOR could adjust to peacekeeping.29  
The presence of NZFOR did, however, enable the British to focus on other areas 
of importance.30  The principal lesson learnt from the Bosnia deployment, 
according to Major General Piers Reid, was the importance of junior leadership.  
In concordance with the case studies of this thesis, Reid states “[w]e’re [sic] not 
talking about the company commander or contingent commander.  It’s the junior 
lieutenant and corporal.  Small groups of New Zealanders sorting problems out on 
the ground, in many cases with people pointing automatic weapons at them [sic].  
It’s [sic] discipline and skill that lets them stand impartial even when morally they 
might feel one side has a superior position”.31  Without effective junior 
leadership, discipline can degenerate, both inflaming dangerous situations and 
reducing the combat capability of soldiers. 
 On 20 September 1999, the first INTERFET forces deployed in East 
Timor.  Basically, the NZDF contingent comprised of Special Air Service (SAS) 
personnel (who actually deployed on the first day), an infantry company (Victor 
Company) (which deployed to Dili on 28 and 29 September), and an infantry 
battalion group (NZBATT) (which was fully deployed to Suai between 22 and 29 
October).  These Army units were supported by various other Navy, Air Force 
and Army support units, which were dispersed throughout operations in East 
Timor.  Given East Timor was a significant deployment for the NZDF, the 
preparation of the Company and Battalion Groups are detailed in a training 
section below.  Briefly, Victor Company and the initial Battalion Group 
undertook training in New Zealand, along with final preparation and 
acclimatisation in Australia, prior to deployment to East Timor. 
 In common with most cases of counterinsurgency operations in LIC, the 
Special Forces were instrumental to the success of operations in East Timor.  The 
New Zealand Special Air Service: (1) provided security for the evacuation of UN 
staff from East Timor in early September 1999 (Operation Dorix); (2) were part of 
the INTERFET Response Force that initially secured Dili airport and port 
facilities on 20 September 1999; and (3) reconnoitred and partially secured much 
of East Timor ahead of deploying regular forces.  To elaborate on this latter role, 
New Zealand SAS performed “reconnaissance and surveillance, vital asset 
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protection, forming liaison and communication teams, arrest, disarm and detain 
operations against the militia, and humanitarian assistance and close personnel 
protection of senior officers and ‘at risk’ civilians”.32  The New Zealand SAS 
were also involved in four contacts (engagements) with enemy forces.  In short, 
the SAS were a great asset to the INTERFET operation. 
 As in Bosnia, the New Zealand Company initially deployed to Dili was 
ordered to maintain security in a large area of operations (AO).  Victor 
Company’s AO was the western sector of Dili, previously secured by a battalion 
from 2 Royal Australian Regiment (2RAR).  Victor Company “had been given 
this sector for two reasons – their APCs gave them a high degree of mobility, and 
the sector was a relatively quiet area”.33  Victor Company was then deployed to 
Suai, where significant militia violence and engagements with INTERFET troops 
had occurred.  Given the pressing need to secure all of East Timor as quickly as 
possible, the INTERFET commander, Major General Cosgrove stated, having 
Victor Company arrive in East Timor so promptly was ‘like gold’.34
 In late October 1999, a New Zealand Battalion Group (NZBATT 1) joined 
Victor Company in Suai, and dispersed over the Cova Lima district.  NZBATT 1 
and 2RAR (and initially 3RAR) were under the command of Brigadier Mark 
Evans (Australian), Commander West Force.  Given West Force controlled the 
mountainous border area with Indonesia, their operational environment was “the 
most sensitive and dangerous area in East Timor”.35  The full Battalion was 
deployed in October, because it was not at OLOC in September when the lead 
elements of INTERFET deployed.  This was partly due to pre-deployment 
training being delayed by a clash of Government inter-departmental objectives.36  
This inter-departmental disagreement is analysed below, in the section entitled 
Other Agency Integration. 
 All New Zealand battalion rotations following the withdrawal of NZBATT 
1 included Territorial Force (TF) personnel.  These TF personnel accounted for 
approximately 10-15 percent of the following Battalions’ strength.  The initial 
case studies of this thesis have shown that the combat capability of 
Conscript/Reserve/Territorial personnel can suffer from a lack of training, unit 
cohesion and discipline.  These personnel weaknesses can be exacerbated by poor 
junior leadership, especially at the Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO) level.  The 
New Zealand Territorial personnel deployed to East Timor did not display these 
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problems; potential reasons for this maybe as follows.  First, TF personnel 
underwent significant training with Regular Force (RF) units prior to deployment.  
Hence, the operational capability and discipline of TF personnel were improved 
and unit cohesion was solidified.  In the case of NZBATT 5, TF personnel 
received four months pre-deployment training.  The length of training was 
increased from two months, at the request of Lieutenant Colonel Hayward.37  
Second, TF personnel were integrated into RF units.  Therefore, TF personnel 
were led by competent junior commanders.  Third, TF personnel were motivated.  
This was indicated by TF personnel willingness to relinquish their civilian 
employment and accept a “reduction in rank, in recognition of their 
inexperience”.38  It was stated by Lieutenant Colonel Dransfield that the aptitude 
and capability of TF personnel was comparative to Regular personnel.  
Nevertheless, the inclusion of TF personnel in the East Timor deployment does 
indicate an inability of the NZDF to maintain a Battalion at full strength, with 
Regular troops, past the first rotation.  Colonel Hayward also stated that to ‘fully 
realise the ability of TF personnel, they must be effectively managed and guarded 
from situations of excessive risk’.39
 Similarly, NZBATT 3 was a composite battalion, formed from more than 
62 army units, and based on 16 Field [Artillery] Regiment.  Given the non-
infantry base and the composite nature of NZBATT 3, there was a potential for 
significant problems to arise during the deployment.  However, no problems were 
reported.40  The composite, non-infantry nature of NZBATT 3, again illustrates 
the stress placed on NZDF assets by maintaining an operational battalion past 12 
months. 
Moreover, NZBATT was only ever at full strength because of the 
incorporation of foreign units.  At the time of the East Timor operation, “the 
strength of each of the Army’s two RF [Regular Force] battalions was just over 
400.  According to current doctrine a full battalion should comprise four rifle 
companies.  In practice [sic], the NZ [New Zealand] Army has been based on 
three-company battalions for some time.  Because of limitations on personnel 
numbers, the Bn Gp [Battalion Group] option would require either a three-
company Battalion, but with only two platoons in each Company (there are 
normally three), or a three platoon, two company Battalion.  Therefore, the Army 
could deploy a battalion structure, but it would be slightly “hollow” in terms of 
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numbers”.41  This ‘slightly hollow’ nature of the NZDF is a significant issue and 
is getting worse, due primarily to retention problems.  Simply, ‘hollow’ units 
create risk on operation, as they are expected to perform as if they were full 
strength units, which they are not. 
In terms of military principles, NZDF personnel have illustrated a 
professional and restrained approach to counterinsurgency, as well as 
independence and initiative in their actions.  However, the DLOC/OLOC process 
and inadequate institutionalisation of lessons learned has undermined the 
professional capability of the NZDF. 
 
Tactics, Techniques and Standard Operating Procedures 
The primary concern, with regard to Tactics, Techniques and Standard Operating 
Procedures, was a clash with Rules of Engagement (ROE) and United Nations 
(UN) policy. 
 The appropriateness of the ROE governing New Zealand troops, operating 
under the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor 
(UNTAET(took responsibility from INTERFET progressively after February 
2000)), was challenged by Colonel Gibbons.  At the time, “if a New Zealand 
soldier patrolling the bush near the border saw an armed militiaman ‘patrolling in 
a tactical way with obvious intent’, he was required to challenge him before 
opening fire, unless his life was directly threatened.  Given the conditions under 
which the first New Zealand Battalion was operating along the border this was 
impracticable and impaired its ability to safely and effectively carry out its 
mission”.42  Colonel Gibbons successfully implemented a change to the ROE, 
which after ratification by the UN, applied for all UNTAET personnel operating 
in East Timor.  The change to the ROE improved the safety and confidence of 
UNTAET personnel, and improved the probability of eliminating the militia 
threat. 
Similarly and again in East Timor, soldiers would take up ambush 
positions to intercept militia.  However, Rules of Engagement (ROE) forbade 
initiating a contact by firing first or using suppressing fire. 43  Hence, one of the 
most successful tactics for intercepting insurgents was prevented by ROE.   
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Patrolling was one technique that required development for operations in 
East Timor, and was in no way related to ROE or UN policy.  Following the 
shooting of a New Zealand soldier on patrol near the Indonesia-East Timor 
border, the pace of subsequent patrols was reduced.   The change of technique 
came about after advice was sought from a Falintil (The Armed Forces for 
National Liberation of East Timor) commander.  
 Intelligence is a critical enabler for counterinsurgent operations in LIC.  
However, as stated by former UN Under-Secretary General and Head of the UN 
Angola Verification Mission, Dame Margaret Joan Anstee, “[i]t does not seem to 
be well known, or understood, that the UN is not allowed to gather 
intelligence”.44  The UN rationale for this policy is as follows.  First, “to gather 
intelligence is to impose upon the host country’s sovereignty”.45  In abstract 
terms, the generation of intelligence could be seen as violating the inherent rights 
of a sovereign state.  However in real terms, an absence of intelligence completely 
undermines the operational capability of military forces.  To this point, Brigadier 
Roger Mortlock states, “there is an undeniable reality that an intervention force 
without a sound intelligence capability is one which is blind.  It cannot, therefore, 
expect to react sensibly to threats to the mandate and to the mission strategic plan.  
The ability for military intervention forces to run an intelligence gathering 
capability openly is vital for the successful ending of conflict.”[his italics and 
emphasis]46  Hence and as is stated in the Panel on United Nations Peace 
Operations Report (Brahimi Report), United Nations military forces must be 
provided with strategic intelligence and the freedom to generate tactical 
intelligence.47  Second, intelligence may undermine impartiality in a 
peacekeeping environment.  The primary principle of peacekeeping assumes that 
all warring parties are supportive of a peaceful outcome (this is often an erroneous 
assumption).  If this assumption is accepted momentarily for argument’s sake, the 
collection and analysis of intelligence by the peacekeepers should not be 
perceived as a challenge to either warring party.  Intelligence should be 
considered as a guarantee that both sides are abiding by the peace agreement.  The 
gathering and analysis of intelligence will only be a threat to either warring party, 
if that party is attempting to break from the conditions of the peace agreement.  
Given that peacekeeping only occurs were violence is present, intuitively, there 
must be a party committing that violence.  Hence, intervening forces must have a 
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capacity to gather and analyse intelligence.  To this point, the Panel on United 
Nations Peace Operations Report (Brahimi Report) concurs: when one party is 
violating the terms of a peace agreement, impartiality can cause “ineffectiveness 
and … amount to complicity with evil”.48  Two examples follow, which illustrate 
the importance of intelligence for intervening force. 
Due to a lack of intelligence and analysis, Brigadier Mortlock stated that 
the warring parties in Angola used the presence of UN Angola Verification 
Mission (UNAVEM) I & II, as a reprieve to re-arm and re-train.  Furthermore, the 
cantonments designated and occupied by the warring Angolan factions, and 
monitored by UNAVEM personnel, were established on strategically important 
terrain.  Hence when the fighting resumed, the Angolan factions were positioned 
to control internal and external means of communication, population centres and 
strategically significant topographical features.  The strategic positioning of the 
Angolan factions was well planned, but went unnoticed by the UN’s civilian staff.  
In the Angolan case, intelligence and military analysis may have enabled a more 
appropriate response from the UN.49
In comparison, the New Zealand Truce Monitoring Group (TMG) was 
critical in gaining intelligence and fostering peace in Bougainville.  The greatest 
threat to the peace in Bougainville was distrust and rumour.  The basis for much 
of the intelligence provided to the TMG came from each of the warring parties, 
and was illustrative of the other side’s actions.  Hence, the principal role of the 
TMG was to verify intelligence and disprove misinformation.  Functionally, 
intelligence verification was done by talking to the side described in the 
intelligence reports.50  Significantly, however, the process would not have worked 
under a UN peace monitoring mandate.  This is because the core function of the 
TMG, gaining and analysing intelligence, would have been prohibited.  Hence, a 
peaceful outcome would not have been achieved.  Admittedly, however, this 
process may only work if both parties truly want peace, and there are no other 
internal or external groups fuelling the conflict. 
ROE that have prohibited techniques that are critical to counterinsurgency 
and UN policies that have forbidden the collection of intelligence are major 
impediments that have been faced by the NZDF while operating as 
counterinsurgents in LIC.  These impediments undermine important military force 
principles that are essential in LIC, including the collection of accurate human 
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intelligence, the application of initiative and the deployment of precisely tailored 
forces.  Furthermore, the constraints placed on these military principles directly 
undermine the capability of a counterinsurgent to achieve the doctrinal principles 
outlined in this research. 
 
Equipment 
In addition to training, NZFOR in Bosnia had to be re-equipped with an 
assortment of “basic and specialist equipment”.51  This equipment included 
“Night Vision Goggles, Global Positioning Systems, diesel generators, engineer 
plant equipment”,52 appliqué armour and new sights for the armoured personnel 
carriers (APCs), Land Rover Field Ambulances and new parts for the “aged Land 
Rovers [sic] fleet”.53  These purchases were critical to the NZFOR deployment.  
For this reason, Lieutenant Colonel Bright indicated that these deficiencies “cast 
doubt on readiness states”.54  In other words, the capacity of the NZDF to move 
from the Directed Level of Capability (DLOC) to the Operational Level of 
Capability (OLOC) was in question.  Furthermore NZDF personnel, because of 
the DLOC/OLOC system, were then deployed into conflict with only rudimentary 
training with this new equipment.  In fact, the United Nations requested that New 
Zealand provide troops for UNPROFOR in March 1994, the Government agreed 
in May 1994 and NZFOR’s equipment sailed for Bosnia in July 1994.55  Given 
the short time period between mission inception and deployment, the purchases of 
new equipment had to be rushed.    This rushed procurement forced systems and 
equipment to be accepted without trial, and as Brigadier Jameson noted, carried a 
“disproportionate risk in being delayed”,56 or being ineffective, non-calibrated 
and dangerous. 
This chapter has shown communications weaknesses have been a known 
problem in the NZDF, since Operation Golden Fleece in 1989.  One of the critical 
equipment shortfalls that could not be surmounted, prior to the East Timor 
deployment, was that of communications.  Hence, NZDF personnel were at times 
unable to communicate, due to East Timor’s mountainous terrain.  Australia had 
similar communications difficulties in East Timor with the PRC-77 radio.  
Australia also had elements of the Project Raven communications upgrade 
available, which enhanced the transmission of battlefield data.57
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As was illustrated in Exercise Black Diamond (1996), communications 
failures can significantly degrade friendly combat capabilities and provide 
vulnerable centres of gravity for the enemy to exploit.  A soldier of 1 Royal New 
Zealand Infantry Regiment (1 RNZIR) participating in the above Exercise, 
explains the result of poor communications and logistics for an Infantry 
Company: “In a real war, with troops moving towards the front, we’d [sic] have a 
real problem”.58  Judith Martin, a defence writer, explains “[p]re-Vietnam 
communications equipment is a constant source of frustration: changes of plan 
have a domino effect, especially where re-supply is concerned, and the echelons 
supplying the front-line troops with ammunition, water and kit are at times not 
receiving vital orders – because of difficulties with aging equipment or 
atmospheric conditions”.59  The requirement to improve the NZDF 
communications system, following the Exercise Black Diamond, was reiterated 
by Colonel Martyn Dunne.60
The effectiveness, reliability, range, security and connectivity of Army 
communications is being enhanced by the tactical communications upgrade.  The 
new communications system will improve the transmission of data traffic, 
including written orders, images, geographic information and pictures.  The 
tactical communications system will also enhance the range of transmissions, 
while reducing distortion, interference and data error rates.  The consequence of 
this communications improvement is digitisation and more effective command, 
control and intelligence sharing.61
A lack of logistics capability was a major deficiency of the NZDF prior to 
the East Timor deployment.  The NZDF did not have an effective means of 
moving containerised supplies within the New Zealand area of operations (AO), 
until immediately before the Battalion deployment.  The NZDF purchased two 
truck-mounted cranes as a solution.  Although these cranes were critical to the 
East Timor deployment, the purchase of these cranes was made in late September 
1999.  Fortunately, the New Zealand manufacturer was able to deliver the cranes 
within a month.  Hence, the cranes were available for the initial deployment of the 
New Zealand Battalion.  Furthermore, at times NZBATT was forced to use 
packhorses to transport essential supplies to isolated company and platoon bases.  
“The demanding terrain and difficult weather conditions, especially during the 
wet season, have meant that the NZDF has had to improvise to get essential 
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supplies through to its positions in the rugged hill country of the Cova Lima 
district”.62  In all fairness, this shows initiative.  Although, this example may also 
imply a need to improve the NZDF’s airborne and mechanised logistics 
capability. 
In addition to the equipment deficiencies outlined above, the NZDF will 
require replacement infantry weapons.  In the short term, the C9 machine gun and 
the Carl Gustav 84mm recoilless anti-armour weapon require replacement.  The 
Carl Gustav is an ‘obsolete, inefficient, inaccurate, very-short range weapon’.63  
However, the Carl Gustav is flexible in the range of ordnance it can deliver, 
including illumination, smoke, anti-armour and anti-personnel rounds.  Hence to 
maintain the ability to deliver a diverse range of ordnance, the C9 and Carl Gustav 
may be replaced by a variety of weapon systems.  The collection will include a 
5.56mm machine gun and a Medium Range Anti-Armour Weapon.  However, the 
replacement systems will also have to deliver short-range illumination, bunker-
busting, anti-armour, anti-personnel incendiary and smoke rounds.  As illustrated 
in Somalia, and analysed in the armour section of this chapter, disembarked New 
Zealand soldiers will require protection from vehicular-ised heavy personnel 
weapons.  This capability will be enabled by the Medium Range Anti-Armour 
Weapon and Direct Fire Support Weapon, proposed in the Defence Long-Term 
Development Plan.64  Possible Direct Fire Support Weapons may include a 0.50 
calibre machine gun with computer assisted targeting or some form of 40mm 
automatic grenade launcher.  These types of weapons have been proven 
particularly useful in the case studies of this thesis. 
In terms of military principles, a lack of integrated communications has 
been a significant impediment to NZDF counterinsurgency operations in LIC.  
This is a serious issue that requires resolution.  In addition, aging infantry 
equipment has restricted the capacity of the NZDF to apply precise force. 
 
Training 
The delivery of pre-deployment training for personnel deploying to East Timor 
was critically important.  However, there were a number of issues that 
undermined the effectiveness and delivery of the pre-deployment training.  In the 
case of Bougainville, the DLOC-OLOC process and pre-deployment training were 
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basically irrelevant, and the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) rotations to 
Afghanistan have generated a separate set of issues. 
 Warning and Operational Orders (these documents outline expected unit 
functions in theatre) were not available to all units deploying to East Timor, this 
impacted units in the following ways.  First, this lack of orders reduced the time 
available for pre-deployment training.  Second, planning for training was 
constrained, and less task-specific than what would be expected, because the 
above orders were either not available or lacked accurate or complete intelligence 
data.  Third, the Commanders intent and mission objectives were not clear until 
Operational Orders were received.65
Brigadier Mortlock, the initial TMG commander, is highly critical of the 
DLOC-OLOC and Warning-Operational Order processes.  This is because these 
processes rely on a designated time period in which to train prior to deployment.  
This time period is not always available.  In the case of Bougainville, the TMG 
was required immediately to secure the temporary and fragile peace.  In addition, 
Major General Piers Reid stated that comparatively, the NZDF maintains a lower 
standard of readiness than the Australian Defence Force (ADF).  The ADF also 
uses the DLOC-OLOC process.  However, the entire ADF is at a higher state of 
readiness, and units are rotated through an Operational Level of Capability 
(OLOC).  On the contrary, the NZDF is a small organisation with huge 
commitments; this dynamic prevents the NZDF from maintaining such a level of 
capability.  Simply, resource, policy and personnel recruitment and retention 
issues in the NZDF reduce readiness.66  An NZDF report on lessons from East 
Timor states that “[t]here can be no doubt that New Zealand’s future military 
operations are constrained by the readiness limitations inherent in the Purchase 
Agreement.  Furthermore, the rationale for what degree of notice is required for 
what kind of scenario and what type and size of force should be re-examined in 
the light of operational requirements, rather than solely fiscal imperatives”.67
 In the case of East Timor, there was a limited timeframe for pre-
deployment training.  With the intelligence that was available, the NZDF was 
fairly well placed to incorporate terrain, weather and country briefing as part of 
the pre-deployment training.  However, due to coalition and domestic intelligence 
restrictions, the operating environment in East Timor was not fully appreciated.  
Moreover, attempts by planners to provide information through coalition liaison 
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were prevented.68  The limitations of NZDF intelligence are further examined 
below. 
 Initially, there was no contingency plan available for training, equipping, 
or supplying the first Battalion deployed to East Timor.  As a result, a training 
schedule had to be developed.  This training schedule was limited by time 
constraints, which precluded the analysis of existing information.  Therefore, 
Australian and British doctrine was incorporated into New Zealand planning, 
given the lack of contemporary New Zealand doctrine available.69  Nonetheless, 
New Zealand soldiers were generally provided with a decent and flexible pre-
deployment training. 
 Training encompassed individual, collective and joint competencies.  At 
the individual level, there were basic skill inadequacies including a lack of, ‘(1) 
live firing experience, (2) knowledge of urban warfare methods, (3) the ability to 
conduct weapon searches, and (4) unarmed combat skills’.70  At the collective 
level, training was limited.  Company Groups had little experience with combined 
arms operations with APCs, as this was not a significant part of recent past 
training.  Battalion Group exercises were only performed in Australia, again this 
was not a significant part of recent past training.  In addition, non-infantry 
personnel were required to form a full Battalion Group.  The skill levels of these 
non-infantry personnel were low.  Nonetheless, these non-infantry personnel were 
expected to deploy with the Battalion Group to East Timor, without additional 
training.  At the Headquarters level, one 8-hour Command and Control exercise 
was conducted prior to deployment.  At the joint level, there was no joint New 
Zealand training before deployment.  Victor Company personnel were trained 
with Australian Blackhawk helicopters prior to deployment and with New 
Zealand Iroquois on arrival in Dili.  The New Zealand Company and Battalion 
Groups had little joint warfare training with helicopters.  The Auditor-General 
states “Platoon and Company commanders needed to appreciate more fully how 
best to utilise helicopters”.71  This deficiency was exacerbated by a reduced 
number of joint exercises in the years prior to the East Timor deployment. 
 The NZDF provides an adequate level of combat training at the individual 
level.  However, counterinsurgency operations in LIC require additional forms of 
training.  Such training is classified into band or star groups (these are core skill 
sets that the individual must achieve, and vary depending of the individual’s 
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trade).  A regular soldier will have trained to approximately a five band/star grade, 
while a SAS soldier would have trained to approximately a fifteen band/star 
grade.72  Languages, counter-intelligence and specialised warfare skills could all 
be band group additions.  Simply in relation to LIC, counterinsurgency personnel 
require additional skill sets.  However, the Army can only train personnel to a 
standard, that time and resources permit. 
 An Army General Staff report prepared in May 2000 indicates the need for 
greater collective and combined training;73 joint and coalition training must also 
be frequent, cohesive and significant.  The requirement for improved “combined 
arms procedures”74 was a significant lesson from Exercise Black Diamond, 
according to Colonel Martyn Dunne.  On coalition training “General Cosgrove 
remarked in Dili in November 1999, [that] the ADF and the NZDF must engage 
in more combined exercises, exchange postings and build on the ‘common 
understanding’ that exists between the two nations.  Military cooperation, he said, 
must occur ‘rather more routinely between our countries’”.75
 The Joint Headquarters has been effective in making the single services 
aware of the requirement for joint training.  However, ‘given the competing 
requirements and restrictions, the services have difficulty scheduling core single 
service training, let alone setting time aside for joint training’.76  The issue here is, 
‘no individual training can be truly effective without joint training.  
Correspondingly, joint training cannot be effective if the individual units are not 
well trained in their single service core skills’.77  However, new units entering the 
NZDF will force joint training, as they are specifically designed for joint 
operations.  As an example, the new Multi-Role Vessel (MRV) will have to train 
with the other services, as its function is to operate, serve and be served by the 
other services.  Due to this evolving environment, the Joint Headquarters is 
integrating, where possible, single service crew training and exercises into joint 
training and exercises. 
In addition, there was a problem with Unauthorised Discharge (UD) of 
weapons in East Timor.  The cause of the UDs was explained by Brigadier Dunne 
as a “lack of familiarity”78 with the weapons used.  This problem needs to be 
overcome with more individual training, using live ammunition at DLOC.  The 
importance of training with live ammunition was indicated by all the New 
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Zealand battalion rotations that followed NZBATT 1, as there was a reduction in 
UDs.79
The PRT in Afghanistan includes personnel from all three services.  The 
pre-deployment training for the PRT has had to integrate all personnel, and raise 
the disparate group to a designated standard for the operation.  This has been a 
complex deployment, with the personnel being deployed exhibiting a good level 
of competence.  However, the NZDF is struggling with current deployments due 
to severe manpower shortages; combat and combat service support elements are 
below 80 percent establishment strength, and combat support elements are below 
70 percent establishment strength.80  These problems are exacerbated by the loss 
of a significant number of junior officers.81   
The causes of the manpower issues experienced presently, especially by 
the Army, are multifaceted.  First, in service personnel have been adversely 
influenced by the high rotation and deployment rate.  These issues of constant 
movement clash with a desire for stability, especially where family is concerned.  
Major General Piers Reid stated that he personally knows of three separate 
occasions, when married couples have exchanged children at the airport, as “Dad 
flies in from Iraq and Mum flies out to Afghanistan”.82  Second and similarly, the 
buoyant job, property and financial markets have drawn highly skilled personnel 
out of comparatively low paid military jobs into civilian sectors.  Moreover, 
private soldiers deploying to Afghanistan and Iraq are paid around NZ$30,000 per 
annum.  If these same soldiers accept the same level of risk, but work as 
bodyguards in the same countries, they can earn upwards of U.S. $150,000 
annually.  Third, there has been some dissatisfaction with NZDF equipment and 
leadership, which is being addressed.  Fourth, Brigadier Mortlock states there is 
no mechanism that facilitates a discourse between the military and the population.  
Hence, there is a lack of understanding among the population about the military, 
especially operationally.  This has generated social disrespect towards the 
military.83  Fostering a greater openness about operations, training, technological 
advancement and lessons learnt, may improve understanding and respect for the 
military.  This could be facilitated through greater participation in tertiary 
education of active service personnel.  Simply, (1) military personnel and 
academics need to collaborate on joint work, (2) military personnel must disperse 
across more universities domestically and internationally, and (3) academics must 
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generate a greater quantity of contemporary, comprehensive, realistic, objective 
and high-quality defence product.  However, to facilitate an improved interaction 
with academia, the NZDF may need to improve the timely delivery of non-
classified information to the public.  In the production of this thesis, Official 
Information Act requests were appropriately answered by the NZDF, but the 
response times were very slow (2-6 months).84  This is a regrettable situation, 
which as Air Marshall Bruce Ferguson, Chief of Defence Force explains, is 
caused by insufficient manpower at Army General Staff to fully process all 
Official Information Act requests.85  This is an unfortunate impediment to the 
legitimate passage of information, and hence should be rectified. 
These manpower issues may also have a latent effect on future operational 
planning.  In preparation for the East Timor deployment, “at all [planning] levels 
the staff structures involved were, to say the least, “thin”.  In many cases the 
process relied upon a handful of critical individuals”.86  This may well worsen, as 
the ‘loss of a cadre of junior officers’ is felt.87
 Combined arms and joint force are two military principles that the NZDF 
has failed to adequately train for.  Given the frequency with which the NZDF 
operates as a counterinsurgency force, these principles need to be more effectively 
rehearsed. 
 
Armour 
The following section analyses the fundamental functions of armour: protection, 
manoeuvre and firepower.  This analysis is in relation to NZDF deployments.  
With reference to the previous analysis, this section examines the capabilities of 
the New Zealand Light Armoured Vehicle (LAV) and Light Operational Vehicle 
(LOV) for counterinsurgency operations.  This section also makes 
recommendations to overcome areas of armour weakness in the NZDF. 
 
Protection 
One of the most significant upgrades required for the NZFOR deployment to 
Bosnia, was the application of appliqué armour to the M113 APC.  The armour 
package consisted of an Enhanced Appliqué Armour Kit (EAAK) of side armour, 
frontal armour, leased Australian Army anti-mine belly armour, internal spall 
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liners and Kevlar crew helmets.  This armour package gave the crew and 
embarked troops greater protection from mines, sniper fire, high calibre machine-
guns and smaller High Explosive Anti-Tank (HEAT(ie. Rocket Propelled 
Grenades)) rounds. 
 The EAAK armour was an effective, battle proven kit.  However the 
EAAK manufacturer, Rafael Industries, was approached because the United States 
Government’s Foreign Military Sales organisation could not approve military 
support for New Zealand in such a short timeframe.  This situation raises two 
questions: (1) why was the NZDF not eligible for immediate military assistance, 
and (2) does this situation indicate a flawed rationale behind the DLOC/OLOC 
policy.  Furthermore, the upgrades could not be undertaken in New Zealand, 
which could have caused additional risk. 
 Prior to the East Timor deployment, the NZDF identified the upgrading 
and refurbishing of 25 APCs as being critical to providing an adequate level of 
protection for deployed infantry.  The APCs were upgraded to a level, and with 
equipment, previously acquired for the Bosnia deployment.  The APC were 
refitted with EAAK appliqué armour, anti-mine belly armour and Kevlar spall 
liners.  Hence, possessing the armour kits ensured deploying forces would be 
adequately protected.  However, deployments that require critical equipment 
acquisitions put equipment, personnel and mission objectives at risk.   
 
Manoeuvrability 
In addition to the APC upgrade required for the Bosnia deployment, 21 Army 
Land Rovers needed significant upgrading and servicing before they became 
operationally capable.  The engine and brakes constituted the major upgrade for 
the Land Rovers.  The petrol engines of the Land Rovers were replaced with 
diesel engines.  The diesel engines improved reliability, simplified supply 
requirements (the British Battalion that the New Zealand Company was attached 
to did not operate petrol powered vehicles), and improved the safety and cost 
effectiveness of the Land Rover fleet.  The Land Rover brakes were upgraded 
from drum to disc types, so as to manage the altered vehicle characteristics.  
These upgrades were successful.  However, the time-frame was very tight, which 
reduced the possibility for testing the upgraded equipment.88
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As indicated in Bougainville operations, ground manoeuvre can be 
severely constrained by underdeveloped roads, difficult terrain and adverse 
weather conditions.  However, aging equipment can exacerbate the operational 
difficulties created by unfavourable environmental and infrastructural factors. 
 In the case of the East Timor deployment, the refurbishment and 
replacement of aging and unreliable Army vehicles presented the most significant 
possible constraint to the NZDF being able to deploy on-time.  In addition to an 
APC armour upgrade, it was necessary for: (1) the track and suspension of the 
deploying APCs to be replaced; (2) the engine, gearbox and steering systems on 
the APCs to be rebuilt; (3) the APCs weapon systems to be refurbished; and (4) 
the mechanical, electrical and structural components of the APCs to be 
meticulously inspected.  This replacement, refurbishment and inspection insured 
the APC fleet could operate effectively in East Timor’s difficult terrain.  This 
effectiveness was mainly due to the APC being a light, tracked vehicle.  There 
were significant issues, such as age related problems and poor logistics, which 
reduced the APC’s operational capability.  These issues are examined below. 
In addition to the APC fleet, there was a requirement for 35 Light 
Operational Vehicles (LOVs) to accompany the deployment to East Timor.  At 
the time, the LOVs in service were Land Rovers.  Due to the unreliability of the 
Land Rovers deployed to Bougainville, it was decided that these vehicles would 
no-longer be deployed operationally.  Hence, 35 civilian utility vehicles were 
purchased.89
These deficiencies indicate the propensity of previous New Zealand 
governments, to allow the degradation of military equipment to a point of 
complete obsolescence.  This obsolescence: (1) risks a fissure between NZDF 
capability and the Government’s Purchase Agreement requirements; and (2) puts 
NZDF personnel and mission objectives at undue risk.  An Army General Staff 
report prepared in May 2000 further illustrates the danger obsolete and inadequate 
equipment can pose to personnel and mission objectives.90  These problems were 
further exacerbated by the Cabinet taking from March 1999 until July 1999 to 
authorise the upgrading and refurbishment of the deploying APC fleet and other 
critical equipment purchases.   
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Firepower and Visibility 
A lack of firepower has been a consistent cause of risk for the Army.  Except for 
the most rudimentarily armed foe, the New Zealand Army has been out-gunned 
and out-ranged. 
In addition to appliqué armour, the NZDF M113 support vehicles 
(Ambulance, Fitters Vehicles, Mortar Carriers and Recovery Vehicle) were also 
fitted with 0.50 calibre machine-guns and armoured cupola shield.  This firepower 
upgrade was a response to the risk level expected in Bosnia.  In addition, the 
visibility and fire systems of the remaining NZFOR M113 APCs were also 
enhanced.  This enhancement included search lights and Sabre II Image 
Intensifying night sights.  Analogous with the EAAK armour, the Sabre night 
sight could not be fitted in New Zealand.  In turn, “[t]he Sabre II sight was not 
linked to the machine guns due in part to the limited time to develop and prove the 
design”.91  This is an extremely serious deficiency; and a deficiency that the 
DLOC/OLOC system will maintain.  Furthermore, the Sabre II sights were second 
generation systems, which were less capable than the American made third 
generation systems that the NZDF wanted.92  Longer lead-times may have 
enabled the third generation equipment to have been acquired.  In addition, there 
was no training on, or testing of, the new weapons before deployment.  On the last 
rotation of troops through Bosnia (K Company 3), the shortcomings of the rushed 
procurement were fully realised.  Staff Sergeant Dalton explained, “[a]fter the 
shoot began we encountered many problems with the guns and the T50 turret 
[main M113 firing position].  The first of these was that the 50 cal [machine gun; 
M113 main armament] kept getting the belt trapped on the newly installed night 
sight.  The rounds would catch the switch on the bottom of the sight and stop the 
gun feeding correctly.  This would happen at certain degrees of elevation and the 
end result in all of the vehicles was that the feed pawls on the guns became weak 
and would not hold the rounds up or they broke off completely.  The second 
problem was that the turret traverse handle had been changed from the top of the 
traverse box to the bottom and traversed the opposite way to what we were used 
to.  This was not discovered by myself [Dalton] until now [sic] because my own 
vehicle, which was still back at Kiseljak, was different.  The outcome of this was 
that the crews had to re-teach themselves to shoot as everything was different 
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from what we had in [New Zealand] NZ.  The third problem was that the M113s 
that were not from [Headquarters] HQ and were constantly used on the 
checkpoints had weak return springs, from leaving the weapons locked in the fully 
elevated position, as was the standard operational practise when on checkpoint 
duty.  This caused the guns not to recoil fully, again causing stoppages.  All this 
aside [sic] there was some woeful shooting which tended to drop our morale even 
lower.  Many of the older hands were getting some good strikes on target 
however, once a stoppage occurred and the necessary drills had been carried out.  
Engagement times were slow and ranging tended to be done by “walking” the 
rounds in, rather than by standard gunnery practise.  The Canadians on the other 
hand were shooting well…  This was out to ranges of 1600 metres and beyond.  
The [Canadian] 50 calibres were used with pinpoint accuracy…  We [NZFOR] 
left the range in an uncertain frame of mind, knowing our guns were not as good 
as we were used to them being…  [W]e [NZFOR] continued on our way home 
[base] vowing to rip the night sights out and turn the traverse boxes up the right 
way”.93  Fortunately, this episode was a Canadian inspired exercise, towards the 
end of the UNPROFOR deployment.  Had the New Zealand M113s been 
engaging an armed threat, the outcome may have been dead New Zealand soldiers 
or dead ostensibly protected civilians.  For a professional army to be effective, 
soldiers must be highly trained on, and proficient with, equipment that they will 
be likely to use in conflict.  Hence, that equipment must be available in peacetime 
for: (1) training, and (2) be held in sufficient quantities to equip any possible force 
deployment.  Dalton also indicated that the Canadian gunners were more 
proficient than some of their New Zealand counterparts; this deficiency could be 
overcome by more gunnery practise. 
In addition to the poor handling of the M113s 0.50 calibre machine-gun, 
the gun had a shorter effective range than most sniper rifles and anti-tank weapons 
in theatre.  This was compounded by the fact NZFOR had no other long-range 
direct-fire weapons in Bosnia.  This lack of long-range firepower would have 
placed the NZFOR soldiers at a distinct disadvantage if they had been engaged by 
enemy forces. 
Strong explains “[t]he experience in Bosnia showed the New Zealand 
Defence Force that it could not rely on the short time between being advised to 
deploy overseas, and the deployment date, to equip its forces to an acceptable 
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level.  If in the future the New Zealand Government requires the Defence Force to 
contribute to multinational peacekeeping efforts, the Defence Force need to be 
maintained at a high state of equipment readiness.  Bosnia also shows that 
decreased Government funding caused the Defence Force to lag behind specific 
military technological developments.  This is to a point where they are unable to 
compete in a modern war, or even some peacekeeping environments, without 
significant capital expenditure prior to deployment”.94  The same statement could 
also describe the readiness state of the NZDF, on deployment to East Timor.  
Simply, the NZDF must be more ready. 
 
Transforming the Army – Light Infantry to Motorised Light Infantry 
The introduction into service of the generation three Light Armoured Vehicle 
(LAV) and the Light Operational Vehicle (LOV) have significantly improved the 
capabilities of the NZDF.  The LAV and LOV have ameliorated many of the 
problems examined above.  However, the underlying causes of equipment failure 
and under-performance indicated above will not be solved by the LAV and LOV. 
 The LAV is a highly mobile armoured weapon system, designed to 
improve the performance integration of armour and infantry.  Like the up-
armoured M113, the intrinsic LAV armour will provide protection from: 7.62mm 
ammunition, 155mm High Explosive (HE) artillery rounds beyond 15 metres, and 
mines containing up to 7.5 kilograms of trinitrotoluene (TNT).  Appliqué armour 
available to the NZDF should also offer protection from 14.5mm ammunition.  
The LAV also incorporates a warning system, to alert the crew to incoming laser 
range finders and target designators.  Hence, the LAV should provide adequate 
protection in most LIC environments, as the primary weapons of insurgents are 
5.45mm, 5.56mm and 7.62mm assault rifles, sniper rifles, conventional or 
improvised mines, with the addition of some 0.50 calibre vehicle-mounted 
machine guns.  On operations in Iraq, the LAV provided adequate protection, but 
was enhanced with appliqué armour by the U.S. Marines.  The LAV has also 
protected Australian users from suicide car-bombs in Iraq and Canadian users 
from anti-armour mines in Ethiopia/Eritrea.95   
A growing threat to counterinsurgent forces in LIC is the Rocket Propelled 
Grenade (RPG).  The New Zealand Army is correct in articulating that the best 
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form of defence for armour from man-portable, short-range, High Explosive Anti-
tank (HEAT) weapons “is to have dismounted infantry clear potential areas of 
risk, especially in defiles and urban terrain”.96  However, such infantry tactics will 
not always be appropriate or conducive to mission objectives.  For example, high 
speed manoeuvre may be required to reinforce or escort friendly forces, or 
intercept or rout enemy forces.  These activities negate slow infantry clearing 
operations, and increase the importance of armour protection.  In addition to 
conventional Appliqué armour, the NZDF should investigate the effectiveness of 
steel mesh armour.  Steel mesh armour is attached to, but stands 10-15 
centimetres proud of, the armoured vehicle’s intrinsic armour.  The steel mesh 
detonates HEAT rounds before main-armour-impact.  This effect dissipates the 
force of the round, leaving insufficient explosive power to penetrate the main 
armour of the vehicle.  Steel mesh armour is a cheap and simple, but less 
effective, alternative to Explosive Reactive Armour (ERA).  However, steel mesh 
armour has been effectively utilised by the British Army in Iraq and the Russian 
Armed Forces in Chechnya. 
With respect to manoeuvre, the LAV provides a high degree of on-road 
and a reasonable degree of off-road capability.  The LAV will provide good 
strategic mobility, but may suffer from insufficient armour in complex terrain at 
the tactical level.  The technical systems incorporated into the LAV will assist 
with navigation, and enable night and all weather situational awareness.  This 
latter ability will better enable night operations, when a technologically inferior 
foe is functionally dislocated.97   
As an aside, it is important that motorised infantry units maintain a high 
level of personnel fitness.  The British found that personnel operating as infantry 
in the Falklands conflict, but who trained in and were from motorised units, did 
not have the fitness to keep pace with infantry from non-mechanised units.  
Hence, the NZDF must provision adequate training for dismounted light infantry.  
For example, this training will facilitate infantry operations in complex non-urban 
terrain, and low sustainability paratrooper and heliborne missions. 
In the realm of Firepower and Target Acquisition, the LAV provides a 
significant capability improvement for the NZDF.  The LAV is armed with two 
7.62mm machine guns and one 25mm stabilised automatic cannon.  The 25mm 
cannon fires either Armour Piercing Fin Stabilised Discarding Sabot – Traced 
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(APFSDS-T) or High Explosive Incendiary – Traced (HEI-T) ammunition.  
Electronic target acquisition and designation equipment of the LAV includes a 
day, image intensification and thermal image sight,98 global positioning system 
and laser range finder.  This equipment communicates with a tactical navigation 
system that provides navigation, target re-acquisition and battlefield awareness 
information.  As illustrated by the Canadian Army, the aforementioned main 
weapon system and targeting technologies enable a “LAV company to engage and 
destroy targets at well over two kilometres, and along a frontage of up to four 
kilometres or more”.99  The Canadian Army also states that “[t]he coordinated fire 
from the LAVs can kill a large portion of the tanks in existence today, excluding 
newer generation tanks”.100  In fact, Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicles (IFVs) 
firing the same 25mm automatic cannon, destroyed T-72 Main Battle Tanks 
(MBTs) in Iraq.  However of greater significance, in terms of counterinsurgency 
operations, is the ability of the LAV to engage point targets at extended distances.  
In Somalia for example, the warring factions utilised ‘technicals’; civilian utility 
vehicles fitted with 0.50 calibre machine guns.  A typical tactic employing the 
technicals ‘was to emerge from behind a dune in the desert, fire a few bursts at the 
UN peacekeepers, then withdraw’.101  “The range of the [Somali] 50cal [machine 
guns] was much greater than the … C9 [machine gun], Styer rifle, or anything 
else available [within]… the New Zealand Infantry Battalion”.102  Hence, the 
“technicals could fire at us [New Zealand peacekeepers] with impunity”.103  The 
LAV offers the ability to acquire and engage such targets, with pin-point accuracy 
from a position of relative safety. 
The 2nd Battalion of the Royal Canadian Regiment (2RCR) characterise 
the LAV capabilities and requirements are follows:  “Today’s [motorised] infantry 
section is a two part fighting system comprised of the vehicle [LAV] and the 
dismounted section.  When the two parts work together, they are most effective…  
The training required to achieve proficiency in these tasks will likely prove to be 
the greatest challenge for commanders within today’s environment of heavy 
tasking”.104
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Tactics; Command, Control and Communications (C3) 
The Canadian Army has indicated that as a consequence of the introduction of the 
LAV, Tactics and Command, Control and Communications have become 
considerably more complex.  Therefore, the training of motorised light infantry 
units has become more complex, comprehensive, technologically focused and 
demanding. 
 The LAV provides significant situational awareness for dismountable 
troops (dismounts).  Hence, all dismounts should receive basic training on the 
LAV’s observation technology, so as to fully exploit this equipment.  Crew 
members also require “[c]ontinual and comprehensive training [to ensure the 
effective operation of] weapon systems, sights, navigation aids and other LAV 
components”.105  The technological systems of the LAV cause crew “skill fade if 
they don’t [sic] use the LAV constantly”.106  Hence, LAV crews and dismounts 
require extensive and continual training, especially for night operations.  Night 
operations can functionally dislocate unsophisticated enemy forces, but are 
demanding on LAV crews.  Hence, night training must be encouraged to build 
confidence in abilities and equipment.  “LAV units require well-trained, cohesive 
crews, in order to achieve high levels of proficiency”.107  The LAV also requires 
high proficiency and leadership from crew Captains and Sergeants,108 as LAV 
operations can be highly independent and cover an extended area of operations. 
 The synergy created between infantry and armour by the LAV, also 
creates a dilemma.  There is greater situational awareness available to the infantry 
commander from within the LAV turret, due to the technological systems.  In 
addition, coordination with the LAV Captains is more effective from within the 
LAV.  Hence, upon disembarkation the infantry commander loses a degree of 
situational awareness and synergy but enhances his ability to command and lead 
the infantry.  This issue can only be overcome with joint experience and training. 
Target acquisition is critical in all conflict scenarios, for both defensive 
and offensive operations.  In counterinsurgency operations target acquisition can 
be complicated, as enemy activity is purposely non-linear and covert.  As 
indicated by the case studies of this thesis, armoured units are hindered in 
detecting and monitoring all-spectrum enemy activity.  This is because the 
sighting envelopes of armoured units are restricted.  The outcome of non-linear 
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covert enemy activity and constrained detection envelopes, can be, unanticipated 
and accurate incoming enemy fire.  Furthermore, the potential for unobserved 
enemy action is amplified at night.  To diminish the potential for effective enemy 
activity, an unobstructed field of vision is necessary.   Specifically in reference to 
the LAV, the Canadian Army indicates a requirement for night vision goggles to 
be provided for the LAV crew commander.109  Hence, open-hatched all-spectrum 
observation by day and night will be possible, and will ensure unit security.  In 
addition, the dismountable infantry will also have to be trained for night 
observation tasks.  This is because the extended use of “thermal optics lead to 
crew fatigue”.110
The tactics for insuring unit security will be divergent, depending on the 
adversary.  When opposing an advanced enemy, the utilisation of deception and 
concealed action may be paramount.  For example, the mechanised and armoured 
units of the Serbian Army effectively hid in Kosovo’s complex terrain.  This 
Serbian deception plan and the lack of NATO ground forces, prevented NATO 
airpower from detecting and destroying the fielded Serbian units.  When opposing 
a lightly armed unsophisticated opponent, concealment may be counterproductive.  
Positioning the LAV in open terrain will enable the exploitation of the onboard 
observation, target acquisition and weapon systems.  Hence, enemy units can be 
observed, targeted and eliminated, while remaining outside the effective range of 
the enemy’s weapons. 
The LAV will extend areas of operation and enable increased mobility.   
Hence, augmented combat support and combat service support operations will be 
required.  These support operations are partly the task of the Light Operational 
Vehicle (LOV).  In the function of combat support, the LOV will be required to: 
“carry mortars and short range weapons that are too heavy to be man-packed; tow 
artillery”; 111 and provide a platform for communications and C2.  As for combat 
service support, the LOV will need to transfer “spare parts, specialised 
ammunition, fuel, food,”112 sundry items and casualties between bases or general 
logistics vehicles and forward positions on or near the battlefield.  In East Timor, 
the Australian Army established that LAV elements could move across terrain 
faster than combat service support elements, especially over difficult terrain.  It 
was suggested that the Australian Army may be forced to convert more LAVs into 
combat service support vehicles.  This is an expensive and inefficient option.  The 
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LOV should, however, effectively provide both combat service and combat 
service support.  The New Zealand Army states “[t]he Pinzgauer [LOV] is, 
arguably, the finest extreme mobility vehicle in the world today”.113  Importantly, 
New Zealand soldiers support this fact.114   
The LOV is also on operation in Afghanistan with the New Zealand 
Special Air Service.  “These vehicles will be [sic] heavily armed and able to 
operate independently far from their bases”.115  It is also likely that these vehicles 
will carry advanced communications, observation, acquisition, and targeting 
equipment.  This technical kit carried will be in addition to direct and indirect fire 
equipment.  In addition to Special Force operations, the LOV can “operate down 
in peacekeeping, [and assume] patrol, personnel movement and 
reconnaissance”116 tasks. 
With the future in mind, a leading tenet in the NZDF must be to maintain 
the LOV and LAV elements at (1) a high state of readiness and (2) abreast of 
technological advancement.  Unfortunately, this chapter has clearly illustrated that 
readiness and technology have been lacking in the NZDF.  Furthermore, these 
problems have been exacerbated by the DLOC/OLOC process.  Hence, the NZDF 
will have to be active in maintaining readiness and the technological edge.  The 
NZDF must also be vigilant in preventing the DLOC/OLOC process from 
constraining technological advancement.  The NZDF is more effectively 
equipped, with the aforementioned armour upgrades, to undertake combined arms 
operations in LIC.    
 
Artillery 
New Zealand artillery has not been used in combat since the Vietnam War.  This 
in no way undermines the fact that artillery is an indispensable part of 
counterinsurgency operations in LIC.  Artillery is the soldier’s all weather, day 
and night instrument of fire support.  However, the use of artillery by 
counterinsurgency forces in LIC must conform to three principles: combined 
arms, precision and the use of firebases.  These issues are analyses in this thesis’ 
chapter ‘Military Force in Low Intensity Conflict’.  Critically for New Zealand, 
“the 105mm gun, as a howitzer, is probably reaching the end of its life”.117
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 Internationally, the minimum calibre of artillery for main operations is at 
least 155mm.  The larger calibre offers extended range from a relatively light gun, 
with the provision for innovation, such as “terminally [precision] guided 
munitions”.118  However, upgrading to a 155mm gun may require larger artillery 
units.119  This requirement may prove problematic, as the current artillery units 
are presently 30 percent under establishment strength.120  Other solutions may 
include an alternative gun system, or more probably a vehicle mounted heavy 
mortar (LOV or LAV type vehicle).  For example, the 120mm mortar ‘has greater 
firepower but shorter range than the 105mm gun, and can deliver an enormous 
mix of ordnance’,121 including terminally guided munitions.  The 120mm mortar 
may be effective at supporting manoeuvre forces, but may prove less effective in 
counterinsurgency operations. 
The case studies of this thesis have illustrated the growing requirement for 
terminally guided munitions, due to the critical nature of precision and 
discrimination on the part of counterinsurgents in LIC.  It has also been 
demonstrated that, high trajectories are critical for mountain and urban operations.  
A 120mm mortar should effectively provide for the two requirements above.  
However, counterinsurgency operations in LIC also require long-range indirect 
fire, ease of deployment and the protection of firebases.  155mm artillery could 
provide long-range precision fire, thus enabling the consolidation of units in 
firebases.  Internationally there is a move towards lightweight 155mm artillery, 
such as the LW155 howitzer that can be transported by a CH-47 Chinook.  Most 
vehicle mounted 120mm mortars are not transportable by helicopter.  However, a 
towed 120mm mortar could be deployed by helicopter, but may not have the 
range to support manoeuvre elements from static firebases.  These issues are 
analysed further in the artillery subsection of the next chapter. 
 
Aviation 
Fixed and rotary wing aviation assets are an indispensable element in 
counterinsurgency operations.  The following subsection analyses the capabilities 
of the Royal New Zealand Air Force (RNZAF) and NZDF in the application of 
airpower in counterinsurgency operations. 
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Helicopters - Essential Nature and Use 
The RNZAF’s UH-1H Iroquois helicopter detachment provided an effective and 
essential troop-lift, reconnaissance, medical-evacuation and support capability to 
the NZDF deployment to East Timor.  Force multiplication was a valuable 
outcome, enabled by the ability of the Iroquois detachment to move troops and 
supplies across mountainous clear/jungle/wooded terrain. The helicopter 
detachment’s effectiveness is indicative of the good level of competency among 
RNZAF personnel.  However, only three out of four Iroquois initially requested 
by the Government to serve in East Timor, achieved OLOC in the prescribed 
period of time. 
 No. 3 Squadron (operate the UH-1H Iroquois) and the RNZAF 
demonstrated competency in planning for the East Timor operation.  No. 3 
Squadron made an effective contribution to NZDF and coalition joint planning 
groups.  Despite significant time constraints, the RNZAF and No. 3 Squadron 
were able to identify and overcome most personnel and equipment deficiencies 
prior to deployment.  However, additional risk was created by the terminal 
preparation for operations in East Timor.  In addition, the last-minute readiness of 
No. 3 Squadron prevented a period of acclimatisation being undertaken.  
Experience gained through active deployments and a rigorous domestic and 
international training schedule, enabled No. 3 Squadron to effectively plan for 
self-sufficient support on deployment to East Timor.  However, No. 3 Squadron 
planning was undermined by a lack of, and poor quality of, intelligence on their 
destination Area of Operations (AO).  This lack of information was partially due 
to the Australian-led INTERFET Headquarters not designating a national AO, 
prior to deployment.  The Australian Defence Force may have been assessing the 
capability of the NZDF operationally, prior to assigning an AO. 
 However, there were a number of pre-deployment and in-theatre issues 
that indicate limited No. 3 Squadron (helicopters) and joint force preparedness.  
These issues range from critical equipment upgrades to hurried pre-deployment 
training of aircrew.  No. 3 Squadron made an effective contribution to the East 
Timor deployment.  However, the level of threat, East Timor’s natural 
environment and the Iroquois’ lift capability, limited Air Force and Army 
operations.  These issues are analysed in the applicable subsections below.122
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Protection 
Given the level of risk (low-medium) associated with the East Timor operation, 
the deployed Iroquois required protection against small-arms fire.  This protection 
package included (1) an armoured floor, and (2) integrated body armour / life 
preservers (integrated vests).  The Operational Preparedness Reporting System 
(OPRES) had reported for some years, that the protection package was critical for 
No. 3 Squadron to meet the requirements of the Government’s Purchase 
Agreement.  However critical, these item were not selected as a high priority by 
either the RNZAF or NZDF.  The Iroquois’ armoured floor was not prioritised, as 
it was to be addressed by a planned upgrade or replacement of the utility 
helicopter in 2003-05.  The integrated vests had been a RNZAF project 
throughout the 1990s.  Had the RNZAF been able to adequately resource these 
projects, both could have been in-service well before the East Timor 
deployment.123
Moreover, this protection package should have been available for the 
Bougainville deployment.  As it was, the aircrew were forced to wear ballistic 
vests borrowed from the New Zealand Police, underneath flotation vests.  This 
improvised design was functional, but constrained the aircrew’s actions unduly.  
In Bougainville, the Iroquois only had onboard armour protection for the pilots.  
Given the unarmed nature of the Bougainville operation, the importance of 
armour was elevated as the only form of personnel protection.  Fortunately, the 
only time a TMG Iroquois was fired upon, the round missed and no further rounds 
were fired.124
As part of the NZDF contingency planning undertaken in early 1999, it 
was found that both the Iroquois armour and integrated vests were critical to the 
East Timor deployment.  The RNZAF began to identify suppliers of Iroquois 
armour in July 1999, and had finalised a purchase agreement for four sets of 
armour by August 1999.  These first sets were installed, enabling four Iroquois to 
deploy to East Timor on 24 September 1999.  However on 18 September 1999, 
the RNZAF was instructed to ready an additional two Iroquois to be deployed to 
East Timor.  Given the need to requisition, manufacture and fit armour to these 
additional Iroquois prior to deployment, the final two Iroquois were not deployed 
until 14 October 1999.  As noted earlier, the acquisition of the integrated vests had 
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been active through the 1990s.  By August 1998, the ML Lifeguard Equipment 
Ltd integrated vests had been selected as the preferred choice.  However, a 
purchase order was not placed with ML Lifeguard Equipment Ltd until 27 July 
1999.  By which time, ML Lifeguard Equipment Ltd could not meet the allotted 
deadline of 1 September 1999.  The British Ministry of Defence kindly lent the 
RNZAF 24 integrated vests for the East Timor deployment.  These unmodified 
British vests were effective, but did not fully meet the operational requirements of 
No. 3 Squadron.125
There are a number of issues that arise from last-minute preparation.  First, 
the terminal acquisition of helicopter armour and integrated vests made product 
testing and pre-deployment training of and with this equipment impossible.  
Second, had the British loan of integrated vests not been available, Iroquois 
aircrews would have deployed without personal protection, or at best with 
improvised protection.  Third, the Iroquois are integral to New Zealand’s Counter-
Terrorist capability, a standing requirement set out in the Government’s Purchase 
Agreement.  However, without the integrated vest and helicopter armour, the 
RNZAF could not fulfil the Counter-Terrorist component of the Purchase 
Agreement.  In short, a critical enabler (helicopters) in joint force operations was 
insufficiently supported.  Utility helicopters supporting joint force operations are 
essential to counterinsurgency and therefore the NZDF must improve this 
capability. 
 
Firepower and Target Acquisition and Designation Equipment 
The RNZAF UH-1H Iroquois is a basic utility helicopter, hence the only form of 
firepower carried is a pintle-mounted M60 machine gun positioned at the rear of 
each cargo bay door.  The M60 is carried to provide cover-fire for embarking and 
disembarking troops and general suppressing fire.  The RNZAF UH-1H has no 
target acquisition or designation equipment.  Under OLOC, when an Iroquois is 
deployed on operation, it must be provided with door gunners. However, the 
training of door gunners was not funded or maintained as a part of DLOC.  Hence, 
personnel had to be recruited, albeit from within the RNZAF’s Air Security 
Branch, screened and trained at airborne door gunnery.126
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 The initial door gunner training was accomplished over a six week period, 
beginning August 1999.  These door gunners completed their training by 17 
September 1999 and deployed with the first four Iroquois on 24 September 1999.  
However, on 18 September the RNZAF was instructed to ready an extra two 
Iroquois, this required extra door gunners to be trained.  The training of the 
second set of door gunners was further complicated by a lack of available Iroquois 
to train on.  The second set of training could not be completed in time, and left 
No. 3 Squadron without the requisite number of door gunners.  Although the door 
gunner training course was reduced to four weeks duration, the second set of door 
gunners did not arrive in East Timor until November 1999.127
 Door gunnery is a core skill, enabling the helicopter squadron to satisfy 
the Counter-Terrorist requirements of the Government’s Purchase Agreement.   
However at the time of East Timor, door gunnery was not a requirement under 
DLOC.  Door gunnery is a requirement under OLOC.  The Auditor-General 
argues “[b]uilding up a capacity, such as door gunners, takes a considerable 
amount of time.  If deployment requirements change, the ability to conduct the 
training can be put under pressure, reducing the amount of training provided”.128  
In the author’s view, door gunnery must be a part of DLOC and be trained for 
regularly.  Door gunnery is integral to No. 3 Squadron’s mission brief (this brief 
includes support for the SAS in conducting counter-terrorist operations and 
support for regular combat operations (under standard operating procedures)); 
hence door gunners must maintain excellence in their gunnery skill at all times.  
Furthermore, door gunnery must be a part of DLOC so that the Government 
compensates the RNZAF for maintaining the skill set.  After the East Timor 
operation, No. 3 Squadron has developed a reserve of door gunners.  However, if 
this ability is not recognised and formalised by the Government as a part of 
DLOC, the capability may be lost if funding is tight or the attention of personnel 
is diverted.   
 
Communications 
Prior to the East Timor deployment, the communications equipment of the 
deploying Iroquois were upgraded.  The KY-58 communications terminal was 
replaced by the KY-100 terminal.  The KY-100 terminal enabled greater 
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interoperability with coalition partners, in addition to enhanced bandwidth and 
broader frequency capabilities.129  The communications upgrade had been 
initiated prior to the notification of deployment to East Timor, but had to be 
rushed to completion.  The communications installation “posed real difficulties 
that were overcome thanks to the outstanding work”130 of RNZAF staff.  The KY-
100 communications equipment was installed in the first three Iroquois by 17 
September 1999, three days before the deployment deadline.  Installing the secure 
communications gear so close to an active deployment, constrained the testing of 
this equipment and severely limited pre-deployment training with the equipment.  
The compression of installation time increased (1) the risk that the equipment 
would not be available and (2) the chance of equipment failure in theatre.  The 
deployment also illustrated inadequacies in the current No. 3 Squadron 
communications equipment. 131  Effective communication is a fundamental 
military principle and must always be maintained at a high state of readiness and 
capability. 
  
Trained Personnel 
The following section illustrates and analyses the areas in which further helicopter 
training is required, and the rationale for that training.  As is examined below, the 
interaction of air and ground elements has been a leading deficiency in NZDF 
capability.  The following examples illustrate the necessity for intensified joint 
training, which must be frequent and encompass substantial force elements.  
However, featured below are a number of specific force elements that have 
required further training, or operated below expectations. 
Prior to Operation Golden Fleece 1989 (OGF), the NZDF had no joint 
force procedures for airborne medical evacuations.  The simulated medical 
emergencies in OGF, were described as “ad hoc”.132  As indicated in the NZDF 
2005 Annual Report, No. 3 and N. 40 Squadrons meet the requirements for 
airborne medical evacuation detailed in the Government’s Purchase Agreement.  
However, night and all weather airborne medical evacuation will not be realised 
by No. 3 and No. 40 Squadrons until the introduction of the NH90 and the 
upgrade of the C-130 is complete. 
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The RNZAF met with difficulty deploying Air (base) Security personnel 
to East Timor.  Air Security Branch was a new unit (combining General Service 
Instructors and Air Force Police) that was not fully operational.  Moreover, the 
door gunners trained for East Timor were drawn from the Air Security Branch, 
further degrading personnel available for securing the RNZAF camp at Suai.  The 
pre-deployment training of the Air Security Branch was further degraded by a 
lack of: ‘(1) air (base) security doctrine; (2) standard operating procedures; (3) 
fully trained instructors; (4) time; and (5) suitable security equipment (night 
vision equipment, flood lighting and body armour)’.133  In theatre, the above 
problems caused the Air Security Branch to perform below expectation. 
Joint training between the RNZAF’s No. 3 Squadron and the Army 
appeared to be an area of deficiency, prior to the East Timor deployment.  
Moreover, this joint training deficiency remains an unresolved issue.  Currently, 
No. 3 Squadron undertakes joint training with the Army to: (1) advance single 
service Standard Operating Procedures for joint operations, (2) train personnel 
who specialise in operating with the other service (eg. Air Liaison Officers), (3) 
train Platoons and Company groups in utilising helicopters for the provision of 
supply and troop lift requirements.  The Army and No. 3 Squadron have an 
agreement for the provision of a minimum number of joint training hours or 
tasks.134  However, the agreement is seldom met, due to operational deployments 
and other task requirements.135  As an example, the major NZDF triennial joint 
and combined exercise, Joint Kiwi O5, was postponed until 2008 because of 
operational requirements.  Moreover, the level (number of Iroquois deployed) of 
No. 3 Squadron support for joint training does not effectively represent the 
jointness, fluidity or complexity of the modern battlefield. 
  As a part of a joint exercise held in 1996, three Iroquois moved a 
Company of 100 soldiers over a distance of 10 kilometres.  This operation took 1 
hour and 40 minutes to complete.  Following the exercise an after action report 
stated that this joint operation was “laughable at best”.136  The author would argue 
that (depending on terrain) most dismounted infantrymen could march 10 
kilometres in 1 hour and 40 minutes.  Marching the Company over the distance 
described above, would also maintain the mass of the unit.  The three Iroquois 
described above could only carry a total of twelve troops per sortie.  This meant 
the first twelve person unit had to maintain the security of the landing zone (LZ), 
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for between 15 and 20 minutes before the next twelve person unit arrived.  If the 
LZ is initially under enemy fire, or arouses the interest of enemy combatants, the 
earlier troops deployed may find attrition quickly eroding their mass.  A 
dismounted enemy unit cannot be allowed to tactically manoeuvre faster than a 
New Zealand unit deployed by helicopter. 
The first Company-sized heliborne insertion of New Zealand Army 
personnel since the Vietnam War occurred when Victor Company was deployed 
to Suai, East Timor.  At the time, Suai was the site of significant Militia violence, 
and Militia members were engaging INTERFET Special Forces in the region.  It 
was decided, despite the high risk situation, Victor Company would be deployed 
prior to the New Zealand Battalion’s arrival.  Given the risk, Victor Company’s 
commanding officer, Major Howard, insisted: (1) the deployment be the Brigade’s 
main task, (2) that Australian Blackhawk helicopters would transport the 
Company quickly and en masse, and (3) sufficient logistics support be provided to 
support the Company when deployed in Suai.  All of these conditions were agreed 
to. 
Over 100 of Victor Company’s personnel, plus three day’s supplies and 
support weapons, were deployed via nine Australian Blackhawk helicopters to 
Suai, on 10 September 1999.  The air-insertion went smoothly.  Victor Company 
took control of Suai airfield from SAS personnel, dug defensive positions and 
secured the Suai beachhead.  Once the beachhead was secure, four New Zealand 
APCs, a number of trucks and three weeks of supplies were landed by Australian 
landing craft.137
As was stated earlier, the jointness, fluidity and complexity of the modern 
battlefield are not adequately trained for by joint Army-No. 3 Squadron exercises.  
The air mobility operations of the Iroquois do not represent contemporary troop 
lift capabilities and realities.  If Platoon and Company commanders cannot 
experience the potential capability of moving entire units in training, they may not 
fully comprehend what such capabilities mean for active operations.  In East 
Timor, it was found “[n]ot all Platoon and Company Commanders were familiar 
with the use of helicopters in Army operations”.138  This was because “joint 
training opportunities at the collective level are [sic] limited, [and] not all 
Commanders get to put theory into practice”.139  This criticism is not directly 
focused at the Air Force or Army, as No. 3 Squadron would require more than 25 
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Iroquois to effectively deploy a Company-sized unit in one sortie.  The limiting 
factor is helicopters, No. 3 Squadron only has 14 Iroquois.  This small number of 
helicopters cannot adequately produce joint force effects. 
 
Tactics 
A further requirement illustrated by OGF, was the need for a reconnaissance and 
surveillance capable helicopter.  In the exercise, the role was undertaken by the 
Australian Army’s Bell 206B-1 Kiowa light observation helicopter.  This type of 
helicopter would also be useful in airborne command and control, and liaison 
operations, as shown in Somalia.  This deficiency could be rectified with the 
current training/light utility helicopter purchase project.  The synergies created by 
observation helicopters is analysed in the subsection, The Future – NH90, below. 
 
Flying and Base Conditions 
NZDF operations in East Timor became relatively independent when New 
Zealand forces took control of a large East Timorese region bordering Indonesia.  
The majority of the New Zealand Battalion and No. 3 Squadron were stationed at 
Suai.  The construction of the Iroquois base at Suai was assisted by Australian 
Military Engineers, and incorporated the newly acquired Deployable Bulk Fuel 
Installation (DBFI).140
 Initially, an Australian Blackhawk detachment was responsible for the 
troop lift provided to the New Zealand Battalion.  After the Australian 
Blackhawks departed at the end of 2000, the Iroquois detachment became 
responsible for the troop transport requirements of the Australian and New 
Zealand Battalions deployed along the Indonesian border.  This troop transport 
task was in addition to reconnaissance flights, supply operations and airborne 
medical evacuations.   
The Iroquois were critical to troop movement and supply operations, as 
East Timor’s terrain and weather made land movement and transport slow and 
difficult.   No 3 Squadron was also credited with being more responsive towards 
the New Zealand Battalion, in comparison to helicopter units under foreign 
command.  However, an agreement between the New Zealand Government and 
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the United Nations, in relation to the number of flying hours undertaken by No. 3 
Squadron, inhibited some tasks being completed.141
As stated earlier, the threat level and environmental conditions in East 
Timor degraded the performance of the Iroquois.  The level of threat required the 
installation of belly armour, an extra crewman (door gunner) and two M60 
machine guns.  In addition, the temperature, humidity and altitude of most 
missions were high, reducing the lift capability of the helicopter.  In these 
conditions the Iroquois was limited to carrying between 1200 and 1800 pounds of 
load.  “Such conditions meant that the Iroquois was often able to carry only four 
fully-equipped soldiers”.142   
In addition, the number of fully-equipped soldiers carried is limited to six 
by available cabin space.  Cabin size and lift restrictions had the effect of limiting 
the scope and dimension of Army operations.  The Auditor-General notes an 
example where a platoon responding to an ‘incident’, would require two sorties of 
a four ship (comprising all Iroquois in-theatre by February 2000) deployment; and 
if only two Iroquois were available, land transport would have been relied on.143  
Hence, even a relatively small platoon-sized response force could not be deployed 
in a prompt manner.  A swift response by counterinsurgency forces is critical in 
LIC, as the enemy will generally strike and retreat.  Therefore, heliborne response 
times must be improved. 
No. 3 Squadron was also restricted to daylight flying.  Once the Australian 
Blackhawks were extracted from East Timor, night heliborne troop movements 
were impossible.  In addition, airborne medical evacuations would have been 
near-impossible for No. 3 Squadron.  East Timor’s terrain and weather, combined 
with No. 3 Squadron’s lack of Night-Vision flight, markedly increased the 
probability for aircraft accidents.  This is a significant issue as: (1) ground units 
generally require covert insertions, which can be effectively conducted at night; 
and (2) the heliborne evacuation of casualties is a day and night requirement. 
 
The Future – NH90 
On 31 March 2005 the NH90 was named as the preferred UH-1 replacement.  The 
NH90 is built by NH Industries, a consortium of Eurocopter, Agusta and Fokker, 
and was specifically established to develop and manufacture the helicopter.  New 
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Zealand is among thirteen countries to have selected the NH90, including ten 
European countries and Australia. 
 The number, date of delivery, cost and specification of the New Zealand 
NH90 has not as yet been finalised.  However, the basic specification of the 
Tactical Transport Helicopter (TTH), the likely version of the NH90 chosen by 
the NZDF, could provide a significant improvement in NZDF capability.   
The NH90 provides the following capability improvements. First, 
enhanced combat personnel lift; each NH90 can carry sixteen fully equipped 
troops, which equates to four times the lift capability of the UH-1.  Second, the 
NH90 provides improved communications and data transfer interoperability.  
Third, the NH90 offers improved range and endurance.  Fourth, the NH90 
incorporates advanced computerised avionics, flight control and mission systems.   
These systems include night vision equipment, Forward Looking Infrared (FLIR), 
weather radar, digital map generation and helmet mounted sight and display.  
These systems will enable all weather, day and night, ‘Nap of the Earth (NOE) 
flight beyond the Forward Edge of the Battle Area (FEBA)’.144  Fifth, the NH90 
is interoperable with the Multi-Role Vessel (MRV), enabling ship to shore 
operations.  Sixth, the NH90 can be airlifted by C-130 and has a limited ability to 
self-deploy.145
 Hence, the NH90 is an enabler of joint and coalition interoperability to 
develop within the NZDF.  What the NH90 also needs to do is “support a broad 
range of military activities, including Special Forces”.146  The NH90 will provide 
troop lift, basic visual and infrared reconnaissance data, aero-medical evacuation, 
logistical support and national anti-terrorism capabilities.  The NH90 will require 
a protection suite, so as to operate safely in risk environments.  Protection may 
include crew and cargo-bay armour and an electronic warfare suite to interdict 
radar and infrared missile locks.  These protection systems should be factory 
installed, so as to avoid crash installation before deployment.  Pre-deployment 
installation does not provide any bonuses; it merely generates risk of equipment 
failure and prevents training and familiarisation.  There must also be joint 
appreciation of how the NH90 will operate in a joint environment and with 
Special Forces.  To effectively provide the Special Air Service (SAS) with 
realistic training and operational helicopter support, the following two criteria 
must be fulfilled.  First, New Zealand “must stop relying on [our] allied 
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[helicopter support for special operations]”.147  Second, a number of the NH90s 
‘must have night sensors, night flight capabilities and an ability to undertake 
covert infiltrations and extractions [, re-supply and search and rescue for the 
SAS]’.148  The joint environment in which the NH90 will operate must also be 
appreciated.  The NH90 will require Intelligence, Surveillance and 
Reconnaissance (ISR) support, the provision of command, control, data and voice 
communications and friendly unit protection, within a joint environment.  All 
NZDF elements must be joint, “everything must interact”149 cohesively. 
 The purchase of a new training helicopter for the RNZAF should also 
augment the operational capability of the NH90.  For example, equipment 
rationalisation could mean a helicopter used for training, could also double as an 
observation or reconnaissance helicopter.  This example is identical to the former 
duel function of the RNZAF Bell 47G Sioux, prior to accidents reducing squadron 
numbers, whereby only training could be supported.  The observation helicopter 
may incorporate sensors, optics, communications and protection equipment.  
However, using the same basic airframe may mean 98 percent commonality and 
reduced maintenance cost.  The observation helicopter will then act as a force 
multiplier to the NH90, which consequently force multiplies the infantry unit, the 
tempo of operations and the command cycle.  These outcomes occurred in Sector 
West, East Timor, because the Australian Army deployed the Bell 206B-1 Kiowa 
light observation helicopter. 
Similar light helicopters can also be armed with minor armament 
subsystems, to fulfil armed reconnaissance, air support, and escort protection.  
Light armed helicopters would also provide ground elements with CAS training.  
Helicopter provided CAS was available to New Zealand ground elements in 
Bosnia, and will be increasingly available in the future.  Hence, ‘it would be 
appropriate to train with [armed helicopters]’.150  This would further the joint 
capability of the NZDF. 
 
Aircraft - Essential Nature and Use 
All of the cases reviewed in this chapter reveal the essential nature of aviation 
assets to a successful counterinsurgency strategy.  Aviation is multidimensional in 
purpose, ranging from facilitating logistical support, to commanding the 
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battlefield with Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, 
Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (C4ISTAR) capabilities, to 
applying precision strike.  Hence the subsections below analyse airborne 
firepower, protection and logistics. 
 
Firepower 
You train as you fight and you fight as you train – this dictum exemplifies the 
basic rationale for training and the concomitant operational capability that is 
derived from training.  With respect to this dualism, the following subsection will 
analyse the role of airborne firepower as a component of joint force.  Firepower in 
counterinsurgency is primarily a combination of strike aircraft configured for 
Close Air Support (CAS) and ground elements trained as Tactical Air Controllers 
(TACs).  This combination provides a timely and accurate source of firepower on 
the battlefield.  CAS is a basic provision in almost all operations, and is either a 
national or coalition combat element.  Consequently ground elements, operating 
as TACs, must be trained to operate in conjunction with CAS.  In addition, current 
trends internationally indicate the dissemination of Tactical Air Control skills to 
all ground combat personnel. 
Tactical Air Control has been an operationally required capability of the 
NZDF.  A Tactical Air Control Party (TACP) was sent as a part of NZFOR to 
Bosnia.  The responsibility of the New Zealand TACP was to protect Maglaj from 
enemy fire, by directing North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) provided 
Close Air Support.  The facility in which the TACP was based suffered a number 
of hits from enemy shell-fire.151  This shell-fire indicates that the TACP and CAS 
had a significant functional dislocation effect on enemy artillery operations in the 
area.  Tactical Air Control has also been a critical skill requirement for SAS 
personnel in Afghanistan. 
 As in Bosnia and Afghanistan, Tactical Air Control and Close Air Support 
(CAS) are fundamental requirements for ground forces conducting 
counterinsurgency operations.  Historically, however, there has been limited (1) 
preparation of TACs, and (2) allocation of CAS assets and hours.152  
Consequently, the NZDF ability to coordinate CAS was constrained.  With the 
demobilisation of No. 2, No. 14 and No. 75 Squadrons, comprising Aermacchi 
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MB-339s and McDonnell Douglas A-4K Skyhawks, ‘the Army’s exposure and 
understanding of CAS … diminished’.153  To this point, a “recently retired head 
of the SAS Group said …, an army without an air force strike capacity to train 
with[,] will have to up[-]skill before deployment to any combat environment or to 
most peacekeeping operations”.154  The only practical training the Army could 
receive with CAS would be achieved through foreign pre-deployment training.   
Consequently, the loss of ground element training with CAS has severely 
compromised Army capabilities, and caused ground element failure in achieving 
Directed Levels of Capability (DLOC) as prescribed by the Government’s 
Purchase Agreement.  The 2005 NZDF Annual Report states in relation to SAS 
coalition interoperability, “[t]here were significant problems experienced in the 
area of Close air Support[, and t]rained Forward [Tactical] Air Controllers are not 
available”.155  Furthermore the 2005 NZDF Annual Report, with respect to all 
Land Combat Forces, states that the “Army continues to experience difficulties 
when working with other coalition forces as a result of degradation in the trained 
state of Forward [Tactical] Air Controllers for the provision of Close Air 
Support”.156  Due to the degradation of Tactical Air Controller preparedness, the 
NZDF’s capability to operate effectively in risk environments, including LIC, has 
been severely compromised. 
In addition, the NZDF no longer has the ability to field CAS, or other 
forms of airborne firepower, including air interdiction and battlefield air 
interdiction.  “New Zealand A-4K Skyhawks were placed on standby for a short 
period to backup … [the] Australian air contribution.  [The Australian air 
contingent included b]oth F 18 and F 111 aircraft…[, which were actively 
employed] on photoreconnaissance missions over East Timor”,157 in addition to 
surveillance, escort and protection duties.  In response to the INTERFET 
operation, Indonesia deployed armed F-5 fighter aircraft, T-209 attack submarines 
and missile patrol boats to the East Timor area of operations.  These Indonesian 
military elements shadowed and aggressively challenged the INTERFET airborne 
and maritime deployment.158  These Indonesian actions warranted a significant 
INTERFET airborne and maritime combat presence.  The capabilities of the New 
Zealand airborne contingent, placed on standby for the initial operations in East 
Timor, are no longer available to the NZDF.  This has significantly reduced Army 
Tactical Air Control capabilities, and may cause policy failure in the event of 
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future conflict.  In brief, the NZDF’s joint force capability has been severely 
undermined. 
 
Protection 
The threat posed by surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) and small arms fire, to 
transport aircraft, became increasingly apparent to the RNZAF in the early 1990s.  
Specifically, in 1992 an Italian Air Force C-130 was shot down in Bosnia by a 
SAM, in Somalia a RNZAF Andover was fired upon,159 and in 1994 an RNZAF 
C-130 had to be fitted with cockpit armour to conduct humanitarian operations in 
Rwanda.  In the mid-1990s, the RNZAF was unable to support some UN 
operations because of the significant threat of ground fire.  Hence in 1998, three 
No. 40 Squadron C-130 Hercules transport aircraft received a missile-
countermeasure system and a cockpit-armour package.  The countermeasure 
system included “the Missile Approach Warning System (MAWS), the Radar 
Warning Receiver (RWR) and Countermeasure Dispensing Systems (CMDS)”.160  
This countermeasure system gave the C-130 a capability to detect radar locks and 
missile launches, and dispense flares and chaff as decoys against heat and radar 
seeking missiles.  In 2005, an upgrade for the self-protection systems of the C-130 
commenced.  The particulars of this contract are detailed in the following section.  
A further security upgrade was hastily undertaken prior to the deployment of the 
C-130 to East Timor.  This security upgrade was to fit secure communications 
equipment. 
 
Supply – No. 40 Squadron 
In 1989, the RNZAF transport squadron comprised five C-130s, two Boeing 727s 
and ten Andovers (No. 42 Squadron).  At the time, Peter Jennings questioned the 
capability of the RNZAF transport fleet to support exercises like Operation 
Golden Fleece (OGF).  Subsequently, the Andovers were disposed of and the two 
Boeing 727s were replaced with two Boeing 757s.  However, Jennings’ greatest 
concerns were over the serviceability and age of the C-130s.  Over the period of 
Jennings study (1983-1988), the serviceability of the C-130 ranged between 57 
and 71.5 percent.  In addition, three months after OGF finished, all five C-130s 
were grounded due to cracks around the wing-roots.  The C-130 is very important 
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to the NZDF, as it is used as both a strategic (inter-theatre lift) and tactical (intra-
theatre lift) transport aircraft.  However, as Jennings stated in 1989, the C-130 
“will be more prone to developing stress and fatigue problems … the longer [it] 
remain[s] in service”.161
In 2005, the NZDF Annual Report stated that “the C-130 fleet continues 
[sic] to suffer poor reliability due largely to age related component failures”.162  
The mentioned age related component failures reduced available flight hours, and 
caused unscheduled maintenance and an inability to complete planned tasks.  
“Many tasks faced lengthy delays and amendments, while others were cancelled 
altogether or transferred to the Boeing 757s”.163  The following components of the 
C-130 are unreliable due to age, or are difficult to maintain due to limited 
availability of consumable spares: “radar, […] self-protection system, hydraulics, 
powerplant [sic] and propeller, electrical subsystems, fuel systems, navigation 
systems, and fire/overheat warning systems”.164  This is a completely 
unacceptable state of affairs.  The C-130 is a critical enabler within the NZDF.  
Without the C-130, New Zealand cannot project force.  Force projection is 
essential in all military operations including counterinsurgency. 
The significance of No. 40 Squadron was illustrated in the deployment and 
supply of INTERFET forces in East Timor.  At the time No. 40 Squadron, 
operated C-130 Hercules and Boeing 727 aircraft.  No. 40 Squadron: (1) 
participated in the evacuation of UN personnel from East Timor in early 
September 1999; (2) contributed to the deployment of the INTERFET Response 
Force on 20 September 1999; (3) deployed the Company Group to Dili and 
transported most of the first Battalion Group to Darwin; and (4) maintained 
supply links to the New Zealand units in Dili and Suai.  In addition, the superb 
efforts of the maintenance staff, air loading personnel and aircrew of No. 40 
Squadron were instrumental in making New Zealand operations in East Timor 
possible.  Similarly, the C-130 and Boeing 727/757 have been instrumental in 
providing strategic and tactical airlift for the NZDF operations in Bosnia, 
Bougainville and Afghanistan.  In addition to providing tactical and strategic 
airlift to NZDF training and operations, the C-130 must: (1) maintain readiness 
for “tactical operations such as air-drop, air-land operations from partially 
prepared air strips and counter-terrorist operations”;165 and (2) support 
paratrooper and Special Air Service training. 
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A problem faced by the NZDF is that the RNZAF possesses no strategic 
air-transporters capable of moving defence equipment.  The Boeing 757 can move 
personnel and limited quantities of freight strategically (inter-theatre), but not 
tactically (intra-theatre).  The C-130 is designed to transport personnel, freight 
and equipment tactically, a function shared with the former Andover fleet.  Given 
the limited strategic airlift spectrum provided by the Boeing 757, the C-130 is 
utilised as an all spectrum tactical and strategic transport.  This problem is 
exacerbated by: (1) New Zealand’s geographical isolation, which makes all airlift 
strategic; (2) the significant increase in operations since 1998, which coincided 
with the loss of the Andover fleet; and (3) the increasing weight of NZDF 
equipment, like the LAV, LOV and NH90.  With specific reference to Special 
Operations, the current C-130 fleet are unreliable and possess limited self 
protection, avionics and communications.  As the only tactical transport available 
to the SAS, the C-130 fleet must possess advanced avionics and communications, 
including ‘night sensors, night flight capabilities”,166 and effective self protection.  
These capabilities are required to provide “an ability to undertake covert 
infiltrations and extractions [, re-supply and search and rescue] for the SAS’.167
In summation, the C-130 is a critical enabler for the NZDF, and “the 
number of tasks [the C-130] must undertake is ever increasing”.168  In addition, 
the loss of other tactical transport aircraft in the RNZAF has also meant that 
tactical airlift is deemed below other service requirements by between one and 
three aircraft.169  However, replacement “aircraft are very expensive and have not 
been made a priority”.170  Hence, the RNZAF is forced to struggle to maintain an 
aircraft, which no longer fulfils the requirements set out in the Government’s 
Purchase Agreement. 
A partial solution to the age derived reliability and sustainability issues of 
the forty year old C-130 fleet is a fifteen year life extension upgrade.  The contract 
for this upgrade is worth NZ$226 million and will significantly upgrade the flight 
deck, communication and navigation, fatigue monitoring, baseline electrical, fuel 
gauging, auxiliary power and air-conditioning systems of the C-130.  The contract 
will also refurbish the C-130s centre wing section, while an additional NZ$12 
million will be spent on a new self protection system.171   
As indicated, this upgrade should improve the reliability and sustainability 
of the C-130 fleet.  The C-130 upgrade should also augment and diversify 
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capabilities available to the SAS.  However, the upgrade does not address some of 
the fundamental issues outlined above.  These include New Zealand’s lack of 
strategic airlift, the increase in NZDF operating tempo since 1998, the loss of No. 
42 squadron’s tactical transport aircraft, or the growing weight of NZDF 
equipment.  Some of these issues will be diminished by the introduction of the 
Multi-Role Vessel (MRV).  The MRV is designed primarily for operations in 
Southeast Asia and the Pacific.  Hence, the operating tempo of the MRV may not 
keep pace with distant NZDF deployments.  Neither will the MRV provide 
support for non-littoral operations.  There are no simple or inexpensive solutions 
to the airlift issues faced by the NZDF.  International trends show however, (1) a 
move towards strategic transport aircraft similar to the C-17, or (2) an expansion 
of existing tactical transport aircraft fleets with additional C-130 or A400M.  An 
improvised solution has been the use of contracted strategic air transport.  As an 
example, two USAF C-17s were used to transport New Zealand SAS troops and 
equipment to Afghanistan in June 2005.172  It is clear from the aforementioned 
analysis that the military principle of joint force is a weakness within the NZDF. 
 
Issues attributed to Logistic limitations 
The following subsection analyses in-theatre issues caused by insufficient 
logistical support and the incorporation of force elements within larger coalition 
forces.  The subsection also analyses the effect of the National Support Element 
(NSE) upon supply. 
In East Timor, the maintenance of No. 3 Squadron Iroquois was 
complicated by inadequacies and the somewhat arbitrary supply of spare parts 
from New Zealand.  These problems could have prevented No. 3 Squadron from 
having a sufficient number of serviced Iroquois on the flight line, or providing 
adequate Iroquois flying hours.  These problems were exacerbated when increased 
flying hours were required.   As an example, between July and September 2000 an 
increase in flying hours required an extra Iroquois to be deployed.  The RNZAF 
reported “the lack of spares in theatre, excessive lead times for spares from New 
Zealand, and … the inflexibility of the aircraft phase program” meant that four 
Iroquois could not perform all required tasks. 
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 The lack of logistics support for No. 3 Squadron can be attributed to two 
problems.  First, transport flights into Suai were limited.  This meant critical 
supplies, such as food, water and medicine, were prioritised over helicopter spare 
parts.  In addition, initially only New Zealand C-130 aircrew were willing to fly 
into Suai.  This was because the Suai airstrip was short, and had mountains and 
trees across both approach vectors.  Second, communications between the 
Iroquois supply base in Auckland, the National Support Element in Darwin – 
through which supplies passed – and the helicopter detachment in Suai were 
ineffectual.  At times, this communications ineffectiveness caused the 
unavailability of parts in theatre, consequently precluding the maintenance of the 
Iroquois.  By February 2001, this latter problem had been solved by the 
introduction of a computerised inventory system.  This system improved the 
maintainability of the Iroquois in theatre. 
 A further compromise caused by duty requirements, and supply and 
maintenance issues is as follows.  The interval between phase maintenance of the 
Iroquois deployed in East Timor was increased from 200 to 300 hours.  This 
change was made to increase the length of time the Iroquois could be operated in 
theatre.  RNZAF maintenance personnel state that this change did not unduly 
reduce the safety of the Iroquois, but recognised the lengthened tour reduced 
performance and caused the mechanical condition of the Iroquois to be 
downgraded. 
 The APC fleet deployed to East Timor also proved difficult to maintain. 
This maintenance problem was caused by logistics, as spare APC parts were also 
low priority items.  Hence, Army mechanics were forced to cannibalise some 
APCs for parts, so as to maintain the remaining fleet.  Another reason for the 
NZDF supply problems indicated above and in the navy section of this chapter, 
was caused by the implementation of a ‘just-in-time’ supply model.173  This 
supply model reduced the quantity of spare parts and supplies held by the NZDF, 
hence causing supply delays.  It is important here to remember Molke’s adage, 
‘nine tenths of military operations are logistics’.  Similarly, the truck mounted 
cranes, which were purchased immediately before deployment to East Timor, 
were considered by the force commander “the most valuable piece of equipment 
in East Timor”.174 Hence, the NZDF should not be treated like a business. 
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Further logistics constraints can occur if national force contingents are 
deployed as a part of a larger foreign force.  In Bosnia, the New Zealand 
Company deployed was incorporated into a British Battalion (BRITBAT).  In the 
case of logistics, all supply requests had to go through BRITBAT to the UN.  This 
caused significant delays in securing essential supplies for the New Zealand 
Company.175  
Supply operations into East Timor depended upon the National Support 
Element (NSE), which operated from Darwin, Australia.  The NSE’s task was to 
ensure supplies and equipment reached the New Zealand forces deployed in East 
Timor.  The NSE sourced supplies in Australia, coordinated stores and equipment 
coming from New Zealand, and chartered civilian and military vessels and aircraft 
to transport cargo to East Timor.  This tri-service organisation provided an 
effective and successful service for NZDF operations in East Timor.176
The above logistical issues illustrate the importance of sufficient and 
efficient supply elements.  Without effective supply elements, combat elements 
cannot function.  Furthermore, risk is created if combat elements do operate 
without sufficient support.  The Multi-Role Vessel (MRV) should alleviate some 
of these supply issues.  However as noted earlier, the MRV may lack the tempo to 
support deployed forces unilaterally, and will not effectively support non-littoral 
operations. 
  
Navy - Essential Nature and Use 
In support of the East Timor operation, the Frigates Her Majesty’s New Zealand 
Ship (HMNZS) Te Kaha, HMNZS Canterbury and the tanker HMNZS 
Endeavour were deployed.  Te Kaha and Endeavour had been on exercise near 
Singapore, and were at a high state of readiness on arrival in theatre.  Canterbury 
was also at a high state of readiness when Te Kaha was replaced. 
 The two New Zealand Frigates were fully integrated with INTERFET’s 
maritime operations; patrolling, escorting and providing surveillance of the East 
Timor maritime theatre.  The activities of Te Kaha and Canterbury supported 
INTERFET’s “three major roles: presence, sea lift and guarding the sea lines of 
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communication for the force”.177  Crawford and HarperA argue, “[t]he 
[INTERFET] deployment of a significant force of capable warships, combined 
with the operation of maritime patrol aircraft and strike aircraft, made it perfectly 
clear that the international coalition would brook no interference in the 
deployment [and operations] of Interfet [sic] ground forces”.178  INTERFET 
warships also provided security for support vessels, which were fundamental to 
the East Timor operation.  Crawford and Harper also assert, “without the 
protection provided by the [INTERFET] warships it is highly likely that many of 
the chartered merchant ships would not have agreed to sail to East Timor”.179  
Similarly, without INTERFET warship protection, it would have been imprudent 
for naval logistics and troop ships to enter the East Timor area of operations.  This 
is because, at that time, Indonesian naval and airborne combatants occasionally 
acted in a hostile manner towards INTERFET ships and aircraft.   
However, Te Kaha and Canterbury were deployed without the SH-2G 
Seasprite helicopter, which seriously degraded the offensive capabilities of the 
New Zealand Frigates.  This was because the SH-2G was not available at that 
time.  Prior to the SH-2G Seasprites being delivered, the Royal New Zealand 
Navy (RNZN) operated the SH-2F Seasprite.   The introduction of the SH-2F was 
an interim measure to replace the RNZN’s obsolete Westland Wasp maritime 
surveillance and strike helicopter.  The SH-2F operated by the RNZN was an 
unarmed helicopter.  Hence, any engagement between a New Zealand Frigate and 
hostile surface or submersible vessels would have occurred in circumstances of 
technological parity rather than superiority.  In addition, when Canterbury’s SH-
2F Seasprite required a major service, it was undertaken in Darwin.  Servicing the 
Seasprite in Darwin reduced the time Canterbury was without a helicopter.  
However, given the integral nature of helicopters to all functions of a surface 
vessel, in the future provision should be made to rotate Seasprites, so operational 
RNZN Frigates are never without a helicopter.180  Nevertheless, the presence of 
RNZN vessels and aircraft off East Timor were appreciated and valuable to 
INTERFET operations. 
                                                 
A Crawford and Harper are often cited in this chapter due to the importance of their research into 
NZDF operations in East Timor.  However, the aforementioned research has been supplemented 
by numerous other texts and the accounts of practitioners. 
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The tanker Endeavour proved critical to the coalition’s maritime and land 
force deployment to East Timor.  This was partly due to the Royal Australian 
Navy (RAN) having only one tanker, Her Majesty’s Australian Ship (HMAS) 
Success, available for operations off East Timor.  In addition, until mid October, 
Success and Endeavour were the only tankers available to the INTERFET 
operation.  Endeavour was central in transporting fuel and supplies from Australia 
and Singapore to HMAS Success, stationed off Dili.  Success and Endeavour 
“were so vital to the operation that Interfet [sic] regarded them as two of the most 
likely targets for any attack”.181  Similarly, Endeavour was a critical enabler for 
the TMG.  This is because Endeavour transported much of the TMG’s equipment 
to Bougainville. 
The critical nature of maritime forces in New Zealand’s predominantly 
maritime environment cannot be understated.  Maritime force projection will be 
critical to most future NZDF operations.  In this role, the MRV should perform 
effectively, with protection from national or coalition surface warships, maritime 
aircraft and coalition submarines.  Simply, maritime forces are essential to joint 
force operations. 
 
Communications 
The East Timor deployment illustrated communications issues for the RNZN.  
The ability of RNZN ships to provide sufficient and secure communications with 
other coalition sea, land and air units was constrained.  Indicated problems 
include, communication system reliability, and the crew’s ability to handle 
voluminous and secure communications traffic.182
 
Logistics 
All of the case studies of this chapter have shown logistics to be a fundamental 
problem for the NZDF.  There are two main reasons for this: (1) no functional 
navy logistics ship; and (2) a widespread and incorrect assumption that our own 
armour, artillery and trucks would not be required to support our infantry in a 
foreign deployment.  The premise for this assumption is that, our coalition 
partners will provide deployed New Zealand forces with support units.  Except for 
the PRT in Afghanistan, the case studies have shown NZDF has provided all the 
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mechanised and support units needed by New Zealand soldiers in foreign 
deployments.  The NZDF has had difficulty deploying these mechanised and 
support units because the RNZN does not possess a logistics ship.  Furthermore, 
in the case of East Timor, Australia relied heavily upon the RNZN and RNZAF 
for logistics support.183
Operation Golden Fleece (OGF) illustrated the need for a logistics ship to 
be acquired by the NZDF.  The deployment and continued supply of the forces in 
OGF would have “caused significant problems”.184  In 1989, it was expected that 
a logistics ship would be available for the RNZN by 1992/3.  Unfortunately in 
1999, as the NZDF deployed to East Timor, there was still no New Zealand 
logistics ship available. 
The availability of commercial shipping has been absolutely critical to the 
cases under study.  In East Timor the NZDF hired two cargo ships, while in OGF 
a roll-on roll-off ferry was hired.  Hiring commercial shipping does pose 
significant issues.  First, the case studies showed a lack of facilities capable of 
handling ferries and conventional cargo ships.  This lack of facilities has forced 
landing craft and helicopters to be used for lodgement and supply tasks.  
Helicopters and landing craft require specialised naval vessels to effectively 
perform such tasks.  Hence, commercial shipping would be ineffective.  Second, 
the availability of commercial vessels may not coincide with the timely 
deployment of military contingents.  In the case of East Timor, the availability of 
commercial shipping dictated the deployment date of the first New Zealand 
Battalion’s heavy equipment and initial supplies.185  In addition, the requirement 
for operational security, and the variability of force structures and deployment 
sequences, can cause commercial contracts to be formed immediately before 
deployment.  This terminal planning creates serious risk that commercial logistics 
will not be available.  Third, the willingness of commercial vessels to operate in 
hostile areas is, understandably, low. 
 The RNZN vessels deployed to support the East Timor deployment, along 
with their Air Force and Army colleagues, found logistics problems caused by the 
low priority given to New Zealand naval spare parts and stores.  This problem was 
generated in a coalition environment, as RNZN assets were commanded by a 
multinational force rather than a national headquarters.  A naval logistics liaison 
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was seconded to work with the coalition logistics team, which reduced the supply 
shortages.186  Joint force must become a more important priority for the NZDF. 
 
Other Issues - Medical 
In OGF, there was no depot for the storage of medical supplies required, or 
procedures for the re-supply of field units, or joint force airborne medical 
evacuations.187
 Fortunately, the medical support for the deployment to East Timor was 
more successful.  Following the TMG operation in Bougainville, Army medical 
staff designed a 13.6 ton hospital that can be deployed by a single C-130.   This 
hospital is designated Forward Surgical Team (FST) light.  The FST concept is 
basically a copy of the Australian light field hospital deployed to Bougainville, to 
support the TMG and the latter Australian Peace Monitoring Group (PMG).  The 
FST contains an “operating theatre, two wards, a resuscitation unit, an X-ray 
facility and about thirty highly trained medical staff”.188  The medical staff of FST 
are both civilian and tri-service military personnel.  The efforts of the FST and 
pre-deployment medical planning meant that the NZDF personnel medical 
statistics were good, in comparison with other nations.  The FST also saved the 
lives of New Zealand soldiers, other UN personnel and a number of East 
Timorese.189
However, the FST was at times constrained by support services.  For 
example, No. 3 Squadron Iroquois could not transport injured persons at night or 
in bad weather.  Thus, the actions of FST staff were limited.  The main issues 
effecting the provisioning of health services outlined by the Auditor-General in 
relation to the East Timor deployment are as follows: (1) substandard personnel 
medical records; (2) shortages of medical staff; (3) supply deficiencies; and (4) 
constraints to preventative and environmental health services.190   
All of these aforementioned problems are significant; however, staff and 
supply shortages could have prevented the delivery of critical health services.  On 
medical staff shortages, the NZDF has reported a difficulty in maintaining 
requisite numbers of medics, environmental health officers, doctors and 
specialists.  This staff situation worsened, when one surgeon and one anaesthetist 
 288
under contract to the NZDF resigned after being given notice to deploy to East 
Timor with NZBATT 1.191   
The FST was also designed to operate in theatre for 2 weeks.  Pre-
deployment planning expected the FST to operate for 6 months in East Timor.  
However, the FST operated in East Timor for 22 months, from October 1999 to 
August 2001.  One of the results of this extended deployment was the need to 
attract civilian health personnel to work within the FST.  Given the difficulty in 
sourcing these civilian medical practitioners and the austere conditions in East 
Timor, short-term civilian deployments of 2 to 6 weeks were introduced.  Hence, 
the cohesion of the medical staff in the FST was reduced, and existing supply 
problems were exacerbated.192
Medical supplies were ordered from Suai, then either sourced by the 
National Support Element (NSE) in Darwin or the Logistics Executive in 
Trentham.  This was a sound logistical arrangement, however, problems still 
ensued.  Medical provisioning issues encountered by the FST were caused by: (1) 
the ordering, sourcing and forwarding system for medical supplies; and (2) 
unanticipated end-user demand.  To this point, there will always be high demand 
for medical supplies in LIC.  This is because medical supplies and services are an 
essential element in winning the ‘hearts and minds’ of the in-theatre civilian 
population. 
The first problem encountered by the FST was a difficulty in ordering, 
sourcing and delivering the supplies.  The FST was not provided with a computer 
until November 2000; beforehand, ordering was manual and more difficult.  The 
NSE staff then had difficulty translating the FST supply definitions into civilian 
medical terminology, so that the supplies could be sourced from Darwin.  This 
problem was partly caused by an absence of logisticians trained in, or experienced 
with, medical supplies.  In addition, the civilian staff that manned the FST were 
unfamiliar with NZDF medical supplies and ordering systems.  These problems 
compounded to negatively effect “accuracy of orders, accuracy and quantity of 
items delivered, and the timeliness of supply”.193  The Auditor-General noted that 
“[w]hile supplies were expected to take up to four weeks [to arrive], they 
generally arrived in 6-8 weeks.  This caused considerable frustration for [Health 
Support Service] HSS personnel.  Supplies of Class 8 [medical provisions] were 
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so limited at times that even simple but heavily used items (like foot powder and 
Panadol) ran out”.194
The second difficulty the FST faced was unexpected demand for medical 
supplies and services.  First, the FST was expected by INTERFET to provide 
medical support to the Canadian, Fijian and Irish detachments operating under 
NZBATT command.  This initially created shortages of FST medical supplies.  
Second, the East Timorese population required acute medical assistance from the 
FST following the initial deployment.  This acute medical assistance then 
expanded to broader humanitarian medical aid under the NZBATT 2 deployment.  
This medical assistance to civilians stressed the FST, in theatre medical stores, 
and diversified and complicated the medical supplies required.  These expanded 
requirements exacerbated the problems facing FST personnel described above.  
Despite NZDF knowledge of the medical supply problems noted above, no lasting 
solution was forthcoming from the NZDF during the 22 month deployment of the 
FST.195
A further significant issue, not fully analysed by the Auditor-General, was 
that of the provision of health services to the people of East Timor, in the New 
Zealand AO.  As stated above, the provisioning of health services to the local 
population is a central aspect of any ‘hearts and minds’ campaign.  If the ‘hearts 
and minds’ campaign works, the population will provide dependable intelligence 
to the counterinsurgent.  Hence, the provision of health services to the civil 
population is critical.  However, the provisioning of health services by the NZDF 
to the people of Cova Lima district was undertaken after the deployment of 
NZBATT 2.  Furthermore, the provision of health services for the population 
transpired due to an UNTAET directive, rather than being NZDF initiated.  In 
addition, while critical, the health services provided by the FST to the local 
population were often restricted by supply limitations and procedural orders.196   
Hence, in the future the New Zealand Government, NZDF and HSS 
should be aware, civilians in LICs require medical care, and it is not only 
altruistic, but in the interest of the deployed force to provide this medical care.  If 
the NZDF is to be successful in counterinsurgency operations, the allegiance of 
the people must be acquired.  This is because the NZDF requires intelligence on 
enemy movements and actions; this information can only be acquired with the 
help and support of the civil population.  The provision of medical care to the civil 
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population should be viewed as an element of joint force that is essential in 
counterinsurgency operations. 
 
Command, Control, Initiative, Communications and Intelligence (C2ICI) 
The following section analyses Command and Control issues generated by NZDF 
operational deployments to Bosnia, Bougainville and East Timor.  This section 
analyses a number of elements that enable force to be coordinated and applied in 
counterinsurgency operations.  
 
Command, Control and Initiative 
The deployment of the Company Group and Battalion Groups to East Timor did 
cause Command and Control (C2) challenges.  However, the challenges that did 
occur were effectively managed.  Command issues that did arise included: (1) 
complicated C2 caused by coalition integration (foreign force elements were 
integrated into NZBATT, while NZBATT was itself a force element within a 
larger coalition); (2) joint cooperation issues; (3) Rules of Engagement (ROE) that 
compromised Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs); and (4) language issues. 
In Dili, Victor Company operated under the tactical command of 3RAR, 
and reported on national matters to the Senior National Officer (SNO), who in 
turn was accountable to the Joint Commander in New Zealand.  Similarly in Cova 
Lima district, NZBATT was operationally under the control of Commander West 
Force (An Australian Brigadier from 2RAR), but also reported to the SNO.  To 
complicate matters, the New Zealand SNO was also Commanding Officer, Dili 
Command.  Fortunately, command and control functioned well and few problems 
emerged.197
One issue that did emerge from operations in the Cova Lima district was 
the critical nature of Brigade level C2 training.  “The New Zealand Battalion 
Group was incorporated into … [West Force, which covered] the most hazardous 
and operationally difficult area of East Timor.  It [NZBATT] was required to 
integrate smoothly and quickly into the brigade operation and to effectively 
conduct control operations in a large Battalion Area of Operations (AO).  Given 
the paramount importance of force protection, its own security was a vital 
consideration throughout.  Its [NZBATT] ability to do all this depended to a 
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considerable degree upon its command and control capacity.  This required the 
right equipment (particularly communications), doctrine, operating procedures, 
and, above all, training.  In particular, the training needed to be at the right level.  
The operation underlined the vital importance of the NZDF retaining its brigade-
level operational skills, particularly command and control”.198   
The designation of the New Zealand Army’s field elements as the Land 
Force Group, rather than a Brigade, has caused significant command and control 
issues.  The term ‘Land Force Group’ has no military relevance, but in the New 
Zealand context is equivalent to a Brigade.  Both are an autonomous field army, 
containing approximately three battalions.  Deployed New Zealand battalions will 
“always be operating in a brigade group with a couple of other battalions”.199  
Hence, the NZDF must train as it is to fight.  That is as a brigade. 
One command issue involved a clash between INTERFET Rules of 
Engagement (ROE) and New Zealand Army Standard Operating Procedures 
(SOPs).  Initially, the M18A Claymore command detonated fragmentation device 
(mine) was prohibited from being deployed by New Zealand soldiers, despite 
significant clashes with militia in mid-2000.  Following the intervention of the 
New Zealand Joint Commander, Claymore mines were distributed and installed 
by NZBATT soldiers.200
Under the command of NZBATT 1 was a Canadian Company Group of 
250 personnel.  “Having a large group of independently-minded, French-speaking 
Canadians under their command was an arrangement that created ‘a few 
challenges’, according to Lieutenant Colonel Burnett”.201  Language issues 
presented some problem throughout the INTERFET/UNTAET command and 
control infrastructure.  However, the integration of other coalition force elements 
was critical to maintaining NZBATT personnel strength. 
Furthermore, “[o]n some occasions when New Zealand’s three armed 
services had to interact in East Timor, it was obvious that they did not know 
enough about each other.  The need for jointness in operations was aptly 
demonstrated by the East Timor deployment.  Interfet’s [sic] success, in 
particular, rested on a joint approach to operations, which allowed for the best use 
of land, sea and air forces.  It is not always recognised that without capable naval 
and air forces it would have been impossible to deploy and support Interfet 
[sic]”.202  Joint training will be critical to future NZDF deployments. 
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Some of the command issues indicated above, were also experienced in 
Bosnia and Bougainville.  In Bosnia there were some command issues, which 
were caused essentially by the New Zealand Company being hidden within the 
British battalion structure.  The coalition structure in Bosnia meant that the NZDF 
contribution was not joint.  Hence, some issues concerning joint operations did 
not appear until the TMG deployed to Bougainville.   
As elucidated above, there was structural dislocation of the single services 
and coalition units in Bougainville.  In an interview, Major General Piers Reid 
highlighted the fact that the single service elements in Bougainville were 
essentially independent, and took direction from their own single service 
commands in New Zealand.203  Brigadier Roger Mortlock, the initial TMG 
commander, compares the function of the TMG command to the management of 
six tribes: the Australian, Ni Vanuatu and Fijian Defence Forces, in addition to the 
New Zealand Army, Navy and Air Force.  The command structure of the TMG is 
represented below in Graphic Two.  The Australian contingent was mostly 
confined to logistics, while the Ni Vanuatu and Fijian contingents were integrated 
within the four outpost commands.  Mortlock emphasised that while ‘there was no 
consolidated [joint] command, the three services [and the three foreign Defence 
Forces] did their best to function jointly’.204  Mortlock also stressed that the 
Army, Navy and Air Force, all did their own single service functions well, and 
cooperated effectively when needed.205  It must be highlighted however, that in a 
scenario where conflict is occurring, the lack of jointness may have undermined 
the operation. 
Graphic 6: TMG Command and Control Structure – Bougainville 
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“The creation of a joint forces headquarters in Trentham in July 2001 is 
one expression of the NZDF’s determination to adapt and improve the way it is 
organised and operates”.206  The Joint Headquarters as a concept has a long 
history, but became increasingly needed following Bosnia, Bougainville and East 
Timor.  However, the ultimate development of the Joint Headquarters was 
initiated by: (1) The Inquiry into Defence Beyond 2000; (2) the then newly 
elected Labour Government; (3) Air Marshall Kerry Adamson; and (4) the East 
Timor deployment.  The Joint Headquarters was established under the command 
of Brigadier Martyn Dunne, and became operational after fifteen months of 
development. 
In the area of Command and Control, the Joint Headquarters will enhance 
the NZDF by creating a joint approach to planning and commanding operations.  
Prior to East Timor, operational planning was undertaken by the Joint Operational 
Commanders Group.  The Joint Group was appointed by the Chief of Defence 
Force (CDF), as conflicts emerged.  The Joint Group incorporated three Brigadier 
equivalents, one of whom would be designated Joint Commander by the CDF, 
except if one of the Chiefs of Staff was appointed Joint Commander.  There were 
two significant problems with the Joint Operational Commanders Group.  First, 
the Group’s effectiveness relied on the personalities of the Commanders.  Hence, 
‘there were instances where people would not agree, or were unavailable to agree 
on solutions’.207  Second, the Commanders of the Joint Group also kept their 
single service headquarters separate.  Given the Joint Group Commanders were 
also component Commanders, they were answerable to their single service chiefs.  
If one of the Commanders was not designated Joint Commander, then there was 
one direct line of responsibility to the CDF.  Nevertheless, the Joint Group 
structure, while fraught with issues, was successful in Bosnia, Bougainville, and 
to an extent in East Timor.  The components of the Joint Group did however rely 
on the NZDF to force cooperation.   
Planning for, and operations in, East Timor were conducted by the Joint 
Group, with two important distinctions.  First, East Timor was planned using an 
Australian development schedule.  Second, under the direction of Brigadier Lou 
Gardener, Land Command established a degree of jointness, by integrating other 
service personnel into the planning and operating process.  However, this was not 
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a truly joint environment; it was an Army Headquarters with a few Navy and Air 
Force personnel attached.  The Joint Group “was ultimately successful because it 
was based on sound doctrine and that the overall concepts, procedures and 
sequence were appropriate.  Indeed, the inherent “ad hoc’ery” of the structures 
(particularly at the strategic level) sometimes hampered the process”.208  A further 
jointness issue arose in the planning for East Timor, as “the maritime and [Fixed 
Wing] FW … [elements were] not well connected to the operational level 
planning process.  This meant that the [Joint Commander] JC lacked visibility of 
the totality of the NZDF contribution”.209
There were also three significant whole-of-government planning issues 
that hindered the planning of the Joint Group.  First, “there was some reluctance 
on the part of other key Government departments to pursue planning at such an 
early stage.  For departments such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade 
(MFAT), the bilateral relationship with Indonesia was a significant issue and there 
were some sensitivities associated with the NZDF planning for a possible military 
option in East Timor”.210  Second, “[t]here was little understanding outside 
Defence of the implications of the preparedness levels set out in the Purchase 
Agreement and the requirements of those levels in terms of lead time and resource 
commitment”.211  Third and as a result of the two aforementioned issues, there 
was “delay in obtaining inter-departmental consensus in the advice to be given to 
Ministers on such issues as a national end-state requirement”.212  Such issues are 
very significant and need to be addressed by inter-departmental training. 
The establishment of the Joint Headquarters has forced a joint approach to 
planning and operations.  All operational headquarters function jointly, thus 
enabling awareness, cooperation and support.  It is now common for inter-service 
planning and preparation for land, sea and air exercises and operations to be 
undertaken by non-component personnel.  For example, Navy and Air Force 
personnel may lead the planning for land component training or operations, with 
Army advice.  This is a common practise internationally and among New 
Zealand’s closest allies. 
Procurement and training are also highly significant areas where the Joint 
Headquarters can create joint cohesiveness, which in turn will improve joint C2.  
The establishment of the Joint Headquarters is a top down strategy for creating 
jointness among the single services.  Equipment must be purchased and training 
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must be provided that will fulfil single service requirements in a joint 
environment, and enhance the synergy of a joint approach.  For example, a 
significant impact of the Army’s Precision Manoeuvre doctrine will be improved 
Command and Control (C2), force integration and friendly and enemy tracking.213  
However, these improvements may not develop jointness without joint 
management and adaptation.  If the Joint Headquarters continues to function in 
the areas of operations, training and procurement, jointness should develop. 
A further C2 challenge has been produced by the Australia, New Zealand, 
and United States (ANZUS) rift.  The political friction between the New Zealand 
and American Governments has precluded coalition training.  Hence, it is 
impossible for NZDF personnel to train in a coalition environment with U.S. 
forces.  Despite the likelihood that New Zealand personnel will operate with such 
coalition forces in conflict.  New Zealand “personnel have to ‘train’ on operation, 
[where] they must catch up with … coalition interoperability.  [The] most 
significant [restraint] is [to] US [sic] – New Zealand exposure.  Hence, … US 
[sic] [personnel] do not trust New Zealand troops [on operation] because [there 
has been no joint experience of training together].  [There has however been] 
some change, as [New Zealand] personnel [have] deployed to US [sic] Southern 
Command in Florida”.214  In summary, there are significant C2 issues that are 
degrading the application of joint force; however, the establishment of the Joint 
Headquarters has improved this situation. 
 
Airborne Command, Control, Communication and Intelligence (C3I) 
Command, Control, Communication and Intelligence (C3I) can be effectively 
provided by airborne platforms.  C3I aircraft were traditionally used for 
coordinating airborne units.  As air, land and sea units have become more 
combined, C3I aircraft have had to adapt to managing a joint environment.  
Airborne C3I has also proliferated, whereby relatively small land elements are 
provided with intelligence, fire support, communication links and C2 from 
dedicated C3I aircraft.  Special Forces are a prime example of small land elements 
that have exploited the benefits of airborne C3I. 
 A C3I aircraft is essentially, any airframe, fitted with sensors, 
communications hubs and links, and information processors.  Maritime patrol 
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aircraft fulfil these requirements, and have actively been doubling as C3I aircraft 
since the early 1990s.  The RNZAF P-3 Orion, ‘if installed with the appropriate 
optics, sensor suites and communications facilities, could operate as anything 
from a C2 platform, to facilitating surveillance of land based operations’.215  The 
P-3 also provides excellent endurance, security, mobility, projectability and can 
communicate effectively with disparate force elements.  The Coalition Warrior 
Interoperability DemonstrationsB also illustrate that older technology, ‘such as the 
P-3, should not be upgraded unless it is able to interact and interoperate in a joint 
warfare environment’.216  The P-3 needs to be able to operate with: (1) Special 
Forces and other land elements; (2) other aircraft; (3) naval vessels; and (4) 
civilian agencies and maritime assets.217  The NZDF does not currently utilise the 
P-3 to supplement land elements; neither are there plans to do so in the future.218  
Furthermore, outside the Joint Headquarters there is little recognition of the 
interoperability of land elements and airborne C3I. 
 The above analysis of airborne C3I demonstrates that: (1) the NZDF has 
not developed effective air-land interoperability; and (2) the Joint Headquarters 
has a significant task in creating a joint, cohesive force.  This cohesive force will 
require acquisitions and force structure development that is formed by a joint 
environment.  All force elements must be able to be projected, protected, 
supported, commanded and supplied with information.  If these requirements are 
not facilitated jointly, the utility of each force element is significantly 
diminished.219
 
Communications 
Operation Golden Fleece (OGF) illustrated the near-absolute ineffectiveness of 
NZDF communications; the situation is much the same in 2006.   First, much of 
the communications equipment deployed to the OGF’s headquarters (HQ) was 
inoperable.  Second, communications between HQ and field units were 
completely ineffective.  As a result, field units were using information 36 hours 
                                                 
B “Coalition Warrior Interoperability Demonstration is a US DoD led and planned demonstration 
programme to identify and trial Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence 
(C4I) technology interoperability. It is designed to evaluate how emerging C4I technologies and 
practices can be quickly and effectively applied to Joint and Combined operational problems in all 
warfare dimensions whilst enhancing interoperability”. Quoted from New Zealand Defence Force, 
January 2006, Coalition Warrior Interoperability Demonstration, New Zealand Defence Force, 
Wellington. 
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old.  Jennings states, it was quicker to send information by messenger, than by 
radio. 220  Third, field units were not able to communicate with each other.221  
This artificially isolated units, cutting them off from mutual support from other 
field units or artillery fire. 
 Operations in East Timor again showed the ineffectiveness of NZDF 
communications.  New Zealand Army personnel rely on High Frequency (HF) 
communications systems.  These HF systems are dispersed down to the squad 
level and are installed in most operational Army vehicles.  The power output and 
thus range of the systems vary; the vehicle-mounted models have a greater range 
than the infantry radio.  In addition, the Army’s HF radios are heavy, are un-
secure and cannot handle digital communications.222  When these factors are 
combined with mountainous or wooded terrain, the Army’s communications 
capability is poor.  Poor communications then impact on intelligence, 
surveillance, reconnaissance and offensive operations.  As was indicated earlier, 
the recent Trunk Communications upgrade will enhance the capability to 
communicate with, and command ground elements.  In addition, the Joint 
Command and Control System and the Joint Communications Modernisation 
Programme should enhance joint C2. 
 
Counter-Communication 
Counter-communication is the act of: (1) disrupting enemy communications; (2) 
extracting information from enemy communications; or (3) protecting one’s own 
communications from enemy interference or becoming a source of information for 
the enemy.  Significantly, counter-communications have not been a significant 
part of NZDF operations.  However, the Trunk Communications upgrade, and the 
UH-1/NH90 and C-130 communications upgrades have assisted in securing 
NZDF communications. 
 
Intelligence 
A lack of capacity for gaining intelligence is a fundamental weakness of the 
NZDF.  This weakness is caused by the following two factors: (1) the poor 
relationship New Zealand maintains with the United States; and (2) a lack of 
trained intelligence personnel within the NZDF. 
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In the case of East Timor, pre-deployment and operational information 
was provided to the NZDF by New Zealand’s intelligence partners.  This 
intelligence was of a good standard.  However, the NZDF was not permitted 
access to all foreign intelligence sources.  Due to this deficiency, not all 
operational intelligence requirements were achieved.223  Hence, undue risk was 
imposed upon NZDF personnel, equipment and mission objectives. 
 It was established in East Timor, that “fully effective intelligence sharing 
for New Zealand is still hampered by the downstream effects of the difficulties in 
the US [sic] -NZ [United States – New Zealand] relationship”.224  This diplomatic 
fissure with the United States, created intelligence sharing issues for New Zealand 
with Australia.  A difficulty in generating infrastructure intelligence is an example 
of the New Zealand – Australia intelligence sharing problem.  “It was difficult for 
New Zealand to gather the level of … [infrastructure intelligence required,] solely 
… [with New Zealand’s] own resources.  There was an Australian product that 
would have assisted in meeting New Zealand’s information requirements with 
regard to infrastructure, but because it was partly based on US [sic] [United 
States]-sourced intelligence, it was not released to New Zealand”.225  When the 
Forward Planning Team and Liaison Officers were deployed to Australia, “the 
most significant initial obstacle to the performance of their duties [was the 
fractured intelligence dialogue with Australia]”.226  Intelligence is critical to any 
military operation.  Hence, an improved tripartite intelligence relationship 
between the Australia, New Zealand and the United States is indispensable. 
 “The deployment of personnel into intelligence appointments in East 
Timor revealed some gaps in the NZDF’s intelligence capability.  These were 
most notable in the areas of Counter-Intelligence (CI), Psychological Operations 
(PSYOPS) and languages (a weakness in language capabilities across the NZDF 
is not simply an intelligence matter; it is also a serious operational issue).  In 
general, the NZDF lacks sufficient numbers of personnel experienced and trained 
in providing intelligence support to operations in the joint and combined setting”.  
These are basic requirements for counterinsurgency forces in LIC.  Intelligence 
must be effective and personnel with language skills are central to the collection 
of intelligence. 
 It is critical to be able to communicate with civilians in theatre.  For 
example, intelligence assessments concerning the expected actions of militia were 
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proven inaccurate.  The nature of the militia was ‘only’ established when New 
Zealand and Nepalese units were attacked and personnel were killed in action by 
militia groups.  After liaising with the Falintil, changes were made to the New 
Zealand methods of operation.227  It is notable that the New Zealand Senior 
Negotiation Officer in Bougainville was an Army Engineer by trade.  However, 
the Senior Negotiation Officer could speak pidgin, and was hence indispensable 
for the operation. 
 In East Timor, a leading source of intelligence for the New Zealand 
Battalion were the Civilian-Military Affairs (CMA) units and personnel.  The 
CMA elements were established by NZBATT 2 and were maintained by 
successive Battalions.  CMA liaison officers were attached to each New Zealand 
Company, and detachments of four CMA personnel were deployed to live in the 
villages of the Cova Lima district.  As had been illustrated in earlier 
counterinsurgency operations, like those that occurred in Malaya, Borneo and 
Vietnam, CMA personnel living with the population form a highly effective 
conduit for information.  CMA personnel showed they could create a trustworthy 
relationship with the East Timorese, and enable the effective distribution of 
humanitarian aid.  Most importantly to military operations, however, the 
population of the Cova Lima district provided dependable intelligence on militia 
movements and infiltration of the New Zealand AO.228  In addition, there was 
good intelligence provided by the New Zealand Police personnel who had been 
previously deployed in East Timor. 
 In theatre, Army intelligence is limited to human intelligence (HUMINT) 
as a means of collection.  However, HUMINT is generally the most effective 
means of gathering intelligence for a counterinsurgency force.  NZDF operations 
have proven the effectiveness of HUMINT in counterinsurgency, and the ability 
of New Zealand force elements to gather HUMINT.  By contrast, the current 
NZDF Land Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance (ISR) augmentation 
programme is designed to improve intelligence collection by electronic means.  
This may assist the NZDF in some counterinsurgency scenarios, but is largely 
dependent on topography and insurgent skill and tactics.  Areas where the NZDF 
would be wise to focus resources to defeat an insurgent by improving non-human 
intelligence are: (1) improved intelligence structure coherency and information 
management systems;229 (2) communications intelligence collection; and (3) 
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imagery intelligence using Unmanned Air Vehicles (UAV) designed by the 
Defence Technology Agency.  However, this technological intelligence must not 
inhibit training for the collection of HUMINT. 
 
Other Agency Integration – The Confluence of Civil and Military Affairs 
The Officials Committee for Domestic and External Security Co-ordination 
(ODESC) has been essential for the operations covered by this chapter.  Apart 
from ODESC, general agency integration before and on deployment has been 
haphazard, under-supported and usually obstructed by the government, military 
and non-governmental organisations.  These issues have to be improved so as to 
enable a holistic application of force in counterinsurgency operations. 
In the case of Operation Golden Fleece, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
and Trade provided a token contingent, while the Domestic and External Security 
Secretariat was not involved.230  As indicated by Peter Jennings, “[f]urther 
planning is … needed in defining the relationship between civil and military 
authorities in the conduct of low-level contingency operations in the South 
Pacific”.231
 An integrated approach to active operations is critical.  In the case of East 
Timor, a ‘whole of government approach’ was critical for pre-deployment 
planning.  In addition, several civilian government departments deployed 
personnel to East Timor.  In establishing the institutions of a sovereign state, 
“New Zealand has provided [East Timor with] a wide range of assistance…, 
including development aid, police and prison officers, legal staff and other 
specialist expertise”.232  This is an example of the application of political, 
economic, diplomatic and military force in a counterinsurgency operation. 
 As indicated by Lieutenant Colonel Antony Hayward, the provision of law 
and order was problematic during the transition from UN to domestic East 
Timorese control.  Hayward argues “[w]ithout a functioning and effective 
constabulary backed up by a responsive judiciary, the community’s perception of 
what constitutes a legitimate central authority can quickly be undermined”.233  
This occurred because: (1) the number of UN international police (UNPOL) was 
reduced without an equivalent increase in East Timorese police effectiveness, and 
(2) the public did not recognise the authority of the national police or legislation.  
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Consequently, NZBATT personnel were forced to exceed their mandate and 
provide some form of law and order. 
 In addition to the provision of territorial security provided by NZBATT, it 
was recognised that the New Zealand contingent would need to establish a holistic 
form of security in East Timor.  This was because the population was the ‘centre 
of gravity’ for the INTERFET and UNTAET forces.  Hence, information 
operations were undertaken “to reach into, and influence, the population”,234 and 
civil affairs operations served as a conduit between the military and the 
population. 
 NZBATT 5 eclipsed the previous New Zealand battalions in the area of 
civil affairs, by publishing and implementing the ‘Realisation Issues’ plan.  
Colonel Hayward does emphasise, however, that the Realisation Issues plan was 
only possible because of the external security established and environmental 
knowledge gained by the previous New Zealand Battalions.235  The Realisation 
Issues plan “investigated most facets of public life including judiciary, law and 
order, education, health services, sanitation and water, public works, power 
service, agriculture, forestry, the Church, civil society organisations and public 
administration”.236  The rationale for the Realisation Issues plan “was that good 
governance and services when embedded, transparent, and understood would go a 
long way to overcome the deep-rooted security issues contained within Cova 
Lima”.237  Hence, security could only be entrenched by the creation of civil 
society.  Although aid agencies and the ministries of East Timor could provide 
some facets of civil society, it was the responsibility of NZBATT to focus and 
coordinate humanitarian assistance in Cova Lima. 
 The justification for NZBATT 5 taking responsibility for coordinating 
humanitarian assistance in Cova Lima is illustrated in what follows.  On arrival in 
Cova Lima, the personnel of NZBATT 5 found that the provision of aid was 
uncoordinated.  This meant that entire projects were non-functional, due to critical 
elements not being present.  Aid was also diminishing and being targeted toward 
other regions.  As a result: (1) the newly built law court was not resourced or 
staffed adequately to function; (2) the Cova Lima medical centre was about to be 
closed, leaving only a tuberculosis clinic; and (3) there was a cholera outbreak due 
to dirty water.  It was established that the United Nations structure was 
ineffectual; the only entity that could help the locals of Cova Lima was NZBATT.  
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Subsequently, NZBATT coordinated NGO, local and governmental efforts to 
rebuild Cova Lima, with significant assistance coming from the New Zealand 
Government and Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade.238
 A further initiative of the Realisation Issues plan was to identify groups 
and individuals who influenced the social cohesion and interaction of the Cova 
Lima population.  “These included UN and NGO international and national 
officials based in Dili, Indonesian military (TNI) commanders across the border in 
West Timor, refugees remaining in camps also in West Timor, community, 
church, business and youth leaders, teachers, and Issue Motivated Group members 
within the District”.239
Understanding the needs and capabilities of these groups and individuals 
enabled NZBATT to provide services and prevent further conflict.  For example, 
two of the aforementioned groups attempted to act, or acted in a way that began to 
destabilise the Cova Lima district.  First, militia groups were spreading 
disinformation among East Timorese refugees in West Timor, stating it was 
unsafe to return to East Timor.  This undermined the repatriation process, by 
reducing the trust the refugees had in the civil leadership in East Timor.  
NZBATT, with the assistance of the TNI in West Timor, provided correct 
information about the state of East Timor to the refugees in West Timor.  Thus, 
the provision of the correct information made void the disinformation of the 
militia groups.  Similar information operations also had to be undertaken in 
Bosnia and Bougainville.  Second, ‘Issue Motivated Groups’ (IMGs), who 
expressed valid and invalid social concerns through paramilitary activities and 
threatening behaviour, degraded internal security in Cova Lima.  Some East 
Timorese officials wanted NZBATT to forcibly suppress the IMGs.  However, 
NZBATT did not want to disenfranchise the members of the IMGs as: (1) some of 
their grievances were valid; and (2) suppressing the activities of these individuals 
could cause greater violence to erupt.  Hence, dialogue was initiated with the 
IMGs, their concerns were openly published in the local NZBATT-sponsored 
newspaper, and the Cova Lima population was educated on what constituted 
appropriate behaviour in democratic states.   
NZBATT also made it clear inappropriate or violent behaviour was 
intolerable, and offenders would be prosecuted according to the rule of law.  
NZBATT learnt that IMGs were attempting to recruit members at church 
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congregations and among college students.  The IMGs were also presenting the 
greatest threat to the periphery of the New Zealand AO.  Hence, NZBATT 
soldiers deployed to patrol and support the UN police in preventing violent action.  
“In the outlying villages, those deemed most at risk from these groups, small 
groups of soldiers were deployed for extended periods to physically challenge the 
origins of disaffection through discussion, an understanding of cultural norms, and 
a professional work ethic”.240  The CDF and CDF-Ops had reservations about the 
presence of soldiers in villages.  Additionally, members of NZBATT 5’s 
reconnaissance platoon and Regimental Sergeant Major, after specialised training, 
monitored villages designated of interest by information operations.241
The holistic approach of NZBATT 5 also facilitated much of the 
reconstruction effort in the Cova Lima district.  NZBATT 5 “sought to create the 
conditions necessary for a substantive redevelopment of the District that would 
mitigate some of the security risks associated with poverty and a community still 
suffering the effects of forced migration and fear of violence”.242  These activities 
fostered: (1) the development of the local authorities; and (2) trust between 
NZBATT and the population.  NZBATT “ensured that all tasks undertaken would 
not create a dependency but instead were focussed on assisting the East Timorese 
taking control of their own destiny”.243  This approach of fostering local self-help 
was two dimensional.  First, it was made clear that projects would not proceed if 
the population was not willing to help itself.  Subsequently, local East Timorese 
volunteered their labour.  Second, local individuals were employed to ‘define, 
facilitate and be responsible “for confirming projects, receiving donor 
contributions”244 and procuring supplies.  In addition, NZBATT organised 
workshops where NGOs, government missions and the New Zealand contingent 
personnel could synergise their individual efforts in rebuilding the district. 
Hayward makes a number of insightful observations regarding the 
NZDF’s capability to effectively peace-keep or peace-enforce.  First, along with 
Gerald Hensley, the former New Zealand Secretary of Defence, and Vice Admiral 
Sir Sommerford Teagle, the former New Zealand Chief of the Defence Force, 
Hayward argues the NZDF must continue to train for higher level war-fighting, so 
as to allow greater “flexibility and adaptability”245 in counterinsurgency.  “To 
place pressure on its conventional warfare training requirements would further 
erode the NZDF’s ability to remain a viable Defence Force”.246  Second, defence 
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personnel are often deployed under UN command, into intra-state conflicts 
without the capability or professional skill in effective nation-building.  Hayward 
argues “[n]ation building requires considerable skill, patience and a deft approach, 
and many military forces engaged in peace support operations lack the 
competence and sophistication necessary to ensure that some form of political, 
economic or social distortion does not eventuate”.247  Third, Hayward questions 
whose responsibility it is to rebuild failed states, if it is not the task of military 
forces.  This question arises because: (1) the UNTAET personnel in Suai were 
under-resourced; (2) centralised UN organisations in Dili were unwilling to take 
responsibility for the periphery; and (3) NGOs did not instinctively cooperate in 
the provision of humanitarian and development aid.248  In conclusion, Hayward 
argues “there is a need for a body with the requisite skills that can facilitate a 
more effective transition”249 to civil society.  Significantly, Hayward has 
independently come to the same conclusion as the author, with reference to an 
organisation like the Expeditionary Civil Service, as detailed in chapter five. 
Brigadier Roger Mortlock, commander of the Bougainville TMG, 
identifies three ‘conditions for [peacekeeping] success’.  These three conditions 
must be established by the military, but are not core military functions.  First, 
Mortlock emphasises that the belligerents in conflict must be made accountable 
for their actions.  Mortlock states “both successes and failures need to be 
absolutely transparent to the people.  For it is the people who are the ultimate 
instrument of accountability [sic].  Further, it is only this absolute degree of 
transparency that provides the intervention force with the on-going justification to 
act in order to keep the peace process on course”.250  Second, Mortlock identifies 
the need for peace-keeping forces to be political.  The dichotomy of civil and 
military affairs, apparent in a democracy, cannot be transferred to LIC.  Historic 
examples of LIC illustrate that, initially, the counterinsurgent’s military has been 
the only effective mechanism capable of providing aspects of civil society.  Third, 
Mortlock argues that the intervention force must be careful not to damage the 
economy of the state in which they are deployed.  In Angola, the UN forces were 
forced to rely upon the local economy for logistics support.  Such economic 
demands, by peacekeepers, “can cause inflation, hunger, [further] … poverty, and 
corruption”.251
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Mortlock makes a further critical observation: a soldier’s training for war, 
is central to his capacity to peace-keep.  However, as the NZDF trains for, and 
operates increasingly in, peacekeeping operations, the availability of time and 
funding for ‘war-fighter’ training is diminished.  Furthermore, recruitment and 
retention of military personnel becomes increasingly difficult, as the time spent in 
peace operations increases.  Simply, people join the military to fight wars.  
Mortlock explains this occurrence with a “peculiar cause-and-effect model: [t]he 
more peace operations the military undertake, the more they [the military] will 
specialise in those activities.  The greater the peace operations specialisation the 
less effective will become the war fighting capability.  As the war fighting 
capability diminishes, the more difficult will become recruitment and retention.  
And so, the more difficult it will become to conduct peace operations”.252
 Among those NZDF personnel interviewed in the production of this thesis, 
there was unanimous endorsement for supplementary and interpretive Low 
Intensity Conflict doctrine.  The NZBATT 5 Realisation Issues plan could form 
the foundation of an operational level interpretive doctrine applicable in LIC.  At 
the strategic or philosophical level, the NZDF’s Foundations of New Zealand 
Military Doctrine (NZDDP-D) requires a complementary doctrine that would be 
relevant in LIC.  The principles of this thesis’ chapter, A Doctrine for Low 
Intensity Conflict, including the Expeditionary Civil Service (ECS), could 
function as a basis for this complementary doctrine.  The training with, and 
operational use, of these supplementary doctrines will enable the peculiar forms of 
force needed in counterinsurgency.  Integrated pre-deployment training of the 
military, government agencies and non-governmental organisations will raise 
awareness of individual and collective objectives, capabilities and requirements.  
This should generate better results upon deployment.  However, there are dangers 
if New Zealand generates a unique “philosophy on nation building and enhancing 
stability”.253  First, the application of a unique doctrine may bring the NZDF into 
conflict with other command ideologies.  This could be problematic in the case of 
a coalition operation.254  However in Bougainville, the NZDF applied a unique 
ideology.  This caused some quizzical, but generally supportive observations and 
command issues with the ADF.255  Second, there is a danger of an interpretive 
document becoming an unvarying template.  This will cause failure, as all conflict 
environments are distinct.  In summary, the NZDF has an effective civil-military 
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capability that is essential in counterinsurgency operations.  What must be ensured 
is that this capability is institutionalised. 
 
Conclusion 
The NZDF has made clear and essential progress with the release of ‘Foundations 
of New Zealand Military Doctrine (NZDDP-D)’.  This doctrine is critical for 
creating an environment of jointness within the NZDF.  However, time and 
resource constraints and an unrelenting operational tempo are adversely effecting 
the development of jointery.  There is also some disunity between doctrine and 
policy, leading to confused doctrinal premises being outlined in New Zealand 
defence policy. 
 The inherent tenets of the Army’s Precision Manoeuvre doctrine are 
conducive to operational effectiveness in counterinsurgency.  The ethos, values 
and culture of the NZDF have also proven to be highly beneficial in 
counterinsurgency operations.  However, there must be a greater effort to 
institutionalise and formalise operating procedures and tactics for 
counterinsurgency operations in LIC, within the NZDF.  This requires the 
introduction of strategic and operational supplementary doctrines that are 
pertinent to counterinsurgency operations in LIC. 
 The principal obstruction, leading cause of failure and the greatest risk to 
the NZDF is the DLOC/OLOC process.  Essentially, the NZDF is maintained at a 
sub-operational level.  This causes hurried pre-deployment training and re-
equipping prior to operations.  Critically, however, pre-deployment installation of 
upgrades do not provide any bonuses; they merely generate risk of equipment 
failure and prevent training and familiarisation.  In East Timor, the initial 
Battalion Group was not ready to deploy with the INTERFET Coalition, due to 
the DLOC/OLOC process.  Similarly in Bosnia, the equipment deployed had to be 
rushed to readiness.  Hence, the equipment was untested and personnel were 
untrained on that equipment.  As has been earlier observed, it is critical that 
service personnel train as they are to fight, because they fight as they train.   
Due to the DLOC/OLOC process, readiness is essentially based upon 
financial imperatives rather than operational logic.  In reality, operations do not 
necessarily have long lead-times.  This makes readiness critical.  In the case of 
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Bougainville, there was essentially no pre-deployment training time.  Hence, the 
TMG had to deploy with the equipment, training and personnel that were 
available. 
The introduction of modern technology is a further positive step for the 
NZDF.  Over the past fifteen years, obsolescent NZDF weapons systems have put 
New Zealand personnel and mission objectives at risk.  This has often been due to 
the superior firepower and mobility fielded by the forces of adversaries.  Weapon 
systems including the LAV, LOV, NH90 and MRV, and command, control and 
communications technologies will restore the capability edge to the NZDF.  
However, these technologies will necessitate jointness, coalition interoperability 
and continual upgrade to maintain a technological edge. 
Joint cooperation, in itself, has become a critical enabler for military 
operations.  The requirement for joint training is however, creating significant 
challenges for the NZDF.  As stated above, time, resource and personnel restraints 
coupled with a high operating tempo have restricted joint training.  Personnel 
restraints are the most significant deficiency in the NZDF.  As an example, the 
Army is currently between 20 and 30 percent under strength in certain arms.  This 
is a critical, long-term issue for the military. 
The technology and doctrine of the NZDF, and operational reality, creates 
a requirement for coalition interoperability.  Within interoperability there is a 
requirement for field element and intelligence cooperation.  If field elements are 
to operate together, they must train together to create trust and synergy.  
Intelligence is a requirement for all military operations.  Without intelligence, 
field and command elements are visually impaired.  However, New Zealand does 
not have the means to acquire intelligence unilaterally.  Hence, allied intelligence 
is an essential enabler for New Zealand forces on operation.  Unfortunately, 
intelligence cannot be ascertained freely from New Zealand’s allies, due to the 
political fissure between New Zealand and the United States. 
In summation, the NZDF has proven to be an effective counterinsurgency 
force in LIC.  The high standard of New Zealand personnel is central to this 
effectiveness.  Moreover, the equipment and command deficiencies outlined in 
this chapter have been, or are being addressed.  However, there are joint and 
interoperability challenges facing the NZDF.  The NZDF must also facilitate 
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greater institutionalisation of lessons learnt.  For all this, the NZDF is capable of 
operating competently as a counterinsurgency force in LIC.   
Conversely, however, as outlined in the 2005 NZDF Annual Report, 
significant risk would be incurred if regular field elements were to operate in 
Employment Contexts (EC) 3-5.  EC 3-5 include security challenges to: (1) the 
Australia-New Zealand Strategic Area; (2) New Zealand’s interests in the Asia-
Pacific region; and (3) New Zealand’s interests in global peace and security.  Put 
simply, the Annual Report indicates the NZDF cannot at present operate regular 
force elements outside New Zealand.  This is in contradiction to current practise, 
as the NZDF have deployed the PRT and a SAS team to Afghanistan.  It was 
stated at the beginning of this chapter that for the NZDF, the Afghanistan 
experience may demonstrate two important issues.  Humanitarian assistance and 
special force operations may be: (1) an area of NZDF excellence, and (2) 
politically viable operational options for the Government.  Afghanistan may also 
demonstrate that at present resource levels, the PRT and SAS deployment is all 
the NZDF can deploy.  The PRT and SAS are a significant contribution to the 
future of Afghanistan.  However, Bosnia and East Timor were numerically 
considerably larger deployments.  The importance of force readiness, capability, 
numerical strength and projectability are hence significant requirements for the 
NZDF. 
 In terms of doctrinal principles, the NZDF has: effectively controlled 
international interference; provided internal security; applied civil operations that 
have supplemented military operations; and installed a command system that 
proved sufficiently unified on operation, but requires improvement.  In terms of 
military principles, there are a number of areas where the NZDF shows skill, but 
there are other areas that need improvement.  NZDF doctrine has proven 
sufficiently adaptable to ensure operational effectiveness in counterinsurgency 
operations.  However, this doctrine needs to be supplemented by doctrinal 
supplements specifically tailored to LIC.  The NZDF is endowed with 
professional personnel, who can operate independently, and show initiative and 
restraint.  Joint force and combined arms operations have been insufficiently 
supported principles in the NZDF.  A lack of modern equipment, readiness policy 
and inadequate training has reduced the NZDF’s capability to employ joint force 
and combined arms on operation.  Aging communications technologies have been 
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a principal cause for concern throughout the NZDF; essentially, NZDF 
communications need to improve so as to enable joint force, combined arms and 
force precision to be effectively utilised.  The acquisition of accurate human 
intelligence has been a strength of the NZDF.  This is because of the way the 
NZDF has utilised military forces in coordinating and applying political, 
diplomatic, economic and military forms of force.  This holistic use of force has 
enabled effective outcomes when the NZDF has operated in counterinsurgency 
roles. 
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Chapter Eight 
Australian Defence Force 
 
This chapter analyses the implications of Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) for the 
Australian Defence Force (ADF).  The chapter concomitantly makes 
recommendations concerning the ADF approach to LIC. 
As has been indicated earlier, this research acknowledges that conflict is 
fought through the application of political, economic, diplomatic and military 
forms of force.  This research analyses how these forms of force can be 
coordinated and applied strategically, tactically and operationally by a 
counterinsurgent.  This chapter analyses, principally, how effectively the ADF has 
coordinated and applied these forms of force in counterinsurgency operations.  In 
terms of doctrinal principles, this chapter investigates how effectively the ADF 
has controlled international interference, provided internal security, applied civil 
operations and installed a unified command, when operating as a 
counterinsurgent.  There are also ten military principles that are examined in 
relation to ADF counterinsurgency operations in LIC; they include doctrinal 
precision, professionalism, independence, initiative, force precision, restraint, 
combined arms, joint force, integrated communications and accurate human 
intelligence.  From this basis of holistic examination, recommendations are 
suggested that would augment the capability of the ADF when operating as a 
counterinsurgent in LIC.  The analysis and recommendations made in this chapter 
will also be of interest to other medium-sized defence forces, which will be 
confronted with similar issues as the ADF when operating as counterinsurgents in 
LIC. 
The sections of this chapter reflect the critical elements of force in LIC.  
Frequently these elements of force have proven to be as essential to conventional 
warfare as they are to LIC.  However, there are a number of sections below that 
emphasise distinct forms of force required in counterinsurgency operations in 
LIC.  This chapter and the previous chapter on the New Zealand Defence Force 
are intentionally structured alike.  The chapters are structurally similar and they 
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analyse the same or comparable operations.  This enables comparisons to be made 
and lessons to be learned. 
Some of the issues analysed in this chapter are generic to military 
operations, including conventional operations.  The rationale for their examination 
is that they have significant effects on LIC operations.  Moreover, the effect of 
these issues may be more significant in LIC than in conventional conflict, due to 
the political, moral and civil dimensions of counterinsurgency. 
 
Overview 
In what follows the Australian Defence Force’s (ADF) involvement, over the 
period 1993 to 2006, in a range of LICs and aspects of conventional conflict is 
analysed.  The range comprises: Operation Solace (1993) Somalia; Operation 
Lagoon (September-October 1994) Bougainville; Truce Monitoring Group 
(TMG) and Peace Monitoring Group (PMG) Bougainville (1997-2001); 
International Force East Timor (INTERFET) and United Nations Transitional 
Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) (1999-2002); Operation Enduring 
Freedom in Afghanistan (2001-2006); and Operation Iraqi Freedom (2003-2006). 
 Analogous with the previous chapter, the rationale for the above range of 
operations is as follows.  First, the operations cover a recent and dense period of 
ADF operations.  This enables an analysis of lessons learned and an operational 
check on the implementation of those lessons by the ADF.  Close examination of 
these recent operations also gives some indication of what will be required in the 
future from the ADF.  Second, the stated operations form sections of a force-
deployment spectrum, within the broader envelope of LIC. 
Graphic 7: Force Deployment Spectrum 
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The above graphic illustrates the force-deployment spectrum, showing both 
potential operations in theatre and ADF deployments of the type indicated above.  
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This spectrum is partly related to the level of violence in theatre, but is not 
restricted by that level of violence.   
The ADF deployment to Operation Solace in Somalia constituted a 
battalion group, namely 1st Battalion Royal Australian Regiment (1RAR).  1RAR 
was tasked with administering the Baidoa Humanitarian Relief Sector in southern 
Somalia.1
Operation Lagoon was an Australian planned, led and supported mission.  
However, the main land force elements incorporated one company each from Fiji 
and Vanuatu, and a para-military platoon from Tonga.  This combined force was 
known collectively as the South Pacific Peace Keeping Force (SPPKF).  The ADF 
supplied one amphibious and one logistics ship, C-130 and Caribou aircraft, 
Blackhawk helicopters, force intelligence, surveillance, communications and 
strategic command.  Collectively, Operation Lagoon constituted a force 
equivalent to a battalion group.  The aim of Operation Lagoon was to facilitate 
security at a peace conference held in Arawa, Bougainville.  Essentially, this task 
involved monitoring a cease fire agreement. 
Again in the case of Bougainville, the TMG and PMG’s purpose was to 
monitor an established peace. Given the operational environment in Bougainville, 
it was deemed that the TMG and PMG should be unarmed.  The TMG was a 
small-scale joint force, under a New Zealand command, with Australian support.2  
The PMG replaced the TMG and was predominantly an Australian operation. 
The ADF commitment to INTERFET was the largest Australian force 
deployment since World War Two.  In addition, the INTERFET operation was 
commanded by Australia.  The ADF INTERFET commitment, at its height, 
constituted approximately three battalions with attached armour, a joint 
operational headquarters (HQ), transport helicopter and aircraft support, a naval 
contingent, and service support for most of the INTERFET force.3
The ADF commitment to Afghanistan consisted of “a Special Forces Task 
Group; two 707 Air-to-Air Refuelling aircraft …; four F/A-18 Hornets …; [and] 
two AP-3C Orion maritime patrol aircraft”.4  These forces either operated directly 
or indirectly “against the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan”,5 freed coalition 
forces to undertake missions against the Taliban and Al Qaeda, or supported the 
Multinational Interception Force.  Moreover, Royal Australian Navy (RAN) 
vessels also provided regular, but intermittent support to the Multinational 
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Interception Force.  The Multinational Interception Force enforced sanctions 
against Iraq and endeavoured to quarantine Afghanistan from seaborne 
interference. 
The initial ADF commitment to Iraq included “[Her Majesty’s Australian 
Ship] HMAS Kanimbla with Army Air Defence and landing craft detachments; a 
Navy Clearance Diving Team; a Special Forces Task Group; an F/A-18 Hornet 
fighter detachment; and a C-130 Hercules transport aircraft detachment”.6  These 
force elements operated against Iraqi military forces and assisted with opening 
Iraqi port facilities to coalition vessels.  The ADF has made subsequent 
deployments to Iraq, including cavalry and support elements. 
 
Doctrine and Policy 
The basis for Australian defence policy, since 1901, has alternated between two 
contrasting strategic imperatives: Defence of Australia and Forward Defence.  The 
Defence of Australia strategy emphasises the pre-eminence of naval and air forces 
in controlling the sea-air gap to the north of Australia.  Hence within this strategic 
framework, land forces are of limited strategic relevance.  The Defence of 
Australia strategy has maintained primacy during the periods, 1901 to 1939 and 
1972 to the present.  During the period 1945 to 1972, Australian strategy focused 
on limited war and insurgency in Southeast Asia.  (It could be argued that the 
chronological dominance of these strategies is less distinct than what is stated 
above.  However, the distinction outlined in this section is sufficient for the 
purpose of this analysis.)  The strategy of Forward Defence elevated the Army to 
a position of primary ADF combatant.  Hence, a highly trained, well equipped, 
professional army was formed and sustained.  Due to the re-emergence of the 
Defence of Australia strategy after 1972, the Australian Army was once again 
relegated to a position of “the least significant of the three services”.7
The case studies of this chapter analyse ADF counterinsurgency 
operations in LIC, during the period 1993 to 2006.  LIC necessitates highly 
trained, well equipped land force elements, which must be closely supported by, 
and integrated with, air and sea force elements.  During that period, however, 
Australian defence policy and strategy has emphasised air and sea combat, 
command and control, and technical surveillance and intelligence.  This strategy 
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has been to the detriment of ADF land elements, as well as joint strategic and 
tactical force projection and support capabilities.  Hence, Australian defence 
policy and strategy has severely constrained the ADF’s capability in LIC. 
The “dissonance between … declaratory [Australian] strategic theory and 
… actual [ADF] military practice”8, since the early 1990s, was recognised in the 
Australian defence white paper: Defence 2000.  Defence 2000 acknowledged that 
“the development of … [Australia’s] land forces … [needed] to reflect a new 
balance between the demands of operations on Australian territory and the 
demands of deployments offshore, especially in … [the] immediate [regional] 
neighbourhood”.9 Despite this acknowledgement, Defence 2000 maintained the 
primacy of the Defence of Australia strategy.10  Subsequently, however, the threat 
to Australia’s security interests represented by global terrorism, proliferation, and 
failed and failing states caused a re-evaluation of national defence priorities.  
Hence in 2005, the Australian Government published ‘Australia’s National 
Security: A Defence Update 2005’.  There was another version of this published 
in 2003.  However, the 2005 issue will be the focus of this section, as it most 
accurately reflects current Government thinking. This update indicates a growing 
realisation that Australia has “significant security responsibilities in the immediate 
region, [must] make meaningful contributions to coalition operations further 
afield [sic] and more broadly defend Australia and Australian interests”.11  The 
document also recognises that “[t]hreats to national and international security are 
increasingly interrelated … [and] Australian security interests are not defined by 
geography alone”.12  These are significant conceptual departures from previous 
defence white papers.  The Defence of Australia strategy is giving way to Forward 
Defence, and the dissonance between policy and practice is diminishing. 
‘Defence Update 2005’ also indicates that to “meet … [the 
aforementioned] policy and strategic needs, the ADF must be able to operate as a 
networked, joint force across information, air, land and maritime domains.  It 
must be able to operate in environments that are complex and ambiguous, and 
where adversaries, have increasingly lethal capabilities.  Through continuing 
modernisation, it needs to retain a capability edge over potential rivals.  At all 
times it must maintain high levels of preparedness”.13  Hence, contemporary 
Australian defence policy and strategy is beginning to assimilate 
contemporaneous operational military practise.  Furthermore, that military 
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practise has, and is, principally occurring within the parameters of LIC.  Therefore 
as the current strands of Australian defence policy and strategy develop, the 
effectiveness of the ADF in LIC should improve.  This is primarily because ADF 
doctrine is becoming more tailored to counterinsurgency operations in LIC. 
ADF personnel interviewed for the purposes of this thesis have been 
critical of the defence policy process.  Specifically, there is a fissure between the 
service organisations and government in the creation of policy and defence 
reports; similar processes have occurred in New Zealand.  There are three areas of 
concern.  First, the policy process almost excludes military input.  When the 2000 
Defence White Paper was being compiled, the services were limited to a 24 hour 
turnaround of drafts, as a means of influencing the process.  In the case of the 
Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade’s paper on 
Australian Maritime Strategy, “the Navy wasn’t [sic] allowed to make a 
submission”.14  Second, defence policy is not reflective of military doctrine.15  
This is a significant deficiency as force structuring, personnel, equipment 
procurement and command and control infrastructures are integrated, co-
dependent derivatives of doctrine.  Hence, if doctrine is not synchronised with 
policy, military capability and government intent will not equate.  Third, the 
defence updates have been too narrowly focused upon land-centric expeditionary 
warfare.  Dr David Stevens, of the Royal Australian Navy’s Sea Power Centre, 
indicated that there are many diplomatic, constabulary and military tasks 
performed by the Navy, which are not included in ‘Defence Update 2005’.16  This 
lack of accuracy could skew future force structuring and budgetary imperatives.  
This in turn could create a force that may lack the flexibility to perform 
operations, and hence achieve government intent.17
Subordinate to government policy and strategic guidance is the ADF’s 
philosophical doctrine: ‘Foundations of Australian Military Doctrine’ (ADDP-
D).18  As the highest form of joint Australian doctrine, ADDP-D endeavours to 
create a seamlessly integrated ADF.  To achieve this end, ADDP-D enshrines the 
fundamental concepts that ultimately guide the various services and elements 
within the Australian Defence Organisation.  The leading conceptual strands of 
ADDP-D comprise joint coordination, political adroitness, Manoeuvre Warfare, 
coalition integration and an embryonic form of Effects-Based Operations.19  
Future concepts, as outlined in the doctrinal publication ‘Force 2020’, consist of a 
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Seamless Force, Network-Enabled Operations and an Effects-Based Approach.20  
These concepts combine to generate Australia’s ‘Future Warfighting Concept’, 
Multidimensional Manoeuvre.21
Multidimensional Manoeuvre is an evolved form of contemporary 
Manoeuvre Warfare, which simply seeks to apply strength against weakness 
through manoeuvre.  Multidimensional Manoeuvre depends upon a Seamless 
Force applying an Effects-Based Approach.  An Effects-Based Approach “seeks 
to defeat an adversary’s strategy and resolve[,] instead of merely attriting [sic] his 
armed forces”.22  This greatly enhances flexibility and enables asymmetry in the 
process of achieving an outcome.  Seamless Force is a whole-of-nation approach, 
which “goes beyond the contemporary understanding of ‘jointness’,… to 
maximise … collective warfighting capabilities and specialisations [through 
integration and synergy]”.23  In addition, Seamless Force is dependent on the 
connectivity provided by Network-Centric Warfare.  Network-Centric Warfare 
seeks to link “sensors, engagement systems and decision-makers into an effective 
and responsive whole…  [In so doing, a seamless force is provided] with the 
ability to generate tempo, precision and combat power through shared situational 
awareness, clear procedures, and the information connectivity needed to 
synchronise … actions to meet the commander’s intent”.24   
The future doctrinal concepts, outlined above, will influence the way the 
ADF operates in LIC.  Hence, the influence of each concept is subsequently 
analysed.  Seamless Force is a derivative of three current concepts: joint 
coordination, political adroitness and coalition integration.  Joint coordination “is 
the effective integration of thought and action [by all three services] … to achieve 
a common goal”.25  In all the case studies of this thesis, joint coordination has 
been a key factor in enabling the effective application of force in LIC.  Forces 
must be politically adroit, so as to limit and control the post-conflict political 
consequences of military action.  Political adroitness is critical in LIC, as the 
population is the centre of gravity.  Hence, military action must only occur in 
concordance with a strategy of winning the hearts and minds of the population.  
Furthermore as a whole-of-nation approach, governmental and non-governmental 
agencies are integrated within the Seamless Force.  This concept needs to be 
reinforced in LIC, as only a holistic form of security will succeed.  (For further 
explanation of the concept of holistic security, see this thesis’ chapter, A Doctrine 
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for Low Intensity Conflict.)  Coalition integration is only an important 
requirement in LIC, if the deploying force in multinational.  All of the case studies 
of this thesis, except those contained in the Soviet/Russian chapter, involve 
coalition force.  Hence it is important for the ADF to maintain a capability to 
operate effectively with foreign defence forces.  An Effects-Based Approach to 
LIC will be effective as long as the approach is adaptive enough to be applied in 
an unconventional manner.  There are few, if any, specific critical nodes in LIC 
that will incapacitate an insurgent strategy.  However, sealing the theatre and 
controlling the population’s support, will drastically curtail an insurgency.  Hence 
an Effects-Based Approach, focussed upon the aforementioned operational 
outcomes, may be effective in LIC.  Network-Centric Warfare has been shown, in 
Afghanistan and Iraq, to be highly effective in LIC.  ‘Precision and joint combat 
power, situational awareness, information connectivity and synchronisation’26 
have been critical in effectively prosecuting counterinsurgency operations in LIC.  
Therefore the aforementioned doctrinal concepts should provide a firm and 
effective conceptual basis for the ADF in LIC, providing that the conditions 
delineated above are incorporated operationally. 
 An Effects-Based Approach, as perceived by the three services, represents 
a Whole of Government synthesis in generating a “seamless national security 
force”27 response to a complex security issue.  However, there is a perceived 
“cultural dissonance”28 among the three services, pertaining to the Effects-Based 
Approach.  The idea of cultural dissonance refers to a separate service meaning 
being attached to a universal concept, such as the Effects-Based Approach.  
However, cultural dissonance may be a rational and reasonable consequence of 
the individual services’ Spectrum of Operations.  A Spectrum of Operations 
indicates the range of tasks that the force elements of a service can perform.  For 
the RAN, potential tasks include intelligence collection and surveillance, cover, 
maritime strike and interdiction, maritime mobility, land strike, support to 
operations on land, and amphibious operations.29  These tasks correspond broadly 
to three maritime roles: Military, Constabulary and Diplomatic.30  Furthermore, 
the aforementioned tasks and roles have a conceptual basis in the philosophical 
concepts of sea control, sea denial, maritime power projection and sea lines of 
communication.31  Some of the maritime tasks listed above would be familiar to 
other services, but be derived from different concepts.  Alternatively, some of the 
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aforementioned maritime tasks would be completely foreign to the other services.  
Hence the differing environments, in which the single services operate, have 
created a cultural dissonance within the ADF.  Difficulties can consequently 
develop when a joint operating concept, such as the Effects-Based Approach, 
comes in contact with cultural dissonance. 
 To manage the difficulties of cultural dissonance in a joint environment, 
joint and whole-of-conflict education is essential, as is lateral command, control 
and communications between service stovepipes (vertical non-integrated 
information flows), and top-down doctrinal management.  However, these 
requirements create their own set of resource, personnel and structuring issues.  
Implementing an Effects-Based Approach to conflict is “an expensive enterprise 
… [, in terms of] communications, command …, people’s time [and] skill sets.  
[Due to the complex interface within the ADF and] between ourselves and 
coalition partners.  People haven’t [sic] realised … to be a seamless … effects-
based force…, [there are] high transaction costs [involved]”.32  Whether these 
costs will be funded is an issue for the ADF, given that the products are 
intangible.  In terms of personnel, there is an attempt “to educate … [personnel] to 
three ends; (1) … [individual service] professional mastery; (2) [tri-service] joint 
[mastery]; and (3) [mastery of] the national Effects-Based Approach.  Most 
[personnel] simply cannot cross the mastery of their own activities and those of 
others to make sure that unified outcomes can be achieved”.33  Hence, there is a 
“disconnect between the demands … [the ADF] puts on people to … [assimilate 
this knowledge] and the … capacity to educate them”.34  However, if knowledge 
is only conferred upon a highly educated leadership, issues will arise of personnel 
not understanding “the nuances of the directions given to them by their 
commanding officers”.35  This may in turn cause “political trouble at an early 
stage [in the conflict]”.36  Nonetheless, the Effects-Based Approach is an 
operational reality.  Whole-of-Government synergy has been a significant factor 
in both Operation Bel Isi in Bougainville and Operation Ramsi in the Solomon 
Islands.37
 The terms Network-Centric Warfare and Seamless Force are almost used 
interchangeably by the three services.  This is because Seamless Force is 
dependent on the connectivity of Network-Centric Warfare.  In addition, these 
future concepts have a basis in current joint thought.  Seamless Force and 
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Network-Centric Warfare will constitute a significant conceptual and foundational 
redesign of the Australian Air Force’s Future Air and Space Concept.  
Specifically, the “Air Force is seeking to shape itself to be … networked [and] 
seamless [within a] whole of government approach … to solving complex security 
[issues]”.38  The Army will also integrate these future concepts with the Hardened 
and Networked initiative.  For the Navy, these concepts represent an evolutionary 
process, as maritime platforms have historically been networked.39  However as 
stated above, these concepts are advancements on jointness.  Hence, the degree of 
jointness within the Defence Force may indicate the future capability of the ADF 
to incorporate Seamless Force and Network-Centric Warfare.   Bob Breen,A a 
research fellow at the Australian National University, indicated that “efforts made 
in the 1990s to develop a joint [command and control] C2 structure that made 
joint force projection more efficient and effective were not successful”.40  Dr 
David Stevens, the Director of Strategic and Historical Studies at the Australian 
Sea Power Centre, states in the case of East Timor that “the Army … [clearly 
lacked understanding of] what Navy could do and what it brought to the 
mission”.41  Breen also states that “arguably as late as 2003, the ADF was still 
having difficulties applying joint doctrine to operations, illustrated by the 
deployment to the Solomons [sic]”.42  Breen indicates that the Defence Force 
lacks joint cohesion because “the ADF did not rehearse joint force projection at 
all [during] the 1990s”.  Furthermore, the Kangaroo, Tandem Thrust and 
Crocodile exercises “were always partial rehearsals, they rehearsed what came 
after [an amphibious assault], and the three services essentially trained 
separately”.43  Hence, while there are doctrinal, structural and capability 
developments occurring within the ADF, with the purpose of enabling the future 
concepts, there are still significant developments required at the operational level 
to assimilate current and future concepts. 
 The joint operational issues analysed above, may represent a lack of 
doctrinal cohesion at the single service level.  This is a generally accepted 
assertion within the ADF.  Captain Peter Leschen, RAN, describes the situation 
thus, “[d]octrinally, the ADF has a situation where joint, maritime, land and 
                                                 
A Breen has been often cited in this chapter due to the importance of his research into numerous 
ADF operations in LIC.  However, the aforementioned research has been supplemented by 
numerous other academic texts, government documents and the accounts of practitioners. 
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aerospace concepts are expressed in four different languages, which are not 
necessarily well understood across the ADF”.44  This lack of cohesion undermines 
the ADF’s capability in LIC.  Presently, there is no mechanism within the ADF to 
ensure single service and joint doctrinal cohesion.  The three services are simple 
expected to assimilate joint doctrine published by the ADF Warfare Centre, or 
joint future concepts published by Strategy Group.  The only other forums for 
joint doctrinal learning are the staff colleges, joint service modules and 
programmes.  A Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) Wing Commander has 
indicated that the ADF “is trying to work toward a system where there is an active 
linkage between the development of joint doctrine and reference to the single 
service doctrine”.45  This system would ensure “a two way information flow…, 
[through] formal joint management and steering mechanisms within Defence”.46  
Dr Michael Evans, of the Land Warfare Studies Centre, indicates that joint 
doctrinal understanding and cohesion would benefit from “more joint involvement 
from the service studies centres”.47  Evans also states that the ADF would benefit 
from a “Joint Studies Centre, as the individual studies centres don’t [sic] have 
enough critical mass to [enable doctrinal cohesion separately]”.48  The Strategy 
Group and the ADF Warfare Centre share the responsibility for joint doctrine.  Air 
Commodore Mark Lax, Director General Strategic Policy at the Strategy Group, 
stated that the role of Strategy Group is to provide “high level guidance for the 
department… [in terms of concepts]”.49  However, Strategy Group does not 
“specifically invigorate policy”.50  It may be appropriate if Strategy Group and the 
ADF Warfare Centre were to be invested with the authority to ensure doctrinal 
cohesion.  This then would make for better jointery, which is critical in LIC. 
 It is clear that Australian defence policy and doctrine are corresponding 
increasingly well with the requirements of counterinsurgency operations.  
However, there are concerns that as these changes take place, policy and doctrine 
will become gradually more land-centric and less joint.  The ADF must focus on 
ensuring that policy and doctrine are based on the military principle of joint force.  
Counterinsurgency operations require a joint approach, and this joint approach 
must be supported by policy and doctrine.  Australian policy and doctrine 
recognise the importance of a holistic approach to conflict, incorporating political, 
economic, diplomatic and military forms of force.  Such an approach is essential 
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in counterinsurgency operations.  However, the services of the ADF must also 
ensure that this holistic approach can be applied jointly. 
 
Infantry 
Infantry operations are analysed below in four subsections: (1) Personnel; (2) 
Tactics, Techniques and Standard Operating Procedures; (3) Equipment; and (4) 
Training. 
 
Personnel 
As indicated by the counterintelligence personnel of 1 RAR, the initial Somali 
impression of Australian troops was that they were “white, European-looking, 
English speakers like the Americans, but impersonal and aloof – just like the 
French.51  This impression was realistic, given 1 RAR soldiers believed they were 
in Somalia to close-with and engage a conventional foe.  This 1 RAR mindset 
only began to alter through the efforts of two counterintelligence personnel.  
These counterintelligence personnel indicated to 1 RAR that the population was 
the centre of gravity for the operation.  This was due to the intelligence the 
population could provide 1 RAR.  Given this rationale, 1 RAR personnel 
transformed their “stern… [and] unsmiling” character with smiles, Somali 
greetings, fairness, friendliness and compassion.52  These evolved Australian 
characteristics quickly won the support of the Somali population. 
 However, various irritants undermined 1 RAR operations by putting 
pressure on professionalism and the morale of Australian personnel.  These 
irritants included: (1) the local police authority holding prisoners for serious 
crimes for only 24 hours; (2) ROE that gave Somali belligerents (the term 
Belligerents is used as 1 RAR combated three indistinct armed threats, criminals, 
nomadic ‘bandits’ and Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO) guards) a 
significant tactical advantage; (3) provocation from Somali youths; and (4) poor 
and unfair base living conditions.  The first and fourth problems indicated above, 
could have been moderated by ROE that authorised the holding of criminals and 
belligerents, and a planning phase that ensured the comfort of personnel in theatre.  
Without such actions personnel may be provoked to breach ROE or act 
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aggressively towards the populous.  Such actions could seriously undermine an 
LIC operation. 
 As with examples in the previous chapter, an understanding of culture was 
an important lesson learned from Operation Lagoon.  Specifically, liaison officers 
provided a critical link between the ADF, NZDF, Fijian, Tongan and Ni Vanuatu 
force elements.  Although this liaison was critical, those selected did not always 
possess the requisite language and cultural skills; this problem has also been an 
issue for the NZDF, but not to the same extent.  Consequently at the pre-
deployment training stage, the pacific force elements were offended by the lack of 
cultural courtesy extended to them by the ADF.  Hence, pre-deployment training 
was less effective, as the pacific contingents were reserved and inadequately 
integrated.  Furthermore, there should have been liaison officers deployed 
amongst the leadership of the opposed forces in Bougainville.  This may have 
stopped Papua New Guinean Defence Force (PNGDF) interruption of the peace 
conference, and encouraged Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA) and 
Bougainville Interim Government (BIG) conference attendance.53
 In Bougainville, a combination of short tactical planning, training and 
deploying phases, and inadequate numbers of troops, meant the “force structure 
was insufficient to accomplish the mission”.54  The ground elements equated to a 
company HQ and eight under-strength platoons, rather than the nine platoons 
envisaged at the planning stage.  Furthermore, this force arrived in Bougainville 
the day before the anticipated conference start date.  Hence, “[t]ime was not 
available for the SPPKF to become more situationally [sic] aware and to employ 
force multipliers, such as liaison, human intelligence networks, technical 
surveillance and high and low level communications to offset the lack of 
numbers”.55   
In the case of Operation Lagoon, political imperatives undermined military 
requirements.  Following the initial tactical reconnaissance visit to Bougainville, 
all SPPKF participants recognised the need for twenty-one days of readying time.  
This timeframe would include: (1) ten days training; (2) four days of maritime 
deployment; and (3) seven days to secure the neutral zones.  The then Papua New 
Guinean (PNG) Prime Minister, Julius Chan, demanded the twenty-one days to be 
cut to fourteen.  Hence, “[t]raining was truncated, resulting in the SPPKF not 
satisfying ADF standards for off shore deployment.  There was a lack of cohesion 
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and mutual confidence among the contingents comprising the Combined Force.  A 
more complex and expensive deployment plan was implemented to reduce 
deployment time – i.e. [sic] by air rather than by sea… [But most significantly, 
b]ecause SPPKF force elements did not have time to establish themselves in 
designated neutral zones, criminal gangs intimidated conference delegates and 
locals, [and rogue PNGDF elements broke the cease fire agreement]”.56  In short, 
“[t]he SPPKF was … not in a position to guarantee security or properly support 
the conference for the first three days”.57
The professionalism of the Australian forces in East Timor was put under 
immense pressure by militia and Indonesian Territorial Force units.  These latter 
belligerents provoked and threatened ADF personnel following the INTERFET 
lodgement.  However, there were no incidents of ADF personnel reacting to 
incitement.  Despite the provocation, the ADF aggressively asserted their 
authority in Dili and throughout the countryside.  ADF operations in East Timor 
were reminiscent of those performed in Operation Solace.  The early ferocity of 
operations in Dili was also a product of operations in Northern Ireland.  This was 
because the commanding officer of 2 RAR, Brigadier Mark Evans, was an officer 
of the British Army and had served in Northern Ireland.  Hence, high tempo 
patrols, aggressive cordon and search operations, the clearing houses and 
buildings belonging to militia, and immediate response to sightings, incidents and 
intelligence, quickly suppressed and functionally dislocated adversarial forces.  
The assertive dispatch of forces into the border regions similarly dislocated the 
militia.  In both rural and urban operations, ADF units were enthusiastic users of 
population based intelligence.  This intelligence was often highly effective, 
frequently creating a butterfly effect, where detainees would provide further 
usable information.58
 In common with Australia’s allies, the ADF employs a two stage level of 
preparedness.  ADF units are directed to maintain a Minimum Level of Capability 
(MLOC), which in an agreed timeframe can be improved to an Operational Level 
of Capability (OLOC).  An Australian Government report,59 published in 
September 2000, indicated the MLOC/OLOC dichotomy had hidden a serious 
Force generation issue within the Australian Army.  The NZDF has had similar 
problems due to a similar force generation policy, which seems to indicate that the 
policy is flawed. 
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  Force generation is a process of moving units from MLOC to OLOC.  
The outcome of Force generation is unit readiness.  At the time of operations in 
East Timor, the Australian Army was notionally a structure incorporating nine 
brigades.  Two brigades (1 and 3) were regular force, one was an integrated 
reserve/regular brigade (7), and the remaining six brigades were reserve 
formations (4, 5, 8, 9, 11 and 13).  Prior to 2000, 3 Brigade constituted the ADF’s 
Ready Deployment Force (RDF), a force at high readiness.  In response to East 
Timor, 1 Brigade’s readiness was improved, so as to supplement the RDF.  
However, once the RDF deployed to East Timor in early 1999, the ADF found 
itself without the Latent Combat Force or Enabling Component to facilitate force 
rotation at strength.  The Latent Combat Force describes formed lower-readiness 
non-deployed units at MLOC, while the Enabling Component encompasses ADF 
training centres and instructors.  The weakness of the Enabling Component was 
described by the Australian Army as follows: “Rationalisations over the past 
decade have reduced Army and supporting and enabling elements to the extent 
that their capacity to support short-notice surge requirements has effectively been 
removed.  For example, it is assessed that the Training Command – Army will 
have difficulty meeting all the potential individual training requirements 
necessary to sustain the enhanced combat force, [and] remediate the personnel 
shortfalls in the lower readiness formations…”60  Furthermore, the Latent Combat 
Force was described as “dysfunctional [and unable] to fulfil its role”.61 This role 
is to reinforce the RDF, when the initial units require rotation or supplementation.  
The reason for the dysfunctional nature of the Latent Combat Force was an 
institutionalised lack of readiness.  This lack of readiness was caused by the 
MLOC/OLOC process.  First, problems associated with “personnel management, 
training, recruiting practises, equipment provisioning, callout legislation and most 
of all resourcing [sic] [precluded a functional ready-state of capability within the 
Latent Combat Force]”.62  Notionally, however, the Latent Combat Force was 
fulfilling its MLOC capabilities and mandated readiness times of between 180 and 
360 days.  Hence, the MLOC/OLOC process had generated a latent force that was 
functionally irrelevant, so as to minimise expenditure.  Furthermore the 
‘Rationalisations’ during the 1990s, had eroded the Enabling Components to an 
extent, that they themselves were also functionally irrelevant.  The Australian 
Government report referred to earlier, expressed concern “that the practice of long 
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readiness times delivered no useable capability while creating the impression that 
the Army was large and capable”.63  The report recommended that: (1) no unit 
should be maintained at readiness-state beyond 120 days; and (2) if units could 
not be resourced to meet that readiness-state, they should be disbanded.64  As a 
result, the pursuant Defence White Paper proposed an Army structure centred on 
three brigades (1, 3 and 7 Brigades).  These brigades would be composed of six 
regular battalions, plus units from the Special Operations Group.  In addition, 
each brigade would include “a range of specialised combat units such as armour, 
artillery, reconnaissance, aviation, combat engineers, logistics and support 
units”.65
 Special Operations Forces (SOF) have been a central aspect of ADF 
operations in East Timor, Afghanistan and Iraq.  In the case of East Timor, 
Australian SOF undertook three mission-critical operations.  First, SOF partook in 
extracting UN staff from East Timor.  Second, SOF personnel represented the 
core of the INTERFET Response Force, which secured ports of entry in East 
Timor.  Third, SOF personnel provided reconnaissance information on, and partly 
secured much of, East Timor’s countryside.  In the case of Operations Slipper 
(Australia’s participation in Operation Enduring Freedom), Falconer and Catalyst 
(Australia’s participation in Operation Iraqi Freedom), SOF constituted the 
entirety of Australia’s land combat component participation. 
 In Afghanistan a “150-strong [Special Air Service Regiment] SASR 
detachment … [operated] in southern Afghanistan … [from] late 2001, equipped 
with a mix of 4 x 4 and 6 x 6 patrol vehicles, motorcycles and quad bikes.  
Missions have included surveillance, reconnaissance, forward air control, 
screening of escape routes and ordnance disposal.  In March [2001] the force took 
part in combat operations during the [United States] US-led [sic] Operation 
‘Anaconda’”.66  Following two further rotations through Afghanistan, SOF 
operations were suspended in early 2003.67  This cessation of SOF operations in 
Afghanistan may have been in active or passive support of Australian SOF 
operations in Iraq.  However, a “Special Forces Task Group (SFTG) consisting of 
Special Air Service (SAS) Regiment, Commandos, Incident Response Regiment 
(IRR) and logistic support personnel have … [returned] to Afghanistan to conduct 
special operations in support of security and reconstruction efforts in the 
country”.68  As of September 2005, the “SFTG … [continued to] provide 
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reconnaissance, surveillance and other specialised capabilities to the Coalition’s 
continuing operations against Al Qaeda and the Taliban”.69
 SOF operations in Iraq, while asymmetric, targeted fairly conventional 
objectives.  Australian SOF were deployed: (1) to Iraq’s western desert to deny 
Saddam’s regime the capability to strike Israel with ballistic missiles; (2) to 
observe strategic roads and military installations near Baghdad and in Iraq’s 
western desert; (3) to conduct direct-action missions against communications and 
other specified installations; and (4) contain the conflict by denying movement to 
“foreign [insurgency] supporters … [and] former regime [officials]”.70  The SFTG 
in Iraq “was built around a Special Air Service (SAS) Squadron.  It was supported 
by a reinforced Commando Platoon as a Quick Reaction Force and a Nuclear, 
Biological and Chemical Defence troop from the Incident Response Regiment.  It 
also had a Forward Command element from Headquarters Special Operations and 
personnel from the Logistics Support Force and the RAAF.  Support came from 
the C-130s of 36 Squadron and a detachment of three CH-47 Chinook helicopters 
from the 5th Aviation Regiment”.71  The SFTG was also provided, at times, 
combat air support from F/A-18 Hornets from 75 Squadron. 
 In terms of military principles, ADF personnel have conducted themselves 
in a professional manner, and have maintained restraint when facing difficult 
situations.  ADF personnel also illustrate a capability to operate independently and 
have with initiative.  However, the MLOC/OLOC force generation process has 
undermined the professional capability of the ADF, as it has done in the NZDF. 
 
Tactics, Techniques and Standard Operating Procedures 
In the case of Somalia, Tactics, Techniques and Standard Operating Procedures 
(SOPs) were highly variable.  This was because the tactics and procedures of 
different companies and platoons reflected the attitudes of their commanders.  
This divergence varied from “aggressive patrolling, house and building searches 
and vigorous questioning of anyone behaving suspiciously…[, to] patrolling and 
offering a friendly ‘Hello’ in Somali to … diffuse tension in [Baidoa]”.72  Breen 
asserts “[t]here is insufficient evidence to validate [the effectiveness of] either 
approach”.73  What is evident is that aggressive commanders, who relentlessly 
acted upon counterintelligence, seized quantities of arms and cash and arrested or 
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killed many criminals and Somali belligerents.  Furthermore, there seems to be no 
evidence that this approach caused undue tension in Baidoa, other than among 
criminal and belligerent elements. 
 Initial patrolling was the primary tactic for securing Baidoa.  However, 
patrolling units were based at the airfield, and had to march to town before the 
patrol could begin.  This meant each patrol: (1) was monitored by Somali 
belligerents and criminals; (2) were tired from the march to Baidoa town; and (3) 
were not effectively securing Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO) 
compounds.  To overcome this issue, 1 RAR units deployed to all NGO 
compounds in Baidoa, and from these compounds patrols originated and 
terminated.  Although this change placed 1 RAR personnel in a more threatening 
environment, overall security in Baidoa improved.  There were two further early 
changes to 1 RAR tactics.  First, driven by intelligence, additional house and 
building searches were authorised.  Second, further M113 patrols were introduced 
in Baidoa, to bolster 1 RAR presence.  These tactics provided 1 RAR with 
‘surprise, stealth, initiative’ and elicited intelligence from the population.74 As a 
result of aggressive commanders, the re-deployment of 1 RAR units to town, and 
timely and correct counterintelligence proved a highly effective tactical mix. 
 Rural operations in the Baidoa sector were inconsistent with urban 
operations.  The significant inconsistencies included Australian operations, ROE, 
the 1 RAR command interpretation of the UN mandate, and intelligence collection 
and rural politics.  The latter two issues will be analysed in the ‘Intelligence’ 
section below.  Australian operations were obviously rural in intent, incorporating 
cordon and search, road control, and rapid reaction operations.  Many personnel 
of 1 RAR presumed the intent of these operations was to capture bandits, arms 
and ammunition.  In contrast, it seems the intent of 1 RAR command, was to use 
the above operations to promote Australian presence and deter bandits.  
Furthermore, the UN focus was on a militia threat, while in reality bandits were 
the real threat.  Hence initially, operating procedures for the listed operations were 
only marginally effective at achieving a tangible result.  For example, cordon and 
search operations consistently lacked surprise.  This was due to counterproductive 
coalition psychological operations, pre-operation Australian counterintelligence or 
reconnaissance platoon presence in targeted settlements, and noisy, slow M113s.  
Consequently, bandits could escape and conceal weapons and ammunition 
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securely prior to Australian cordons being set.  Company and platoon 
commanders did attempt to overcome such cordon and search issues with 
initiative.  However, these innovative operations were often overruled by higher 
command or ROE.  For example, intelligence information was attained on the 
movements of a bandit leader.  To civilian casualties, the reconnaissance platoon 
decided to intercept the bandit leader when entering or exiting the town of 
Tugerhosle.  To provide information for the intercept operation, “three snipers 
dressed as locals”75 were sent to observe the town.  Once Lieutenant Colonel 
Hurley became aware of this operation, it was cancelled, as it breached the ROE.  
Instead, a cordon and search operation was suggested.  ‘This approach created 
significant problems and dangers: the sound of the APCs would alert the bandits 
to the operations, the town was to large to effectively cordon, and any fire fight 
between the reconnaissance platoon and the bandits could kill civilians’.76  Hence 
a risk averse attitude toward ROE, amplified a risk for military personnel and 
civilians.  The aforementioned examples of rural operations in Somalia, actually 
demonstrate the effect ROE and a UN mandate can have on initiative and 
operations.  Initiative was significant in Somalia, as standard operating practises 
were initially ineffective.  However, initiative often came in conflict with ROE, 
and/or the command interpretation of the UN mandate.  “The focus…[of the UN 
Mandate] was not on securing each sector in its entirety, but on ensuring there 
was a secure environment for the distribution of humanitarian aid”.77  Herein lays 
the problem, the mandate and the Australian command interpretation of that 
mandate, focused on a process, rather than an outcome.  If the mandate focused on 
the freedom of movement and security within the sector, unit initiative would 
have concentrated force on realistic threats. 
 As indicated above, it was important for ADF personnel to establish a 
permanent presence among the civil population.  This was significant in reference 
to doctrinal principles because internal security could be provided and civil 
operation could be applied.  In terms of military principles, this ADF presence 
enabled accurate intelligence to be gained, which led to force being precisely 
applied.  However, various ROE prohibited certain practices that are critical to 
counterinsurgency and certain UN policies undermined the collection of 
intelligence.   More specifically, certain UN policies did not reflect the reality of 
the operational environment.  These are significant issues that the ADF had to 
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operate in accordance with (as have the NZDF and other defence forces that were 
researched earlier in this thesis), which undermined their capability as 
counterinsurgents.  Specifically, these issues challenge important military force 
principles that are essential to counterinsurgency, including the collection of 
intelligence and the application of initiative and precisely tailored force.  The 
limitations placed on these military principles simultaneously damage the 
capability of the counterinsurgent to realise the doctrinal principles outlined in 
this research. 
 
Equipment 
In the case of Operation Solace, many of 1 RAR’s equipment requirements were 
initially refused by ADF Administrative Branch staff.  The said equipment 
included “hand-held Global Positioning Systems, night vision goggles, thermal 
imagers, PACE 10 data processing equipment, squad radios, laptop computers and 
other technical items”.78  A process of debate ensued, regarding the appropriate 
level of technological sophistication needed by 1 RAR in Somalia.  It was not 
until this debate reached the Deputy Chief of General Staff, Major General Geoff 
Carter, that 1 RAR’s equipment requests were supported.79  Significantly, this 
issue should not have arisen.  There is no rationale, at all, that should deploy 
forces with inferior equipment.  This is especially so, when superior equipment is 
already available, or easily acquired.  Superior equipment will advantage forces in 
the field to outclass the enemy, whatever the tactical/strategic context. 
 Once deployed, the superior equipment was critical for some operations 
and gave 1 RAR soldiers a valuable edge over Somali belligerents.  The primary 
responsibility of 1 RAR was to protect their base at Baidoa Airfield from 
incursion.  This objective would have been impossible at night without the 
distribution of night vision goggles (NVGs) to sentries, and the allocation of 
thermal imaging devices to key observation posts.  The thermal imaging devices 
could show approaching Somali gunmen, their style of movement and manner of 
weapons carriage.  NVGs also provided a critical advantage for units on patrol in 
urban areas, where ambient light was low.  Motorola hand-held radios, which 
were initially vetoed for the operation, were decisive for both observation work 
and when contacts occurred.80
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 Similarly in East Timor, NVGs and laser designators gave ADF personnel 
a real and potential advantage over belligerent groups.  This was true for all night 
operations, in both rural and urban environments.  NVGs and laser designators 
were especially critical for ADF personnel in defensive positions.  Upon 
deploying along the West Timor border, 2 RAR personnel found themselves being 
observed by Indonesian patrols.  “The Australians could see each member of the 
patrol clearly through night vision goggles and had them spotted with their laser 
beams”.81  This occurred while the Indonesian patrol could see nothing of the 
Australian personnel or position.  However, operations in East Timor indicated 
the ADF “struggle[s when large quantities of] body-armour, helmets and hand-
held radios [are required in a short amount of time]”.82  Dr Michael Evans, of the 
Land Warfare Studies Centre, accurately described the aforementioned items of 
kit, as “fundamentals that soldiers … [must] have”.83  As such, Evans stated the 
provision of kit is a “human rights issue, [as] … [Defence has a] duty to care for 
personnel”.84  This is an often overlooked moral point. 
ADF operations in East Timor also illustrated the obsolescence of some 
crew-served weapons.  Professor Paul Dibb stated that, in 2000, the Australian 
Army was “entirely correct to argue that their kit is ageing, becoming obsolescent 
… if you look at air defence weapons, or some of the other equipment, … they are 
old”.85  For example, the M40 106mm recoilless rifle fielded by the ADF was 
developed in the 1950s and used extensively in Vietnam.  The M40 offers some 
ranged firepower, but lacks precision guidance and fires only a limited array of 
ordnance.  Simply, the M40 is outclassed by many other readily available 
weapons systems.  Subsequently, the M40 has been replaced by the Javelin 
medium-range guided anti-armour weapon.  A range of further support weapons 
will also be acquired under the ADF’s project Land 40, phase 2.  These weapons 
will supplement the ADF’s current and aging stock of Carl Gustav 84mm 
recoilless rifles and MAG-58 7.62mm general purpose machineguns (GPMGs).  
Supplementary weapons will likely include 0.50 calibre machineguns, 40mm 
automatic grenade launchers, light cannon or man-portable short-range anti-
armour weapons.86
 In the case of Afghanistan and Iraq, advanced equipment was critical to 
the success of the deployed SOF.  Essential SAS kit in Afghanistan and Iraq 
included rocket launchers, guided anti-tank weapons, heavy machineguns, 
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automatic and rifle mounted grenade launchers, sniper rifles, advanced optical 
devices, positioning systems and communications.  In addition, it appears many of 
these systems are being upgraded, replaced or further disseminated within units of 
Australian Special Operations Command (SOCOMD).87  This seems an 
appropriate use of resources, given the increasing contemporary use of Special 
Forces worldwide.  Bob Breen, of the Australian National University, asserts that 
the reason the SOF are so well equipped is “because they control all their 
enablers”.88  Simply, the SOF “can reach back into a procurement system and get 
their own support, … money, [and] … identify and win their own piece of the 
budget”.89  Furthermore, the SOF “routinely get[s] first priority when working 
with the other services”.90  Hence, the SOF constitutes “a piece of the ADF that is 
truly joint and well rehearsed in joint special operations”.91  If the ADF as a 
whole could learn from the SOF, Australian force efficiency could improve. 
 In terms of military principles, advanced technical kit enabled ADF 
personnel to generate valuable intelligence and consequently apply precise force.  
It is therefore critically important that ADF field elements are provided with such 
technical kit when needed. 
 
Training 
Training is the principal determinant of war, including LIC.  In general, ADF 
personnel have illustrated a good level of capability.  This capability is a 
derivative of good training concomitant with a reasonable level of readiness.  In 
Somalia, East Timor, Afghanistan and Iraq, Australian personnel exhibited a good 
level of combat skill.  However, there was “some criticism about the quality of 
recruits allocated to some infantry units; with those directly out of Initial 
Employment Training deployed on operations and subjected to an unnecessarily 
steep learning curve before they could become useful members of a section.  This 
put more pressures on the section leaders and other section members as they tried 
to “take up the slack”.92  As examined above, the ADF’s Latent Combat Force 
and Enabling Component were nominally responsible for this issue.  The principal 
responsibility resides in the MLOC/OLOC process.  If the MLOC/OLOC process 
maintains units at too low a level of readiness, they will become irrelevant. 
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In comparison, a high level of training and readiness was critical for the 
success of SOF personnel in Afghanistan and Iraq.  In Iraq “[d]uring February and 
early March [2003], the [Special Forces] Task Group conducted ‘Full Mission 
Profile Exercises’ by day and night.  They rehearsed all the contingencies they 
could foresee for operations inside Iraq.  The exercises also involved [United 
Kingdom] UK and [United States] US [sic] close air support.  This intensive 
period of realistic training acclimatised the soldiers and honed their skills.  This 
proved to be essential to the eventual success of the operation.  The training 
period also enabled the Commandos, helicopter assets, medical support and the 
Incident Response Regiment detachment to rehearse for their Quick Reaction 
Force role”.93  Simply, a force will always require theatre-specific training.  
However, a force must already maintain a high level of training and readiness, 
given the short warning periods prior to contemporary operations. 
In Somalia, Bougainville and East Timor, some ADF units did not 
demonstrate a comprehensive understanding of LIC.  This is due to a lack of 
training.  Most ADF units did not seem to comprehend the criticality of civil-
military affairs.  However, the ADF understanding of civil-military affairs skills 
had improved between the operations in Somalia and East Timor.  As stated by 
Colonel Singh, Commanding Officer 3RAR, LIC training must occur “because 
it’s [sic] not something you can just pick up on the day”.94  Therefore while ADF 
personnel are professional, their capabilities do not correspond precisely with the 
requirements of counterinsurgency, in as much as they do not fully comprehend 
the importance of civil operations as a means of achieving situational awareness 
through accurate human intelligence.  Although, as stated above, this deficiency is 
diminishing as the ADF deploy to conflicts as counterinsurgents. 
 
Armour 
As has been frequently noted in earlier discussions, armoured vehicles (Armour) 
are a multidimensional force element.  Hence, this section is divided into four 
subsections: protection; manoeuvrability; firepower and visibility; and tactics, 
command, control and communications.  Armour is a central element of a 
combined arms approach to counterinsurgency operations.  The aforementioned 
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subsections are enablers that facilitate the precise application of a combined arms 
approach in counterinsurgency. 
 
Protection 
The M113 Armoured Personnel Carrier (APC) gave 1 RAR fairly comprehensive 
protection in Somalia.  This was because Somali belligerents possessed few 
weapons that could penetrate M113 armour.  In contrast, the Australian Land 
Rover fleet offered no protection to embarked personnel.  A lack of armour 
against small-arms fire is in keeping with the essential nature of the Land Rover.  
However, a mesh guard should have been installed, so that thrown debris could 
not penetrate the windscreen.  This is because debris such as stones and bricks 
were often thrown at 1 RAR Land Rovers, and in the past peacekeepers have been 
killed by this method. 
 Operations in East Timor constituted the first operational deployment of 
the Australian Light Armoured Vehicle (LAV).  The LAV was deployed in two 
primary configurations: (1) a turreted, LAV-25 with 25mm cannon; and (2) an un-
turreted personnel carrier version LAV-PC.  The LAV was deployed along with 
the M113 to provide armoured mobility, firepower and enhanced C2 and 
communications.  However, with specific reference to armour, Australian 
armoured units were less protected than New Zealand armoured units.  The base 
model Australian and New Zealand M113 and the Australian LAV (Generation 
II), were designed to provide protection against 7.62mm ammunition, shell 
splinters and some mines.  Given the uncertain security environment in East 
Timor, the New Zealand Defence Force decided to up-armour all deploying 
M113s.  This decision was not mirrored by the ADF.  Subsequently, armour crews 
expressed concern regarding rifle fire and possible anti-armour weapon fire.95  It 
seems inappropriate that appliqué armour was not provided for the M113s and 
LAVs, which deployed to East Timor.  This, however, is a contentious point, as it 
is dependent upon subjective risk assessments.  Further concern was, however, 
expressed regarding the weapon station on the LAV-PC.  The weapon station 
comprises a 0.50 calibre machinegun above the commander’s hatch.  To operate 
this weapon, the commander must be exposed to enemy fire. 
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 None of the issues stated above appear to have been rectified prior to the 
initial deployment of the LAV to Iraq.  12 LAV-PCs and LAV-25s were deployed 
to Baghdad by July 2004.  However as in East Timor, the LAVs deployed lacked 
sufficient armour protection.  Development work of up-armouring the LAV only 
began in May 2004, when the initial deployment of the LAVs began.  The only 
armour upgrade installed in the LAV fleet, prior to deployment, were spall liners 
removed from M113s.  It was not until early 2005, that the LAV received 
appliqué bar-armour and specialised spall liners.  The appliqué bar-armour has 
been examined in the previous two chapters; this appliqué armour is intended to 
detonate Rocket Propelled Grenade (RPG) rounds before impacting the main 
armour.  However, the Australian appliqué bar-armour only protects against 
normal incidence or horizontal round trajectories.  As in Chechnya and Somalia, 
insurgents will target the hull roof, where armour is thin.  Hence, the ADF should 
attempt to develop protection from RPG rounds fired from buildings and roofs.  A 
further hurried acquisition by the ADF consisted of the Protector Remote 
Weapons Stations (RWS).  The Protector RWS enables the crew to fire a remote 
controlled 0.50 calibre machinegun, while remaining ‘buttoned down’ inside the 
LAV.96  This was a critical purchase, as the Australian LAV-PC’s previous 
weapon station was unprotected.  Hence, defensive fire endangered the LAV-PC’s 
commander. 
 In regard to the aforementioned operations, the armour upgrades, or the 
lack thereof, indicate a disconcerting anomaly within the ADF or wider Australian 
defence establishment.  Armoured units have been deployed without armour 
upgrades, which other nations have deemed critical.  Conversely, when Australian 
armoured units have been upgraded, the upgrades have occurred after deployment 
to hostile zones.  There are three possible explanations for the lack of, or late, 
upgrading of armour.  One, Australian intelligence has underemphasises levels of 
risk.  Two, the ADF has not made sufficient contingency purchases of mission 
critical hardware, or is slow in responding to emerging threats.  Three, the 
Australian Government may be forestalling contingency purchases through 
budgetary constraints.  However, none of these explanations justify the additional 
risk to which Australian personnel are exposed. 
 Phase 4 of Project Land 112, the latest tranche upgrade of the Australian 
LAV, was rejected by the former Defence Minister Robert Hill in June 2005.  The 
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Phase 4 upgrade was intended to enhance the “survivability and situational 
awareness”97 of the LAV.  It is likely that the Phase 4 armour would be ballistic 
armour, designed to withstand 0.50 calibre machinegun rounds.  Hence, RPG 
rounds would still pose a significant threat to the LAV.  Nevertheless, the 
unwillingness to provide the best protection available is questionable.  The LAV 
is currently the most capable Australian armoured vehicle, short of the future 
M1A1.  The LAV is also the principle deployable vehicle of Australia’s 
mechanised brigade.  Hence, it would seem appropriate that Phase 4 armour 
acquisitions should be approved by the Australian Government.   In contrast, by 
July 2002 Project Land 106, a M113 upgrade including appliqué armour had been 
awarded.  It seems incongruous that the LAV and M113, which provide a similar 
capability and are of the same brigade, do not receive the same level of armour 
protection. 
 
Manoeuvrability 
The majority of vehicles deployed to Somalia on Operation Solace were Land 
Rovers, 6x6 upgraded Land Rovers and M113 APCs.  These vehicles provided 
general mobility and were essential for the Quick Reaction Force (QRF).  
However, the natural environment and logistical constraints put these vehicles and 
hence mobility at risk.  The importance of unconstrained mobility, provided by 
the M113, was clearly illustrated in Somalia.  The M113 enabled forces to 
manoeuvre on and off road, providing a mobility advantage over the enemy.  In 
contrast, wheeled vehicles could only manoeuvre on-road, and were unable to 
sustain lengthy operations due to punctures.  This is an important lesson for forces 
deploying to LIC; tracks give unconstrained mobility, wheels do not.  
Furthermore, the harsh conditions of Somalia required a greater supply effort to 
maintain vehicles.  Such natural conditions must be understood prior to 
deployment, so that equipment can be kept in the field. 
 Mobility was a critical enabler in East Timor, as the relatively small 
Australian contingent was responsible for a large area of operations (AO).  This 
mobility was provided by Land Rovers, M113 APCs and LAVs.  In addition to 
mobility, the latter two varieties of armoured vehicles constituted a significant 
Australian presence and deterred enemy action.  This was due to their inherent 
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offensive and defensive properties.  LAVs and M113s were used successfully in 
both rural and urban environments.  These vehicles provided protection and 
improved communications for reconnaissance missions, conferred mobility on 
quick reaction forces, and provided extra force for cordon and search, patrol and 
checkpoint operations. 
There were, however, a number of mobility issues illustrated in East 
Timor.  First, and as in Somalia, the M113 was unequalled in terms of mobility.  
“[T]he M113s were able to negotiate terrain that proved impassable to other 
vehicles, particularly in steep, confined terrain during the monsoon season.  The 
M113’s superior cross-country mobility often meant it was the only vehicle type 
able to deploy or redeploy infantry patrols, sniper teams, civil-military operations 
teams and retransmission sites to remote villages and border areas.  When poor 
weather in East Timor’s high country prevented helicopter operations, the M113 
was the only Australian platform capable of fulfilling these key mobility tasks”.98  
The LAV also provided excellent mobility in the dry season, “but suffered some 
mobility difficulties off-road in rocky, boggy or slippery conditions”.99  Hence, it 
would seem appropriate to maintain a tracked troop-lift capability in the ADF.  
The tracked mobility of the M113 was instrumental in Somalia and East Timor, 
and would have been useful in Bougainville.  In addition, the Soviets found 
tracked vehicles to be critical in Afghanistan’s difficult off-road terrain.  The 
Israelis also indicated the mobility of the M113 was important in Lebanon.  
However, the Israelis established that the M113’s armour, visibility and firepower 
were deficient for complex operations.  Similarly, the Australian’s found in East 
Timor that the M113 needed additional surveillance, target acquisition, 
communications, navigation and battlefield command capabilities.  These 
capabilities will be discussed in the following subsection. 
A further mobility issue illustrated in East Timor was the capability of 
fighting vehicles to cross terrain at speeds in excess of support vehicles.  Both the 
LAV and M113 exceed the mobility of general support vehicles in difficult 
terrain.  However, the LAV was reported to “cover road distances four times 
faster than support vehicles”.100  This is a significant problem for the ADF, which 
may be forced to acquire further LAV-Combat Support (LAV-CS) vehicles.  In 
reference to the M113, the introduction of the M113AS4 Armoured Logistics 
Vehicle (ALV), as part of Project Land 106, should enable efficient movement of 
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supplies to forward units.  However, the general logistics vehicles may still 
experience difficulties moving supplies along long, tenuous roads, as in East 
Timor. 
 
Firepower and Visibility 
A significant impediment to security in rural Somalia was night attacks against 
civilian vehicles by bandits.  From a concealed position, bandits would stop 
vehicles with small arms fire, then rob, intentionally injure or kill the occupants.  
Daylight ambushes by Somali bandits were deterred by roadblocks, which would 
order vehicular patrols to follow (at a distance) and protect likely targets.  These 
tactics did not work at night, as the pursuant patrol’s headlights could be seen by 
the bandits.  Hence, ‘Night Rider’ patrols were instituted, for “night counter-
ambush operations”.101 The 6x6 Land Rovers used were fitted with infrared lights, 
ANTAS 6A thermal imagers and three independent machine guns.  The vehicles 
were driven by personnel wearing night vision goggles, carried weapons to fire 
illumination rounds, and emitted no light.  The ‘Night Rider’ patrols were highly 
effective, as the bandits had no way of detecting the patrols.  After the first night 
of patrols, ambushes ceased.102
 In the case of East Timor, inadequate surveillance, target acquisition, 
communications, navigation and battlefield command capabilities were a 
limitation for Australian M113 units.  There were four areas of concern.  First, the 
M113’s “T-50 … turret possessed no night-fighting capability and was unable to 
apply accurate and discriminating fire … because of a lack of any sighting system 
or powered gun control equipment”.103  Second, the M113 was not equipped with 
any advanced night driving capability.  Third, the M113’s improvised 
communications systems were problematic.  Fourth, the M113 and the LAV 
possessed no global positioning system for operational manoeuvre, nor a tactical 
navigation system to improve situational awareness.  Simply, M113, and 
occasionally LAV crews, were required to fight dumb, blind and without an 
effective means of defence.  These advanced technical systems are important.  As 
was found in Somalia by the ADF and Bosnia by the NZDF, adversaries can often 
possess crew-served weapons with significant firepower and range.  Hence 
armoured units, which are often equipped with the only long-range direct-fire 
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weapons deployed, must have a capability to return ranged and accurate fire 
against such targets. 
 Fortunately, some of the technical capability limitations outlined above are 
being overcome.  Project Land 106 will provide a significant capability upgrade 
for the M113.  This will be primarily provided by a day/night sight and turret 
stabilisation to improve fire accuracy.104  In addition, the M113 is likely to receive 
the Raven vehicle communications system upgrade, and may be fitted with some 
form of Battlefield Command Support System (BCSS).  Project Land 112, the 
phased upgrade of the LAV, has been authorised to provide a limited technical 
capability upgrade.  Phase 3 of Land 112 includes: (1) ‘an enhanced thermal 
imaging sight, laser range finder and an improved fire-control system’;105 and (2) 
a global positioning system and navigation system.  However, Phase 4 
improvements, which included a “battlefield … management enhancement”, have 
been rejected.106  As argued earlier, these technical systems are critical for 
repulsing adversaries with long-range direct-fire weapons.  Such adversaries are 
found in LIC, given the proliferation of simple weapons such as 0.50 calibre 
machineguns.  Moreover, the ADF’s M113 and LAV will be less technologically 
advanced than the NZDF’s generation three LAV and the ADF’s own M1A1, 
which may generate difficulties when operating as part of a combined arms group 
or as a part of a coalition. 
 
Tactics; Command, Control and Communications (C3) 
The criticality of combined arms training was illustrated in East Timor, both in a 
positive and negative manner.  “A significant contributing factor toward the 
overall success of 2RAR operations was the high level of familiarity between it 
and B [Squadron] Sqn 3/4 [Cavalry] Cav…  The co-operative culture and 
collective understanding of each other’s standard operating procedures that 
existed between the two units was identified as a major advantage for Operation 
‘Warden’ commanders”.107  Conversely, “[t]he initial requirement to employ C 
[Squadron] Sqn [Cavalry] Cav in the infantry mobility role meant the unit was not 
permitted to deploy with its own organic recon[naissance] scouts.  This hampered 
the squadron’s flexibility and effectiveness in later phases, and forced 3 Brigade 
to assign up to a platoon of soldiers … to act as recon[naissance] scouts.  The 
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assigned troops were not familiar with [Australian Standard LAV] ASLAV or 
cavalry operations, or with operating in a dispersed and highly mobile manner.  
As a result, the capacity of local commanders to extend information-gathering 
operations beyond terrain inaccessible to vehicle movement was diminished”.108  
The ADF must be weary of deploying units that are not cohesive.  This is 
increasingly important as motorised infantry functions become more complex and 
technologically focused.  Motorised cavalry and infantry functions cannot be 
undertaken by ad hoc formations.  This is an additionally serious consideration for 
3 Brigade, due to the Brigade’s light infantry foundation.  The problem is, light 
infantry is easily deployable but lacks integrated armour protection.  Hence, 3 
Brigade infantry battalions must be diligent in training with 3 Brigade Cavalry 
Regiment (B Squadron 3/4). 
 In reference to the military principles outlined in this thesis, the critical 
nature of armour in counterinsurgency can be understood in terms of combined 
arms.  Armour facilitates movement, provides protection, augments C3 and 
intelligence, and adds firepower to other units that it operates with.  Armour can 
also enable the application of precise force by the counterinsurgent, if used with 
restraint. 
 
Artillery 
As with the NZDF, the last ADF deployment of artillery occurred in the Vietnam 
War.  This however, in no way, undermines the fact that artillery is an 
indispensable support element in LIC.  As has been stated before in this thesis, 
artillery is the soldier’s all weather, day and night provider of fire support.  
However, combined arms, precision and the use of firebases must be the leading 
tenets of artillery use in LIC. 
 The current ADF complement of indirect fire-support weapons includes 
the L119 105mm Field Artillery Gun and the M198 155mm Towed Howitzer.  
Both artillery systems “will reach end of life-of-type in 2010”.109  The 
replacement for these fire-support systems will likely be multidimensional.  The 
M198 155mm howitzer will be replaced by a new 155mm howitzer, in both a self-
propelled (SP) and towed configuration.  It is likely that some 105mm guns will 
be retained within 3 Brigade.  This retention may be purely for A Field Battery, a 
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parachute trained unit for the support of 3RAR, or 3 Brigade’s entire 4 Field 
Regiment.  In addition, the ADF is also likely to acquire a 120mm mortar variant 
of the LAV, designated Light Armoured Mortar System (LAMS).110
 It is improbable that the LAMS or the SP 155mm will be suited to LIC, as 
both of these systems are specialised for manoeuvre.  Both the retained 105mm 
and new towed 155mm would be expected to achieve the principle of combined 
arms outlined above.  However, the 105mm cannot currently provide precision or 
offer the range necessary for the consolidation of firebases.  Hence, there are two 
requirements the new towed 155mm howitzer should fulfil, so as to be optimised 
for LIC operations.  First, the 155mm howitzer must be capable of delivering 
precision/terminally guided munitions.  This is due to the requirement for 
precision and discrimination in LIC.  Second, the towed 155mm howitzer needs to 
be helicopter transportable.  Artillery must be capable of moving as quickly as 
light infantry units.  This is especially important in difficult terrain.  As was 
shown in Operation Anaconda, artillery could not keep pace with infantry due to 
terrain, and air support was hampered due to C2 and poor weather conditions.  
Hence, infantry took excessive casualties due to a lack of combat support.  If the 
new ADF 155mm towed gun is not helicopter transportable, the ADF may need to 
consider acquiring the 105mm Terminally Guided Projectile (TGP).  The 105mm 
gun and TPG would then deliver mobile precision fire-support to the ADF.  
Although, the range of 105mm gun firebases (11.4km) would be significantly less 
than 155mm howitzer firebases (40-60km).111
 
Helicopters – Essential Nature and Use  
The use of utility helicopters was an Australian strength in Operation Solace, 
while the lack of a liaison and command helicopter was a significant weakness.  1 
RAR effectively utilised coalition helicopters to support airmobile ‘show of force’ 
operations.  These operations were designed to impose an Australian presence and 
deter bandit activities.  Simply, these airmobile operations indicated to the 
Somalis that Australian units could appear anywhere at anytime.  However, the 
unit’s commanding officer, Lieutenant Colonel Hurley, stated that an absence of 
liaison helicopter support “was quite a serious deficiency”.112  This absence of 
liaison helicopter support restricted command mobility, as Hurley was forced to 
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travel by road.  This restricted Hurley’s ability to command from the field, 
encourage and monitor troops and oversee projects and operations.113
 The criticality of helicopters to operations in East Timor was paramount.  
An Aviation Squadron Group of Australian UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters were 
among the first forces deployed to East Timor.  Similarly, Australian Navy Sea 
King helicopters were present in the East Timor AO from the beginning of 
INTERFET operations.  Both of these helicopters were deployed to facilitate 
airborne mobility, conduct reconnaissance, enable the expansion of presence 
throughout East Timor, permit rapid reaction to incidents and expedite critical 
supply operations.  In addition, “air superiority … [and] aerial firepower”114 was 
demonstrated by UH-60s in ‘show of force’ operations.  Hence, the presence of 
helicopters provided a psychological deterrent against militia activities in East 
Timor.  A further example of the deterrent effect of helicopters occurred on the 
border with West Timor.  In October 1999, intelligence reported large-scale cross-
border militia raids were planned.  However, the employment of airmobile 
operations and observation flights by Bell 206B-1 helicopters, in addition to 
regular operations, appear to have deterred the militia.  It could be argued that 
observation or reconnaissance helicopters are of little value in LIC, as they are 
unable to identify minor ground elements.  However, observation helicopters can 
identify large-scale ground elements.  This ability concomitantly deters the 
adversary from massing force.  Hence, the adversary will be forced to operate in 
small groups.115
 ADF CH-47D Chinooks were essential in providing Australian Special 
Force mobility in Operation Iraqi Freedom.  Aero-medical evacuation and the 
transportation of supplies were other CH-47D tasks, in support of Special Forces 
in Iraq.  Similarly, Australian CH-47Ds were deployed to Afghanistan in early 
2006, in support of Australia’s “continuing commitment to the fight against 
terrorism”.116  The CH-47D “provide[d] additional aero-medical evacuation and 
air mobility support to Australia’s Special Forces Task Group”.117
 The ADF’s current fleet of Blackhawk and Sea King utility helicopters 
will probably be replaced by the NH90 Tactical Transport Helicopter (TTH).  
This is likely given: (1) the resent purchase of 12 NH90 to form an additional 
squadron; (2) the ADF’s requirement for helicopter fleet rationalisation; (3) the 
marinised nature of the NH90 for amphibious operations; and (4) that a naval 
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combatant version of the NH90 exists.  The Australian NH90, designated the 
MRH90, “varies from previous … models in its advanced communications suite 
and tactical data link capabilities”.118  These communication and data link 
capabilities will provide connectivity between the MRH90 and other ADF 
network centric forces, this will be important in terms of effective communication 
and the precise use of intelligence in joint force operations.  Further analysis of 
the NH90 is presented in the previous chapter. 
 
Protection 
Australian Army helicopters are undergoing Electronic Warfare Self-Protection 
(EWSP) upgrades under project Air 5416.  Air 5416 is tasked with rectifying 
known EWSP deficiencies in much of the ADF air fleet.  However, the protracted 
nature of this project has imposed risk on deploying helicopters.  Even though Air 
5416 began in the mid-1990s, EWSP systems on aircraft deploying to Iraq in 2003 
and Afghanistan in 2006 had to be rapidly upgraded.  “[CH-47D] Chinooks and 
[C-130] Hercules were hurriedly upgraded before their deployment to Iraq … [in 
2003].  This involved the installation of limited [Electronic Warfare] EW 
equipment and some underbelly armour to protect crews”.119  The capability of 
the 2003 EWSP and armour upgrade must be questioned.  This is because in less 
than three years, a further $25 million needed to be spent on EWSP, ballistic 
protection and communications equipment, to prepare two CH-47Ds for service in 
Afghanistan.120  Such rapid acquisitions may provide a level of protection.  
However, rapid acquisitions create risk as: (1) there is no or very limited time to 
develop and prove the equipment; and (2) there is no or very limited time to train 
personnel with the equipment.  Hence, the equipment may fail on operation due to 
technical or human error.  Given the essential nature of helicopters to joint force 
operations in counterinsurgency, the ADF must ensure that these units are well 
protected from enemy fire. 
 
Firepower and Target Acquisition and Designation Equipment 
As of December 2004, the ADF is being progressively delivered with an Armed 
Reconnaissance Helicopter (ARH) capability.  The Australian ARH capability is 
provided by 22 upgraded Eurocopter Tiger combat support helicopters.  The target 
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acquisition and designation systems on the ARH include day and night visual 
sensors, image intensification, and a laser rangefinder/designator.121  The ARH is 
also equipped with an EW suite.  The armament of the ARH will include a 30mm 
cannon, 70mm unguided rockets, Hellfire II guided anti-armour weapons, and 
Stinger or Mistral air to air missiles.122
 There are three main mission types required of the ARH.  First, the ARH 
will provide a day and night tactical surveillance and reconnaissance capability.  
Of the ADF case studies in this thesis, this capability has only been deployed in 
East Timor.  In East Timor, the Bell 206B-1 Kiowa carried out surveillance, 
reconnaissance and escort duties.  In this role the Kiowa provided: (1) timely 
intelligence of some opposition movements; (2) some deterrence; and (3) wider 
battlefield awareness.  As illustrated in the initial case studies of this thesis, the 
effective use of surveillance and reconnaissance helicopters will reduce risk and 
enhance situational awareness.  Second and third, the ARH will “escort [troop-
lift] … helicopters during air assault operations and [provide] … aerial fire 
support for ground troops”.123  In these roles the ARH would be tasked with 
suppressing and engaging dispersed ground targets in LIC.  This is a new 
capability for the ADF.  However, the initial case studies of this thesis 
demonstrated the significance of this capability.  The rationale for this is 
multidimensional: (1) there is a high degree of synergy between helicopter and 
land units; (2) helicopter targeting and weapons systems can effectively apply 
precision fire; and (3) helicopters can often see as much, or more, of the 
battlefield than the soldier on the ground.  This latter point means, helicopters can 
see and engage small targets on the battlefield independently, but in support of 
ground units.  The ARH will be a valuable addition to joint force operations 
undertaken by the ADF.  An extended analysis of helicopters in LIC is provided 
in the earlier chapter: Military Force in Low Intensity Conflict. 
 
Aircraft – Essential Nature and Use 
Aircraft within a LIC battlespace essentially provide three capabilities: (1) 
firepower; (2) logistic support; and (3) command, control, communications, 
computers, intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance 
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(C4ISTAR).  The case studies of this chapter indicate that the ADF air component 
can, and has contemporaneously, undertaken all of these functions.   
 
Firepower 
Airborne firepower can be divided into three categories: (1) air to air; (2) air to 
surface maritime; and (3) air to surface land.  For the initial stages of the 
INTERFET operation, the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) provided latent 
capability in all of these areas.  This Australian airborne presence discouraged 
overtly hostile actions by Indonesian air and sea units in the area.  In October 
2001, a detachment of four Australian F/A-18 Hornets were deployed to Diego 
Garcia.  This deployment was in support of coalition operations in Afghanistan.124  
In support of Operation Iraqi Freedom, Australia deployed 14 F/A-18 Hornets to 
the Middle East in 2003.  The F/A-18 Squadron undertook the following mission 
tasks consecutively: (1) “protection of high value Coalition aircraft such as air-to-
air refuellers [sic] and intelligence collection aircraft[, and engaged] time-critical 
[ground] targets such as the regime leadership, missiles or enemy forces 
[concomitantly]”;125 (2) fixed-target strike missions; and (3) close air support 
(CAS) and air interdiction.126
 The exclusive use of Precision Guided Munitions (PGMs) by the RAAF in 
Iraq improved accuracy and minimised collateral damage.  The PGMs utilised by 
the RAAF included 250 (GBU-12) and 1000 (GBU-10) kilogram laser guided 
freefall bombs.  Since the cessation in mid-2003 of Australian combat air 
operations in Iraq, there have been two aircraft weapon acquisition programmes 
proceeding.  These include: (1) Air 5418 that will provide a long-range anti-
surface weapon for the F/A-18 Hornet and AP-3C Orion; and (2) Air 5409 that 
will equip F/A-18 Hornet with the Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM).127  Both 
of these weapons could be used in counterinsurgency operations.  However, the 
long-range anti-surface weapon is specifically designed for a higher threat 
environment.  In comparison, the JDAM has acted as a highly successful force 
multiplication tool in counterinsurgency.  Hence, the JDAM will provide a 
significant enhancement to the ADF’s capability.  Project Air 5409 Bomb 
Improvement Programme was tasked with providing the RAAF with an 
“autonomous air-to-surface weapon that could be used with near-precision 
 355
accuracy, day or night, in all weather and during conditions where ground targets 
are obscured by environmental factors such as smoke, cloud cover or sand 
storms”.128  Such environmental factors have been, to varying degrees, a limiting 
factor in all the case studies of this thesis.  Furthermore, the guidance systems of 
the ADF’s GBU-10 and GBU-12 laser guided bombs would have been obstructed 
by these environmental factors.  Conversely, the JDAM guidance system cannot 
be blocked by environmental factors.  In the medium term, the communications 
and targeting systems onboard the F/A-18 will also be upgraded under project Air 
5376.  The communications upgrade will enable greater data sharing between all 
air and ground assets.  The targeting system upgrade will “improve the detection, 
identification, precision targeting and damage assessment phases of RAAF F/A-
18 counter air, strike and offensive air support operations”.129  These capability 
improvements will enhance the timeliness and precision of air-launched guided 
munitions, which is critical in counterinsurgency. 
 Beyond 2015, the Australian Air Force will receive the F-35 Joint Strike 
Fighter (JSF).  There has been criticism of the JSF capability envelope in relation 
to Australia’s air combat needs.130  In terms of air to air combat the JSF is inferior 
only to the F-22 Raptor.  However, the JSF’s surface attack capabilities are 
technologically superior in relation to all other combat aircraft.  As in the case of 
East Timor, the JSF will provide a significant deterrent capability against inferior 
regional air and maritime combatants.  As in the case of Afghanistan and Iraq, the 
JSF will provide a surface attack capability superior to that fielded by the F/A-18.  
The JSF can utilise all current ADF air launched precision guided munitions.  The 
JSF has advanced systems to target these munitions with precision.  The JSF also 
incorporates a comprehensive communications suite, including satellite, data link 
and tactical communications systems.  These systems will enable the highest level 
of joint integration that current technology can support.  The current Australian 
Chief of Air Force, Air Marshal Angus Houston, explains the significance of the 
JSF in relation to its network enabling capabilities: “The performance of an 
effectively networked system will exceed the sum of its individual parts.  This is 
achieved by exploiting data link information technology to display a common 
picture of an engagement that is shared in real time between all participating 
sensors, shooters and command and control nodes within the system”.131
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 Hence, the ADF has and will have an effective air-strike capability, which 
could provide effective support in LIC.  However, given the air-strike capability is 
a derivative of a networked system, the ADF must ensure the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the other network links and nodes.  Basically there are three 
further requirements for this system to operate effectively: (1) reliable 
communications; (2) well trained land component personnel; and (3) effective 
battle-proven procedures for air and surface synergy (joint force).  ADF 
communications is examined in a separate subsection below, the latter two system 
requirements are analysed subsequently. 
Close Air Support (CAS) is the principal form of airborne firepower 
utilised in counterinsurgency.  CAS is formed through a combination of strike 
aircraft and ground elements operating as Tactical Air Controllers (TACs).  These 
TACs provide the strike aircraft with situational awareness and target designation 
information.  Australian SAS personnel have displayed in Afghanistan and Iraq 
the ability to effectively employ CAS.  However, CAS is increasingly becoming a 
central task of regular ground elements.  The case studies of this thesis have 
indicated a general lack of synergy between air and regular ground elements.  Dr. 
Michael Evans also perceives there to be a lack of “air-land integration [within the 
ADF]”.132  Hence, it is important that TAC skills are dispersed throughout 1, 3 
and 7 Brigades, as well as the SAS Regiment.  It is also important that the RAAF 
perceives CAS as a conceptual equal to strategic strike.  “It is also clear from the 
Iraq War that every advance in [Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance] 
IS&R, communications systems, and digital management of the battlefield both 
increase the capability to carry out close air support and the need for tighter 
integration, better training, and more standardized [sic] procedures and 
equipment”.133  These improved SOPs are joint in nature, and will only be 
acquired through extensive joint training. 
 
Protection 
Air 5416 is an integrated electronic warfare self-protection (EWSP) project, 
designed to enhance the survivability of much of the ADF air fleet.  “Project 
[5416] … was established … to address deficiencies in the EWSP capabilities of 
selected ADF aircraft and enhance their respective survivability in a high-threat 
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environment”.134  Aircraft operating in LIC must contend with two threat 
scenarios: (1) low-altitude small-arms fire; and (2) medium-altitude surface-to-air 
missiles (SAMs).  The latter threat is increasing in LIC, due to the spread of man-
portable SAMs.  Hence, aircraft in LIC must be armoured or remain out of small-
arms range and possess effective EWSP capabilities. 
 The risk of aircraft sustaining fire in LIC increases as the aircraft descends 
below medium altitudes.  Hence, strike and C4ISTAR aircraft face minimal risk, 
transport aircraft that operate from in-theatre airfields are at maximum risk during 
take-off and landing, while helicopters face a constant risk during operations.  The 
F-111 has been equipped with a EWSP suite under Air 5416, while the F/A-18 is 
being provided with an enhanced EWSP ensemble under Air 5376.  Air 5416 
Phase 2 and 4 are tasked with providing both the C-130H and C-130J-30 
respectively with enhanced EWSP systems.  These latter phases of Air 5416 
should be considered urgent, as the current C-130 fleet are operating in a risk 
environment in Iraq and Afghanistan.  The C-130 is a critical enabler for ADF 
operations and hence a high value asset.  Senator Hill, Minister for Defence, has 
stated that “the risks to the platforms [C-130] and their air crews during conflict 
would be unacceptable and limit the capability options the ADF would be able to 
deploy”.135  The C-130 should be protected from surface risk as soon as possible, 
anything less would be negligence.  It is important to understand that a loss of air 
support for joint force operations can severely undermine mission objectives. 
 
Supply 
This subsection will focus upon the ADF’s primary logistics aircraft.  These 
comprise 14 DHC-4 Caribou light transport aircraft, 12 C-130H and 12 C-130J-30 
Hercules medium transport aircraft and 4 Boeing B-707-338C air-to-air refuelling 
(AAR) aircraft.  These aircraft were critical to the success of ADF operations 
analysed in this chapter (this could also be said for all of the other case studies of 
this thesis).  Simply, these aircraft are critical enablers within the ADF.  Despite 
this fact, the ADF airlift capability has almost consistently failed to achieve 
required levels of availability between 2000 and 2005.  Furthermore, during this 
period “insufficient [airlift] assets[, at times,] were available to meet some 
concurrent requirements”.136
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 The DHC-4 Caribou was first flown in 1958, entered service with the 
RAAF between 1964 and 1968, and was withdrawn from production in 1973.  
The Caribou is a light tactical transport aircraft with excellent short-take-off and 
landing (STOL) capabilities.  These STOL capabilities enable the Caribou to 
operate from “short, confined and rudimentary airstrips with soft and rough 
surfaces and in wet conditions”.137  Simply, the Caribou can supply forces using 
airfields inaccessible to larger transport aircraft, and at an un-refuelled range 
beyond that provided by transport helicopters.  This is an important function for 
the RAAF.  However, most Caribou tasks could either be transferred to the C-130 
or Chinook.  The Caribou provided essential logistics support to operations in 
Bougainville and East Timor.  However, Caribou operations were constrained by 
low availability rates, including 55 percent in 2000, 82 percent in 2001, 84 percent 
in 2002, 85 percent in 2003, 97 percent in 2004, and 60 percent in 2005.138  “The 
primary causes [for the 2000 figure] were engine unserviceabilities [sic], lack of 
serviceable spare parts, and aircraft availability arising from the inability to 
achieve planned maintenance because of a high rate of effort in East Timor and 
Papua New Guinea”.139  Airframe and component age, coupled with delays in 
scheduled maintenance kept Caribou availability low until 2004.  Caribou 
availability in 2005 was again low due to similar reasons as stated above.  A study 
conducted by Raytheon Australia found that a “particular problem … for the 
Caribous [sic] is their original Pratt & [sic] Whitney Twin Wasp R-2000 radial 
piston engines[,] which have been out of production for almost 30 years.  The cost 
of maintaining the engines has reached undesirable levels and poor reliability is 
resulting in fewer aircraft available for operations at any one time”.140  
Replacement of the Caribou, originally under Project Air 5190 then under Project 
Air 8000, has been underway for 30 years (since 1976).  The unavailability of the 
Caribou leaves airlift tasks unfulfilled, or places additional stress on other airlift 
assets such as the C-130.  Airborne logistics have been critical in all the case 
studies of this thesis.  In addition, the case studies of this chapter have indicated 
ADF airlift capabilities, have at times, been insufficient to fulfil supply 
requirements of joint ADF operations.  In keeping with international trends, 
logistics requirements will expand.  Hence, the Caribou capability should be 
replaced.  With what is a more complex question, and is addressed below. 
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 Initially, however, the ADF’s C-130 fleet will be analysed.  The ADF fleet 
of C-130s currently incorporates 12 C-130H and 12 C-130J-30 models.  As the 
largest transport aircraft in the ADF fleet, the C-130 is employed in both the 
tactical (intra-theatre) and strategic (inter-theatre) airlift roles.  The C-130 has 
been instrumental in providing force projection and support for all ADF 
operations analysed in this chapter.  Heavy C-130 tasking has been synonymous 
with the period 2000 to 2005.  Concomitantly throughout this period, heavy 
tasking has eroded the C-130 capability to sustain specified availability rates.  
During the period 2001 to 2005, availability rates have varied between 71 and 97 
percent.  The low figure was reported in 2001 and reflects the consequences of 
force regeneration.  Significant force regeneration was required as a result of ADF 
operations in East Timor.  As a result of concurrent ADF operations in 
Afghanistan and Iraq, C-130 availability is again declining.  In 2005, C-130 
availability had degenerated to 84 percent.  The cause of these low percentiles is 
detailed below.141
 Operational requirements in East Timor combined with the replacement of 
the 12 C-130E with 12 C-130J-30, between late-1999 and 2001, to prevent the 
ADF Airlift Group from achieving all strategic objectives.  During this period the 
C-130E was being withdrawn, and age related serviceability issues reduced 
possible tasking.  Concurrently, delays with the introduction into service of the C-
130J-30 and associated aircrew generation shortages, further reduced the 
availability of the C-130 fleet.  These C-130E and C130J-30 issues, plus the low 
availability of the ADF Caribou and Boeing 707 fleets, caused intense tasking of 
the C-130H fleet.  Due to this intense tasking and the age of the C-130H fleet, 
force regeneration projects reduced availability through 2001 and 2002.  C-130H 
force regeneration included deep maintenance, operational upgrade requirements 
and the resolution of a repairable component backlog.  Through 2003 and 2004, 
C-130 availability matched the high rate of tasking required for operations in 
Afghanistan and Iraq.  However by 2005, the C-130 fleet was prevented from 
achieving designated objectives “due to [a] high operational tempo, limited 
aircraft serviceability and [low] availability due to … aircraft modifications 
required for operations”.142  The reducing availability of the C-130H is logical, 
given that the aircraft was to be retired from service by 2008.  Phase 1 of Project 
Air 8000 envisioned a life extension programme, which would enable the 
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employment of the C-130H until 2020.143  However, recent strategic lift 
requirements may have rendered the C-130H life extension obsolete. 
The reliance on the Special Air Service Regiment (SASR), as primary 
combat element in Iraq and Afghanistan, has obliged the ADF to augment the 
RAAF’s strategic airlift capability.  Major General Duncan Lewis, a former 
commander of the Australian Special Forces Group, indicated that the ADF 
requires “better strategic reach to be able to reach out and deploy in a reasonable 
sort of tactical configuration”.144  Strategic reach, timeliness and tactical 
configuration can only be achieved by an integral military transport aircraft.  In 
addition, the weight and size of operational units and support elements requires a 
transport aircraft of greater dimension and lift capability than the C-130.  Defence 
Minister, Robert Hill, has indicated that this capability requirement will be filled 
by the Boeing C-17 Globemaster.145  The acquisition of the C-17 is probably the 
best solution to the concomitant requirements of the SASR; tactical configuration 
and strategic reach. Dr. Michael Evans indicated that the C-17 will also “[partly] 
reconcile … operational versatility with … organisational stability”.146  Simply, 
the ADF will be able to sustain units that are deployed to achieve the 
Government’s intent.  However, the C-17 acquisition may cause the 
“refurbishment [of] the RAAF’s 12 aging C-130H Hercules medium tactical 
transports … [to] be scrapped”.147  Hence, the C-17 may not augment the C-130 
fleet, but replace half of it.  Whether four C-17s can replace the C-130H capability 
is questionable.  This is because the current airlift group cannot maintain required 
availability rates.  Furthermore, operations in East Timor indicated the need for a 
greater airlift capability than is currently available.  Hence, it would seem 
disingenuous to reduce the C-130 fleet.  Alternatively and as indicated above, the 
RAAF’s Caribou fleet requires replacement.  Hence, given the Caribou’s 
regionally confining short-range and the C-130s heavy tasking, it may be 
appropriate if the C-17 nominally replaces the Caribou fleet.  Operationally, the 
C-130 fleet could: (1) operate down to fill the tasking orders of the 
decommissioned Caribou; and (2) fulfil the current C-130 tasking orders with 
assistance from the C-17. 
The Boeing B-707-338C is the current ADF AAR aircraft.  Two B-707s 
were deployed to Kyrgyzstan for “operations against the Taliban and Al Qaeda in 
Afghanistan”.148  However, the operational tasking during operations over 
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Afghanistan exacerbated the limited availability and serviceability of the aging B-
707.  On average, the availability of each B-707 has almost halved between 2001 
and 2005, from approximately 500 hours to around 300 hours yearly.  In addition, 
the performance targets for the B-707 fleet similarly reduced from 2136 hours in 
2001, to 1400 hours in 2005.149  Hence, it is fortunate that the B-707 will be 
replaced by the Airbus A330 Multi-role Tanker Transport (MRTT) by 2008.150  
Both of these aircraft primarily provide an AAR capability.  The Australian 
Department of Defence also states that the B-707 and A330 MRTT provide a 
“significant strategic airlift capacity when not engaged in aerial refuelling 
tasks”.151  This is a partial misnomer, as the two aircraft only provide a strategic 
air logistics capability.  This only includes personnel and freight transport.  It is 
important that this capability is not confused with an all-spectrum strategic airlift 
capability.  Simply, the B-707 and A330 cannot project tactically-configured 
units.  However, the B-707 has provided, and the A330 will provide, an AAR 
capability that is becoming increasingly important to counterinsurgency 
operations in LIC.  This AAR capability will afford C4ISTAR and combat aircraft 
the endurance to engage sparse and nimble targets in LIC.  In terms of military 
principles, supply aircraft are joint and precision force enablers.  These aircraft 
enable combat air and ground units to function and therefore should be perceived 
as being equally important as those combat units in counterinsurgency operations. 
 
Airborne Command, Control, Communication and Intelligence (C3I) 
Airborne Command, Control, Communication and Intelligence (C3I) are 
becoming increasingly important in LIC.  This is because of the evolving joint 
nature of modern operations.  C3I aircraft have a communications and 
management capability, which enables dispersed air, land and sea units to 
combine.  Effectively, C3I aircraft in counterinsurgency are a hub, which actively 
or passively enables shooter and sensor nodes to communicate.  As has been 
indicated in the previous two chapters, forms of C3I aircraft have begun to 
proliferate.  In some cases, dedicated C3I aircraft are provided to small ground 
units, as a force multiplication tool. 
 Hence, the introduction into service of the RAAF’s Boeing 737 Airborne 
Early Warning and Control (AEW&C) aircraft is significant from a LIC 
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perspective.  The AEW&C aircraft is a C3I platform designed primarily for 
airborne surveillance and combat support operations.  However, the 
communications capability of the AEW&C aircraft will also enhance the 
connectivity between air, land and sea units.  Simply, the AEW&C will become a 
flying relay station.  Breen indicated that “having … a multipurpose 
communications facility … in the air, retransmitting, coordinating and relaying … 
[information will be] an enormous enhancement for land operations”.152  
Australian doctrine will also support this enhanced connectivity, with the 
introduction of Network-Centric Warfare (NCW).  As indicated in the previous 
chapter, the P-3 Orion maritime surveillance aircraft can also provide an airborne 
C3I capability.  ‘If installed with the appropriate optics, sensor suites and 
communications facilities, [the P-3 can] operate as anything from a C2 platform, 
to facilitating surveillance of land based operations’.153  Air Commodore Mark 
Lax indicated that the ADF has utilised the P-3 as a C3I aircraft, in support of 
joint land operations.154  This is most likely in support of SF missions. 
 The aforementioned C3I aircraft will also be provided with additional 
information and communication links, through the emerging ADF UAV 
capabilities.  Since 2000, three sets of Unmanned Air Vehicles (UAVs) have been 
acquired by the ADF, two of which operate at the brigade level and below.  These 
latter two systems may be useful in LIC.  The two systems include the Israeli 
Aircraft Industries I-View 250 Tactical Unmanned Air Vehicle (TUAV) and the 
Elbit Systems Skylark mini-UAV.155  The TUAV will be incorporated into the 
ADF structure at the brigade level, and will operate mainly in support of the Tiger 
armed reconnaissance helicopter.  Hence, the TUAV will only be marginally 
supportive of counterinsurgency operations.  The TUAV may perform useful area 
surveillance duties in counterinsurgency.  However, an important function of the 
TUAV in counterinsurgency will be to act as a radio relay, improving surface to 
surface and surface to air communications range, reliability and subsequently 
bandwidth.  In contrast, the Skylark UAV has been operationally deployed with 
an Australian task group to Iraq and the Solomon Islands.  In operations in the 
Solomon Islands, the Skylark UAV: (1) improved surveillance; and (2) made 
movement to contact and re-deployment easier.  The Skylark UAV is a “man-
packed tactical mini-UAV able to undertake close-range surveillance and 
reconnaissance of areas of interest beyond hills and other obstacles that block 
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line-or-sight observation”.156  Robert Hill, Minister for Defence, emphasised that 
the Skylark will “improve the situational awareness of patrols and response 
elements and hence their ability to counter potential threats”.157  Hence, the 
Skylark UAV will be, and is, making a demonstrative effect on small unit 
operations.  Successful small unit operations are critical in counterinsurgency.  
The aforementioned aircraft and UAVs will enhance joint force operations and the 
precision with which they are applied, improve the communication of timely 
intelligence, and therefore augment the capability of independence ground units. 
 
Navy – Essential Nature and Use 
Naval operations have been an indispensable part of all ADF operations included 
in this thesis, as they where for the NZDF in the previous chapter, and for the 
coalition forces operating in Somalia and Iraq (chapters three and four).  
Essentially Command of the Sea has been a requisite condition for the ADF 
unilaterally, or as part of a coalition, to be involved in the said operations.  
Command of the Sea “is defined as the possession of such a degree of superiority 
that one’s own operations are unchallenged by the adversary, while the latter is 
incapable of utilising the sea to any degree”.158  However, the fluidity of the 
maritime environment and the ambiguity of contemporary operations have 
resulted in a more nuanced concept of Command of the Sea.  The nuanced nature 
of maritime operations will be analysed below.  Broadly, Australian naval ships 
have enabled Sea Control and Maritime Power Projection, in the achievement of 
strategic objectives.  Hence, these two strategic concepts will form the primary 
subsections below.  Initially, however, this section will briefly analyse naval 
commitments to the thesis’ case studies.  The initial analysis will focus upon the 
RAN’s major surface vessels, which are the primary providers of Sea Control and 
Maritime Power Projection.  Hence, the focus of this subsection will be on the 
Amphibious and Afloat Support Force, Surface Combatant Force and Naval 
Aviation Force. 
 For Operation Solace, the Training, Helicopter and Logistics Support Ship 
HMAS Jervis Bay (I) and the Landing Ship Heavy HMAS Tobruk (II), ‘provided 
the initial strategic lift for 1 RAR to deploy’.159  “Subsequently Tobruk was 
integrated into the [Multinational Force] MNF and provided logistic, 
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communication, intelligence and air support to both Australian and coalition 
forces”.160  However, in the case of Operation Solace there were ship readiness 
and logistics constraints to operations.  Initially, Tobruk was not in a serviceable 
state due to major mechanical and systems problems.  These problems were 
rectified in time for deployment, and were maintenance rather than defect related.  
Deficient logistics support and movement, and the tasking of only one Jervis Bay 
sailing caused 1 RAR to be deprived of equipment, vehicles and stores.  These 
shortages indicated an insufficient maritime lift capability, even for 
counterinsurgency operations.   
In the case of Operation Lagoon, Tobruk and the Auxiliary Oiler 
Replenishment Ship Success were deployed.  These “RAN [vessels] … provided 
afloat command and control and logistics support”.161  As the combined HQ for 
Operation Lagoon, the communications systems onboard Tobruk were a critical 
intra and inter theatre link.  However, the trunk communications system 
(INMARSAT) onboard Tobruk and Success were improvised, marginally 
effective at sea, and became overloaded on operation.  Logistics constraints also 
grounded a naval helicopter for two weeks during the operation.  Given the 
limited numbers of helicopters available in Bougainville, this grounding was a 
significant constraint.  The Australian naval contribution to the TMG included 
Tobruk, Success, four Landing Craft Heavy (LCH), a Clearance Diving Team 
(CDT) and Sea King helicopters.  The Fremantle Class Patrol Boats (FCPB), 
Fremantle and Ipswich, were also on standby in Cairns, in support of the 
operation.    “Tobruk transported personnel, vehicles and equipment in support of 
the … [TMG, while] Success provided an afloat headquarters…  [The] LCHs 
provided logistic support on rotation”.162  Moreover, an RAN support force was 
sporadically present throughout the Bougainville peace process. 
Australian naval operations in East Timor involved a significant fleet 
deployment of Adelaide and Anzac Class Frigates, motor launches, patrol boats, 
Success, Tobruk, LCHs and the fast catamaran Jervis Bay (II).  The combat force 
asserted Sea Control, conducted surveillance, patrolled, collected intelligence, 
escorted naval and commercial logistics vessels, and conducted anti-submarine 
work.163  Success transported fuel, water, ammunition and other consumables into 
theatre, and then acted as an afloat warehouse in support of coalition air, land and 
sea operations.  Success and Her Majesty’s New Zealand Ship (HMNZS) 
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Endeavour, the Royal New Zealand Navy’s (RNZN) Replenishment ship, “were 
so vital to the operation that Interfet [sic] regarded them as two of the most likely 
targets for any attack”.164  Tobruk and Jervis Bay were also critical to operations 
in East Timor.  These vessels initially deployed much of the coalition’s land 
forces and provided logistics support throughout the operation.  Nevertheless, 
there were significant logistics constraints during operations in East Timor, 
indicating a continued need to bolster the ADF’s Sealift or Amphibious lift 
capability.  Such an increase in capability has become apparent, with the 
introduction of the Amphibious Transports HMAS Manoora and Kinimbla.  The 
LCH fleet was also critical in providing tactical troop and logistics transport 
between Dili, Suai and Oecussi. 
Australian maritime operations in support of Operation Enduring Freedom 
and Operation Iraqi Freedom are at times intertwined.  Maritime support for the 
International Coalition Against Terrorism and the UN Multinational Maritime 
Interception Force against Iraq (RNZN was also involved), required the 
deployment of Adelaide and Anzac class Frigates and Amphibious Transports to 
the Persian Gulf.  In direct support of Operation Iraqi Freedom, Frigates and 
Amphibious Transports were central to the ADF effort.  “Kanimbla [transported 
ADF assets to the Middle East and] acted as a command and control platform 
during waterway clearance operations in the North Arabian Gulf.  [The Anzac 
class Frigate] Anzac provided naval gunfire support during a Royal Marine assault 
on the Al Faw Peninsula.  [The Adelaide class Frigate] Darwin provided escort 
services”.165  Australian maritime forces were also involved in the humanitarian, 
stabilisation and recovery efforts in Iraq.  What is clear from the above analysis is 
that naval units are essential to counterinsurgency operations, especially in terms 
of enabling the function of air and ground units in a joint force environment. 
The subsequent subsections, ‘Sea Control’ and ‘Maritime Power 
Projection’, analyse naval concepts in relation to operational requirements.  In 
addition, the subsections examine prospective force structuring and acquisitions, 
and how these changes will effect future operations. 
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Sea Control 
Sea Control is a derivative of the concept, Command of the Sea.  Sea Control as a 
concept “recognise[d] that the sea … was a dynamic medium and that the value of 
maritime operations was in relation to the use of the sea for movement and not for 
possession of the sea itself”.166  Hence, “Sea Control is defined as that condition 
which exists when one has freedom of action to use an area of sea for one’s own 
purposes for a period of time”.167  Inversely, Sea Denial “is defined as that 
condition which exists when an adversary is denied the ability to use an area of 
sea for his own purposes for a period of time”.168  Furthermore, Sea Denial and 
Sea Control may occur concurrently, “so sea denial is an aspect of sea control 
rather than an entirely separate concept”.169  Importantly for this thesis, Sea 
Control is not merely a concept of conventional warfare.  “Sea Control may be 
required in circumstances other than conflict between nation states”.170  In fact, 
Sea Control “operations will be required whenever … [a nation’s] freedom of 
action at sea is threatened”.171  Consequently, if there is a level of threat, there is 
also a level of risk that must be assumed.  The threat and risk level will 
concomitantly designate the naval units tasked. 
Sea Control “will be an essential element, whether as object or 
precondition, of almost any conceivable campaign or operation which will be 
mounted by Australian forces, whether acting unilaterally or in coalition…  In 
many circumstances, sea control will be pre-existent, but it is important that its 
status not be uncritically assumed”.172  In the case of Operation Solace, HMAS 
Tobruk and Jervis Bay (I) did not require escort by Australian warships for two 
reasons.  First, Somali warlords did not present a threat on the high seas.  Second, 
a multinational force of warships was present off the Somali coast, passively 
deterring land-based action.  Conversely, in the case of operations in the East 
Timor AO, Australia and allies deployed warships to assert Sea Control and latent 
Sea Denial.  Under the auspices of Sea Control, at sea, allied warships conducted 
four explicit and two latent modes of operation.  First, warships gathered 
intelligence and conducted surveillance, in a joint environment, to generate joint 
battlespace awareness.  Second, warships provided cover “for less capable forces 
to ensure their protection and the completion of their tasking without interference 
form an adversary”.173  In the case of East Timor, cover was “effectively 
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exercised through the simple threat of intervention”.174  Cover “is particularly 
applicable to situations in which it is desirable to contain the intensity or 
branching of a conflict.  An adequate degree of cover in such circumstances can 
be an important deterrent of a would-be adversary and will ensure that the 
situation will not escalate”.175  “Surface combatants of the RAN and coalition 
navies provided cover for the land forces during the critical stages of the insertion 
of the coalition force into East Timor in 1999.  The presence of highly capable 
and well-armed warships gave a clear demonstration of the force’s resolve and its 
capacity to defend itself”.176  Third, coalition warships provided a layered defence 
of friendly amphibious, support and commercial vessels and convoys heading for 
East Timor.  Without this layered defence, amphibious and support vessels would 
have been at unnecessary risk and commercial vessels would not have entered the 
East Timor AO.  Fourth, Advance Force Operations were conducted against 
submarine, mine and other submerged explosives, “in advance of the main force, 
… in order to make acceptably safe the area in which the latter … [would] 
operate”.177  Fifth, INTERFET warships provided a latent capability to Interdict 
Commercial Shipping and Sealift, had the intent of the Indonesians become 
adversarial.  “At the Operational level, [Interdiction of Commercial Shipping and 
Sealift] … will be to prevent an adversary’s reinforcement or resupply [sic] of 
deployed units and any attempt to conduct manoeuvre operations by sea”.178  
Sixth, INTERFET warships also provided the latent capability of Maritime Strike 
and Interdiction.  Maritime Strike and “Interdiction of an adversary’s maritime 
forces, [occur] … to prevent their use for sea denial, sea control or power 
projection”.179  In support of the UN Multinational Maritime Interception Force 
against Iraq and Operation Enduring Freedom, Australian naval ships imposed 
Sanctions against Iraq and a Blockade against Al Qaeda and the Taliban.  
Essentially, maritime forces provide critical support to other units in 
counterinsurgency, but this active support may appear passive.   
 
Maritime Power Projection 
“Sea control, once achieved, establishes the environment for more direct efforts in 
relation to the land.  Maritime forces can shape, influence and control this 
environment, as well as deliver combat force ashore if necessary.  The delivery of 
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force from the sea is defined as maritime power projection and can take the form 
of the landing of amphibious or special forces or the delivery of seaborne land 
forces, or bombardment by guided or unguided weapons from seaborne 
platforms”.180  Contemporary technology and greater joint structuring has 
augmented the capacity of maritime forces to influence events on land.  There are 
four key areas of change: (1) growing Mobility of Mass; (2) greater organic 
helicopter lift; (3) extended range and guided projectiles; and (4) enhanced C3I 
capabilities.  These four areas of maritime evolution are analysed below, in 
relation to Maritime Mobility, Support for Land Forces, Land Strike and Sea-
Basing.   
The simplest form of Maritime Mobility is Sealift.  Sealift describes the 
capability to “transport land forces into theatre and sustain [those land forces on 
subsequent] operations”.181  However, Sealift “requires the utilisation of 
developed port facilities for embarkation and disembarkation”.182  If usable port 
facilities do exist, land forces transported by sealift vessels are unlikely to arrive 
in a tactical configuration.  Simply, land forces are not immediately ready for 
action after disembarkation from a sealift vessel.  Furthermore, the archipelagic 
and sparse island nature of the region, combined with a lack of deep water port 
facilities, constrains the employment of sealift vessels.  Hence, “the reality of 
operational contingencies and local threats will often require the use of 
amphibious forces which are capable of transporting land forces and disembarking 
them in a high state of tactical readiness in the absence of developed facilities”.183  
Amphibious operations are a more complex form of Maritime Mobility.  
Amphibious vessels include integral lift elements; units that can deliver land 
forces to the shore or over the shore.  These integral units enhance the operational 
mobility, flexibility and striking power of deploying land force elements.  This is 
because land forces are not confined to single points of entry, and units can be 
deployed in a tactical configuration.  The degree to which a vessel is amphibious 
is a further consideration.  Deck space for helicopter and tilt-rotor operations, and 
loading facilities for conventional or cushion landing craft, designate what force 
can be deployed and how quickly. 
Maritime Mobility has been a critical enabler in the aforementioned ADF 
case studies.  The vehicles, equipment and stores required for these operations 
were almost always transported by sea.  Despite this fact and until 2000, maritime 
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mobility has been critical vulnerability within the ADF.  In fact, between 1982 
and 2000 the ADF possessed only one fully operational amphibious vessel: 
Tobruk.  Until 1994 and following 1999, Tobruk’s capability was supplemented 
by the training ship Jervis Bay (I) and the converted commercial ferry Jervis Bay 
(II), respectively.184  The latter vessel was purely a sealift ship, while the former 
had only marginal amphibious capability.  Due to this limited maritime mobility: 
(1) 1 RAR deployed to Somalia without some essential equipment, vehicles and 
stores; (2) Tobruk sailed to Bougainville for Operation Lagoon 200 tonnes above 
its maximum recommended displacement; and (3) the initial deployment of 
INTERFET troops to East Timor were forced to deploy light.  Characteristics 
particular to these operations enabled projection success, although differing 
situations may have illustrated the risk of insufficient maritime mobility.  
Moreover, given the requirement for maintenance, training and exercising, a ship 
cannot always be operational.  During the period 2000 and 2005, Tobruk’s 
average requirement to be at MLOC was 273 days.  Hence, Tobruk was expected 
to be operational 74 percent of the time.  At other times, Tobruk was required to 
be at 48 hours notice, unless in major refit.  If an operation occurred when Tobruk 
was being refitted, the ADF may have been less able to deploy.  Hence, the 
introduction into service of the Amphibious Transports Manoora and Kanimbla 
has been a critical capability improvement.  The combined MLOC requirement, 
for Tobruk, Manoora and Kanimbla, has been approximately 800 days since 2003.  
This translates to two vessels being available at any one time, with a combined lift 
capability of between 765 and 900 personnel.185  This is a basic requirement for 
the ADF, given the Australian expeditionary deployments over the past 15 years.  
For example, the ADF deployments to Iraq have depended heavily upon Manoora 
and Kanimbla.  These deployments have also contributed significantly to the 
heavy tasking of these two aforementioned ships.186   
The future of amphibious lift for the ADF is detailed in Joint Project (JP) 
2048, Phase 4.  Phase 4 envisages the replacement of Tobruk and Manoora, with 
two larger amphibious vessels in 2010 and 2013, respectively.  Following the 
ADF operations throughout the 1990s and especially in East Timor, it became 
obvious that Australia needed a larger amphibious force.  The ADF also required 
greater disembarkation agility from a future amphibious force.   Hence during 
1999, the Naval Material Requirement Branch (NMRB) devised a Multi-Role 
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Auxiliary (MRA) ship concept.  The MRA was originally designed to operate as 
an “underway replenishment ship; [a] transport ship for an army battalion group 
of around 1200 troops and equipment; [an] aviation support ship; [and a] logistics 
support ship”.187  These design requirements reflected “the growing trend towards 
over-the-horizon amphibious operations[, and the] … flexibility and rapid 
response and the increasing emphasis being placed by the ADF on the ability to 
project and sustain forces in the littoral environment”.188  There are two ship 
designs in contention to fulfil the MRA requirements: the Navantia Strategic 
Projection Ship and an extended version of the Armaris Mistral-class Landing 
Helicopter Dock (LHD).189  Both ships are floodable dock, flat-top helicopter 
assault ships.  The Strategic Projection Ship appears to better fulfil Australia’s 
MRA requirements, given its integral capacity to transport 1200 troops.190  This 
exceeds the troop lift capability of the Mistral-class LHD, which can lift 450 
troops without displacing transportable vehicles or helicopters.191  As the future 
ADF amphibious force will comprise only two vessels, and given the land force 
requirements of the case studies of this chapter, it would appear the acquisition of 
the Strategic Projection Ship would be more appropriate.  Such a ship could have 
deployed and partially sustained most of the forces required in the above ADF 
case studies. 
In addition, those same integral lift elements can further support the 
operations of land forces, following the initial deployment.  “Army battlefield 
helicopters (organic to the amphibious task group) and naval utility helicopters 
can provide extensive support to operations on land”.192  In littoral zones, landing 
craft provide similar support to land forces, as do the aforementioned helicopters.  
Also in “littoral zones, maritime forces prevent the adversary moving forces by 
sea.  This protects the seaward flank of friendly land forces and denies the 
adversary the ability to conduct maritime manoeuvre”.193  This is a tangible 
capability and one which operates in the latent sense of deterrence.  In the latent 
sense, the mere presence of naval vessels in theatre can create a coercive effect 
that deters violence.  The support and sustainment capabilities outlined draw upon 
aspects of the ADF’s combat, amphibious and logistics support vessels.  The 
following analysis will focus on the RAN’s logistics support contribution to land 
operations. 
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A significant element in sustaining land forces is that of logistics.  Naval 
logistics support for land forces has been provided by a single dedicated vessel 
within the ADF.  The Afloat Support Force incorporates two vessels, the 
Auxiliary Oiler Westralia and the Auxiliary Oiler Replenishment ship Success.  
Westralia “is primarily configured to provide fuel and water, has [only a] limited 
capacity for the carriage of food and stores, and [has] no capacity to carry cargo 
ammunition”.194  In contrast, Success “is a multi-purpose support ship capable of 
providing fuel, water, ammunition, stores and fresh and frozen foodstuffs to 
receiving ships or units at anchor or while underway”.195  Hence, only Success 
can sustain a deployed land force.  Success was critical in sustaining the land, air 
and sea elements deployed to the various Bougainville operations analysed above, 
and operations in East Timor.  However, in the case of East Timor, Success could 
not have sustained the INTERFET lodgement without the assistance of HMNZS 
Endeavour and subsequent coalition replenishment ships.  This RAN 
replenishment shortfall was partially caused by Westralia being unavailable 
during INTERFET operations, due to the damage caused by an engine-room fire.  
Furthermore during the period 2000 to 2005, Success has been at MLOC on 
average 249 days per year.  Hence on average, the ADF is nominally without a 
replenishment ship for 116 days per year.196  This is significant for a capability 
that is critical to most regional ADF operations.  There are also two ADF 
sustainment limitations, which were illustrated by operations in Bougainville and 
East Timor.  First, the limited capability of Tobruk and Success to produce potable 
water, through desalinisation, creates a need for water to be transported 
strategically into theatre.  Second, Success has no ship to shore fuel transfer 
capability, other than via helicopter.  A similar capability, to transfer potable 
water ashore, may also be useful.  The RAN has received advice from the U.S. 
Marine Corps on such matters. 
Success and Westralia will be replaced under Project Sea 1654.  Phase 2A 
of this project will replace Westralia with HMAS Sirius, an interim auxiliary 
oiler.  Phase 2B and 2C will replace Success and Sirius with new, purpose-built 
auxiliary oiler replenishment (AOR) ships.197  These two future AORs should 
ensure a continuous replenishment capability.  The AORs will “provide support 
for two separate naval taskforces as well as support of forces ashore and fixed 
installations such as bases, airstrips and townships...  [The vessels will be] able to 
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supply large quantities of marine distillate [fuel], aviation fuel, water, ammunition 
and various other stores”.198  The future vessels also need to be able to produce 
large amounts of potable water, and transfer this water and fuel efficiently to 
shore.  Hence, deployable pipes, and bulk water and fuel installations need to be 
an integral part of the AORs.  Separately, the future AORs should have a 
capability to sustain a land force of a battalion group.  Together, the AORs should 
have a capability to sustain a lodgement comparable to INTERFET, with support 
from chartered air and sea assets.  Given this requirement for chartered civilian 
assets, the ADF must continue to provide Sea Control. 
To enable sustainment operations and the delivery of humanitarian aid, 
which is often a component of counterinsurgency, port facilities are often 
required.  Hence, CDTs and associated equipment and vessels are also a 
requirement in LIC.  In this case, CDTs would be tasked with removing 
dangerous substances and objects from ports, as to enable the use of the said ports.  
Of the aforementioned case studies, only in the case of non-littoral Afghanistan 
were port clearance operations not required. 
The Naval Aviation Force, in conjunction with embarked Army 
helicopters, has also proven to be essential in LIC.  These helicopters generate an 
amphibious capability and enable naval support of land operations.  The RAN’s 
S-70B-2 Seahawks and SH-2G Super Seasprites are designed primarily to 
“operate as an integral component of the parent ship’s weapons and sensor suite, 
extending the detection range of the force, maximising the offensive range, and 
reducing the vulnerability to attack”.199  These capabilities provide actual and 
latent Sea Control.  However, the combat support capabilities of the two 
aforementioned helicopters, and the RAN’s Sea King Mk 50A and embarked 
Army Blackhawks, have been indispensable in the ADF cases under study.  
Combat support tasks include utility lift of personnel, equipment or stores, and 
land surveillance and reconnaissance.  Utility lift includes the lodgement of forces 
from amphibious ships, the subsequent movement and supply of those forces on 
land.  These latter utility capabilities were critical, especially in Bougainville and 
East Timor.  Naval aviation and embarked army helicopters are also immediately 
available in theatre.  This immediacy is a critical capability early in operations, 
prior to other tactical transport assets becoming available.  Unfortunately, logistic 
support deficiencies during 1999 through 2001, and continuing personnel 
 373
shortages have limited naval aviation capabilities and prevented some 
performance targets being achieved.  Moreover when heavily tasked, as in 
Operation Iraqi Freedom, maintenance backlogs have reduced performance.200  
Maintenance of the Sea King, in terms of cost and time, is also a matter of 
concern, given the criticality of this asset in combat support operations.  Hence, 
Project Air 9000 should also include the replacement for the Sea King, with a 
common ADF type of utility helicopter.  This replacement will most likely be the 
Eurocopter NH/MRH-90, which was examined above. 
Maritime forces can also be highly capable in peace building operations, 
whereby naval vessels provide personnel and facilities to rebuild communities.  
Integral to naval ships are trades-people, who can be based at sea and deploy to 
land when necessary.  These trades-people are backed by facilities onboard that 
enable their work.  Other naval personnel, such as “military observers, liaison 
officers, HQ staff officers, disarmament inspectors or … medical or 
communications teams”,201 can also support peace operations.  “Naval forces, 
particularly amphibious vessels and organic helicopters, can provide substantial 
logistics support [for peace operations]”.202  As indicated above, naval forces 
invariably bring significant consignments of humanitarian aid to peace operations.  
Moreover, CDTs have been critical in removing obstacles, so that Sealift vessels 
can gain access to port facilities for disembarkation.  Such operations were 
undertaken by the British in the Iraq war (analysed in chapter four), so as to 
ensure humanitarian aid could reach the Iraqi people.  In terms of doctrinal 
principles, this is essentially the application of civil operations. 
Land Strike is the “ability of maritime forces to strike directly at the 
land”.203  Such a strike would constitute the use of organic air units, guns or land 
attack missiles, in a strategic and independent role.  The same means of delivering 
firepower can be utilised to support operations on land.  In this sense, the weapons 
systems fire in support of friendly land forces.  In addition, naval air weapons and 
sensors can “contribute to [joint] anti-air operations [in littoral areas]”.204
Such operations occurred in 2003, when HMAS Anzac “provide[d] fire 
support to [United Kingdom] UK Royal Marine forces on the Al Faw peninsula[, 
Iraq]”.205  These operations included coalition air, land and sea elements, which 
necessitated seamless joint coalition command and control.  As stated earlier, a 
naval capability to strike at the land is an effective form of deterrence.  Hence, a 
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lack of naval gunfire against land targets does not mitigate the requirement for, or 
the coercive effect of, a naval land-attack capability. 
Sea-Basing is a concept relevant to “amphibious operations, [and is] a 
technique of basing certain land force support elements aboard ship which 
decreases shore based presence”.206  As a concept, Sea-Basing does not exist 
within the RAN’s capstone doctrine, ‘Australian Maritime Doctrine (RAN 
Doctrine 1, 2000)’.  Sea-Basing is referred to within the RAN’s second level 
doctrine, ‘The Navy Contribution to Australian Maritime Operations (RAN 
Doctrine 2, 2005)’, but is not fully developed.  Sea-Basing was an essential, but 
inadvertent operating method for ADF force elements deployed to East Timor.  
Simply, land forces were provided with intelligence, surveillance, mobility, 
support and C2 from ships at sea.  Future littoral operations will leverage greater 
support from ships at sea, through Sea-Basing.  Commodore Jack McCaffrie, of 
the Sea Power Centre, indicated that Sea-Basing was a central consideration in the 
development of the ADF’s future amphibious ships.  McCaffrie stated that a 
principal Army requirement for the future amphibious ships is to “land 1000 
personnel and keep 800 aboard for support”.207  The requirements of the support 
elements would include Command, Control, Communication, Computers, 
Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR), logistics, firepower and 
mobility.  For example, the Army requires the future amphibious ships to have: 
(1) an independent capability to simultaneously launch six NH90s carrying a 
company of 120 personnel; and (2) field the Tiger ARH in support of land 
operations.208  Given these pending requirements, RAN doctrine needs to be 
enhanced in the area of Sea-Basing.  As is indicated below, Sea-Basing is a 
current operational reality. 
 Joint Command and Control, provided by RAN vessels, has been essential 
during the ADF operations in Bougainville, East Timor and Iraq.  The ADF 
describes the foremost role of the Amphibious Transports Kanimbla and 
Manoora, as that of a “deployable joint force headquarters [DJFHQ]”.209  As a 
DJFHQ, Manoora and Kanimbla provide “Command, Control, Communication 
and Intelligence (C3I) and electronic warfare”210 capabilities for a joint taskforce.  
Similarly, Tobruk and Success have provided limited C3I capabilities during 
operations in Bougainville and East Timor.  In addition, major coalition combat 
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vessels provided tactical C3I in East Timor and Iraq, in conjunction with airborne 
surveillance and strike aircraft, to assert Sea Control. 
 Liaison is a brief that is not well elucidated in RAN doctrine, but is 
absolutely essential when on operation with a coalition.  McCaffrie stated that 
liaison officers were critically important to operations off East Timor and Iraq.  
This is because coalition “systems must be backed up by competent liaison 
officers”.211  This is because differences in Standard Operating Procedures and 
terminology can prevent coalition members understanding and operating 
effectively together.  Liaison officers can rectify contentious issues, or translate 
obscure terms for retransmission between friendly elements.  Consequently, 
personnel exchanges are some of the most critical methods of creating coalition 
interoperability. 
 It is important to perceive naval units as integral elements of joint 
counterinsurgency forces.  In terms of doctrinal principles, naval units can: 
control the AO and therefore manage international interference; directly and 
indirectly provide, and support operations that provide, internal security; directly 
and indirectly apply, and support operations that apply, civil operations; and 
perform as a unified command and control system.  In terms of military 
principles, naval units are an element of joint force, generate intelligence, provide 
communications links, and through C2 capabilities, enable force to be precisely 
applied. 
 
Command, Control, Initiative, Communications and Intelligence (C2ICI) 
The following analysis examines the essential elements of Command and Control, 
as experienced by the ADF in LIC.  This section analyses a number of elements 
that enable force to be coordinated and applied in counterinsurgency operations. 
 
Command, Control and Initiative 
This section analyses C2 implications for the ADF, from operations in Somalia, 
Bougainville, East Timor, Afghanistan and Iraq.  The section initially analyses the 
aforementioned operations sequentially, so that the implications can be illustrated 
in a simple manner.  Subsequently, the section incorporates these implications 
with the development of C2 structures within the ADF.  This subsequent analysis 
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examines the strengths and weaknesses of the ADF command structure since 1990 
and into the future. 
Operation Solace, the peace-enforcement operation to Somalia in 1993, 
faced two primary difficulties at the pre-deployment stage.  First, planning 
remained covert for an extended period of time.  Second, Australian Army and 
Navy readiness was below expectations.  These two issues subsequently 
undermined the logistics and training build-up for Operation Solace.  In addition, 
a lack of strategic-level planning synergy and excess secrecy seriously 
undermined intelligence. 
 Defence Headquarters (HQ) and Land HQ were aware of a requirement to 
deploy 1 RAR to Somalia in early November.  However, it took four and five 
weeks for this information to reach top and middle level officers in 1 RAR, 
consecutively.  In addition, Combat Service Support (CSS) units were not 
informed of Operation Solace until after 15 December.  Consequently, 1 RAR’s 
“deficiencies in vehicles, weapons, equipment and general stores”212 were not 
recognised until four weeks before deployment.  When these deficiencies were 
recognised, over 1000 supply requests were lodged with a logistics system that 
was unprepared and unadvised of 1 RAR’s high priority setting.  The subsequent 
unorganised delivery of supplies to the embarkation port of Townsville was: (1) 
highly expensive; (2) complicated the loading of HMAS Tobruk and Jervis Bay 
(I); and (3) caused stores and vehicles to be left in Australia.  The complicated 
loading process indicated in point two prevented Tobruk being combat loaded; 
critical supplies for immediate operations in Somalia were not immediately 
obtainable on deployment.  Due to point three, 1 RAR was short of supplies and 
transport once deployed, necessitating a critical re-supply.213
 Operation Solace also indicated a shortfall between reported and actual 
readiness.  Breen states, “long-term deficiencies in stock holdings and 
maintenance schedules were exposed, neighbouring units had to be cannibalised 
for serviceable vehicles, weapons, equipment and stores”.214  In addition, Tobruk 
was not in a serviceable state when ordered to ready for operation.  Fortunately, 
Tobruk’s crew was able to frantically repair major mechanical and system 
failures, to bring Tobruk to “‘Mission Capable’ status”.215
 During the deployment of 1 RAR to Somalia, C2 and logistics were 
conspicuous deficiencies.  Logistics issues will be examined below, under the 
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‘Logistics’ subsection.  C2 from HQ 1 RAR down, worked effectively.  However, 
from HQ 1RAR to the ‘joint’ in-theatre HQ Australian Force Somalia (AFS) and 
then back to the various HQs in Australia, there was near chaos.  HQ AFS was 
designed as a “Deployable Joint Force HQ (DJFHQ) commanding [all Australian] 
forces deployed [to Somalia]”.216  In reality, the HQ AFS was not joint and did 
not have the personnel or status to function “as a tactical Brigade HQ or a third-
line logistic HQ”.217  In actuality, HQ AFS reported to higher HQs in Australia, 
operated as an unnecessary administrative conduit between 1 RAR and Australia, 
and attempted to work the defunct logistics system.  The command issues 
surrounding HQ AFS were caused partly by its complicated initial functions.  
These included both: liaison with coalition members and the American strategic 
command in Somalia; and reconnaissance of the Baidoa sector.  First, everyone 
except HQ AFS and senior Australian HQ personnel, perceived HQ AFS to be a 
senior national liaison team, rather than the AFS Command team.  Second, the 
reconnaissance team was comprised of 1 RAR personnel, who assumed their 
responsibility was to 1 RAR, not HQ AFS.  This was, however, irrelevant, as the 
intelligence gained by the reconnaissance team was attained too late to assist 1 
RAR pre-deployment preparation.  Simply, HQ AFS proved highly ineffective.  
Breen illustrates two lessons learned.  First, all units must comprehend the 
functions of a multilayered national command.  All roles and responsibilities must 
be understood.  Second, it is absolutely critical that battalion HQs train with the 
brigade HQs that they operate with.  Under no circumstances should brigade HQs 
be ad hoc entities.  A further issue relates to liaison and reconnaissance, separate 
teams should have been sent earlier to perform these activities individually. 
The 1994 Bougainville Peace Conference (BPC) failed in achieving peace.  
The failure was principally caused by: (1) elements of the PNGDF breaking the 
cease fire agreement; and (2) the leaders of the BRA and BIG withholding support 
for the conference.  Nevertheless, the force elements of Operation Lagoon were 
successful in fulfilling their prescribed mission objectives.  This was despite joint 
cooperation issues, caused by a flawed planning process.218
 Effective Command, Control and Initiative are as significant in pre-
deployment planning, as they are following deployment.  In the case of Operation 
Lagoon, the ADF exhibited significant planning fissures, which were exacerbated 
by a politically constrained pre-deployment training process. 
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 The Australian Defence Headquarters and Defence Intelligence 
Organisation (DIO) became aware of Operation Lagoon on 23 May 1994.  
Subsequently, a covert planning team was established at Defence HQ, 
incorporating six ADF personnel.  On 8 June, the strategic plan was approved.  
This plan envisaged the deployment of 200 Fijian, Tongan and Ni Vanuatu troops, 
as the primary field elements of a SPPKF.  The SPPKF was to be commanded and 
supported by the ADF.  Hence, the ADF would need to provide the SPPKF with 
pre-deployment training, as well as logistics, surveillance, intelligence, 
communications and command support.  In addition, the ADF needed to feed and 
water all the security personnel and conference delegates.  This information, 
however, was not provided explicitly to ADF operational planners until 9 
September; four weeks prior to operational deployment. 
 Defence HQ did not provide operational planners at Land HQ with explicit 
warning because: (1) “senior officers in Defence HQ were not confident that 
contingency planning … could be kept secret outside … Defence HQ”;219 and (2) 
personnel at Defence HQ preferred “a sequential and hierarchical approach to 
planning rather than a concurrent, parallel process”.220  Neither did the Defence 
Intelligence Organisation (DIO) inform Land HQ of the impending operation in 
Bougainville.  Bob Breen contends that the DIO did not consider ‘the 
interpretation of information and recommending courses of action’221 to be core 
business.  In the absence of explicit warnings, Land HQ appears not to have 
recognised, or acted upon, the implicit warnings of an impending peace operation 
in the media and parliament due to three reasons.  First, Land HQ did not take the 
initiative and begin operational planning for Operation Lagoon, as unauthorised 
contingency planning was not permitted.  “If … [Land HQ] had sought 
authorisation to conduct the planning, then they would not have been allowed 
because the strategic warning was kept a secret in a compartment at Defence 
HQ”.222  Second, Land HQ was focused on “[i]nternal reporting[,] … consultative 
processes …[,] administrative requirements associated with planning, resource 
forecasting and management, and the preparation and conduct of peace time 
training”.223  Third, Breen states “[t]here did not appear to be any staff tasked to 
anticipate future operations by examining the media and the statements of national 
and international leaders”,224 as this is the function of Defence HQ.  The lesson 
here is that information pertaining to upcoming operations must be disseminated 
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to those who will plan the operations.  Simply, excessive secrecy will undermine 
planning, and poor planning will in turn undermine the operation. 
 The lack of a clear, joint and timely ADF consultative process initially 
caused the terminal development of operational plans, the compressed execution 
of training and the logistical build-up to be rushed and less effective.  Basically, 
the warning process resulted in negative outcomes, three of which were serious.  
First, the strategic plan was developed without specialist guidance.  Hence, “the 
Defence HQ plan was logistically unsound and did not contain sufficient detail on 
any aspect of the operation, such as joint arrangements for communication and 
Intelligence”.225  Second and subsequently, the terminal operational planning for 
Operation Lagoon neglected some operational requirements and joint activities 
lacked synergy.  Third, logistical support for Operation Lagoon was unduly costly 
and difficult to coordinate.  In addition, Defence HQ then applied further 
constraints to Land HQ.  This significantly limited operational planning in the 
areas of logistics, support engineering, liaison, reconnaissance and 
communications. 
 The C2 issues illustrated above appear to have been rectified by the ADF, 
to a degree.  This change was demonstrated by the successful Australian 
deployment to East Timor.  Operational level pre-deployment planning and C2 
were vested in the Australian Deployable Joint Force Headquarters (DJFHQ).  
The DJFHQ had been established two years prior to operations in East Timor, and 
had undertaken two humanitarian operations and several exercises.  One of these 
exercises simulated an evacuation operation, while another simulated a brigade 
sized amphibious lodgement.  These exercises paralleled: (1) Operation Spitfire, 
the evacuation of specified persons from East Timor; and (2) Operation Warden, 
the lodgement of INTERFET.  However, Major General Cosgrove, the 
commander of DJFHQ, did state that an opportunity to field test equipment, 
procedures and computer systems would have been beneficial prior to operations 
in East Timor.  Nevertheless, DJFHQ effectively prepared forces for, and 
commanded forces within the East Timor AO.  In terms of preparation for East 
Timor, the DJFHQ was warned four months prior to operations in East Timor.  
This time period enabled effective planning.  However, like previous Australian 
operations warning orders for some field elements came within a month of 
deployment.  These short warning times do not seem to have impacted adversely 
 380
on most of the deploying units.  However, the East Timor deployment illustrated 
severe weaknesses in Australian logistic and engineer support services.226  The 
logistical and engineering limitations will be examined below in their own 
subsections. 
 With specific reference to the SOF Forward Command element, coalition 
interoperability and service jointness were critical enablers for the effective ADF 
combat operations in Iraq.  Interoperability was insured through: (1) decades of 
Australian, UK and U.S. joint special force training and operations; (2) intensive 
pre-combat in-theatre training with UK and U.S. joint forces in February and 
March 2003; and (3) the collocation of the Australian Forward Command element 
with the United States Special Operations Command element in the Middle East.  
The Australian Department of Defence states that “[w]orking relationships 
developed during Operations Slipper [(Afghanistan)] and Bastille [(deployment to 
and in-theatre training for Iraq)] meant their [SOF] actions during Operation 
Falconer [(combat operations in Iraq)] were always closely coordinated with the 
US [sic] and UK special forces [and other tasked combat platforms] operating 
nearby in the Western Desert”.  This coordination was and is absolutely critical to 
SOF, given the reliance of Special Forces on network-centric operations and the 
use of air-launched precision-guided weapons.227
 Concomitantly with the aforementioned operations, an operational level 
HQ was developed within the ADF.  The development of an operational level HQ 
began in the late 1980s, under the then Chief of Defence Force (CDF), General 
Peter Gration.  Gration commissioned the then Brigadier, John Baker, to review 
C2 arrangements within the ADF.  Baker’s report became “the architecture for 
joint operations [and] included a DJFHQ”.228  “The process then began under 
Gration, to create … [the joint operational] capability at the Divisional HQ in 
Brisbane”.229  Operations in Somalia and Bougainville were to show, that these 
nominal structures were of subtle value.  In the case of Somalia, the DJFHQ 
operated as a “liaison HQ…, endeavoured to manage the supply chain, and act[ed] 
in the latter part of the operation as a higher level tactical HQ”.230  The DJFHQ 
“did not have a command relationship with HMAS Tobruk …, and could not task 
it or its helicopters”.231  In the case of both Somalia and Operation Lagoon in 
Bougainville, significant compartmentalisation, secrecy and sequential lag at 
Defence HQ generated considerable command issues on deployment.  However in 
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the case of Operation Lagoon, Land HQ was deployed as a joint force HQ, rather 
than DJFHQ. 
Despite “shortcomings in the joint process, … [operations in the early 
1990s] showed the value of having a headquarters, separate from HQADF in 
Canberra, that could plan, mount and control … overseas deployments”.232  
Hence in 1997, under the then CDF, General John Baker, a standing joint 
operational HQ was established.  This joint operational command structure was 
designated Headquarters Australian Theatre (HQAST).  However, the HQAST 
remained a nominally joint structure.  The core personnel of the HQAST 
constitute a joint staff, “organised on functional lines using the continental staff 
system”.233  However, for the planning and conduct of joint operations, Air, 
Maritime, Land, Special Force Group and Logistic Support Force component 
staffs are assigned to the HQAST.  The Joint Intelligence Centre and Joint 
Movement Group are also under HQAST control.  These component staffs are not 
ordinarily collocated, which enables the ‘potential for single service and joint 
command friction to develop on operation’.234  For an operation, HQAST would 
also be assigned component force elements to command in theatre.  HQAST 
could command these assigned force elements in three potential ways: (1) directly 
from HQAST in Sydney; (2) via a Land, Maritime or Air component command; 
or (3) via DJFHQ, DJFHQ – Maritime (M) or Northern Command (NORCOM).  
Of these, only NORCOM is a full time joint HQ, which permanently commands 
its own force elements and enablers.   
In the case of East Timor, DJFHQ was the appointed command element.  
However, DJFHQ is an Army formation based upon Headquarters 1st Division, 
which is located in Brisbane.  The DJFHQ is “supplemented by maritime, air and 
special operations [and logistics] components [when activated]”.235  Hence, in 
actuality the “DJ[FHQ] has never been a joint force HQ, except in a nominal way 
during exercises and in a practical, but still ad hoc way for Operation Stabilise in 
East Timor”.236  The formation of the HQAST and DJFHQ had rectified many of 
the C2 issues experienced in earlier operations.  However, “[t]he East Timor 
operations revealed that joint C2 arrangements … [did] not meet expectations”.237  
There were three primary reasons for this unsatisfactory performance.  First, the 
three component services did not deliver an integrated and practiced joint 
response.  HQAST doctrine, which brought the three services together for 
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operations, was not sufficient.  For joint operations to work effectively, HQAST 
needed to permanently control all enabling command components.  Second, the 
sequential planning process needed to be superseded.  A concurrent process was 
required for vertical and horizontal planning.  In terms of vertical planning, the 
strategic, operational and tactical levels of command needed to integrate 
seamlessly.  Horizontally, ‘the three services needed to plan together, at the same 
time’.238  Moreover, the vertical and horizontal planning must also be fully 
integrated.  Simply, to operate together, you need to train together.  Third, key 
force elements were not incorporated into the HQAST structure.  Both Logistics 
and Engineering were omitted from the HQAST doctrine prior to operations in 
East Timor.  Hence: (1) the Engineer deployment to East Timor was slow, and the 
importance of their task was not well comprehended; and (2) the tenuous nature of 
the improvised supply chain between Australia and East Timor brought the 
mission close to failure.  Furthermore, this omission has not been fully rectified as 
yet.  This is an unsatisfactory situation, given that both of these capabilities were 
critical enablers in East Timor, the Solomon Islands and Bougainville.  This 
situation may have developed because Logistics and Engineering are elements of 
the Army.  Hence, the operational perceptions of Logistics and Engineering would 
be put forward by Army.  However, the specialist roles of Logistics and 
Engineering are not understood well enough within Army for those roles to be 
presented within a generic Army approach to an operation.  Logistics and 
Engineering must be represented permanently, by separate command components 
within the HQAST structure.  The Logistics and Engineering components must 
also possess command parity with the Air, Land, Maritime and Special Force 
Group components within HQAST. 
The result of General Baker’s command redevelopment initiative, and 
subsequent operations and reviews, HQAST has been superseded by Headquarters 
Joint Operations Command (HQJOC).  The purpose of HQJOC is to centralise in 
an “integrated environment, the Chief of Joint Operations [(Vice Chief of Defence 
Force)] and strategic staff …, the Deputy Chief of Joint Operations [(formerly 
HQAST Commander)] and joint staff, [the] Component Commanders … and their 
staff, the Joint Operations Intelligence Centre …, [the] 1st Joint Movement Group 
…, and a portion of the Headquarters Joint Logistics Command staff”.239  The 
significance of HQJOC for future operations is that its staff will be integrated, 
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rather than simply being collocated component staff.  Breen indicated that all 
HQJOC staff will be joint staff, organised functionally using the continental 
system.  This integrated approach should offer each service “a device to learn the 
strengths and weaknesses of … [their fellow] services”.240  A concomitant 
development should also be a “more [operationally] practised joint response to … 
Government’s [strategic goals]”.241   
In Operations Solace and Lagoon, C2 was undermined by covert planning 
compartmentalisation, sequential lag, poor logistics integration and the lack of a 
functional deployable joint HQ.  In the case of East Timor, many of these C2 
issues had been rectified.  However, component integration and logistics and 
engineering problems became command challenges.  Subsequently, there have 
been major developments within ADF C2, culminating in the HQJOC.  However, 
these subsequent C2 modifications have not been sufficiently tested on operation, 
to indicate their effectiveness.  There are, however, three significant issues that 
may limit the capability of HQJOC.  First, HQJOC is perceived by some as a 
financial device, “to reduce the number of [ADF] HQs [from seven] down to 
one”.242  Economies of Scale will be an outcome of the HQJOC, but economics 
should not be a consideration in the development of operational command 
effectiveness.  An economic motivation may lead to an undesired operational 
outcome.  Second, the HQJOC structure does not appear to supplement the joint 
nature of DJFHQ and DJFHQ-(M).  Operations in East Timor indicated that a lack 
of true joint training became an impediment to component integration.  Therefore, 
the DJFHQs must deploy as joint HQs, on realistic training exercises, and 
command complex joint forces.  Only by training realistically will the DJFHQs 
improve operationally.  Third, the HQJOC does not command force elements, 
other than on operations.  As a result of this, otherwise separated force elements 
may encounter integration issues.  Breen suggests a solution to this problem, 
whereby the HQJOC becomes a “Rapid Response Command”.243  The Rapid 
Response Command would encompass “all high readiness elements from the three 
services…, including intelligence and logistics …, under the [command] of the 
Chief of Joint Operations”.244  The Chief of Joint Operations would then 
“determine the … contingencies … practise[d] for [by the high readiness 
elements]”.245  Consequently, joint operations would be seamlessly integrated, 
because training would provide practical experience of seamless integration.  
 384
However, such an integration of force elements would most likely be opposed by 
the single service chiefs, who would attempt to maintain single service command. 
It is critical that joint command is functionally instituted within the ADF.  
Joint command is essential if joint force is to be applied; joint force must be 
functional if communications are expected to be integrated, and only if this occurs 
will intelligence be acted upon.  Simply and in terms of doctrinal principles, the 
ADF must install a unified command. 
 
Rules of Engagement (ROE) 
ROE were a significant restraint for 1 RAR operations in Somalia, compromising 
SOPs and endangering 1 RAR personnel.  Night operations were particularly 
constrained by the prohibition of illumination flares, trip flares and Claymore 
command detonated mines.  The proscription of both flares left patrol and 
perimeter guards without an ability to illuminate targets effectively.  This forced 
perimeter guards to use flashlights/torches to illuminate Somali belligerents.  
However, the use of torches gave away the positions of the Australian guards, 
endangering their lives.  In addition, without illumination flares, Somalis could 
fire at 1 RAR units and then withdraw securely.  The ban on Claymore mines also 
endangered 1 RAR personnel, who could have been overwhelmed by Somali 
intruders.246
 Operations in East Timor illustrated the dichotomy of effect ROE can have 
on military missions.  The initial success of the INTERFET mission was partly 
attributed to robust ROE (UN Chapter 7: Peace-Enforcement).  INTERFET ROE 
had a dual outcome: (1) conflict escalation was inhibited; while (2) ‘all necessary 
means’ were applied to disarm and discourage the armed threat to East Timor.  In 
contrast, United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) 
ROE (UN Chapter 6: Peace-Keeping) functionally dislocated the deployed 
peacekeeping troops.  This is clearly an illogical outcome.  Hence, governments 
must be careful not to support UN ROE that will cause mission failure.  
Peacekeeping and peace-enforcement forces must have the capability to deny 
freedom of action to any threat.  Otherwise there is no point in deploying military 
units to the theatre of conflict.  Simply, ROE can undermine all of the military 
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principles articulated in this thesis.  For further discussion on this topic, see the 
previous chapter.   
 
Logistics 
This section analyses Logistics support for ADF force elements, for operations in 
Somalia, Bougainville and East Timor.  The section initially analyses the above 
operations consecutively, so that the implications can be illustrated in a 
straightforward manner.  Subsequently, the section analyses these implications 
with reference to current ADF logistics structures. 
Australian logistics was a critical deficiency and vulnerability in Operation 
Solace, even thought the American forces in Somalia were providing 1 RAR with 
water, rations, ammunition and fuel.  There were three significant issues that 
undermined effective logistics.  First, seemingly due to government cost cutting, 
no logistics or tactical air transport detachments were deployed to Somalia as 
planned.  These detachments would have bought goods locally and transported 
supplies between Nairobi and 1 RAR by C-130.  Hence, personnel within HQ 
AFS had to coordinate all incoming supplies, mail and local purchases.  For this 
task HQ AFS was unprepared and understaffed.  Second, the planned second 
Jervis Bay sailing did not occur.  Hence, 1 RAR supplies and equipment were left 
in Townsville.  Third, while on operation, the logistics system failed to respond 
effectively to 1 RAR’s supply requests.  The intention was for Land HQ to receive 
supply requests from 1 RAR, a specified Logistic Group would fulfil the requests, 
and then a Movement Control Group would task Maritime or Air HQ to deliver 
the requested items.  This system proved unsuccessful in reality, due to problems 
at the Logistics Group, Movement Control Group and Maritime and Air HQs.  
The Logistics Group had been issued an order to supply 1 RAR.  However, the 
Logistics Group was unaware of “who had the funds, resources and authority to 
make things happen, and exactly how resupply [sic] and movement of stores from 
Australia to Somalia was to be coordinated”.247  Neither was the Logistics Group 
issued orders to ‘push’ anticipated supply needs through to 1 RAR.  Furthermore, 
“[a]dministrative instructions were silent about the [Chief of Defence Force’s] 
CDF’s intentions for the movement of stores to Somalia, including HQ ADF’s 
allocation of $2.4 million [Australian dollars] for air freight.  This left those 
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responsible (Movement Control) for the overseas movement of stores without the 
resources to do the job”.248  Consequently, supplies did arrive in Somalia, 
although: (1) the supplies arrived without notice; (2) the supply composition of 
containers was not recorded; (3) urgent supplies were not always included, and (4) 
there was no means for 1 RAR to independently move the supplies from 
Mogadishu to Baidoa.  For the entire period of deployment to Somalia, none of 
the supply problems were solved, nor did any level of HQ take responsibility in 
attempting to solve the said problems.  Operation Solace also indicated a chronic 
lack of jointness between Land HQ and Air HQ.  Although Air HQ had been 
ordered by the CDF to provide logistics support for 1 RAR through Land HQ, the 
lack of funding visibility meant Air HQ would not transport critical supplies to 
Somalia.  Breen asserts “that Air HQ operated on a ‘user-pays’ principle unless 
there was a shared understanding of an operational emergency or there were 
specific benefits to be accrued by the Air Force”.249  There appears to be evidence 
of the second point made by Breen.  The lessons here are simply: (1) there must 
be a clear delineation of supply responsibility at all levels; (2) HQs must ensure 
supply systems work effectively; (3) cost should not inhibit appropriate supply 
and freight detachments being deployed on operation; and (4) the separate arms of 
the ADF must develop a joint culture, awareness and support. 
Logistics proved relatively effective in Operation Lagoon, albeit 
significant structural and planning obstructions.  Furthermore, there was an 
absence of logisticians in both Defence HQ and Land HQ planning.  “To their 
credit, these logistic and movements staff used … initiative … to request items of 
supply well before there was any guidance on the structure, duration and mission 
of the Combined Force”.250  However, there was criticism of the logistics system 
from the senior commanders of Operation Lagoon.  The criticism centred on the 
unresponsiveness of the logistics system to operational deployment.  Specifically, 
(1) there was no mail service for Operation Lagoon, and (2) a helicopter was 
unserviceable for two weeks, as critical supplies very slow to be delivered.  As 
indicated by Breen, “these logistic deficiencies had been identified during 
Operation Solace the year before”.251
 Analogous with Operations Solace and Lagoon, logistics was a critical 
deficiency and vulnerability for the INTERFET operation.  Since the early 1990s, 
the Australian logistics corps had been significantly reduced in terms of personnel 
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numbers, infrastructure and stock holdings.  Many logistics functions had been 
commercialised and business theories had been introduced to the field of defence 
logistics.  Consequently, the ADF had no: (1) deployable logistics HQ; and (2) 
domestic or deployable logistics groups to facilitate the collection, transportation 
or distribution of stocks.  In addition, there was insufficient logistics infrastructure 
in Darwin (the Forward Mounting Base), and chronic deficiencies of stock at 
ADF depots.  The latter issue was caused by the commercialisation of logistics 
tasks, and a ‘just in time’ distribution system.252  What proved to be the critical 
enablers of the improvised system were: (1) exceptionally hard working and 
competent personnel adept at adhockery; (2) logistics personnel with the foresight 
to action purchase orders for equipment with long lead times, and charter road, air 
and sea transport, prior to warning orders being distributed; (3) unprecedented 
Australian logistics jointness; and (4) the inclusion of logistics personnel and 
staffs in all planning processes and at all level HQs. 
 Nevertheless, the ADF was able to field a logistics system that supported 
up to 10,500 personnel, 50 helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft and 1,300 vehicles.  
This logistics system was fabricated and came on-line, between two and six weeks 
from inception.  The stages and features of this system were implemented as 
follows.  A Force Support Group (FSG) was tasked with establishing a forward 
mounting base in Darwin.  The FSG was tasked with gathering commercial stocks 
locally, receipting arriving defence stocks, arranging stores infrastructure, 
fulfilling material requests from East Timor, ‘pushing’ standard stores to East 
Timor, and arranging with Movement personnel for the consignments to reach 
East Timor.  Despite the enormity of this task, the FSG was an ad hoc entity, 
initially consisting of 9 Force Support Battalion (FSB).  9 FSB was not 
commanded by a supply officer, and was in fact designed for road transport.  
Hence, 9 FSB did not have personnel trained in local purchase, stock receipt and 
visibility computer systems, or sufficient personnel to load and prepare palletised 
stock.  Some of these issues were alleviated later by the inclusion of 10 FSB, 7 
Combat Service Support Battalion and Logistics Support HQ personnel.  Initially 
in East Timor, the only unit able to receive, distribute and request requisite stocks 
was 3 Brigade Administrative Support Battalion (BASB).  3 BASB was a limited 
unit with limited stock and capacity.  3 BASB’s ordinary function would be the 
support of only 3 Brigade, not INTERFET.  Hence, it was an imperative to deploy 
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10 FSB and Logistics Support HQ to Dili, before individual unit and 3 BASB 
stocks were completely depleted.  However, due to a number of delays, including 
merchant ships not being chartered for 10 FSB, the supply unit was not fully 
operational unit 20 October.  The Logistics Support HQ was another entity 
assembled at short notice, becoming functional by 11 September.  The Logistics 
Support HQ was the logistics command unit in East Timor, tasked with 
coordinating logistic movements and requests, and planning for future logistic 
needs.253
Initially the logistics and movements system began to fail when 
INTERFET was only hours old, on the first day of lodgement.  This was due to 
unplanned military and politico-military requirements.  To guarantee food, water, 
fuel, ammunition and medical supplies, the logistics plan involved all air and sea 
assets operating to a tight schedule, with little flexibility, for three weeks.  
However, 2 RAR personnel and essential vehicles and critical supplies of water 
were preceded by a media contingent, Air Force control tower operators and 
equipment, and UNAMET personnel and vehicles.  It would appear only the Air 
Force personnel were mission critical.  The results of this reprioritisation of 
logistics included: (1) a week long shortage of 2 RAR vehicles; and (2) a critical 
shortage of water for 2 RAR until 3 RAR arrived. 
Overall, the fully functioning logistics system was fairly effective at 
providing mission essential stores, but had insufficient capacity to meet the 
comprehensive needs of INTERFET.  For example, by mid October competing 
logistic requirements included: (1) water, food, fuel and ammunition; (2) spare 
parts; (3) semi-permanent base materials to improve the living standards of 
deployed troops; (4) construction materials for the Engineers; and (5) an excess 
build-up of stores for the wet season.  Of the above requirements, categories 1, 2 
and 5 were prioritised.  As structured, the logistics system was at peak operating 
capacity; local purchase arrangements were overloaded, airport and seaport 
capacity was stretched and there were still insufficient personnel to operate the 
logistics computer systems.  Furthermore, chartered shipping was proving a 
critical impediment to deployment.  This was because insufficient warning time 
had been given to charter commercial vessels.  Hence, only Australian and 
Coalition military aircraft and vessels were available for transport use. 
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These case studies illustrate that logistics is a clear and systemic source of 
weakness within the ADF.  Air Commodore Mark Lax, of Strategy Group, 
describes this situation as a “significant breakdown in the ADF’s logistics 
sustainment [sic] capability”.254  There are three broad reasons for ADF logistic 
weakness: planning, structures and latent capability. 
First, “the inadequate involvement of logistics staff in the … planning 
process … [has] resulted in significant ramifications for supply chains”.255  The 
strategic level planning for Operations Solace and Lagoon excluded logisticians.  
This situation had improved by the time of East Timor, as logisticians were 
involved in the strategic level planning process.  However, due to the sequential 
planning process, operational level planning was not sufficiently developed prior 
to deployment.  Hence, when fissures appeared in the logistics system, there was 
little time to implement solutions.  In 2000, a Joint Logistics Command (JLC) was 
initially established within the Defence Materiel Organisation (DMO).  
Subsequently, the JLC has been incorporated into the HQJOC.  “[A]t the 
operational level, … [JLC], during contingencies, is directly responsible … for the 
provision of logistics support to ADF operations”.256  The inclusion of the JLC 
within the HQJOC should enhance the strategic profile of logistics, and should 
improve logistics planning at the operational level.  In addition, the joint nature of 
the JLC should better “manage the [single service] competition for [air and sea 
lift]”.257  The operational effectiveness of the JLC has, however, been questioned 
in subsequent operations.  In Iraq, it is accepted widely within the ADF that the 
JLC caused “no operational failures”,258 but “performed below expectation”.259  
Moreover, “[t]he logistics management for the ADF in Iraq and Afghanistan was 
run by a civilian contractor.  Hence, the ADF has gained no [recent] practise [with 
operational logistics]”.260
Second, the logistics structures required for the above operations were not 
adequate to need operational needs.  Simply, deployable joint logistics capabilities 
have not been developed within the ADF.  There is a requirement for: (1) a 
deployable logistics HQ to manage the supply chain; and (2) a deployable joint 
logistics group to facilitate the strategic and tactical collection, transportation and 
distribution of stocks in an integrated manner.  In the case of East Timor, the 
development of a deployable logistics HQ only occurred, due to absolute 
operational necessity.  In addition, the collection, transport and distribution of 
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stores for operations in East Timor, was undertaken by non-specialist supply 
units.  Since East Timor, there has not been a concerted effort to develop a 
deployable joint logistics group.  In theatre, logistics support is provided by single 
service logistic elements.261  Moreover, the JLC does not command platforms or 
field elements.262  Consequently, the JLC cannot train to improve logistics 
performance. 
Third, latent ADF logistics capability has been severely reduced by a 
myriad of Government reviews during the 1990s.  These reviews included “the 
Force Structure Review, Defence Regional Support Review, the Defence 
Logistics Redevelopment Project, the Defence Reform Programme, the 
Commercial Support Programme and the Supply Systems Redevelopment 
Programme”.263  The result of this restructuring was the “reduction of logistic 
support personnel … [numbers by approximately] 5,300”.264  Of particular 
consequence was the Force Structure Review, “which considered that only a cadre 
of specialist tradesman was necessary, on the assumption that they would not 
deploy off-shore and would be augmented from within the civilian support 
base”.265  This is clearly a “peacetime assumption”,266 which has no correlation 
with operational reality.  “Hence, the surge capacity [in the ADF, which is 
required for operations,] was lost”.267  The loss of logistics personnel and 
structures within the ADF, was somewhat obscured by the establishment of the 
JLC.  However, the JLC does not offset the surge capacity lost through the 
commercialisation of field elements.  Therefore the ADF has “lost [its] ability to 
be resilient”,268 and will most likely face “serious trouble … managing … 
logistics [on future operations]”.269  This is very serious for the ADF given that 
none of the military principles or the doctrinal principles outlined in this thesis 
can be applied operationally without sufficient logistical support. 
 
Engineers 
This section analyses Engineer support for ADF force elements in East Timor.  
The section initially analyses the East Timor operation.  Subsequently, the section 
makes suggestions for the better operational use of the Engineers, within a joint 
ADF approach to LIC. 
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East Timor’s dilapidated infrastructure, mountainous interior and seasonal 
weather could have proven to be a critical vulnerability for INTERFET.  East 
Timor’s roads were initially unsuitable for INTERFET’s requirements, and the 
pending wet season threatened to aggravate this problem.  Furthermore, East 
Timor’s airfields were insufficient to compensate for the primitive roads.  The 
lack of hard-standing was a further problem in East Timor, which in the wet 
season threatened to immobilise INTERFET personnel, vehicles and aircraft.  
Finally, wet and dry waste was a further burden imposed by INTERFET, which 
overwhelmed East Timor’s rudimentary facilities.  Consequently, Construction 
and Combat Engineers were a critical element of INTERFET operations.  Despite 
this fact, engineering was a neglected function. 
 Engineering personnel were unintentionally excluded, due to oversight, 
from all levels of HQ planning.  3 Brigade’s concept of operations for East Timor 
excluded engineering, except to include the operations of the Brigade’s integral 3 
Combat Engineer Regiment (CER).  This exclusion of independent engineering 
was not corrected at either DJFHQ or HQAST.  Hence, a non-integrated concept 
of engineer operations was produced by Land Command Engineers.  This led to 
an Engineer cell being incorporated into DJFHQ.  However, this DJFHQ Engineer 
cell could do little without authorisation from HQAST, which preferred foreign 
contingents of engineers to deploy to East Timor. 
 Intelligence data was not provided that could target Engineer operations.  
First, the Engineer cell attached to DJFHQ was not provided with vehicles or 
authorisation to leave Dili to gather information.  Second, the collection of tactical 
intelligence excluded information on engineering requirements.  In response, 
Colonel Ahmed Mostafa, commander Land Command Engineers, conducted the 
first engineering reconnaissance between 10 and 13 October.  This reconnaissance 
mission found “INTERFET … [to be in the] midst of an engineering crisis”.270
 Due to Mostafa’s reconnaissance, authorisation was given to deploy the 
remaining Australian construction squadron.  The deployment of 21 Construction 
Squadron was then further delayed, as the chartering of a ship was not expedited.  
Once deployed to East Timor, 17 and 21 Construction Squadrons and 3 CER 
found that insufficient and disordered logistics were curtailing their mission.  
First, the construction materials required by the Engineers exceeded the capacity 
of the logistics personnel to acquire.  Second, construction materials were 
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afforded a low movement priority.  Third, tracking movements was difficult and 
consignments were often broken up.  All of these issues reduced the capacity of 
the Engineers. 
 There are three issues that undermined Engineer operations in East Timor: 
planning, intelligence and logistics.  First, Engineers were excluded from the 
planning process.  Hence, the Engineer’s concept of operations was not integrated.  
Consequently, the Engineer’s requirement for intelligence and logistics was not 
fully appreciated by HQAST or DJFHQ.  Second, strategic and tactical 
intelligence was not provided for the Engineers, and the significance of that 
intelligence data was not initially recognised by DJFHQ.  Intelligence was, 
however, a requirement for Engineer operations to proceed.  Third, the Engineers 
were accorded a low logistics priority.  This was in terms of deployment lift and 
operational logistics provisions.  This deficiency in support, curtailed the 
Engineer’s mission.  Since East Timor, there has been on overt attempt to improve 
Engineer integration.  An Engineer planning cell has not been incorporated into 
HQAST/HQJOC.  Hence, Engineer concepts for operations and resource 
requirements on operations, are not structurally entrenched at the strategic or 
operational planning and command levels.  However, as illustrated by the 
deployment to the Solomon Islands in 2003, the Engineers have realised how to 
influence the planning process.  In the case of the Solomon Islands, without 
consultation, objectives and restrictions were imposed on the Engineers for 
deployment.  When the Engineers indicated that the objectives clearly could not 
be achieved by the specified field elements, the number of Engineering personnel 
deployed was more than tripled.271  Hence, the issue has been informally solved 
by Engineer savvy, rather than HQ comprehension.  The incorporation of an 
Engineer cell into the HQJOC would be a more sound and dependable solution. 
    
Communications 
The ADF’s future warfighting concept, NCW, necessitates the wide dispersal of 
sensor and shooter nodes throughout the battlespace.  Sensor and shooter nodes 
incorporate all manned and unmanned, air, sea and land based surveillance, 
reconnaissance and combat platforms.  These nodes provide information to C2 
nodes or provide target acquisition and designation to other shooter nodes.  
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Invariably in LIC, sensor nodes are human; individuals or small infantry units.  
Shooter nodes in LIC are also generally human, although combat air units 
utilising precision guided munitions are becoming increasingly common.  
However, the above concept would fail without adequate communications links 
between the said nodes.272
Communications is a critical enabler in warfare, and is therefore one of the 
military principles analysed in this thesis.  The dispersal of combat units in the 
field, according to the principles of LIC and NCW, further elevate the importance 
of communications.  The case studies of this chapter have indicated that the ADF 
has experienced communications difficulties at both the strategic and tactical 
levels.  Strategic communications link home country strategic HQs with in-theatre 
tactical HQs.  Tactical land communications incorporates: (1) trunk 
communications between in-theatre HQs down to the company level; and (2) 
combat net radios that enable network-wide communication from brigade HQ 
level down to squad level.  Furthermore, Navy and Air Force users are patched 
into the tactical network.  This tri-service networking enables joint force 
operations.  In the case of Operation Lagoon, ADF joint strategic communications 
were overloaded and unreliable.  In the case of INTERFET, there were some 
deficiencies with ADF strategic and tactical communications equipment and a 
requirement for U.S., British and commercial communications 
supplementation.273  East Timor operations also indicated a scarcity of Day 1 
Army communications systems.  Subsequently, Army has learned the value of 
immediate communications infrastructure onboard Navy vessels.  In Iraq, 
bandwidth deficiencies in particular, limited communications of the ADF, U.S. 
and UK.274
The current ADF communications system requires multifaceted 
improvement.  ADF communications deficiencies will be examined in four 
sections.  First, the system as a whole is not well integrated.  Internally the 
Combat Net Radio (CNR) network is not seamlessly integrated to enable 
communication between any two points in the field.  Furthermore, the tactical and 
strategic networks are not synergised to allow communication between any point 
in the field and any strategic point.  Hence, the system is “stovepiped [sic] and 
lack[s] interoperability”.275  In addition, the trunk and combat net radios do not 
provide the range necessary for dispersed operations, especially in complex 
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terrain.  Second, the combat net radio capability is deficient in a number of areas.  
The growing requirement for data communication is not well provided by the 
CNR network.  The CNR network will not provide the data capacity needed to 
sustain real time situational awareness, which is required for NCW.  Furthermore, 
the reliability and capacity of the High Frequency (HF) combat net radios is poor.  
This is because many of the HF systems are obsolescent.  Third, tactical trunk 
communications are limited in transmission capacity and range.  Fourth, the 
creation of a Local Area Network (LAN) is limited by mobility and deployment 
issues, and issues to do with physical constraints to transmission.276
All of the aforementioned communications issues are being examined for 
rectification under JP 2072 Battlespace Communications System (Land).  Given 
the connectivity requirements associated with NCW, JP 2072 will incrementally 
issue the ADF with modern communications.  Importantly, JP 2072 will integrate 
future communications acquisitions.  For example, the incumbent 
communications projects Parakeet and Raven were not integrated.  Project 
Parakeet improved trunk communications from the DJFHQ down to each Brigade 
HQ.  Project Raven supplemented combat net radio communications from the 
Company to the Section level.  Hence between brigade and company level, 
communications were not enhanced.  To improve communications functionality, 
JP 2072 procurements will include the following.  First, Parakeet trunk 
communications technology will be upgraded to provide: enhanced capacity and 
range; and improved network efficiency and bandwidth.  Second, a LAN for data 
acquisition and dissemination will be established.  The LAN will provide data 
communication between Brigade and Company HQs.  Current ADF LAN 
technology incorporates the P3/4 module.  “The technology provides flexible and 
reliable high-speed communication over a sturdy physical infrastructure of … 
reinforced copper cable”.277  “The subsystem will provide network access to key 
battlefield applications, including the army’s Battlefield Command Support 
System, Air Command Support System, the Standard Defence Supply System and 
Project Ninox assets, which cover manned and unmanned night vision sensors and 
systems and ground-based surveillance capabilities”.278 Third, a combat net radio 
ensemble will be created including: (1) multi-mode multi-band software-
programmable line-of-sight radios and tactical satellite combat radios; (2) intra-
section radios; and (3) improved HF radios.279  David Marshall, of the Australian 
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DMO, states that “[t]he key lesson observed from discussions with allies and 
Australian users is the need to maintain accurate situational awareness at the 
lower tactical level.  Due to force dispersion, this environment has [relied on,] and 
is likely to continue to rely on[,] VHF [very high frequency] and HF [high 
frequency] communications”.280  Hence, the first and third of the above combat 
net radio ensemble will be critically important.  These new radios will be put into 
service between June 2006 and January 2008.281  The second category above, 
intra-section radios, entered service with 3 RAR for “evaluation … [and] field 
testing”282 in September 2005.  Concurrently, the intra-section radio or Soldier 
Personal Radio is being used operationally by 1 RAR in the Solomon Islands and 
by the Australian units in Iraq.283  The intra-section radio improves situational 
awareness, down to the individual level.  This is especially important in urban 
terrain, where section dispersal can limit line-of-sight and hence hand-signal 
communications.  The earlier case studies of this thesis indicated that in such 
urban environments, section members were forced to communicate by shouting 
their positions and intentions.  This form of communication endangered the 
soldiers by improving the situational awareness of the adversary.  However, the 
intra-section radio has a limited range of only 500 meters.  Hence, in rural terrain 
sections must still carry VHF or HF combat net radios, so as to enable longer-
range communications.  Fourth, JP 2072 will embed a GPS within the combat net 
radio system.  This will improve situational awareness and reduce the demand for 
communications by each individual communication.  Fifth, JP 2072 will introduce 
a “tactical airborne system, which could comprise manned and/or unmanned 
platforms operating as range extension relay nodes”.284  These airborne nodes 
will: (1) improve communications range and reliability; and (2) remove a critical 
vulnerability from the battlefield, that is to say ground-based communications 
relay stations.  Sixth, “[a] key operational concept that the JP2072 must support is 
the Amphibious Maneuver [sic] Operations in the Littoral Environment program 
[sic]”285.  JP 2072 will support land combat, HQ, logistics, air and naval 
operations within a joint environment.  Littoral operations have become critically 
important to the ADF, given Australia’s immediate strategic environment.  Hence, 
JP 2072 must ensure that communications will operate seamlessly among the 
ADF’s air, land and sea components. 
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There is, however, an unusual anomaly surrounding joint ADF 
communications.  The three services recognise the need and benefit of joint 
communications.  The three services also recognise a “strategic disconnect” 
between the low-tech communications capabilities of the Army, and the high-tech 
communications capabilities of the Air Force and Navy.286  This strategic 
disconnect in communications capabilities has developed due to the decentralised 
service control of acquisitions, structures, equipment and service operating 
environments.  ADF personnel indicated the need for greater Strategy Group 
leadership, so to ensure a seamless joint communications capability.287  As an 
illustration of strategic disconnect, Navy and Air Force personnel indicated in an 
interview that JP 2072, the Battlespace Communications System, was an Army 
project.288   JP 2072 is primarily an Army project.  However, without joint 
synchronisation in projects, seamless force will not evolve. 
 
Intelligence 
This section analyses the role of intelligence in achieving ADF mission objectives 
in Somalia, Operation Lagoon in Bougainville and East Timor.  However, 
intelligence is not a detached autonomous entity.  Intelligence, civil-military 
affairs and the human interface are an inseparable, complex whole.  Civil-military 
affairs broadly describe a relationship between the population and the soldier.  
The intention of the soldier’s interaction with the population is to gather 
intelligence.  This intelligence then enables the achievement of tactical, 
operational and strategic ends.  Hence, this section is inextricably linked to this 
chapter’s ‘Infantry’ section and the subsequent section on ‘Other Agency 
Integration – Civil-Military Affairs’.  Conversely, there are issues analysed below 
that are purely structural impediments to intelligence flows. 
As was the case with later ADF operations, the lack of pre-deployment 
intelligence was a major weakness in Operation Solace.  For historical, 
geographical, social and contemporary strategic information, 1 RAR’s operations 
and intelligence personnel “had to rely on news reports and the local Townsville 
libraries”.289  This was because the DIO was not tasked with supporting 1 RAR’s 
deployment.  The operational awareness of 1 RAR was further reduced by the 
complexity, fluidity and duplicity of the warring parties’ intentions and actions in 
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Somalia.  Despite reconnaissance party’s operating in Somalia before deployment, 
the base facilities, supply arrangements and operational requirements were not 
fully understood until 1 RAR arrived in the Baidoa sector of Somalia. 
 Operation Solace also illustrated that 1 RAR was not initially aware of 
LIC requirements.  The critical requirement for success in counterinsurgency is 
intelligence.  Basic intelligence in LIC is gained from the population.  Hence, the 
activities of counterintelligence personnel and a conscientious effort to build a 
positive rapport with the population are essential.  Initially on deployment, 1 RAR 
command, operations and intelligence personnel did not seem to be aware or 
dedicated to acquiring population-derived intelligence.  In contrast, 1 RAR 
intelligence personnel utilised American strategic intelligence, which did correlate 
with the tactical level reality in Baidoa. 
 Initially with relative independence and command disregard, 
counterintelligence personnel quickly developed a critical relationship with the 
Somali population.  Originally, only two counterintelligence personnel and three 
Somali interpreters were available in Baidoa.  Their primary focus was to 
“[e]stablish… a rapport with political and community groups…[, NGOs and the 
local population, so as to] encourage cooperation and … develop trust”.290  The 
resultant information “became the most important source of intelligence for 
[Lieutenant Colonel] Hurley [Commanding Officer 1 RAR] and his staff after a 
few weeks”.291  Hence, the counterintelligence group tripled in size in the first 
month of operation, and interpreters were supplied down to the platoon level.  
“Ultimately, [Counterintelligence] CI teams provided 90 percent of the 
exploitable intelligence for urban operations and contributed to all of the security 
coups achieved in Baidoa”.292  The requirement for counterintelligence personnel 
was even greater in rural areas, due to clan rivalry and concomitant duplicity.  
Importantly, however, the intelligence supplied was only effective if the unit 
commanders on duty were willing to exploit the information.  The lesson here is 
simple, counterintelligence/civil-military affairs personnel are critical to LIC.  
These personnel are principal intelligence assets.  Hence, they must be intensely 
supported and exploited. 
Operation Lagoon illustrated: (1) significant pre-deployment horizontal 
and vertical intelligence compartmentalisation; and (2) a complete lack of tactical 
reconnaissance prior to the commencement of Land HQ’s operational planning. 
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 The initial reconnaissance visit to Bougainville and environs was 
conducted on 21 and 22 September.  The visit enabled: (1) liaison with the leaders 
of the adversarial elements in Bougainville; (2) the development of cohesion 
between Operation Lagoon commanders; and (3) an assessment of the strategic 
security environment.  However, the visit was devoid of tactical level specialist 
reconnaissance.  There was no tactical reconnaissance of the four neutral zones. 
Neither was there tactical appreciation of logistic, engineering or communications 
requirements carried out.  This was due to an arbitrary declaration by Defence 
HQ, restricting Australian sub-commanders and specialists travelling to 
Bougainville.  Hence, tactical planning was devoid of critical intelligence 
information.  This created significant communications and logistical dilemmas 
once the operation began.  Furthermore, at the operational planning and tactical 
levels of Operation Lagoon, the security environment and conventions under 
which the adversarial forces would and did operate within the four neutral zones, 
were not well appreciated.  The critical nature of human intelligence was also 
disallowed due to the short operational planning process.  Hence, no informants 
could be recruited, nor could civil-military affairs or liaison officers be deployed 
to gain local information.  What intelligence data that was available was not 
exploited, as ADF operational planners and commanders were too busy 
organising the operation.293
 Moreover, for the duration of the SPPKF operational deployment, there 
were significant intelligence synergy and offshore communications issues.  There 
was no dedicated communications system available for intelligence data to pass 
between Australia and the Bougainville AO.  To put this in perspective, 
Command and Control constitutes a system of communications networks.  
Basically, all elements critical to a unit, like logistics, intelligence and command, 
have their own communications system.  For Operation Lagoon, there was only 
one overloaded command communications system.  Hence, some intelligence data 
was twelve hours old before it was received, and some information failed entirely 
in reaching its designated target.  Furthermore, intelligence that should have been 
passed to the intelligence group dedicated to Bougainville was often filtered, or 
bypassed the group completely.294
 Conversely, intelligence and counterintelligence systems performed 
effectively in East Timor.  Strategic level intelligence passed effectively to 
 399
INTERFET commanders, although it appears that the quantity of information had 
a propensity to overwhelm operational and tactical level staff.  Of critical 
importance was the exploitation of “local information gained through interpreters 
and specialist Intelligence personnel”.295  This information was timely, accurate 
and swiftly began to break the physical capability and psychological will of the 
ADF’s adversaries.  Another critical intelligence link established was between the 
ADF and the Armed Forces for National Liberation of East Timor (Falintil).  ADF 
liaison communication teams were installed at major Falintil cantonments.  These 
ADF teams provided a vital conduit between the ADF and Falintil’s wealth of 
“information gathered … [by a] vast network of informants …, on the locations 
and intentions of militia groups”.296  This information enabled INTERFET forces 
“to detain militiamen and to raid militia headquarters and accommodation 
areas”.297  Aggressively reacting to intelligence, sightings and incidents enabled 
the ADF to apprehend militia members.  These militia members would 
subsequently divulge further information, which led to additional seizures and 
arrests.  All battalion commanders also demonstrated an understanding of the 
essential relationship between intelligence and civil-military affairs.  Similar to 2 
RAR and 3 RAR operations, 5/7 RAR’s commanding officer, Lieutenant Colonel 
Simon Gould instructed his intelligence and civil-military affairs personnel “to 
work together closely to gather information [sic] while facilitating the delivery of 
humanitarian aid and supporting the work of UNTAET with East Timorese 
community groups”.298 These relationships instilled within the population an 
understanding that ADF personnel were in East Timor to help, and were 
concerned for the wellbeing of the East Timorese.  This positive relationship, in 
turn, provides effective intelligence on hostile intent and actions.  
Counterintelligence was also fundamental in providing security for ADF 
operations.  Both physical and electronic means were employed to deny 
INTERFET’s adversaries information.  Hence, INTERFET’s opponents “were 
limited in their ability to advise on where and when to attack INTERFET 
troops”.299
 These case studies indicate three significant intelligence issues within the 
ADF.  First, pre-deployment intelligence has been compartmentalised.  In 
Operations Solace and Lagoon, field elements, operational planners and 
commanders were either not provided with sufficient intelligence, or the 
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intelligence available was compartmentalised.  Conversely for operations in East 
Timor, these strategic and operational level intelligence problems seem to have 
been rectified.  This may be due to the inclusion of the Joint Intelligence Centre 
within the HQAST structure.  Second, pre-deployment and in-theatre “intelligence 
briefings are usually generic and at too high a level”.300  The briefings do not 
“incorporate sufficient cultural and language information”.301  Essentially the 
Defence Intelligence Organisation, the organisation that provides these briefings, 
operate from within a “conventional mindset”.302  Hence, the intelligence 
briefings focus on “threat, [rather than] Force Protection”.303  “Force Protection 
… in peace support operations [and LIC] is [essentially provided by human 
intelligence] HUMINT”.304  HUMINT requires “your [tactical and operational] 
people … [to have] a degree of language proficiency, … cultural respect … [and a 
determination] to interact with the local people positively”.305  In the case of 
Somalia, personnel were briefed on heavy weapons systems and kinetic responses 
to those weapons.306  However, the deploying personnel were not informed that 
this equipment was: (1) no longer in Somalia; (2) unlikely to confront them on 
operations; and (3) highly visible to U.S. electronic intelligence systems.307  
Simply, the intelligence provided did not correlate well with operational realities.  
Due to confidentiality reasons, the transparency of current developments within 
the DIO is difficult to gauge.  However, there may be attempts to rectify the 
deficiencies illustrated above.  In particular, Major General Maurie McNarn has 
been appointed Director of the DIO, replacing a civilian in that position.  The 
appointment of a senior general, with operational experience, may provide some 
solution to the said problem.  Third, as a formal capability within the ADF, civil-
military affairs remain negligible.  It was only after East Timor, that a Civil 
Affairs cell was created in the DJFHQ.  Subsequently in the Solomon Islands, this 
Civil Affairs cell has effectively augmented intelligence.  At a personal level, 
ADF personnel have demonstrated an affinity with, and appreciation of, the civil-
military approach.  As illustrated in this section, the ‘Infantry’ section above and 
the ‘Other Agency Integration – Civil-Military Affairs’ section below, once aware 
of the civil-military approach, ADF personnel effectively interact with the 
population. 
 In terms of military principles, intelligence is critical to military 
operations; without intelligence units cannot act.  Hence, the deployment of 
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intelligence personnel and their actions are as important as the combat units that 
are deployed.  Furthermore, in LIC intelligence is often gained through interaction 
with the civil population.  Due to the importance of the intelligence that the civil 
population can provide, it is critical that civil operations (doctrinal principle) are 
undertaken by counterinsurgent forces in LIC. 
 
Other Agency Integration – Civil-Military Affairs 
This section analyses: (1) primarily, how effectively ADF personnel interacted 
with the populations in Bougainville, Somalia and East Timor; and, to a lesser 
extent, (2) how well ADF personnel cooperated with other defence force 
personnel, on the said operations.  The section subsequently analyses the 
integration of the civil-military approach into ADF doctrine. 
The PMG’s performance in Bougainville was a success, but was 
blemished on occasion by an unwillingness to work with other nationals and 
governments.  There was disinclination within the ADF to work with the NZDF.  
The rationale for this reluctance was multidimensional.  First, New Zealand was 
perceived to be encroaching upon Australia’s sphere of interest.  Hence, NZDF 
operations were not fully supported.  Second, the unarmed nature of the 
operations concerned the ADF.  Third, the ADF was apprehensive about the 
operational state and capability of the NZDF.  Consequently, the hurried ADF 
preparation caused tension between ADF and NZDF personnel, and the Australian 
civilians deployed had received insufficient pre-deployment training to be 
effective.308  Brigadier Roger Mortlock, the initial TMG commander, did however 
state, that the NZDF-ADF tension was an issue that was resolved.309
Team cohesion and a complete understanding of ADF and Australian 
civilian roles was a critical issue in Bougainville.  Similarly, the lack of Australian 
involvement in the peace process meant the ADF did not appreciate the security 
provided by the BRA, or that the TMG was wholly a Civil-Military Affairs 
(CMA) effort.310  There was also an initial reluctance to operate with some of the 
Fijian, Tongan and ni Vanuatu defence force personnel, as the core skills of some 
of these contingents was not equivalent to the ADF or NZDF.  However, the ADF 
did come to appreciate the CMA nature of the TMG/PMG.  Australian pre-
deployment training was significantly improved for the latter rotations of ADF 
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personnel and Australian civilians.  Civilian training included: instruction in field 
skills; interaction with indigenous persons; small team actions; and provided a 
chance to live in the field and acclimatise.  Military training focused on improving 
the language, political, religious and cultural understanding of ADF personnel.  
The PMG’s CMA strategy then became centred on: medical support; sports 
events; hospitality events; and cultural events.  The latter of these points was a 
specific weakness of the ADF, as “Australians do not have much (indigenous?) 
musical culture to offer”.311  This was in comparison to New Zealand (especially 
Maori personnel), Fijian, Tongan and ni Vanuatu personnel’s natural affinity with 
Bougain(villian) culture. 
In addition to urban and rural security operations in Somalia, 1 RAR was 
also required by UN mandate to protect “humanitarian aid convoys and food 
distribution points”.312  These tasks, as read literally, were successfully conducted 
by 1 RAR.  However, this did not mean humanitarian aid was equitably 
distributed to the needy.  This was because of corrupt elders and chiefs, banditry 
and other forms of criminal activity.  Many of these impediments could not be 
overcome by 1 RAR.313
 The primary impediment to the distribution of aid was theft, which 
occurred after 1 RAR sub-units left distribution points.  Somali citizens, who had 
been given aid, would have it stolen by bandits or confiscated by village elders 
and chiefs.  This stolen aid was sold in local markets.  Operations to prevent 
bandit activity were undertaken.  However, these anti-bandit operations did risk a 
breach of the UN mandate.  In fact, “the Australians had no authorisation to 
interfere with the elders’ control of the distribution of food”.314  1 RAR command 
attempted to introduce measures to eliminate the bulk movement of post-
distributed aid.  These measures had to be authorised by the ‘Council of Elders’, 
who were the persons stealing the aid.  Hence, over “75 per cent [sic] of all bulk 
aid deliveries … [continued to be] redirected to … [regional] markets at [the] 
elders’ direction”.315  In addition, elders would disallow some NGO projects, like 
immunisation of children, unless bribes were paid directly to them.  This 
circumstance was caused by a UN mandate, focused on a distribution process 
rather than an equable outcome.  1 RAR would have been more effective had a 
humanitarian outcome been a mandated responsibility. 
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 Nation-building was a secondary requirement of 1 RAR, initiated by UN 
directives and failing NGO projects.  Originally, nation-building for 1 RAR 
incorporated two activities: (1) assisting NGOs with transportation, repairing their 
equipment and providing medical services to the Somali population; and (2) 
liaising with NGO and Somali groups.  However, the desperate situation in 
Somalia drove 1 RAR to further assist the population.  For example, when 
Baidoa’s water supply threatened to fail, 1 RAR personnel coordinated “the 
establishment of new water points and the improvement of existing ones”.316  This 
critical project was assumed, as the UN and local NGOs were unable to 
coordinate an effective response.  The Australian’s also rebuilt warehouses, 
schools and jails, these tasks were beyond their mandate.  The re-establishment of 
a judicial system in the Baidoa sector was a significant contribution towards a 
functioning Somali society made by 1 RAR.  It was not essential for 1 RAR to 
accept responsibility for the above projects.  However, in doing so 1 RAR won the 
hearts and minds of the local Somali population.  This approach was “vindicated 
because Australian security operations were not only very effective, but also 
appeared to be safer than they may have been if there had been minimal liaison 
and no goodwill”.317  However, 1 RAR accomplished the above humanitarian 
assistance and nation-building without civil-military affairs personnel, or a formal 
set of doctrinal guidelines.  For example, the judicial, penal and police system 
established under 1 RAR observation, was marginally effective and easily 
manipulated.  Had 1 RAR been provided with civil-military affairs personnel and 
effective guidelines (as would be the function of an Expeditionary Civil Service), 
the police, judiciary and prison system may have been far more effective.  Nation-
building guidelines would have also indicated to 1 RAR what essential services 
were required, and what challenges would need to be negotiated.  For example, 
elders, chiefs and political factions were not accountable to the people.  Therefore, 
the said groups could commit crime and go unpunished.  1 RAR could have 
formed a news agency, using Australian and local resources, to advise the 
population the situation.  In essence, the force deployment must be in proportion 
to the problem.  If the problem involves a complete breakdown of civil services, 
the solution is a force that can create security and a civil society.  Moreover, such 
a force must guarantee a uniform and stable level of development.  Unlike 1 RAR, 
the French and American battalion equivalents deployed to the Baidoa sector did 
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not conduct nation-building operations.  Hence, Australian instituted programmes 
were, in the long-term, futile.  In terms of cooperation with other defence forces in 
Somalia, ADF personnel at a tactical level had little need to interact with said 
defence forces. 
 Humanitarian assistance was a cornerstone of Major General Peter 
Cosgrove’s strategy.  All ADF ground units demonstrated a commitment to this 
strategy and the East Timorese people, often putting their own lives on the line for 
the indigenous population.  However, 3 RAR, a parachute battalion, excelled in 
their approach to civil-military relations.  This was a consequence of specific 
intent by Lieutenant Colonel Nick Welsh, 3 RAR’s commanding officer, to train 
“his paratroopers to operate in a low tempo peace support environment”.318  Prior 
to deployment, Welsh had ordered members of 3 RAR to be involved in cultural 
and language training.  In addition, “3 RAR training … [focused] on … setting up 
and operating … vehicle check points, crowd control, delivering humanitarian 
assistance, clearing buildings, operating in towns and villages and using strict 
Rules of Engagement”.319  Upon deployment to East Timor, Welsh determined to 
integrate “intelligence and civil affairs functions”.320  Interpreters were employed 
to better facilitate this objective, teach 3 RAR personnel language skills and skills 
to interact positively with the East Timorese.  “Welsh wanted to make interacting 
with the East Timorese and gathering information second nature, thus enhancing 
safety through early warning and facilitating the safety of the East Timorese 
communities”.321  This strategy quickly created a relationship conducive to 
information to pass between East Timorese and ADF personnel, despite militia 
attempts to spread rumours and undermine ADF operations.  “Information flowed 
on a wide variety of border incursions and 3 RAR became a successful crime 
intelligence agency as well as being an effective security force”.322  This 
relationship also constituted a tangible benefit for the East Timorese; ADF 
personnel provided medical assistance, food, and water as well as security 
throughout East Timor. 
This section illustrated operational relationships between the ADF and: (1) 
foreign defence forces; and (2) in-theatre populations.  First, ADF interactions 
with foreign defence forces, in general, appear favourable.  There is only one 
example to the contrary, Operation Bel Isi (Bougainville).  The initial reluctance 
of ADF personnel to be enthusiastic participants in Operation Bel Isi, may be a 
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due to the atypical approach (unarmed peacekeepers/civil-military approach) 
taken to the mission.  Second, the contact between ADF personnel and in-theatre 
populations also appears favourable.  However, the aforementioned case studies 
illustrate an unusual disconnect between operational effectiveness and formal 
doctrine.  In Operation Solace, ADF personnel endeavoured to provide 
humanitarian assistance as fairly as possible, despite indigenous intransigence and 
a weak UN mandate.  In addition, ADF personnel pursued nation-building 
operations beyond those required by the mandate.  These achievements were 
realised without civil-military affairs personnel or a formal set of doctrinal 
guidelines.  Had there been such strategic and operational level guidelines, the 
deployed unit may have achieved greater mission success.  In the case of East 
Timor, humanitarian assistance and nation-building efforts were central 
components of the ADF strategy.  Major General Cosgrove and his subordinate 
commanders effectively applied a civil-military affairs approach, which 
concomitantly generated timely and accurate intelligence. 
To ascertain how effectively civil-military affairs is incorporated into ADF 
doctrine is difficult, as the applicable doctrine is not published openly.  However, 
the publications that collate peace-support guidelines include: (1) the joint 
doctrines ADDP 3.8 Peace Operations and the Australian Defence Force 
Publication (ADFP) 3.8.1 Peace Operations, Planning and Procedures; and (2) the 
Land Warfare Doctrine 3.8.4 Counter-insurgency.  The joint doctrines cover such 
issues as population derived intelligence, whole-of-government operations, and to 
some extent the civil-military approach.  However, as indicated by Dr. Michael 
Evans, the “continuum of stability operations [or LIC] … is not fully covered by 
peace-enforcement doctrines, [such as those listed above]”.323  Simply, 
“peacekeeping support doctrines … [that include the civil-military approach are 
excessively] narrow [in their focus]”.324  Moreover, the ADF has “not as yet 
revamped … [the Australian] counterinsurgency doctrine”.325  Evans suggests that 
a refurbished ADF counterinsurgency doctrine should be broad in scope.  Such a 
counterinsurgency doctrine, Evans states, should reflect Complex Warfighting 
initiatives and the French work on Mastering Violence.326  Complex Warfighting 
and Mastering Violence are theories regarding the suppression of violence in LIC.  
Given the circumstantial evidence provided in interviews, it appears ADF doctrine 
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regarding LIC needs development.  Moreover, this doctrine must not only be 
Army doctrine; LIC doctrine must be joint. 
Given the lack of doctrine encompassing civil-military affairs, it appears 
there are intrinsic qualities in ADF personnel that make them effective in LIC.  
Breen indicated there are four reasons for ADF personnel effectiveness in LIC: (1) 
the egalitarian nature of Australia and the ADF; (2) a ‘fair go attitude’ towards 
local peoples; (3) a lack of entrenched racial views; and (4) operational optimism.  
These qualities, combined with “curiosity, a sense of adventure, energy and 
commitment”,327 generate positive relations with target populations.  These ADF 
personnel qualities are shared, to a degree, with personnel in the NZDF and the 
British military.  The shared focus on human intelligence among these defence 
forces has proven effective in LIC.  However, the lack of doctrinal focus on civil-
military affairs and LIC is a weakness within the ADF.  This is because personnel 
need to comprehend the rationale for the civil-military approach to conflict, and 
how LIC differs from conventional conflict.  Those ADF personnel who have 
been trained specifically for, or comprehended more fully, LIC, have been shown 
to excel on operation.  However, it is essential that civil operations are 
incorporated more fully into ADF doctrine. 
 
Conclusion 
Australian defence policy and strategy, since the early 1990s, have not correlated 
well with operational reality.  Australian Defence Policy has focused upon the 
Defence of Australia.  The primary strategic imperative, derived from the above 
policy, has been the Sea-Air Gap.  This strategic imperative elevated the 
Australian Air Force and Navy to positions of pre-eminence within the ADF.  
Consequently the Australian Army, and tri-service support elements, became less 
significant strategically.  As a consequence of this, the Australian capability in 
LIC has been degraded by policy and strategy.  However the Government White 
Paper, Defence 2000, began to identify and correct the inconsistency between 
policy, strategy and operational reality.  Subsequent Defence Updates have 
continued this transition of priorities.  These contemporary defence priorities 
focus upon countering terrorism, proliferation and the security implications of 
failing and failed states.  This has resulted in a diminishing dissonance between 
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policy, strategy and practice.  There are, however, four pressures that could cause 
a redevelopment of the fissure between policy, strategy and practice.  First, the 
Department of Defence is conservative, and this engenders a lag between practice 
and policy.  Second, the Defence Policy process is exclusionary of the armed 
services.  Third, Defence Policy does not reflect joint or single service doctrine.  
Fourth, Defence Updates are excessively land centric, to the exclusion of 
supportive joint elements. 
 ADDP-D is the ADF’s keystone joint document.  ADDP-D incorporates 
the fundamental concepts that shape the ADF, in a joint manner.  These concepts 
are broadly supportive of operations in LIC.  Future ADF concepts include 
Seamless Force, which is facilitated by Network-Enabled Operations that in turn 
rely upon an Effects-Based Approach.  These three future concepts combine to 
create Multidimensional Manoeuvre, the ADF’s Future Warfighting Concept.  
These future concepts are also broadly supportive of operations in LIC.  In a 
conventional sense, these concepts direct strength against weakness through 
jointness.  However, in an unconventional sense, a whole of nation approach is 
adopted to defeat an adversary’s strategy, without the symmetric attrition of 
combat forces.  In this way, an asymmetric hearts and minds approach is targeted 
at the population, which is the centre of gravity in LIC.  To achieve this approach, 
situational awareness, intelligence, synchronisation and joint combat power are 
elevated in importance.  Hence, complex security issues are engaged by a 
“seamless national security force”.328  However, cultural and doctrinal dissonance 
within the ADF may prove an obstacle for the implementation of the future 
warfighting concepts examined above.  Structural, resource and personnel 
constraints will also limit cultural and doctrinal convergence.  A partial solution to 
this issue would require Strategy Group and the ADF Warfare Centre, which are 
joint institutions, to actively invigorate the joint doctrinal process.  However, the 
implementation of future concepts may be a problematic issue for the ADF. 
 Professionalism has been a paramount strength of ADF personnel in the 
operations under study, despite significant pressure from adversaries and ROE.  
ADF personnel have also illustrated an aggressive determination to attain mission 
objectives.  ADF personnel have also shown a growing enthusiasm for population 
based intelligence.  This is critical in LIC.  Increasingly, SOF personnel are 
becoming an indispensable element of ADF operations.  SOF personnel have been 
 408
highly effective, and have exemplified the benefits of jointery.  Three weaknesses 
do, however, influence ADF personnel on operation.  First, personnel have 
deployed with a misconception of the conflict they are entering.  This is the fault 
of intelligence briefings. These intelligence briefings have provided troops with 
information that does not correlate well with operational realities.  These briefings 
emphasise threats and kinetic responses, rather than force protection.  Force 
protection, in LIC, can only be generated through effective interactions with the 
population in-theatre.  Second, the ADF possesses inadequate cultural awareness.  
This issue has undermined regional coalition operations, when working with 
defence force personnel from South Pacific islands.  Third, the MLOC/OLOC 
dichotomy has created significant capability weaknesses.  Simply, the 
MLOC/OLOC process reduces the transparency of usable unit strength; the 
process hides institutional weakness.  Reduced lead times imposed since 
operations in East Timor, have assisted in solving this problem.  It must be made 
clear, however, that contemporary operations require immediate action.  Simply, 
personnel must be well trained and at a high state of readiness. 
Personnel must also be provided with advanced equipment to be 
operationally effective.  At times the ADF has been unwilling or unable to provide 
personnel with appropriate equipment.  There have been three categories of 
equipment deficiency: sensors, communications and weapons.  However, on 
deployment, personal sensor and communications equipment has improved 
situational awareness and provided a technological edge over adversaries.  
Infantry support weapons were shown to be obsolescent in East Timor.  Hence, 
these weapons are being gradually upgraded.  Such weapons have been untested 
by regular personnel.  However, advanced equipment has been critical to SOF 
operations.  The lesson here is simple: personnel need to be provided with the best 
equipment practicable. 
Armoured vehicles (Armour) were an essential force element in Somalia, 
East Timor and Iraq.  The value of armour, on such operations, is a product of 
four interrelated factors.  First, armour provides protection.  ADF armour has 
provided a reasonable level of protection on operation.  However, there have been 
some deficiencies.  Particular operations in Iraq have involved an apparent risk to 
armour.  However, the initial deployments of armour were not commensurate to 
the level of risk.  Specifically, deploying armour was not provided with appliqué 
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kits, and the LAV-PC was deployed with an exposed weapons station.  This 
generated undue risk for embarked personnel and crew members, despite the fact 
that these issues were only rectified after the initial force had deployed.  The risks 
associated with the environment were understood prior to deployment.  This 
illustrates a weakness within the ADF.  Second, armour enhances 
manoeuvrability.  In general terms, all classes of ADF armour enhanced 
operational mobility.  However, there were two broad environmental lessons to be 
learned: (1) the natural environment can preclude wheeled and airborne 
manoeuvre, while tracked vehicles provide unconstrained mobility; (2) armoured 
combat elements can outpace support elements in difficult terrain, this can 
preclude or constrain re-supply.  Third, armour should provide additional 
firepower and situational awareness.  However, operations in East Timor 
illustrated firepower, surveillance, target acquisition, communications, navigation, 
and battlefield command deficiencies in ADF armour.  In LIC, armoured units 
must possess advanced situational awareness and a capacity to return ranged and 
accurate fire.  These issues are being addressed by Project Land 106 and 112, 
although the latter project is being constrained.  Fourth, armour is most potent 
when combined with other force elements.  ADF operations in East Timor 
illustrated the strength of genuinely combined units, and the weakness of merely 
combining force elements once deployed.  Force elements must combine in a 
cohesive manner, which can only be attained through training.  The ADF must 
ensure combined cohesion. 
The ADF has not deployed artillery on operation since Vietnam.  
Nevertheless, artillery is the soldier’s all weather, day and night supplier of fire 
support.  Moreover, there are three tenets of artillery use in LIC; combined arms, 
precision and firebases.  The ADF needs to ensure these tenets, when the current 
collection of artillery systems is replaced. 
Helicopter support is essential in LIC.  The support provided by 
helicopters is multidimensional, including utility lift, liaison, C2, mobility, 
reconnaissance, surveillance, rapid reaction, fire support, presence and deterrence.  
ADF helicopter support, on the aforementioned operations, has generally been 
effective.  Two areas of concern regarding helicopter use were as follows: (1) land 
combat and command elements should be provided with organic lift; and (2) 
supply chains can be a limiting factor.  The former concern has not been raised 
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since operations in Somalia.  However, the latter concern is a critical vulnerability 
in the ADF, requiring significant consideration.  A further risk illustrated by this 
chapter is helicopter protection.  Prior to a number of recent operational 
deployments, the ADF has had to rapidly acquire and fit ballistic and electronic 
protection to deploying helicopters.  However, rapid acquisition increases the risk 
of human or technical error occurring on operation.  The risk is exacerbated by the 
limited time available to develop and prove equipment and train personnel prior to 
deployment.  Helicopters and their crew form a symbiotic relationship.  The ADF 
must appreciate that rapidly improving one part, does not necessarily produce a 
capability improvement without training. 
Aircraft are also an important element in LIC, providing firepower, 
logistics and C4ISTAR.  First, in terms of firepower, the ADF has: (1) made a 
latent contribution to the assertion of air control in East Timor and Iraq; and (2) 
undertaken CAS and air interdiction missions in Operation Iraqi Freedom.  The 
ADF is improving these capabilities with weapons systems and future aircraft.  
However, CAS necessitates highly trained TACs to provide situational awareness 
and target designation to combat aircraft.  As illustrated in Afghanistan and Iraq, 
SOF personnel are highly capable TACs.  Regular personnel have not 
demonstrated such a capability.  The ADF must ensure regular personnel are 
trained as TACs, as this is an increasingly prevalent requirement in LIC.  Second, 
the provision of airborne logistics is a critical enabler in conflict.  However, the 
ADF has at times failed to achieve required availability.  This situation has been 
further aggravated by insufficient units being available to fulfil concurrent 
demands.  This is not wholly an ADF issue, as past budgetary provisioning has 
not equated to contemporary Government intent.  This issue will be partially 
alleviated by the acquisition of Boeing C-17 and Airbus A330 MRTT transport 
aircraft.  Third, due to the evolving joint nature of conflict, airborne C4ISTAR is 
becoming increasingly important.  Aircraft provide a secure hub for the 
management of sensors and shooters.  The ADF has recently achieved such a 
capability by: (1) acquiring the Boeing 737 AEW&C aircraft; and (2) utilising the 
P-3 as an improvised C2 aircraft.  The primary risk assumed by aircraft in LIC 
occurs when operating tactically at low level.  Hence, transport aircraft are 
primarily effected.  So as to lessen moderate this risk, protection upgrades should 
be considered as critical for transport aircraft. 
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The RAN has been an indispensable part of all ADF operations in this 
analysis.  Basically, naval vessels have been required to generate Sea Control, so 
as to enable Maritime Power Projection.  Sea Control activities have included 
surveillance, patrol, intelligence collection, escort, anti-submarine operations, C2, 
cover, deterrence, advanced force operations and the enhancement of situational 
awareness.  RAN vessels have been effective in these operations.  Furthermore, 
the acquisition of the Air Warfare Destroyer will enhance these capabilities.  
Maritime Power Projection is simply the transportation and support of land forces 
on operation.  There have been three significant constraints to Maritime Power 
Projection within the ADF: (1) organic C3I capabilities; (2) limited logistics lift; 
and (3) a limited amphibious capability.  The entry into service of the Amphibious 
Transports Kanimbla and Manoora has partially resolved these issues.  Moreover, 
future amphibious transports purchased will further enhance C2, logistics and 
operational and tactical mobility.  However, current Navy doctrine may prove a 
limiting factor in the integration of the future amphibious ships.  This is because 
the RAN has not fully realised the implications of Sea-Basing.  In future littoral 
operations, land force elements will require greater C4ISR, logistics, mobility and 
fire-support, from support elements onboard ships.  Hence, the ADF must ensure 
joint doctrinal collaboration for the development of Sea-Basing. 
ADF operational C2 represents one of the most significant strands in this 
particular analysis.  This is due to operational C2 weakness and the significance of 
subsequent improvement.  In Operations Solace and Lagoon, operational 
effectiveness was undermined by covert planning compartmentalisation, 
sequential lag, poor logistics and a lack of an effectual deployable joint HQ.  
Subsequent operations in East Timor were constrained by inadequate component, 
logistics and engineering integration.  Concomitantly, a Joint Operational 
Command and three Deployable Joint Force Headquarters were developed.  The 
Joint Operational Command was established in 1997 as HQAST.  However, 
HQAST did not meet expectation in East Timor.  Essentially, HQAST had not 
enabled an integrated and inclusive joint approach to the operation.  Hence, 
HQAST has been superseded by HQJOC.  HQJOC is a fully integrated joint 
environment, where all staff are organised functionally.  HQJOC should produce a 
more integrated joint approach on future operations.  However, there are three 
weaknesses in HQJOC: (1) the HQ is a financial device; (2) the joint nature of 
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DJFHQ and DJFHQ-(M) have not been supplemented to enable a practised joint 
approach to operations; and (3) HQJOC does not command force elements, other 
than on operation.  The ADF has vastly improved operational C2.  However, there 
is still a need for further development. 
Logistics has been a critical deficiency and vulnerability for the ADF on 
operation.  There are three clear reasons for this weakness.  First, inadequate 
involvement of logistics personnel in the strategic and operational planning 
process has caused operational difficulties.  Preparation for Operations Solace and 
Lagoon excluded logisticians from the planning process.  The situation had 
improved by the time of East Timor.  However, sequential lag at the strategic 
level reduced operational level preparation of the supply chain.  In 2000, the JLC 
was established and later incorporated into HQJOC.  This logistics command 
structure development should ease logistics planning issues in future operations.  
Second, logistics structures below the JLC are inadequate.  The ADF lacks both a 
deployable joint logistics HQ to manage logistics on operation, and a deployable 
joint logistics group to coordinate strategic and tactical collection, transportation 
and distribution of supplies.  Operational logistics is provided by single services 
structures, which are only integrated on operation.  The JLC does not command 
force elements, other than on operation.  Therefore, joint logistics cannot train as 
they intend to fight.  Third, the ADF has lost its latent logistics capability.  
Government reviews in the 1990s made massive cuts in logistics personnel 
numbers, stores and facilities.  These cutbacks were based on theoretical 
peacetime assumptions, which do not correlate with operation realities.  Simply, 
the ADF has lost its surge capacity. 
Frequently, theatres of conflict are characterised by dilapidated 
infrastructure.  Therefore the physical environment can obstruct military mobility 
and sustainability, due to inadequate roads, airfields and ports.  Furthermore, the 
derelict state of civil support infrastructure can create hostility among the 
population.  So as to rectify these issues, the deployment of military engineers is 
significant to operational effectiveness.  However, the ADF endangered strategic 
objectives by disregarding or underestimating the requirement for engineers on 
operation.  Engineers have been: (1) excluded from strategic and operational 
planning; (2) intentionally and inadvertently denied intelligence; (3) withheld 
strategic lift; and (4) accorded a low logistics priority.  All deployed force 
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elements are dependent on the infrastructure provided by engineers.  Hence, such 
mismanagement could have undermined the effectiveness of all force elements 
deployed.  Subsequently, no central effort has been made to improve the 
integration of the Engineers operationally.  The ADF needs to incorporate the 
Engineers into the HQJOC and DJFHQ structures. 
Communications connect sensor, shooter and command nodes.  Hence, 
communications is a critical enabler.  The principles of LIC and NCW further 
elevate the significance of communications.  In terms of communications, the 
ADF has experienced difficulties at the strategic and tactical level.  Importantly, 
ADF communications require: (1) seamless integration; (2) combat net radio 
capacity and reliability improvement; (3) tactical trunk capacity and range 
development; and (4) enhanced tactical LAN mobility.  These issues are being 
resolved under JP 2072.  This project is extensive and highly beneficial for the 
ADF.  However, JP 2072 must ensure seamless joint communications.  The joint 
nature of this JP 2072 is jeopardised by a lack of Air Force and Navy ‘ownership’ 
of the project.  Basically, a strategic and cultural disconnect between the three 
services could undermine the project.  This disconnect is caused by decentralised 
service control of acquisitions, structures, equipment and the individual services 
operating environment.  To rectify this potential problem, Strategy Group must 
provide greater leadership in terms of joint communications. 
Intelligence enables the appropriate application of force, be it kinetic or 
humanitarian.  However, the ADF has suffered from three intelligence 
deficiencies.  First, intelligence was excessively compartmentalised.  This meant 
field elements and commanders, as well as operational planners were operating 
with limited vision.  However, the establishment of HQAST has chiefly alleviated 
this issue.  Second, pre-deployment and in-theatre intelligence briefings are 
excessively generic and at too high a level.  Furthermore, these intelligence 
briefings exclude sufficient cultural and language information.  Basically, Force 
Protection in LIC is primarily generated through the collection of human 
intelligence.  To attain human intelligence, personnel need language skills, 
cultural respect and a positive relationship with the population.  Intelligence 
provided to deploying personnel does not correlate with these operational 
realities.  Third, formal CMA is in general neglected in the ADF.  A CMA cell 
was only created in the DJFHQ after operations in East Timor.  However, 
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informally ADF personnel demonstrate an affinity with, and appreciation of, a 
CMA approach. 
The analysis of CMA in ADF doctrine is problematic, due to the 
confidentiality of various doctrinal publications.  Clearly, CMA is integrated into 
peace-support doctrines.  However, these doctrines are focused on a narrow 
section, within a broad continuum of conflict.  Hence doctrines relating to LIC, 
which are broad in focus, require joint development.  Moreover, there is a belief 
among many senior officers that inhibit the training of personnel in CMA, other 
than immediately prior to deployment.  The belief is that personnel should ‘train 
up, and operate down’.  The essential principle is that in training for high intensity 
conventional conflict, personnel will also acquire skills, knowledge and an 
aptitude conducive to effective operations in counterinsurgency.  This is partially 
true; training generates professionalism, which is critical in counterinsurgency.  
However, this approach neglects the specialist requirements of personnel in 
counterinsurgency.  The ADF is therefore reasonably well placed for 
counterinsurgency operations in LIC, although there is significant room for 
improvement. 
 In terms of doctrinal principles, the ADF has: effectively controlled 
international interference; provided internal security; applied civil operations that 
have supplemented military operations; and gradually installed a command 
system that proved sufficiently unified on operation, but requires improvement.  
In terms of military principles, the ADF generally operates effectively, but there 
are a number of areas that require development.  Over the past five years, ADF 
doctrine has increasingly come to reflect the requirements of modern 
counterinsurgency warfare.  However, ADF doctrine needs to be augmented by 
doctrinal supplements specifically tailored to LIC, especially in the area of civil 
operations.  Much like the NZDF, the core strength of the ADF is its professional 
personnel, who are independent and display initiative and restraint on operation.  
A principle that needs development within the ADF is joint force; doctrine, C2, 
intelligence, communications and the application of force must all become more 
joint.  Readiness policy (MLOC/OLOC), and to a lesser extent a reluctance to 
deploy modern equipment, has reduced the ADF’s capability to undertake joint 
force operations.  Aging and non-integrated communications technologies have 
been an impediment to the ADF; essentially, ADF communications must be 
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upgraded so as to enable joint force, combined arms and force precision.  The 
acquisition of accurate human intelligence has been effectively undertaken by the 
ADF.  However, there needs to be greater emphasis on the gathering of 
intelligence from the civil population at the doctrinal and service level.  
Essentially, the ADF is an effective counterinsurgent force.  However, the lessons 
of LIC must be more fully integrated into ADF doctrine as well as strategic, 
tactical and operational procedures. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 416
Notes 
                                                 
1 Breen, B.  1998, A Little Bit of Hope: Australian Force-Somalia, p. xi, Allen and Unwin, St 
Leonards. 
2 Martin, J.  2003, The Path to Peace: The New Zealand Defence Force in Bougainville 1990-
2003, New Zealand Defence Force, Wellington. 
3 Breen, B.  2000, Mission Accomplished: East Timor – The Australian Defence Force 
Participation in the International Forces East Timor (INTERFET), Allen & Unwin, St. Leonards. 
Ryan, A.  2000, ‘Primary Responsibilities and Primary Risks’ Australian Defence Force 
Participation in the International Force East Timor, Study Paper No. 304, Land Warfare Studies 
Centre, Canberra. 
4 Department of Defence, 2003, The War in Iraq: ADF Operations in the Middle East in 2003, p. 
7, Department of Defence, Canberra. 
5 Department of Defence, 2003, The War in Iraq: ADF Operations in the Middle East in 2003, p. 
7, Department of Defence, Canberra. 
6 Department of Defence, 2003, The War in Iraq: ADF Operations in the Middle East in 2003, p. 
11, Department of Defence, Canberra. 
7 Evans, M.  2001, From Deakin to Dibb: The Army and the Making of Australian Strategy in the 
20th Century, p. 26, Working Paper No. 113, Land Warfare Studies Centre, Australian Army. 
8 Evans, M.  2005, The Tyranny of Dissonance: Australia’s Strategic Culture and Way of War 
1901-2005, p.68, Study Paper No. 306, Land Warfare Studies Centre, Australian Army. 
9 Department of Defence, 2000, Defence 2000: Our Future Defence Force, p. 79, Department of 
Defence, Canberra. 
10 Department of Defence, 2000, Defence 2000: Our Future Defence Force, pp. x-xi, Department 
of Defence, Canberra. 
11 Department of Defence, 2005, Australia’s National Security: A Defence Update 2005, p. 26, 
Department of Defence, Canberra. 
12 Department of Defence, 2005, Australia’s National Security: A Defence Update 2005, p. 26, 
Department of Defence, Canberra. 
13 Department of Defence, 2005, Australia’s National Security: A Defence Update 2005, p. 19, 
Department of Defence, Canberra. 
14 Confidential. 
15 Confidential. 
16 Stevens, Dr. D (Director of Strategic and Historical Studies, Sea Power Centre, Canberra), 
interview 4 April 2006, Sea Power Centre, Canberra. 
17 McCaffrie, J (Commodore RANR; Visiting Research Fellow, Sea Power Centre, Canberra), 
interview 4 April 2006, Sea Power Centre, Canberra. 
18 Australian Defence Headquarters, 2002, Foundations of Military Doctrine, Australian Defence 
Headquarters, Canberra. 
19 Australian Defence Headquarters, 2002, The Australian Approach to Warfare, Australian 
Defence Headquarters, Canberra. 
20 Australian Defence Headquarters, 2002, Force 2020, Australian Defence Headquarters, 
Canberra. 
21 Australian Defence Headquarters, 2002, Future Warfighting Concept, Australian Defence 
Headquarters, Canberra. 
22 Australian Defence Headquarters, 2002, Force 2020, p. 22, Australian Defence Headquarters, 
Canberra. 
23 Australian Defence Headquarters, 2002, Force 2020, p. 17, Australian Defence Headquarters, 
Canberra. 
24 Australian Defence Headquarters, 2002, Future Warfighting Concept, p. 29, Australian Defence 
Headquarters, Canberra. 
25 Australian Defence Headquarters, 2002, The Australian Approach to Warfare, p. 24, Australian 
Defence Headquarters, Canberra. 
26 Australian Defence Headquarters, 2002, Future Warfighting Concept, p. 29, Australian Defence 
Headquarters, Canberra. 
27 Confidential. 
28 Confidential. 
29 Sea Power Centre, 2005, The Navy Contribution to Australian Maritime Operations, p. 9, Sea 
Power Centre, Canberra. 
 417
                                                                                                                                     
30 Sea Power Centre, 2005, The Navy Contribution to Australian Maritime Operations, p. 8, Sea 
Power Centre, Canberra. 
31 Sea Power Centre, 2005, The Navy Contribution to Australian Maritime Operations, p. 8, Sea 
Power Centre, Canberra. 
Sea Power Centre, 2000, Australian Maritime Doctrine, pp. 37-45, Sea Power Centre, Canberra. 
32 Forestier, Anthony. (Group Captain, Director, Air Power Development Centre, Canberra), 
interview 5 April 2006, Air Power Development Centre, Canberra. 
33 Forestier, Anthony. (Group Captain, Director, Air Power Development Centre, Canberra), 
interview 5 April 2006, Air Power Development Centre, Canberra. 
34 Forestier, Anthony. (Group Captain, Director, Air Power Development Centre, Canberra), 
interview 5 April 2006, Air Power Development Centre, Canberra. 
35 Forestier, Anthony. (Group Captain, Director, Air Power Development Centre, Canberra), 
interview 5 April 2006, Air Power Development Centre, Canberra. 
36 Forestier, Anthony. (Group Captain, Director, Air Power Development Centre, Canberra), 
interview 5 April 2006, Air Power Development Centre, Canberra. 
37 Breen, R. J. (Colonel (rtd); Research Fellow, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian 
National University, Canberra), interview 3 April 2006, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 
Canberra. 
38 Forestier, Anthony. (Group Captain, Director, Air Power Development Centre, Canberra), 
interview 5 April 2006, Air Power Development Centre, Canberra. 
Richardson, Robert. (Wing Commander, Deputy Director – Doctrine and Education, Air Power 
Development Centre, Canberra), interview 5 April 2006, Air Power Development Centre, 
Canberra. 
39 Stevens, Dr. D (Director of Strategic and Historical Studies, Sea Power Centre, Canberra), 
interview 4 April 2006, Sea Power Centre, Canberra. 
40 Breen, R. J. (Colonel (rtd); Research Fellow, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian 
National University, Canberra), interview 3 April 2006, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 
Canberra. 
41 Stevens, Dr. D (Director of Strategic and Historical Studies, Sea Power Centre, Canberra), 
interview 4 April 2006, Sea Power Centre, Canberra. 
42 Breen, R. J. (Colonel (rtd); Research Fellow, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian 
National University, Canberra), interview 3 April 2006, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 
Canberra. 
43 Breen, R. J. (Colonel (rtd); Research Fellow, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian 
National University, Canberra), interview 3 April 2006, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 
Canberra. 
44 Leschen, P. D.  2002, ‘The Integration of Joint and Single-Service Doctrine – Ensuring 
Maritime, Land and Air Concepts are Understood and Applied”, p. 5, Australian Defence Force 
Journal, vol. 152, January/February 2002. 
45 Richardson, Robert. (Wing Commander, Deputy Director – Doctrine and Education, Air Power 
Development Centre, Canberra), interview 5 April 2006, Air Power Development Centre, 
Canberra. 
46 Richardson, Robert. (Wing Commander, Deputy Director – Doctrine and Education, Air Power 
Development Centre, Canberra), interview 5 April 2006, Air Power Development Centre, 
Canberra. 
47 Evans, Dr. M (Senior Research Fellow, Land Warfare Studies Centre, Canberra), interview 6 
April 2006, The Outpost Café – Australian War Memorial, Canberra. 
48 Evans, Dr. M (Senior Research Fellow, Land Warfare Studies Centre, Canberra), interview 6 
April 2006, The Outpost Café – Australian War Memorial, Canberra. 
49 Lax, M (Air Commodore, Director General Strategic Policy, Strategy Group), interview 7 April 
2006, Russell Buildings, Canberra. 
50 Lax, M (Air Commodore, Director General Strategic Policy, Strategy Group), interview 7 April 
2006, Russell Buildings, Canberra. 
51 Breen, B.  1998, A Little Bit of Hope: Australian Force-Somalia, p. 73, Allen and Unwin, St 
Leonards. 
52 Breen, B.  1998, A Little Bit of Hope: Australian Force-Somalia, p. 86, 339, Allen and Unwin, 
St Leonards. 
 418
                                                                                                                                     
53 Breen, Bob.  2001, Giving Peace a Chance – Operation Lagoon, Bougainville, 1994: A Case of 
Military Action and Diplomacy, pp. 83-84, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian 
National University. 
54 Breen, Bob.  2001, Giving Peace a Chance – Operation Lagoon, Bougainville, 1994: A Case of 
Military Action and Diplomacy, p. 85, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National 
University. 
55 Breen, Bob.  2001, Giving Peace a Chance – Operation Lagoon, Bougainville, 1994: A Case of 
Military Action and Diplomacy, p. 85, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National 
University. 
56 Breen, Bob.  2001, Giving Peace a Chance – Operation Lagoon, Bougainville, 1994: A Case of 
Military Action and Diplomacy, p. 87, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National 
University. 
57 Breen, Bob.  2001, Giving Peace a Chance – Operation Lagoon, Bougainville, 1994: A Case of 
Military Action and Diplomacy, p. 88, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National 
University. 
58 Breen, B.  2000, Mission Accomplished: East Timor – The Australian Defence Force 
Participation in the International Forces East Timor (INTERFET), Allen & Unwin, St. Leonards. 
59 Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade.  2000, From Phantom to 
Force, Towards a More Efficient and Effective Army, Australian Government, Canberra. 
60 Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade.  2000, From Phantom to 
Force, Towards a More Efficient and Effective Army, pp. 71-72, Australian Government, 
Canberra. 
61 Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade.  2000, From Phantom to 
Force, Towards a More Efficient and Effective Army, p. 73, Australian Government, Canberra. 
62 Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade.  2000, From Phantom to 
Force, Towards a More Efficient and Effective Army, pp. 73-75, Australian Government, 
Canberra. 
63 Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade.  2000, From Phantom to 
Force, Towards a More Efficient and Effective Army, pp. 74-75, Australian Government, 
Canberra. 
64 Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade.  2000, From Phantom to 
Force, Towards a More Efficient and Effective Army, p. 75, Australian Government, Canberra. 
65 Bostock, I.  31 January 2001, ‘Country Briefing: Australia’, Jane’s Defence Weekly, vol. 35, no. 
5. 
66 Bostock, I.  10 April 2002, ‘Australia extends special forces campaign in Afghanistan’, p. 15, 
Jane’s Defence Weekly, vol. 37, no. 15. 
67 Bostock, I.  25 September 2002, ‘Last Afghan rotation for Australian SASR’, Jane’s Defence 
Weekly, vol. 38, no. 13. 
68 Department of Defence, 2005, ‘Operation Slipper’, p. 1, 
www.defence.gov.au
69 Department of Defence, 2005, ‘Operation Slipper’, p. 2, 
www.defence.gov.au
70 Department of Defence, 2003, The War in Iraq: ADF Operations in the Middle East in 2003, p. 
24, Department of Defence, Canberra. 
71 Department of Defence, 2003, The War in Iraq: ADF Operations in the Middle East in 2003, p. 
21, Department of Defence, Canberra. 
72 Breen, B.  1998, A Little Bit of Hope: Australian Force-Somalia, p. 335, Allen and Unwin, St 
Leonards. 
73 Breen, B.  1998, A Little Bit of Hope: Australian Force-Somalia, p. 335, Allen and Unwin, St 
Leonards. 
74 Breen, B.  1998, A Little Bit of Hope: Australian Force-Somalia, pp. 104-105, 108-109, Allen 
and Unwin, St Leonard. 
75 Breen, B.  1998, A Little Bit of Hope: Australian Force-Somalia, pp. 176-177, Allen and Unwin, 
St Leonards. 
76 Breen, B.  1998, A Little Bit of Hope: Australian Force-Somalia, p. 178, Allen and Unwin, St 
Leonards. 
77 Breen, B.  1998, A Little Bit of Hope: Australian Force-Somalia, p. 153, Allen and Unwin, St 
Leonards. 
 419
                                                                                                                                     
78 Breen, B.  1998, A Little Bit of Hope: Australian Force-Somalia, p. 41, Allen and Unwin, St 
Leonards. 
79 Breen, B.  1998, A Little Bit of Hope: Australian Force-Somalia, p. 41, Allen and Unwin, St 
Leonards. 
80 Breen, B.  1998, A Little Bit of Hope: Australian Force-Somalia, pp. 80, 95, 143, Allen and 
Unwin, St Leonards. 
81 Breen, B.  2000, Mission Accomplished: East Timor – The Australian Defence Force 
Participation in the International Forces East Timor (INTERFET), p. 65, Allen & Unwin, St. 
Leonards. 
82 Breen, R. J. (Colonel (rtd); Research Fellow, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian 
National University, Canberra), interview 3 April 2006, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 
Canberra. 
83 Evans, Dr. M (Senior Research Fellow, Land Warfare Studies Centre, Canberra), interview 6 
April 2006, The Outpost Café – Australian War Memorial, Canberra. 
84 Evans, Dr. M (Senior Research Fellow, Land Warfare Studies Centre, Canberra), interview 6 
April 2006, The Outpost Café – Australian War Memorial, Canberra. 
85 Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade.  2000, From Phantom to 
Force, Towards a More Efficient and Effective Army, p. 155, Australian Government, Canberra. 
86 Bostock, I.  19 May 2004, ‘Australia seeks fire support weapons’, Jane’s Defence Weekly, vol. 
41, no. 20. 
Department of Defence, 2004, Defence Capability Plan: 2004-2014, Department of Defence, 
Canberra. 
87 Bostock, I.  18 June 2003, ‘Australia re-equips special forces’, Jane’s Defence Weekly, vol. 39, 
no. 24. 
88 Breen, R. J. (Colonel (rtd); Research Fellow, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian 
National University, Canberra), interview 3 April 2006, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 
Canberra. 
89 Breen, R. J. (Colonel (rtd); Research Fellow, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian 
National University, Canberra), interview 3 April 2006, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 
Canberra. 
90 Breen, R. J. (Colonel (rtd); Research Fellow, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian 
National University, Canberra), interview 3 April 2006, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 
Canberra. 
91 Breen, R. J. (Colonel (rtd); Research Fellow, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian 
National University, Canberra), interview 3 April 2006, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 
Canberra. 
92 Bostock, I.  3 May 2000, ‘Country Briefing: East Timor: An Operational Evaluation’, p. 25, 
Jane’s Defence Weekly, vol. 33, no. 18. 
93 Department of Defence, 2003, The War in Iraq: ADF Operations in the Middle East in 2003, pp. 
21-22, Department of Defence, Canberra. 
94 Bostock, I.  3 May 2000, ‘Country Briefing: East Timor: An Operational Evaluation’, p. 25,  
Jane’s Defence Weekly, vol. 33, no. 18. 
95 Bostock, I.  3 May 2000, ‘Country Briefing: East Timor: An Operational Evaluation’, Jane’s 
Defence Weekly, vol. 33, no. 18. 
96 Bostock, I.  10 November 2004, ‘New Australian armour kit will counter RPG threat in Iraq’, p. 
7, Jane’s Defence Weekly, vol. 41, no. 45. 
Janssen Lok, J.  12 January 2005, ‘Australian ASLAVs to get more Protectors’, p. 6, Jane’s 
Defence Weekly, vol. 42, no. 2. 
Bostock, I.  16 March 2005, ‘Australia fields up-armoured ASLAVS in Iraq’, Jane’s Defence 
Weekly, vol. 42, no. 11. 
Bostock, I.  27 July 2005, ‘Canberra rejects ASLAV upgrade’, Jane’s Defence Weekly, vol. 42, no. 
30. 
97 Bostock, I.  27 July 2005, ‘Canberra rejects ASLAV upgrade’, Jane’s Defence Weekly, vol. 42, 
no. 30. 
98 Bostock, I.  3 May 2000, ‘Country Briefing: East Timor: An Operational Evaluation’, p. 26, 
Jane’s Defence Weekly, vol. 33, no. 18. 
99 Bostock, I.  3 May 2000, ‘Country Briefing: East Timor: An Operational Evaluation’, p. 22, 
Jane’s Defence Weekly, vol. 33, no. 18. 
 420
                                                                                                                                     
100 Bostock, I.  3 May 2000, ‘Country Briefing: East Timor: An Operational Evaluation’, p. 22, 
Jane’s Defence Weekly, vol. 33, no. 18. 
101 Breen, B.  1998, A Little Bit of Hope: Australian Force-Somalia, p. 169, Allen and Unwin, St 
Leonards. 
102 Breen, B.  1998, A Little Bit of Hope: Australian Force-Somalia, pp. 153-188, Allen and 
Unwin, St Leonards. 
103 Bostock, I.  3 May 2000, ‘Country Briefing: East Timor: An Operational Evaluation’, p. 26, 
Jane’s Defence Weekly, vol. 33, no. 18. 
104 Bostock, I.  10 August 2005, ‘Report slams Australian M113 upgrade programme’, p, 15, 
Jane’s Defence Weekly, vol. 42, no. 32. 
Tenix Defence, 2002, ‘LAND 106 M113 Upgrade Project’, 
www.tenix.com  
Tenix Defence, 2006, Project Land 106 M113AS Upgrade, Tenix Defence, Sydney. 
105 Bostock, I.  7 January 2004, ‘Australian Army to standardise light armoured vehicles’, p. 15, 
Jane’s Defence Weekly, vol. 41, no. 1. 
106 Bostock, I.  27 July 2005, ‘Canberra rejects ASLAV upgrade’, p. 14, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 
vol. 42, no. 30. 
107 Bostock, I.  3 May 2000, ‘Country Briefing: East Timor: An Operational Evaluation’, p. 26, 
Jane’s Defence Weekly, vol. 33, no. 18. 
108 Bostock, I.  3 May 2000, ‘Country Briefing: East Timor: An Operational Evaluation’, p. 26, 
Jane’s Defence Weekly, vol. 33, no. 18. 
109 Bostock, I.  13 February 2002, ‘Australian bid to standardise artillery systems’, p. 14, Jane’s 
Defence Weekly, vol. 37, no. 7. 
110 Bostock, I.  31 October 2001, ‘Australia opts for wheeled 120mm mortar platform’, Jane’s 
Defence Weekly, vol. 36, no. 18. 
Bostock, I.  13 February 2002, ‘Australian bid to standardise artillery systems’, p. 14, Jane’s 
Defence Weekly, vol. 37, no. 7. 
Bostock, I.  28 January 2004, ‘Australia launches future offensive fire project’, Jane’s Defence 
Weekly, vol. 41, no. 4. 
Bostock, I.  20 July 2005, ‘Archer system targets Australian Army project’, Jane’s Defence 
Weekly, vol. 42, no. 29. 
111 Department of Defense, 1997, ‘Army Science and Technology Master Plan’, 
www.fas.org/man/dod-101/army/docs/astmp/c3/P3N4.htm
Bostock, I.  20 July 2005, ‘Archer system targets Australian Army project’, Jane’s Defence 
Weekly, vol. 42, no. 29. 
112 Breen, B.  1998, A Little Bit of Hope: Australian Force-Somalia, p. 212, Allen and Unwin, St 
Leonards. 
113 Breen, B.  1998, A Little Bit of Hope: Australian Force-Somalia, pp. 164, 212, Allen and 
Unwin, St Leonards. 
114 Breen, B.  2000, Mission Accomplished: East Timor – The Australian Defence Force 
Participation in the International Forces East Timor (INTERFET), p. 55, Allen & Unwin, St. 
Leonards. 
115 Breen, B.  2000, Mission Accomplished: East Timor – The Australian Defence Force 
Participation in the International Forces East Timor (INTERFET), Allen & Unwin, St. Leonards. 
116 Hill, R. Minister for Defence. 2006, Chinooks to deploy to Afghanistan, p. 1, Senate, Canberra. 
117 Hill, R. Minister for Defence. 2006, Chinooks to deploy to Afghanistan, p. 1, Senate, Canberra. 
118 C4I News, 2005, ‘Innovative Concepts To Enable Australian MRH90 Network Centric 
Capabilities’, p. 1, C4I News, 8 December 2005. 
119 Bostock, I.  9 July 2003, ‘Australia pushes ahead electronic warfare projects’, p. 30, Jane’s 
Defence Weekly, vol. 39, no. 27. 
120 Hill, R. Minister for Defence. 2006, Chinooks to deploy to Afghanistan, Senate, Canberra. 
C4I News, 2005, ‘Australia Plans Major Upgrade For Chinook Helicopters’, p. 1, C4I News, 8 
December 2005. 
 
 
 
 
 
 421
                                                                                                                                     
121 Bostock, I.  15 August 2001, ‘Eurocopter breakthrough with Aussie Tiger’, Jane’s Defence 
Weekly, vol. 36, no. 7. 
Bostock, I.  27 July 2005, ‘Australian Tigers emerge, government invests’, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 
vol. 42, no. 30. 
Eurocopter.  2006, ‘Tiger HAP’ 
www.eurocopter.com
Air Force Technology, 2006, ‘Tiger Attack Helicopter’, 
www.airforce-technology.com
122 Bostock, I.  15 August 2001, ‘Eurocopter breakthrough with Aussie Tiger’, Jane’s Defence 
Weekly, vol. 36, no. 7. 
123 Bostock, I.  15 August 2001, ‘Eurocopter breakthrough with Aussie Tiger’, Jane’s Defence 
Weekly, vol. 36, no. 7. 
124 Australian Air Force, 2006, ‘2000 – A New Century’, 
www.defence.gov.au/raaf/history/airforce_history/2000.htm
125 Department of Defence, 2003, The War in Iraq: ADF Operations in the Middle East in 2003, p. 
26, Department of Defence, Canberra. 
126 Department of Defence, 2003, The War in Iraq: ADF Operations in the Middle East in 2003, 
Department of Defence, Canberra. 
127 Department of Defence, 2004, Defence Capability Plan: 2004-2014, Department of Defence, 
Canberra. 
Bostock, I.  21 July 2004, ‘Australia revives stand-off weapons quest’, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 
vol. 41, no. 29. 
Bostock, I.  6 July 2005, ‘Australia almost sure to but JASSM’, Jane’s Defence Weekly, vol. 42, 
no. 27. 
Bostock, I.  26 October 2005, ‘JDAM chosen for Australian air force Hornets’, Jane’s Defence 
Weekly, vol. 42, no. 43. 
128 Bostock, I.  26 October 2005, ‘JDAM chosen for Australian air force Hornets’, p. 15, Jane’s 
Defence Weekly, vol. 42, no. 43. 
129 Department of Defence, 2004, Defence Capability Plan: 2004-2014, p. 31, Department of 
Defence, Canberra. 
130 Bostock, I.  1 September 2004, ‘Australia air force chief defends JSF choice’, Jane’s Defence 
Weekly, vol. 41, no. 35. 
131 Houston, A.  2004, Is the JSF good enough?  Can Australia’s air combat requirement be met 
by the JSF, or do we need the F/A-22?, p. 4, Strategic Insights No. 9, Australian Strategic Policy 
Institute. 
132 Evans, Dr. M (Senior Research Fellow, Land Warfare Studies Centre, Canberra), interview 6 
April 2006, The Outpost Café – Australian War Memorial, Canberra. 
133 Cordesman, A.  2003, The Iraq War: Strategy, Tactics, and Military Lessons, p. 285, Center for 
Strategic Studies Press, Washington. 
134 Bostock, I.  4 July 2001, ‘ADF regroups electronic warfare programme’, Jane’s Defence 
Weekly, vol. 36, no. 1. 
135 Bostock, I.  9 July 2003, ‘Australia pushes ahead electronic warfare projects’, p. 30, Jane’s 
Defence Weekly, vol. 39, no. 27. 
136 Department of Defence, 2000, Annual Report, p. 247, Department of Defence, Canberra. 
137 Churchus, D. 2000, AIR 5190 - The Perennial Lightweight Project, p. 1, Westbrook Lewis Pty 
Ltd, Australia. 
138 Department of Defence, 2000, Annual Report, Department of Defence, Canberra. 
Department of Defence, 2001, Annual Report, Department of Defence, Canberra. 
Department of Defence, 2002, Annual Report, Department of Defence, Canberra. 
Department of Defence, 2003, Annual Report, Department of Defence, Canberra. 
Department of Defence, 2004, Annual Report, Department of Defence, Canberra. 
Department of Defence, 2005, Annual Report, Department of Defence, Canberra. 
139 Department of Defence, 2000, Annual Report, p. 247, Department of Defence, Canberra. 
140 Bostock, I.  25 October 2000, ‘RAAF considers Caribou upgrade’, p. 14,  Jane’s Defence 
Weekly, vol. 34, no. 17. 
 
 
 
 
 422
                                                                                                                                     
141 Department of Defence, 2000, Annual Report, Department of Defence, Canberra. 
Department of Defence, 2001, Annual Report, Department of Defence, Canberra. 
Department of Defence, 2002, Annual Report, Department of Defence, Canberra. 
Department of Defence, 2003, Annual Report, Department of Defence, Canberra. 
Department of Defence, 2004, Annual Report, Department of Defence, Canberra. 
Department of Defence, 2005, Annual Report, Department of Defence, Canberra. 
142 Department of Defence, 2005, Annual Report, p. 202, Department of Defence, Canberra. 
143 Department of Defence, 2004, Defence Capability Plan: 2004-2014, p. 51, Department of 
Defence, Canberra. 
144 Bostock, I.  11 June 2003, ‘Australia’s special forces ‘lack strategic reach’’, p. 12,  Jane’s 
Defence Weekly, vol. 39, no. 23. 
145 Bostock, I.  18 January 2006, ‘Australia makes plans for heavy airlifter fleet’, Jane’s Defence 
Weekly, vol. 43, no. 3. 
146 Evans, Dr. M (Senior Research Fellow, Land Warfare Studies Centre, Canberra), interview 6 
April 2006, The Outpost Café – Australian War Memorial, Canberra. 
147 Bostock, I.  18 January 2006, ‘Australia makes plans for heavy airlifter fleet’, p. 15, Jane’s 
Defence Weekly, vol. 43, no. 3. 
148 Department of Defence, 2003, The War in Iraq: ADF Operations in the Middle East in 2003, p. 
7,  Department of Defence, Canberra. 
149 Department of Defence, 2000, Annual Report, Department of Defence, Canberra. 
Department of Defence, 2001, Annual Report, Department of Defence, Canberra. 
Department of Defence, 2002, Annual Report, Department of Defence, Canberra. 
Department of Defence, 2003, Annual Report, Department of Defence, Canberra. 
Department of Defence, 2004, Annual Report, Department of Defence, Canberra. 
Department of Defence, 2005, Annual Report, Department of Defence, Canberra. 
150 Bostock, I.  25 January 2006, ‘Country Briefing: Australia’, p. 27, Jane’s Defence Weekly, vol. 
43, no. 4. 
151 Bostock, I.  2 July 2003, ‘Take-off for Australian air force tanker buy’, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 
vol. 39, no. 26. 
152 Breen, R. J. (Colonel (rtd); Research Fellow, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian 
National University, Canberra), interview 3 April 2006, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 
Canberra. 
153 Confidential. 
154 Lax, M (Air Commodore, Director General Strategic Policy, Strategy Group), interview 7 April 
2006, Russell Buildings, Canberra. 
155 Bostock, I.  14 July 2004, ‘Australia calls for tactical UAVs at brigade level’, Jane’s Defence 
Weekly, vol. 41, no. 28. 
Karniol, R.  21 December 2005, ‘Australia to establish two tactical UAV units’, Jane’s Defence 
Weekly, vol. 42, no. 51. 
Bostock, I.  9 November 2005, ‘Australia to deploy Skylark UAVs for Iraq operations’, Jane’s 
Defence Weekly, vol. 42, no. 45. 
156 Bostock, I.  9 November 2005, ‘Australia to deploy Skylark UAVs for Iraq operations’, Jane’s 
Defence Weekly, vol. 42, no. 45. 
157 Bostock, I.  9 November 2005, ‘Australia to deploy Skylark UAVs for Iraq operations’, Jane’s 
Defence Weekly, vol. 42, no. 45. 
158 Sea Power Centre, 2000, Australian Maritime Doctrine, p. 38, Sea Power Centre, Canberra. 
159 Sea Power Centre, 2005, Database of Royal Australian Navy Operations, 1990-2005, p. 15, 
Working Paper No. 18, Sea Power Centre, Canberra. 
160 Sea Power Centre, 2005, Database of Royal Australian Navy Operations, 1990-2005, p. 15, 
Working Paper No. 18, Sea Power Centre, Canberra. 
161 Sea Power Centre, 2005, Database of Royal Australian Navy Operations, 1990-2005, p. 21, 
Working Paper No. 18, Sea Power Centre, Canberra. 
162 Sea Power Centre, 2005, Database of Royal Australian Navy Operations, 1990-2005, p. 32, 
Working Paper No. 18, Sea Power Centre, Canberra. 
163 Stevens, Dr. D (Director of Strategic and Historical Studies, Sea Power Centre, Canberra), 
interview 4 April 2006, Sea Power Centre, Canberra. 
164 Crawford, J. & G. Harper.  2001, Operation East Timor: The New Zealand Defence Force in 
East Timor 1999-2000, p.161, Reed Publishing, Auckland. 
 423
                                                                                                                                     
165 Sea Power Centre, 2005, Database of Royal Australian Navy Operations, 1990-2005, p. 32, 
Working Paper No. 48, Sea Power Centre, Canberra. 
166 Sea Power Centre, 2000, Australian Maritime Doctrine, p. 38, Sea Power Centre, Canberra. 
167 Sea Power Centre, 2000, Australian Maritime Doctrine, p. 39, Sea Power Centre, Canberra. 
168 Sea Power Centre, 2000, Australian Maritime Doctrine, p. 38, Sea Power Centre, Canberra. 
169 Sea Power Centre, 2000, Australian Maritime Doctrine, p. 38, Sea Power Centre, Canberra. 
170 Sea Power Centre, 2000, Australian Maritime Doctrine, p. 40, Sea Power Centre, Canberra. 
171 Sea Power Centre, 2000, Australian Maritime Doctrine, p. 40, Sea Power Centre, Canberra. 
172 Sea Power Centre, 2000, Australian Maritime Doctrine, p. 42, Sea Power Centre, Canberra. 
173 Sea Power Centre, 2000, Australian Maritime Doctrine, p. 56, Sea Power Centre, Canberra. 
174 Sea Power Centre, 2000, Australian Maritime Doctrine, p. 56, Sea Power Centre, Canberra. 
175 Sea Power Centre, 2000, Australian Maritime Doctrine, p. 58, Sea Power Centre, Canberra. 
176 Sea Power Centre, 2000, Australian Maritime Doctrine, p. 58, Sea Power Centre, Canberra. 
177 Sea Power Centre, 2000, Australian Maritime Doctrine, p. 60, Sea Power Centre, Canberra. 
178 Sea Power Centre, 2000, Australian Maritime Doctrine, p. 58, Sea Power Centre, Canberra. 
179 Sea Power Centre, 2000, Australian Maritime Doctrine, p. 58, Sea Power Centre, Canberra. 
180 Sea Power Centre, 2000, Australian Maritime Doctrine, p. 43, Sea Power Centre, Canberra. 
181 Sea Power Centre, 2000, Australian Maritime Doctrine, p. 61, Sea Power Centre, Canberra. 
182 Sea Power Centre, 2000, Australian Maritime Doctrine, p. 61, Sea Power Centre, Canberra. 
183 Sea Power Centre, 2000, Australian Maritime Doctrine, p. 61, Sea Power Centre, Canberra. 
184 Sea Power Centre, 2005, The Navy Contribution to Australian Maritime Operations, Sea Power 
Centre, Canberra. 
185 Department of Defence, 2003, Capability Fact Book, Department of Defence, Canberra. 
186 Department of Defence, 2000, Annual Report, Department of Defence, Canberra. 
Department of Defence, 2001, Annual Report, Department of Defence, Canberra. 
Department of Defence, 2002, Annual Report, Department of Defence, Canberra. 
Department of Defence, 2003, Annual Report, Department of Defence, Canberra. 
Department of Defence, 2004, Annual Report, Department of Defence, Canberra. 
Department of Defence, 2005, Annual Report, Department of Defence, Canberra. 
187 Bostock, I.  19 July 2000, ‘Australia devises multi-role ship’, p. 16,  Jane’s Defence Weekly, 
vol. 34, no. 3. 
188 Bostock, I.  19 July 2000, ‘Australia devises multi-role ship’, p. 16,  Jane’s Defence Weekly, 
vol. 34, no. 3. 
189 Hill, R. Minister for Defence. 2005, Government approves first stage of Amphib Ships project, 
Senate, Canberra. 
190 Navantia, 2005, ‘Strategic Projection Ship’, 
www.navantia.com
191 Armaris.  2005, ‘Mistral-class Landing Helicopter Dock (LHD)’, 
www.armarisgroup.com
192 Sea Power Centre, 2000, Australian Maritime Doctrine, pp. 63-64, Sea Power Centre, 
Canberra. 
193 Sea Power Centre, 2000, Australian Maritime Doctrine, p. 64, Sea Power Centre, Canberra. 
194 Sea Power Centre, 2005, The Navy Contribution to Australian Maritime Operations, p. 115, 
Sea Power Centre, Canberra. 
195 Sea Power Centre, 2005, The Navy Contribution to Australian Maritime Operations, p. 114, 
Sea Power Centre, Canberra. 
196 Department of Defence, 2000, Annual Report, Department of Defence, Canberra. 
Department of Defence, 2001, Annual Report, Department of Defence, Canberra. 
Department of Defence, 2002, Annual Report, Department of Defence, Canberra. 
Department of Defence, 2003, Annual Report, Department of Defence, Canberra. 
Department of Defence, 2004, Annual Report, Department of Defence, Canberra. 
Department of Defence, 2005, Annual Report, Department of Defence, Canberra. 
197 Bostock, I.  17 September 2003, ‘Australia eyes ‘one-stop shop’ support ships’, Jane’s Defence 
Weekly, vol. 40, no. 11. 
198 Bostock, I.  17 September 2003, ‘Australia eyes ‘one-stop shop’ support ships’, p. 14,  Jane’s 
Defence Weekly, vol. 40, no. 11. 
199 Sea Power Centre, 2005, The Navy Contribution to Australian Maritime Operations, p. 157, 
Sea Power Centre, Canberra. 
 
 424
                                                                                                                                     
200 Department of Defence, 2000, Annual Report, Department of Defence, Canberra. 
Department of Defence, 2001, Annual Report, Department of Defence, Canberra. 
Department of Defence, 2002, Annual Report, Department of Defence, Canberra. 
Department of Defence, 2003, Annual Report, Department of Defence, Canberra. 
Department of Defence, 2004, Annual Report, Department of Defence, Canberra. 
Department of Defence, 2005, Annual Report, Department of Defence, Canberra. 
201 Sea Power Centre, 2000, Australian Maritime Doctrine, p. 66, Sea Power Centre, Canberra. 
202 Sea Power Centre, 2000, Australian Maritime Doctrine, p. 66, Sea Power Centre, Canberra. 
203 Sea Power Centre, 2000, Australian Maritime Doctrine, p. 61, Sea Power Centre, Canberra. 
204 Sea Power Centre, 2000, Australian Maritime Doctrine, p. 63, Sea Power Centre, Canberra. 
205 Department of Defence, 2003, The War in Iraq: ADF Operations in the Middle East in 2003, p. 
18, Department of Defence, Canberra. 
206 Sea Power Centre, 2005, The Navy Contribution to Australian Maritime Operations, p. 251, 
Sea Power Centre, Canberra. 
207 McCaffrie, J (Commodore RANR; Visiting Research Fellow, Sea Power Centre, Canberra), 
interview 4 April 2006, Sea Power Centre, Canberra. 
208 McCaffrie, J (Commodore RANR; Visiting Research Fellow, Sea Power Centre, Canberra), 
interview 4 April 2006, Sea Power Centre, Canberra. 
209 Department of Defence, 2003, The Australian Defence Force Capability Fact Book, p.6, 
Department of Defence, Canberra. 
210 Department of Defence, 2003, The Australian Defence Force Capability Fact Book, p.6, 
Department of Defence, Canberra. 
211 McCaffrie, J (Commodore RANR; Visiting Research Fellow, Sea Power Centre, Canberra), 
interview 4 April 2006, Sea Power Centre, Canberra. 
212 Breen, B.  1998, A Little Bit of Hope: Australian Force-Somalia, p. 330, Allen and Unwin, St 
Leonards. 
213 Breen, B.  1998, A Little Bit of Hope: Australian Force-Somalia, pp. 330-333, Allen and 
Unwin, St Leonards. 
214 Breen, B.  1998, A Little Bit of Hope: Australian Force-Somalia, p. 332, Allen and Unwin, St 
Leonards. 
215 Breen, B.  1998, A Little Bit of Hope: Australian Force-Somalia, p. 328, Allen and Unwin, St 
Leonards. 
216 Breen, B.  1998, A Little Bit of Hope: Australian Force-Somalia, p. 352, Allen and Unwin, St 
Leonards. 
217 Breen, B.  1998, A Little Bit of Hope: Australian Force-Somalia, p. 352, Allen and Unwin, St 
Leonards. 
218 Breen, Bob.  2001, Giving Peace a Chance – Operation Lagoon, Bougainville, 1994: A Case of 
Military Action and Diplomacy, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National 
University. 
219 Breen, Bob.  2001, Giving Peace a Chance – Operation Lagoon, Bougainville, 1994: A Case of 
Military Action and Diplomacy, p. 80, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National 
University. 
220 Breen, Bob.  2001, Giving Peace a Chance – Operation Lagoon, Bougainville, 1994: A Case of 
Military Action and Diplomacy, p. 80, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National 
University. 
221 Breen, Bob.  2001, Giving Peace a Chance – Operation Lagoon, Bougainville, 1994: A Case of 
Military Action and Diplomacy, p. 81, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National 
University. 
222 Breen, Bob.  2001, Giving Peace a Chance – Operation Lagoon, Bougainville, 1994: A Case of 
Military Action and Diplomacy, p. 81, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National 
University. 
223 Breen, Bob.  2001, Giving Peace a Chance – Operation Lagoon, Bougainville, 1994: A Case of 
Military Action and Diplomacy, p. 81, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National 
University. 
224 Breen, Bob.  2001, Giving Peace a Chance – Operation Lagoon, Bougainville, 1994: A Case of 
Military Action and Diplomacy, p. 81, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National 
University. 
 425
                                                                                                                                     
225 Breen, Bob.  2001, Giving Peace a Chance – Operation Lagoon, Bougainville, 1994: A Case of 
Military Action and Diplomacy, p. 80, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National 
University. 
226 Breen, B.  2000, Mission Accomplished: East Timor – The Australian Defence Force 
Participation in the International Forces East Timor (INTERFET), Allen & Unwin, St. Leonards. 
227 Brailey,  M. 2005, The Transformation of Special Operations Forces in Contemporary 
Conflict: Strategy, Missions, Organisation and Tactics, Working Paper No. 127, Land Warfare 
Studies Centre, Australian Army. 
228 Breen, R. J. (Colonel (rtd); Research Fellow, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian 
National University, Canberra), interview 3 April 2006, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 
Canberra. 
229 Breen, R. J. (Colonel (rtd); Research Fellow, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian 
National University, Canberra), interview 3 April 2006, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 
Canberra. 
230 Breen, R. J. (Colonel (rtd); Research Fellow, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian 
National University, Canberra), interview 3 April 2006, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 
Canberra. 
231 Breen, R. J. (Colonel (rtd); Research Fellow, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian 
National University, Canberra), interview 3 April 2006, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 
Canberra. 
232 Horner, D.  2001, The Australian Centenary History of Defence, Volume IV: Making the 
Australian Defence Force, p. 139, Oxford University Press, Melbourne. 
233 Horner, D.  2001, The Australian Centenary History of Defence, Volume IV: Making the 
Australian Defence Force, p. 141, Oxford University Press, Melbourne. 
234 Horner, D.  2001, The Australian Centenary History of Defence, Volume IV: Making the 
Australian Defence Force, p. 141, Oxford University Press, Melbourne. 
235 Horner, D.  2001, The Australian Centenary History of Defence, Volume IV: Making the 
Australian Defence Force, p. 143, Oxford University Press, Melbourne. 
236 Breen, R. J. (Colonel (rtd); Research Fellow, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian 
National University, Canberra), interview 3 April 2006, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 
Canberra. 
237 Breen, R. J. (Colonel (rtd); Research Fellow, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian 
National University, Canberra), interview 3 April 2006, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 
Canberra. 
238 Breen, R. J. (Colonel (rtd); Research Fellow, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian 
National University, Canberra), interview 3 April 2006, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 
Canberra. 
239 Department of Defence, 2005, Headquarters Joint Operations Command Project (HQJOCP), 
p. 1,  Department of Defence, Canberra. 
240 Evans, Dr. M (Senior Research Fellow, Land Warfare Studies Centre, Canberra), interview 6 
April 2006, The Outpost Café – Australian War Memorial, Canberra. 
241 Breen, R. J. (Colonel (rtd); Research Fellow, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian 
National University, Canberra), interview 3 April 2006, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 
Canberra. 
242 Confidential. 
243 Breen, R. J. (Colonel (rtd); Research Fellow, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian 
National University, Canberra), interview 3 April 2006, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 
Canberra. 
244 Breen, R. J. (Colonel (rtd); Research Fellow, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian 
National University, Canberra), interview 3 April 2006, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 
Canberra. 
245 Breen, R. J. (Colonel (rtd); Research Fellow, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian 
National University, Canberra), interview 3 April 2006, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 
Canberra. 
246 Breen, B.  1998, A Little Bit of Hope: Australian Force-Somalia, Allen and Unwin, St 
Leonards. 
247 Breen, B.  1998, A Little Bit of Hope: Australian Force-Somalia, p. 363, Allen and Unwin, St 
Leonards. 
 426
                                                                                                                                     
248 Breen, B.  1998, A Little Bit of Hope: Australian Force-Somalia, p. 363, Allen and Unwin, St 
Leonards. 
249 Breen, B.  1998, A Little Bit of Hope: Australian Force-Somalia, p. 365, Allen and Unwin, St 
Leonards. 
250 Breen, Bob.  2001, Giving Peace a Chance – Operation Lagoon, Bougainville, 1994: A Case of 
Military Action and Diplomacy, p. 85, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National 
University. 
251 Breen, Bob.  2001, Giving Peace a Chance – Operation Lagoon, Bougainville, 1994: A Case of 
Military Action and Diplomacy, p. 87, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National 
University. 
252 Breen, B.  2000, Mission Accomplished: East Timor – The Australian Defence Force 
Participation in the International Forces East Timor (INTERFET), p. 131, Allen & Unwin, St. 
Leonards. 
253 Breen, B.  2000, Mission Accomplished: East Timor – The Australian Defence Force 
Participation in the International Forces East Timor (INTERFET), pp.  123- 157, Allen & Unwin, 
St. Leonards. 
254 Lax, M (Air Commodore, Director General Strategic Policy, Strategy Group), interview 7 April 
2006, Russell Buildings, Canberra. 
255 Australian National Audit Office, 2001-2002, Management of Australian Defence Force 
Deployments to East Timor, p. 59, Audit Report No. 38, Australian National Audit Office, 
Canberra. 
256 Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, 2003, Defence Procurement Review, p. 45, 
Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Canberra. 
257 Richardson, Robert. (Wing Commander, Deputy Director – Doctrine and Education, Air Power 
Development Centre, Canberra), interview 5 April 2006, Air Power Development Centre, 
Canberra. 
258 Confidential. 
259 Breen, R. J. (Colonel (rtd); Research Fellow, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian 
National University, Canberra), interview 3 April 2006, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 
Canberra. 
260 Breen, R. J. (Colonel (rtd); Research Fellow, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian 
National University, Canberra), interview 3 April 2006, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 
Canberra. 
261 Department of Defence, 2003, The War in Iraq: ADF Operations in the Middle East in 2003, 
pp. 29-30, Department of Defence, Canberra. 
262 Breen, R. J. (Colonel (rtd); Research Fellow, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian 
National University, Canberra), interview 3 April 2006, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 
Canberra. 
263 Lax, M (Air Commodore, Director General Strategic Policy, Strategy Group), interview 7 April 
2006, Russell Buildings, Canberra. 
264 Bostock, I.  4 December 2002, ‘Australian force deployment capability criticised’, p. 13,  
Jane’s Defence Weekly, vol. 38, no. 23. 
265 Australian National Audit Office, 2001-2002, Management of Australian Defence Force 
Deployments to East Timor, p. 56, Audit Report No. 38, Australian National Audit Office, 
Canberra. 
266 Gilbert, Dr. G. P (Research Officer, Sea Power Centre, Canberra), interview 4 April 2006, Sea 
Power Centre, Canberra. 
267 Forbes, A. (Head Research Officer, Sea Power Centre, Canberra), interview 4 April 2006, Sea 
Power Centre, Canberra. 
268 Lax, M (Air Commodore, Director General Strategic Policy, Strategy Group), interview 7 April 
2006, Russell Buildings, Canberra. 
269 Confidential. 
270 Breen, B.  2000, Mission Accomplished: East Timor – The Australian Defence Force 
Participation in the International Forces East Timor (INTERFET), p.  148, Allen & Unwin, St. 
Leonards. 
271 Breen, R. J. (Colonel (rtd); Research Fellow, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian 
National University, Canberra), interview 3 April 2006, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 
Canberra. 
 427
                                                                                                                                     
272 Schmidtchen, D. Lt Col. 2005, Network-Centric Warfare: The Problem of Social Order, 
Working Paper No. 125, Land Warfare Studies Centre, Canberra. 
Ryan, M. & M. Frater.  2000, A Tactical Communications System for Future Land Warfare, 
Working Paper No. 109, Land Warfare Studies Centre, Canberra. 
273 Ackerman, R. K.  2000, ‘Rapid Commercial Response Links Australian East Timor Forces’, 
Signal, vol. 54, no. 8. 
Confidential. 
Ackerman, R. K.  2000, ‘U.S. Forces Provide Deployable Communications to East Timor’, Signal, 
vol. 54, no. 8. 
274 Evans, Dr. M (Senior Research Fellow, Land Warfare Studies Centre, Canberra), interview 6 
April 2006, The Outpost Café – Australian War Memorial, Canberra. 
275 Department of Defence, 2004, ‘JP 2072 Battlespace Communications System (Land)’, 
Department of Defence, Canberra. 
276 Ryan, M. & M. Frater.  2000, A Tactical Communications System for Future Land Warfare, 
Working Paper No. 109, Land Warfare Studies Centre, Canberra. 
277 Umansky, A.  2000, ‘Australia Delves Into Digital: High bandwidth, portable transmission 
systems quicken communications’, p. 61,  Signal, vol. 55, no. 3. 
278 Baddeley, A.  2004, ‘Australia Builds Future Tactical Network’, p. 64, Signal, vol. 58, no. 12. 
279 Department of Defence, 2004, JP 2072 Battlespace Communications System (Land), 
Department of Defence, Canberra. 
280 Baddeley, A.  2004, ‘Australia Builds Future Tactical Network’, p. 62, Signal, vol. 58, no. 12. 
281 Department of Defence, 2004, JP 2072 Battlespace Communications System (Land), 
Department of Defence, Canberra. 
282 Hill, R. Minister for Defence. 2006, New Leading Edge Combat Equipment for Army, Senate, 
Canberra. 
283 Australian Army News, 2006, ‘Compact comms for ground troops’, Army News, February 23, 
no. 1137. 
284 Baddeley, A.  2004, ‘Australia Builds Future Tactical Network’, p. 64, Signal, vol. 58, no. 12. 
285 Baddeley, A.  2004, ‘Australia Builds Future Tactical Network’, p. 63, Signal, vol. 58, no. 12. 
286 Confidential. 
287 Confidential. 
288 Confidential. 
289 Breen, B.  1998, A Little Bit of Hope: Australian Force-Somalia, p. 38, Allen and Unwin, St 
Leonards. 
290 Breen, B.  1998, A Little Bit of Hope: Australian Force-Somalia, p. 86, Allen and Unwin, St 
Leonards. 
291 Breen, B.  1998, A Little Bit of Hope: Australian Force-Somalia, p. 87, Allen and Unwin, St 
Leonards 
292 Breen, B.  1998, A Little Bit of Hope: Australian Force-Somalia, p. 341, Allen and Unwin, St 
Leonards. 
293 Breen, Bob.  2001, Giving Peace a Chance – Operation Lagoon, Bougainville, 1994: A Case of 
Military Action and Diplomacy, p. 27, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National 
University. 
294 Breen, Bob.  2001, Giving Peace a Chance – Operation Lagoon, Bougainville, 1994: A Case of 
Military Action and Diplomacy, p. 89, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National 
University. 
295 Breen, B.  2000, Mission Accomplished: East Timor – The Australian Defence Force 
Participation in the International Forces East Timor (INTERFET), p. 50, Allen & Unwin, St. 
Leonards. 
296 Breen, B.  2000, Mission Accomplished: East Timor – The Australian Defence Force 
Participation in the International Forces East Timor (INTERFET), p. 51, Allen & Unwin, St. 
Leonards. 
297 Breen, B.  2000, Mission Accomplished: East Timor – The Australian Defence Force 
Participation in the International Forces East Timor (INTERFET), p. 51, Allen & Unwin, St. 
Leonards. 
298 Breen, B.  2000, Mission Accomplished: East Timor – The Australian Defence Force 
Participation in the International Forces East Timor (INTERFET), p. 91, Allen & Unwin, St. 
Leonards. 
 428
                                                                                                                                     
299 Breen, B.  2000, Mission Accomplished: East Timor – The Australian Defence Force 
Participation in the International Forces East Timor (INTERFET), p. 51, Allen & Unwin, St. 
Leonards. 
300 Breen, R. J. (Colonel (rtd); Research Fellow, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian 
National University, Canberra), interview 3 April 2006, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 
Canberra. 
301 Breen, R. J. (Colonel (rtd); Research Fellow, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian 
National University, Canberra), interview 3 April 2006, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 
Canberra. 
302 Breen, R. J. (Colonel (rtd); Research Fellow, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian 
National University, Canberra), interview 3 April 2006, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 
Canberra. 
303 Breen, R. J. (Colonel (rtd); Research Fellow, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian 
National University, Canberra), interview 3 April 2006, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 
Canberra. 
304 Breen, R. J. (Colonel (rtd); Research Fellow, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian 
National University, Canberra), interview 3 April 2006, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 
Canberra. 
305 Breen, R. J. (Colonel (rtd); Research Fellow, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian 
National University, Canberra), interview 3 April 2006, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 
Canberra. 
306 Breen, R. J. (Colonel (rtd); Research Fellow, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian 
National University, Canberra), interview 3 April 2006, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 
Canberra. 
307 Breen, R. J. (Colonel (rtd); Research Fellow, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian 
National University, Canberra), interview 3 April 2006, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 
Canberra. 
308 Breen, R. J. (Colonel (rtd); Research Fellow, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian 
National University, Canberra), interview 3 April 2006, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 
Canberra. 
Reid, Piers (Major General (rtd)), interview 17 October 2005, Massey University, Palmerston 
North. 
309 Mortlock, Roger (Brigadier (rtd)), interview 2 March 2005, private address, Wellington. 
310 Wehner, M.  & D. Denoon.  Eds.  2001, Without a Gun: Australians’ Experiences Monitoring 
Peace in Bougainville, 1997-2001, pp. 43-49, Pandanus Books, Canberra. 
311 Wehner, M.  & D. Denoon.  Eds.  2001, Without a Gun: Australians’ Experiences Monitoring 
Peace in Bougainville, 1997-2001, pp. 43-49, Pandanus Books, Canberra. 
312 Breen, B.  1998, A Little Bit of Hope: Australian Force-Somalia, p. 345, Allen and Unwin, St 
Leonards. 
313 Breen, B.  1998, A Little Bit of Hope: Australian Force-Somalia, pp. 189-223, Allen and 
Unwin, St Leonards. 
314 Breen, B.  1998, A Little Bit of Hope: Australian Force-Somalia, p. 205, Allen and Unwin, St 
Leonards. 
315 Breen, B.  1998, A Little Bit of Hope: Australian Force-Somalia, p. 204, Allen and Unwin, St 
Leonards. 
316 Breen, B.  1998, A Little Bit of Hope: Australian Force-Somalia, p. 213, Allen and Unwin, St 
Leonards. 
317 Breen, B.  1998, A Little Bit of Hope: Australian Force-Somalia, p. 350, Allen and Unwin, St 
Leonards. 
318 Breen, B.  2000, Mission Accomplished: East Timor – The Australian Defence Force 
Participation in the International Forces East Timor (INTERFET), p. 112, Allen & Unwin, St. 
Leonards. 
319 Breen, B.  2000, Mission Accomplished: East Timor – The Australian Defence Force 
Participation in the International Forces East Timor (INTERFET), p. 112, Allen & Unwin, St. 
Leonards. 
320 Breen, B.  2000, Mission Accomplished: East Timor – The Australian Defence Force 
Participation in the International Forces East Timor (INTERFET), p. 115, Allen & Unwin, St. 
Leonards. 
 429
                                                                                                                                     
321 Breen, B.  2000, Mission Accomplished: East Timor – The Australian Defence Force 
Participation in the International Forces East Timor (INTERFET), p. 115, Allen & Unwin, St. 
Leonards. 
322 Breen, B.  2000, Mission Accomplished: East Timor – The Australian Defence Force 
Participation in the International Forces East Timor (INTERFET), p. 116, Allen & Unwin, St. 
Leonards. 
323 Evans, Dr. M (Senior Research Fellow, Land Warfare Studies Centre, Canberra), interview 6 
April 2006, The Outpost Café – Australian War Memorial, Canberra. 
324 Evans, Dr. M (Senior Research Fellow, Land Warfare Studies Centre, Canberra), interview 6 
April 2006, The Outpost Café – Australian War Memorial, Canberra. 
325 Evans, Dr. M (Senior Research Fellow, Land Warfare Studies Centre, Canberra), interview 6 
April 2006, The Outpost Café – Australian War Memorial, Canberra. 
326 Evans, Dr. M (Senior Research Fellow, Land Warfare Studies Centre, Canberra), interview 6 
April 2006, The Outpost Café – Australian War Memorial, Canberra. 
327 Breen, R. J. (Colonel (rtd); Research Fellow, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian 
National University, Canberra), interview 3 April 2006, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 
Canberra. 
328 Confidential. 
 430
Chapter Nine 
Conclusion 
 
Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) is a complex amalgam of diverse forms of violence 
and non-violent coercion.  This complexity creates significant challenges for a 
counterinsurgent attempting to engender security and stability.  LIC is not 
conventional warfare.  This is critical for the counterinsurgent to understand.  The 
insurgent’s violent and coercive strategy is applied so as to achieve political, civil, 
military and psychological results.  Hence, the counterinsurgent must counter all 
of these strategic elements individually.  In addition, the target of the insurgent’s 
violence and coercion is the population.  This is because the population is the 
centre of gravity in LIC.  Therefore the counterinsurgent must also focus on the 
population to be successful.  In terms of military principles in counterinsurgency, 
doctrinal precision, professionalism, independence, initiative, force precision, 
restraint, combined arms, precision engagement, joint force, effective population 
based intelligence, integrated communications, a civil affairs approach and high 
levels of training are critical. 
 
Russian, American and Coalition Case Studies 
The doctrinal and military principles outlined above were derived from historical 
examples of LIC and the three case study chapters of this thesis.  The Russian, 
American and Coalition case studies were essential to this thesis for the following 
two reasons.  First, the case studies provided a means to analyse the applicability 
of historical principles of LIC in modern operations.  Second, the case studies 
illustrated modern principles and forms of force that have developed recently. 
 The effectiveness of a holistic approach to counterinsurgency and the 
critical nature of the four doctrinal principles of this research were illustrated in 
the jungles of Borneo and the mountains of Algeria, as much as they were in the 
towns of Somalia and the cities of Iraq.  Moreover, the military principles outlined 
above were as applicable to the British operations in Malaya in the 1960s as they 
were to the Russian operations in Chechnya in the 1990s (notwithstanding the fact 
that the Russians failed to apply some of the aforementioned military principles in 
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the first Chechen war).  However, there are certain military principles outlined 
above that are significantly influenced by technological development.  For 
example, joint force, precision engagement and integrated communications have 
been revolutionised by recent developments in information technology.  Basically, 
information technology has enabled separate sensors, shooters and command 
nodes to engage elusive targets in ways that could not have been imagined in 
Malaya, Vietnam or Algeria.  It was essential that modern operations be examined 
as case studies in this thesis, as it was critical to establish the constituent elements 
of contemporary approaches to LIC. 
 
LIC Doctrine and Strategy 
Due to the complexity of LIC, the counterinsurgent must possess a task specific 
and comprehensive doctrine to suppress an insurgency.  The doctrine presented in 
this analysis constitutes a theoretical framework and set of strategic principles 
applicable to the reestablishment of security and stability in the (low intensity) 
conflict zone. 
 The theoretical framework expounded in this analysis covers the complex 
phased array of violence experienced in LIC.  This phased array reflects the 
variable, but structurally discernable nature of LIC.  The four phases of LIC are 
organisation (cadre/support), terrorism, guerrilla warfare and mobile warfare.  The 
symbiotic nature of these phases can generate a multitude of threats, which are 
challenging to counter precisely.  By perceiving LIC as phased violence, the 
threats of an individual phase can be counteracted by specifically customised 
strategies.  The implementation of an array of customised strategies ensures each 
threat is effectively countered.  Without this phased distinction, the primary threat 
may be countered; but without effective measures being implemented to oppose 
all phases, the insurgency will continue. 
 In addition to the phased strategy outlined above, there are four principles 
of LIC that the counterinsurgent must observe.  Three of these are: the control of 
international interference; the application of civil operations; and the provision of 
internal security.  The fourth principle encapsulates the requirement for a unitary 
central command, which synergistically applies the three aforementioned 
principles.  Collectively, these four principles constitute a holistic approach to 
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regenerating security and stability.  In a physical sense, these principles are 
applied by civil, police, intelligence and military elements.  The symbiotic effect 
of uniting these force elements will be to win the support of the population.  
However, this symbiotic effect will be dependent on the formation of an 
Expeditionary Civil Service or its organisational equivalent.  The function of the 
Expeditionary Civil Service is to ensure that the civil elements are effective and 
functionally integrated with the military authorities.  If the functional and strategic 
integration of the four force elements is successful, the counterinsurgent will most 
likely be triumphant in LIC.  There are, however, certain military principles that 
must be adhered to so as to ensure counterinsurgent effectiveness. 
 
Military Force 
Military force is the core element in achieving success in LIC.  However, military 
force elements in LIC have a dual purpose.  Military force elements must 
simultaneously defeat the insurgent and win the support of the civil population.   
However, it is recognised that this dual function will be challenging for the 
counterinsurgent, as the civil population and insurgent may seem 
indistinguishable.  Consequently, caution and precision must be exercised when 
engaging the insurgent, so as to minimise the harm done to the civil population. 
 So as to employ military force effectively in LIC, the primary requirement 
of the counterinsurgent is to have a specific tailored and comprehensive LIC 
doctrine.  Such a doctrine should encompass the doctrinal and strategic framework 
outlined above.  The doctrine must minimise the use of military force that could 
harm the civil population, while enabling the flexible use of force to protect the 
counterinsurgent and defeat the insurgent.  The doctrine must clearly elucidate the 
distinction between LIC and conventional warfare.  
 Critical to the eradication of violence in LIC are professional infantry 
personnel, operating within the aforementioned strategic framework.  Professional 
infantry are critical in LIC, as they are the most likely force element to make 
contact with the insurgent.  These infantry personnel and units must be highly 
trained, cohesive, divested with independence and able to apply initiative.  
Moreover, individual personnel must apply force with constraint and precision, 
while fostering good relations with the population.  Within these guidelines, 
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personnel must be well rehearsed in the principles of combined arms and joint 
warfare.  These principles are as applicable to LIC as they are to conventional 
conflict.  Personnel operating in LIC must also be provided with task-specific 
tactics, techniques and procedures.   However, these principles must be flexible; 
the experience of conflict must continually update the way personnel apply force. 
 LIC requires the counterinsurgent to be as well equipped and 
technologically advanced as practicable.  Advanced weaponry and systems can, to 
a varying degree, functionally dislocate the insurgent.  Hence, a well equipped 
counterinsurgent will take fewer casualties and protect the civil population with 
greater precision.  Primarily, personnel must be connected to a highly effective 
communications system.  This communications system must also be optimised for 
the applicable operational environment.  Personnel must also be provided with a 
reliable and precise individual weapon.  Specifically, this analysis has indicated 
the requirement for individual weapon systems to have the equivalent stopping-
power of a 7.62mm round.  Essentially, the principles that support the use of the 
5.56mm round in conventional conflict do not correlate well with the operational 
requirements of LIC.  In addition, the weight of personnel equipment must 
continually be reduced; this includes weapons, optics, communications and 
battlefield awareness equipment. 
 As earlier enunciated, infantry operations must be supported by the 
combined arms effect of artillery and armour.  These weapons systems reduce 
counterinsurgent vulnerability and add to the complexity of risk faced by the 
insurgent.  Armour and infantry must operate synergistically, so as to diminish 
individual unit vulnerability.  There must also be synergism between these two 
direct-fire units and artillery systems, so that infantry and armour can be 
effectively protected.  However, this synergism can only be generated through 
extensive combined training and effective tactical communications.  Critically, 
armour and artillery fire must be precise. 
 Armoured vehicles operating in LIC must be manoeuvrable, well 
armoured and capable of firing a sustained high rate of relatively heavy fire.  
Vehicle armour must protect crew members and embarked personnel from small-
arms and unguided anti-armour fire, and the effects of conventional and 
improvised mines.   This analysis has also indicated that the armour weapon 
systems most applicable to LIC are the automatic cannon and automatic grenade 
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launcher.  However, the effectiveness of these weapon systems is dependent on 
crew visibility.  Significantly, conventional armour provides insufficient visibility.  
As noted in the research, there are tactical and technical solutions to this problem; 
but the fact remains, it is difficult to see an insurgent from within an armoured 
vehicle. 
 Aviation is a critical force element for a counterinsurgency operating in 
LIC.  This is because helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft are capable of providing: 
precise force; command, control, communications and intelligence hub facilities; 
mobility; and support.  Furthermore, the utility of aviation in counterinsurgency is 
being enhanced by current and emerging technologies and procedures, which are 
enabling greater joint force.  It is also notable that the requirement for greater 
strategic, operational and tactical manoeuvre requires the augmentation of 
aviation fleets. 
 Critically, the four combat arms indicated above must operate in a joint 
fashion.  This analysis has illustrated that for synergistic joint operations to occur, 
the said field elements must be integrated by an effective command, control, 
initiative, communications and intelligence system.  Counterinsurgent command 
and control in LIC must be jointly integrated and capable of enabling initiative 
through decentralised independence.  This initiative will enable the exploitation of 
current situational awareness, so as to engage the insurgent promptly.  As stated 
earlier, effective communications are also critical, so as to enable the rapid 
conveyance of intelligence.  Hence, intelligence must be timely and accurate.  
This requires intelligence systems to be efficient in the acquisition, analysis and 
dissemination of tactically usable information.  Significantly in LIC, human 
intelligence will be the leading source of information.  The specific source of this 
human intelligence will be the population.  Hence, the counterinsurgent must 
acquire the support of the population; this can only be achieved through a civil-
military approach to LIC. 
 
New Zealand Defence Force 
The New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) is developing capacity in terms of 
operational jointness.  Such operational jointness is critical in counterinsurgency.  
This is illustrated by the publication of the NZDF’s first formal statement of 
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(“philosophical”) doctrine, and the formation of a joint operational headquarters.  
However, there are three impediments restricting the development of jointery in 
the NZDF: (1) time and resource constraints (limited human and essentially 
financial resources are impeding joint training and development); (2) a high 
operational tempo (this is further reducing the availability of people for joint 
training and development); and (3) a dissonance between New Zealand defence 
policy and doctrine (effectively a lag between doctrinal and policy development, 
consequently, policy has not yet effectively incorporated jointery). 
 The ethos, values and culture of the NZDF are foremost strengths in LIC.  
These core principles provide an effective personal conduit between the civil 
population and NZDF personnel in LIC.  This conduit improves the application of 
civil-military affairs functions and multiplies the intelligence provided to NZDF 
personnel.  However, there are two leading weaknesses in the NZDF approach to 
LIC.  First, lessons learned are not well institutionalised, especially in the area of 
civil-military affairs.  Second, the level of capability (LOC) process within the 
NZDF causes operational risk.  Essentially, defence elements are maintained at a 
sub-operational level.  This is an operational weakness due to the rapidity with 
which contemporary conflicts can emerge. 
 Equipment and systems have been a significant weakness for the NZDF in 
LIC.  However, this weakness is being rectified with the introduction of advanced 
air, land, sea and information technologies.  Concomitantly, however, these 
advanced technologies require augmented joint and coalition training. 
 Joint coordination is critical in counterinsurgency.  However, resource 
constraints and a high operational tempo are restricting the NZDF’s capability to 
train jointly.  The NZDF routinely operates with allies in LIC.  Consequently, 
coalition interoperability is critical for the operational effectiveness of field and 
intelligence elements within the NZDF.  However, the political fissure between 
New Zealand and the United States has disrupted coalition intelligence flows and 
training exercises. 
  
Australian Defence Force 
Throughout the 1990s and to an extent contemporaneously, Australian defence 
policy and strategic thinking has restrained the Australian Defence Force’s 
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capability in counterinsurgency.  The primary strategic imperative during this 
period has been the protection of the Sea-Air Gap.  This strategic imperative is 
essentially territorial defence by naval and air forces.  Consequently, the 
capability of the Australian Army and tri-service support elements had 
diminished.  This was significant, as army and support elements are critical 
enablers in counterinsurgency.  Post-2000 defence documents have, however, 
largely rectified this strategic and operational dissonance. 
 As a consequence of operational experience and the adjustment of defence 
documents, the Australian Defence Force’s fundamental doctrinal concepts are 
becoming aligned with LIC requirements.  However, tri-service dissonance may 
prove an obstacle to the implementation of these concepts.  Structural, resource 
and personnel constraints may also limit tri-service convergence. 
 The Australian Defence Force (ADF) is endowed with professional 
personnel.  ADF personnel are aggressively determined, but display enthusiasm 
for population-based intelligence and a civil-military approach to 
counterinsurgency.  There are, however, three issues that undermine ADF 
personnel in LIC: (1) the information provided in intelligence briefings is of 
limited operational relevance; (2) there is insufficient cultural awareness in the 
ADF; and (3) the level of capability (LOC) dichotomy within the ADF has 
concealed unit weakness. 
 Australian systems and equipment have been primarily effective when 
deployed operationally.  However, some operational risk has been assumed due to 
obsolescent or inadequate systems and equipment.  Many of these technical issues 
are being addressed.  However in parallel, the ADF must also ensure appropriate 
levels of combined and joint training.  This is because advanced equipment 
requires higher levels of personnel training. 
 Australian operational Command and Control (C2), Logistics and 
Engineering collectively represent a critical strand within the analysis.  This is 
essentially because of the weakness of these elements on operation, and the 
subsequent ADF attempts to improve these elements.  The development of a joint 
operational headquarters has, and will, improve operational C2.  However, the 
joint operational headquarters must stop sequential lag and covert planning 
compartmentalisation from occurring.  The joint operational headquarters must 
also ensure the internal joint integration of tri-service and civil components.  
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Moreover, Logistics and Engineering must be better integrated within the joint 
operational headquarters. 
 Australian communications, intelligence and civil-military affairs 
collectively were another critical strand within the analysis.  Communications is a 
link that enables information to pass between sensors, shooters and commanders.  
Inherently, communications is critical to military operations.  However, the 
analysis has indicated ADF strategic and tactical communications weaknesses.  
These weaknesses are being rectified under a joint ADF project.  However, this 
project is being weakened by the lack of Air Force and Navy ‘ownership’ of the 
project.  This is a significant joint force issue, which must be rectified by the 
ADF.  Intelligence within the ADF has been excessively compartmentalised and 
intelligence briefings have left deploying personnel without an adequate 
appreciation of the area of operation.  Fortunately, the formation of a joint 
operational headquarters should reduce compartmentalisation of intelligence.  
However, the intelligence community must make their briefings more 
operationally relevant, focussing on force protection rather than threat.  A civil-
military affairs approach to LIC will generate effective population-based 
intelligence.  The ADF has illustrated an aptitude for civil-military affairs, due 
mainly to the ethos, values and culture of the Defence Force’s personnel.  The 
ADF is also integrating a civil-military approach within their peace doctrines.  
However the ADF should exploit civil-military affairs more fully, by augmenting 
training and doctrine in the area.  First, civil-military affairs must be fostered as an 
approach to counterinsurgency, among ADF personnel.  Second, those units 
specialising in civil-military affairs should be augmented. 
 
The Politics of Counterinsurgency 
Carl von Clausewitz, in On War, argues that ‘war is politics by other means’.1  
Therefore in the case of LIC, it could be argued that politics is why 
counterinsurgency is fought and with what principles, doctrine, strategies, tactics 
and equipment.  It is correct to say that politicians decide when military forces are 
going to be used (at least in democratic states).   However, such discourse is not 
relevant to this research.  What is relevant to this research is the degree to which 
politically elected and embedded governments influence the rate of doctrinal 
 438
adaptation, provide strategic, tactical and operational guidance, and allocate the 
resources that can be used in counterinsurgency. 
 Doctrinal adaptation is a hugely complex process that takes place at 
differing levels within a large bureaucracy, which is best described as a defence 
organisation.  At the zenith of doctrine is policy.  Hence the ideology and strategic 
outlook of elected governments have a tremendous impact on doctrine, especially 
high level doctrine.  In addition, at the highest level of the defence organisation is 
a ministry or department; this is embedded government with the function of 
producing policy under the direction of the minister.  Hence embedded 
government also has a considerable influence on doctrine.  Simply, government 
policy forms doctrine from above and lessons learned on operation form doctrine 
from below.  This dichotomy is only problematic if a dissonance occurs between 
operational reality and government policy.  Such dissonance is often caused by 
political party defence policy and select committee guidelines that do not 
accurately relate to operational reality.  A further dissonance issue that was 
observed and discussed during the production of this research can arise when 
defence ministry/department policy is “conservative [and constitutes a] lag 
between practise and policy”.2  Specifically, a minister was forced to reject 
defence policy and personally rewrite the said policy, so as to ensure the policy 
was consistent with operational reality.  The particulars of this case did not form a 
discourse within this thesis due to the situation’s sensitive nature and because a 
defence organisation requested that it be omitted.  It is suffice to say that 
misaligned government policy can have a serious impact on doctrine and doctrinal 
evolution.  So as to minimise this dissonance, it is important that the services and 
joint organisations within defence are incorporated into the process of developing 
policy; this does not always occur. 
 On operation, elected and embedded governments will occasionally 
provide strategic, tactical and operational guidance to defence organisations.  
Specifically, rules of engagement, limitations on weapons systems to be used and 
constraints placed on tactics, techniques and procedures are among the types of 
restrictions that governments will impose upon defence organisations.  As 
indicated in this research, these types of restrictions can place defence personnel 
at undue risk and at times undermine the capacity of the defence force to attain 
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mission objectives.  To overcome these issues, defence personnel and 
organisations must be consulted prior to limitations being imposed. 
 There are two primary instances where the allocation of resources by 
governments can undermine the capability of defence forces from achieving 
government intent.  First, a government may under fund a defence force, service 
or service component so that certain levels of capability as set out in government 
purchase orders cannot be meet.  If a government expects a defence force to fulfil 
certain roles, then that defence force must be appropriately funded.  If the said 
defence force is not funded to undertake certain tasks, it should not be expected to 
undertake those non-funded tasks.  Second, a government may under fund a 
defence force on operation.  Either the element or elements deployed (as defined 
by the level of funding) will be insufficient in capability to adequately fulfil the 
mission objective, or the element or elements deployed will have to be funded 
from existing defence budgets.  In both cases, personnel may be placed at undue 
risk and/or the government’s intent may not be realised. 
 
Future Research 
Martin van Creveld was quoted in the introduction of this thesis as saying that 
‘much has been written about Low Intensity Conflict – what it is and what it is not 
– but there is very little on how to fight one’.3  The introduction of this thesis 
went on to state that this research would begin to fill this void, which it has 
achieved.  However, there are numerous other areas of research in reference to 
LIC that need further analysis. 
 There are two research projects that are founded in this thesis that will be 
undertaken in the future.  First, the Expeditionary Civil Service concept will be 
further developed.  This development will include a comprehensive set of 
functions and responsibilities that such a service would be required to assume, as 
well as an analysis of the practicalities of state or coalition implementation of the 
service.  This development will initially focus on enabling the concept to be 
introduced into New Zealand and Australia’s governmental and defence force 
structures in a practical sense, so as to enable these countries to approach LIC in a 
more holistic and effective manner.  From this specific basis, guidelines for the 
implementation of the Expeditionary Civil Service concept would be prepared so 
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that the concept can be applied more generally by other states.  Second, joint force 
is an essential element in effective operations in LIC, yet few defence forces 
possess sufficient joint force capabilities.  However, the United Kingdom’s Royal 
Marines and the United States’ Marines are two defence forces that illustrate high 
joint force effectiveness.  Therefore, a further research project will be commenced 
that will analyse the reasons behind the high joint force effectiveness of the two 
aforementioned defence forces and will examine how other defence forces can 
replicate the joint force capabilities of these defence forces. 
 There are numerous other topics that require research that were identified 
in this thesis.  They include issues such as how emergent communications 
technology and armament systems can be exploited by counterinsurgents in LIC.  
There are also issues such as how embryonic conventional warfare doctrines and 
strategies will influence defence forces that are also required to operate in LIC.  It 
has been shown in this thesis that certain conventional warfare capabilities 
developed by a defence force can negatively influence that defence forces 
capability in counterinsurgency.  Hence all new developments in the art of war 
need to be examined in reference to the impact they will have on LIC. 
 
Summation 
The research has illustrated that the New Zealand and Australian Defence Forces 
are generally effective in counterinsurgency.  However, there are numerous areas 
where these defence forces could improve their respective counterinsurgency 
capability.  Both defence forces have analogous requirements for capability 
development, which in turn correlate with the core principles outlined in the 
research.  Principally, both defence forces must develop joint doctrine applicable 
to LIC.  Both defence forces must enhance command and control, intelligence and 
communications elements and processes, so as to ensure jointness and 
interoperability.  Finally, both defence forces and their governments must direct 
more resources into an institutionalised civil-military affairs capability. 
 The research has also summarised and analysed a large body of experience 
in LIC.  Collectively, this experience has illustrated that by adopting certain 
strategies a counterinsurgent can be successful in LIC.  Political adroitness is 
central to a successful counterinsurgency, as the population is the centre of gravity 
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in LIC.  As such, the counterinsurgent must fully comprehend the population.  As 
is indicated in Australian defence doctrine, political adroitness is an important 
factor in the ADF’s approach to counterinsurgency.  A similar awareness of the 
importance of the political nature of LIC has also been demonstrated in the 
NZDF, especially in terms of the Realisation Issues plan that was organised by 
Colonel Hayward, but this awareness has not yet been incorporated into formal 
doctrine.  The ultimate practical expression of political adroitness is the 
development of an organisation that can successfully integrate the civil and 
military tools of a counterinsurgent, such as the Expeditionary Civil Service.  
Such an organisation has two critical functions: (1) to integrate the 
counterinsurgent’s force elements, so as to ensure synergistic joint operations; and 
(2) earn the allegiance of the civil population.  This is because the population 
must support the counterinsurgent with intelligence, which in turn is critical in 
apprehending the insurgent.  The ADF and NZDF have demonstrated on operation 
that this process does work; a civil-military approach will gain the support of the 
population and consequently defeat the insurgent.  However, the ADF and NZDF 
have not created an organisation or structure to implement a civil-military 
approach in LIC.  Consequently, operations are planned and undertaken without 
the benefit of the experience gained on previous operations.  This is an 
unfortunate situation that should be rectified, as experience has demonstrated that 
an integrated and formalised civil-military approach is essential to a successful 
counterinsurgency. 
 Looking forward, a future that includes episodes of politically motivated 
violence can be assured.  Consequently and due to either strategic interest or 
humanitarian sentiment, New Zealand, Australia and much of the Western world 
will very likely be engaged in counterinsurgency operations in LIC.  For this 
reason, the principles outlined in this research must be taken seriously by the 
defence forces in question, and appropriate doctrinal and operational changes 
should be made. 
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1 Von Clausewitz, C.  1943, On War, trans. O. J. Mathias Jolles, Random House, New York. 
2 Confidential. 
3 Van Creveld, M.  2001, Defence of Israel, Rothberg International School, Hebrew University, 
Jerusalem. 
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